
WUKARI INTERNATIONAL STUDIES JOURNAL

VOLUME 8, ISSUE 9, DECEMBER 2024



WUKARI INTERNATIONAL STUDIES JOURNAL

VOLUME 8, ISSUE 9, DECEMBER 2024

Domiciled in the Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Federal University Wukari-Taraba State

ISSN: 2756-4649

Wukari International Studies Journal is an annual publication of Wukari International Studies Group (WISG), domiciled in the Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Federal University Wukari-Taraba State. WISG follows the double-blind peer review process. All manuscripts are reviewed by an editor and members of the Editorial Board or qualified outside reviewers. Decisions will be made as quickly as possible, and the WISG strives to return reviewers' comments to author (s) within 4 weeks for final corrections where necessary. Interested scholars are advised to contact the managing editor via wisjournal@gmail.com or/and 07037694253 for submission of papers for subsequent editions.

*Published materials under **Wukari International Studies Group** can be re-used without permission as long as proper citation to the original publication is given; peer-reviewed articles are freely available without subscription or price barriers; and articles are immediately released in open access format with no embargo period.*

Please be aware that certain content, including tables, figures, and text in articles, may come from other sources. In this situation, you should find out whether this content is reusable by contacting the original copyright holder (often the original publisher or writers). Our Journals are licensed as open access with CC BY 4.0 Attribution. This means authors retain full copyright of their publications.

EDITORIAL BOARD

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Professor Shishi Zhema	Department of History & Diplomatic Studies Federal University, Wukari, Taraba State

EDITORS

Prof. J.P. Dada	Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Federal University, Wukari
Prof. Sam O. Aghalino	Department of History, University of Ilorin
Dr. Victor Lukpata	Department of Political Science, Federal University, Wukari
Prof. Lemuel E. Odeh	Department of History, University of Ilorin
Prof. Usman Muhammed	Department of Political Science, Kaduna State University
Dr. Pally Ejime Agidi	Department of Political Science, University of Agbor
Dr. Christopher Ngara	National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies
Dr. Raji, Adesina Abdulfattah	Department of Political Science,Fountain University, Osogbo
Dr. Philip T.Vande	Department of Political Science,Federal University Lokoja

EDITORIAL SECRETARY

Dr. Ochoga Edwin Ochoga	Department of Political Science Federal University Lokoja

EDITORIAL ADVISORY GROUP

Prof. Pita Ogaba Agbese	Department of Political Science,University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, USA
Prof. Adagba Okpaga	Department of Political Science,Benue State University, Makurdi
Prof. Saliba James	Department of History, University Maidugari
Prof. Audu N. Sambo	Department of Political Science ,University of Jos
Prof. Yabuku A. Ochefu	Department of History,Benue State University, Makurdi
Prof. Sunday P. Bako	Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria
Prof. Barnes Anger	Department of Political Science, Benue State University, Makurdi
Prof. Moses E. Ochonu	Department of History, Vanderbilt University, Nashville Tennessee.
Associate Prof. Alio Mahaman	Department of History, Université Abdou Moumouni of Niamey, Republic of Niger

TABLE OF CONTENT

GENDER EQUALITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 1

THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: AN APPRAISAL 14

ANDREW BUYENGUM JACKSON NIGERIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY KADUNA, FANBI2005@YAHOO.COM 14

GAMBO NELSON NIGERIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY KADUNA, NELSON.GAMBO2022@NDA.EDU.NG 14

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC RELATIONS STRATEGIES IN LOKOJA AND ANKPA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS, KOGI STATE, NIGERIA 22

HISTORY AND CULTURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ADARA AND ZURU IN KADUNA AND KEBBI STATES FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO 2018 33

THE POLITICAL TREND IN CHINA – NIGERIA EXTERNAL TRADE RELATIONS, 1999 – 2021 42

LOCALITY AND STEREOTYPICAL CONCEPTS AS PREDICTORS OF VOTING ATTITUDES AMONG PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ADULT NIGERIAN EMPLOYEES 52

A STUDY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN NIGERIA: A LESSON OF EUROPEAN

INTERNET BANKING AND ADOPTION OF STUDENTS: A CASE OF NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, MAIDUGURI STUDY CENTRE 74

HERITAGE LANGUAGE USE AND ATTITUDE AMONG EFIK MIGRANTS IN LAGOS STATE, NIGERIA 88

SPATIO-TEMPORAL CHANGES IN LAND USE/LAND COVER DYNAMICS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE AREA OF OGUN STATE, NIGERIA 110

CONFLICTS AND SECURITY INTERVENTION IN ARMED CONFLICT IN BENUE STATE 130

FROM COLD WAR DYNAMICS TO CONTEMPORARY COMPLEXITIES: UNRAVELING THE GEO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICA AND RUSSIA RELATIONS 140

IMPACT OF HOUSING QUALITY ON THE HEALTH STATUS OF RESIDENTS OF ONA-ARA LOCAL GOVERNMENT OYO STATE: APPLICATION OF BODY MASS INDEX 150

N-POWER PROGRAMME AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN ONDO STATE: 2016-

SPORTS BETTING AS A MAJOR GAMING IN THE CONTEMPORARY GAMBLING INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA: EXAMPLE OF WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF TARABA STATE 175

AN ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT ZONES IN CONTEMPORARY NIGERIA: A TAPESTRY OF TENSIONS 185

THE TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNAL CRISIS IN AKOKO NORTH-EAST, ONDO STATE, NIGERIA 194

THE PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL MIGRATION OF THE IGBO TO EQUATORIAL GUINEA 211

GENDER EQUALITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

KAZEEM ADEREMI ASIYANBI, PHD
FEDERAL COLLEGE OF EDUCATION (SPECIAL), OYO.
asiyanbi.kazeem943@fceoyo.edu.ng,
ORCID: 0000-0003-4732-315X

AHMED YUSUF BABATUNDE
POST GRADUATE STUDENT, UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN,
ahmedyousouph@gmail.com

ADENIYI MICHAEL ADEWUSI
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, FEDERAL COLLEGE OF EDUCATION (SPECIAL), OYO.
adewusi.adeniyi2467@fcesoyo.edu.ng

KEYWORDS
Civil Society, Gender Equality, Economic Development, Nigeria

ABSTRACT
Gender equality is widely acknowledged as a key driver of economic growth and social advancement. However, in Nigeria, severe gender inequities exist, limiting women's access to school, healthcare, economic opportunities, and political representation. These disparities jeopardize human rights and limit the country's capacity for long-term growth. Civil society groups (CSOs) have emerged as critical players in tackling these issues, pushing for gender parity, empowering women, and holding legislators responsible for enacting inclusive policies. This study investigates the role of civil society in promoting gender equality and economic development in Nigeria. It examines the techniques used by CSOs, assesses their impact on policy reforms and public attitudes, and analyzes the hurdles to accomplishing their goals. This study emphasized the literature rather than the major concerned respondents that have been the focus of previous researchers. Using a systematic literature review, the research synthesizes existing studies on gender equality, economic development, and the contributions of CSOs to identifying gaps based on various authors' submissions on gender parity, trends, and best practices. The findings emphasize the necessity of collaboration among the government, civil society, and other stakeholders in building a more equal and prosperous Nigeria.

Introduction

Globally, the role of civil society in advancing gender equality and economic development has been well-documented, Edwards (2004) argued that civic society creates an equitable society. International experiences demonstrate that civil society can advocate for women's rights, facilitate access to economic opportunities, and challenge patriarchal norms that hinder gender equality (Molyneux (2008).

In Nigeria, as in other democracies, civil society has been instrumental in driving social change and economic progress (Utsaha, 2014; Ibrahim and Ibeanu, 2014). Despite the country's vast resources, Nigeria faces profound challenges, including pervasive poverty, gender inequality, and systemic corruption. Civil society organizations (CSOs) have emerged as pivotal actors in addressing these issues, advocating for policy reforms, and implementing grassroots initiatives aimed at improving socio-economic conditions. Ibrahim and Ibeanu (2014) argued that civil societies are crucial in bridging the gap between the government and the populace, ensuring that the voices of the marginalized are heard and acted upon.

The role of civil society in modern political systems has accumulated significant attention in recent scholarly discourse. Generally, civil society represents one of the essential institutions that facilitate communication between citizens and policymakers (Williamson and Rodd, 2016). Edward (2021) Submits that a robust civil society is essential for a well-functioning and dynamic modern society, as it complements governmental policy formulation cum implementation and positive stimulation of market forces, ensuring a balance of power and a thriving participatory democracy as well as economic growth. As a multifaceted concept, civic society has attracted varying interpretations that reflect its complex role in modern democracies. By the way of description and identification of roles expected of civil society organizations, Scholte (2002) identified that civil society encompasses a vast array of non-governmental organizations, community groups, and advocacy networks critical to connect the government and the general public. This is an indication that civil society plays a crucial role in bridging the gaps between the government and the public, enhancing participatory democracy, and ensuring that diverse voices are heard in the policy-making process. Conversely, Gramsci (2004) presents a more critical view of civil society, by submitting that the organization can be used or manipulated by the state for unpopular policy implementation or better put an appendage of the state. In buttressing the above submission, Gramsci further analyzes civil society as a sphere where the ruling class exercises hegemony, using cultural and ideological means to maintain control over the populace. This perspective suggests that civil society can be co-opted by the state or dominant social forces to reinforce existing power structures and legitimize the status quo, rather than challenging or transforming them.

Both perspectives are essential for a comprehensive understanding of civil society as they both offer a distinct analysis of the roles and impacts of civil society in different political and social contexts. From both views, it is observed that civil society is distinct from the state but closer to it as a cooperating partner that operates within the state in the advancement of civil liberties and voluntary services to the community (Chambers and Kopstein, 2008). Its importance lies in promoting democratic values, fostering economic development, and ensuring social justice. A well-structured civil society enhances participatory democracy by empowering citizens to engage in governance processes and hold public officials accountable. Moreover, it plays a vital role in advocating for marginalized groups, thus promoting gender equality and inclusive development (Aiyede, 2001).

Many literatures have discussed the role of civil society in ensuring gender equality and economic development in Nigeria. However, none has focused on the gap between theoretical discussions and practical outcomes which this study is all out for.

Statement of the Problem

Despite global efforts to promote gender equality as a critical component of sustainable development, Nigeria continues to experience persistent gender gaps that impede economic growth and fair development. Structural impediments, cultural norms, and systematic gender prejudices impede women's access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunities, perpetuating cycles of poverty and inequality. This inequality not only harms human rights but also limits the country's capacity to reach its full economic potential. The persistent gender gap in Nigeria raises critical

questions about the effectiveness of CSOs in addressing these issues and fostering inclusive economic development. This gap is expected to be breached by focusing on various identified authors' submissions on gender parity, trends, and best practices.

Conceptual Review of Relevant Literature

The study is based on three thematic main concepts of the research, which include civic society, gender equality, and economic development. In this section, these concepts are presented, along with definitions cum relevant literature.

Civil Society

Different writers have explored the complexity of the concept of civil society, showing different dimensions of the concept. For example, Kukah (1999) posited that a flurry of the definitions of the concept, no matter their impressions, should not be seen as evidence of the weakness of the concept. Rather, it should be seen as evidence of the international interest and the vitality of the concept. Civil society exists in virtually all countries of the world and this makes its definitions vary from one region to another (Omodia and Erunke, 2007). It comprises voluntary assemblies and organizations that function as a critical component of modern democratic systems, acting as pressure groups that promote justice and social order. Hence, civil society manifests through societal interactions between individuals and the government, reflecting values of cooperation, self-help organizations, and networks of public activities (Adibe, 2015). Chambers and Kopstein (2008) submit that civil society is a realm of association and activity that can operate independently of, in opposition to, in support of, in dialogue with, in partnership with, or beyond the state. This submission underscores the multifaceted nature of civil society, highlighting its ability to coordinate, contradict, or mediate based on varying interests and issues. Civil society serves as an agent or tool for enhancing democratic governance, often working closely with governments, particularly in democratic states. Civil society flourishes more in democratic contexts than in authoritarian regimes, highlighting its association with democratic governance.

For the current study, civil society is defined as a diverse network of voluntary, non-governmental organizations and associations that operate independently from the state in line with the various above descriptions. These entities advocate for gender equality and facilitate economic development through varied interactions with the state, including support, opposition, dialogue, and partnership.

Gender Equality

Gender equality is difficult to define due to cultural and societal variations, structural inequality, and intersectionality. However, gender equality is a concept that ensures that all individuals, regardless of their gender, have equal rights, opportunities, and treatment in all spheres of life (Sen, 1990). This includes areas such as education, employment, political participation, healthcare, and social interactions. At its core, gender equality aims to eliminate discrimination and bias based on gender, promoting fairness and equity for people of all genders. It highlights the principle of equality in implementing gender-related policies within the state framework. The study asserts that equitable treatment of men and women is imperative for societal advancement, as any form of discrimination based on sex hampers societal progress. In addition to these perspectives, other scholarly definitions of gender equality shed further light on its multifaceted nature.

The current study sees gender equality as the state where individuals of all genders have equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities across all sectors of society. It also substantive equality in practice, addressing systemic and structural barriers that perpetuate gender disparities.

Economic Development

Development is a highly debated concept in the social sciences, with varying perspectives from scholars of Western backgrounds and those from third-world societies. Traditionally, it is understood that economic growth differs from economic development. While economic growth refers to an increase in a country's gross domestic product (GDP), economic development encompasses economic growth alongside other positive changes within society. This is evident in the incorporation of the Human Development Index (HDI) by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as an indicator for

measuring development since 1990. Economic development is often described as a gauge of human welfare within a society, extending beyond mere economic growth to encompass transformative changes in living conditions, essential for maximizing productivity. Indicators of economic development include income measures such as GDP, gross national product (GNP), and gross national income (GNI), as well as non-income measures like the HDI. Unemployment, poverty, and inequality are mutually reinforcing, with unemployment leading to poverty and widening the gap between the affluent and the impoverished. Creating more job opportunities holds the potential to gradually alleviate poverty and inequality.

For the current study, economic development is understood as a process encompassing not only the growth of a nation's economy, as measured by indicators such as GDP, but also broader societal changes aimed at improving the well-being and quality of life of its citizens.

Methodology

Due to the nature of the research work and the scanty number of authors that have written on the subject matter, the researcher decided to use the purposive sampling technique which allows for the selection of a limited number from the available population. A process of gradual screening was followed and twenty-five authors were selected purposively. All the data, evidence, and information about civil societies' roles in promoting gender equality and economic development were searched on different databases such as Google Scholar, Web of Science, PubMed, and Microsoft Academic. This selection method aligns with the PRISMA method of systematic literature review that assumes that a single database is likely not to contain all relevant references (Moher et al., 2015).

The search on those databases was made with the following expressions: "grassroots movements" AND "gender mainstreaming" AND "sustainable livelihoods"; "advocacy groups" AND "anti-discrimination" AND "entrepreneurship"; "social enterprises" AND "women's cooperatives" AND "financial inclusion"; "capacity building" AND "women leaders" AND "policy influence"; "awareness campaigns" AND "gender stereotypes" AND "workforce participation"; "legal literacy" AND "property rights" AND "business development"; "collective action" AND "social norms" AND "economic transformation" and many more. The search expressions were made to capture the numerous ways in which civil society organisations and initiatives promote gender equality and economic development in Nigeria. Following an examination of the identified papers' abstracts, both theoretical and empirical studies were discovered. A substantial number of publications were retrieved. At the initial stage, about 53 publications were retrieved.

Inclusion Criteria

These criteria include language, demographics, nature of research, and year of publication.

Method of Analysis

The content analysis is chosen to analyze the data gathered from the search process. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) argued "that qualitative content analysis can be fruitfully used to examine virtually any kind of communication materials, including narratives responses, open-ended survey questions, interviews, focus groups, observations and print media such as articles, books or manuals." This method of data analysis is highly flexible, (Boyatzis, 1998) it also enables the researchers to evaluate the language used in the selected publications and make inferences about the messages in the publications. According to Krippendorff, (2004), content analysis is a methodological tool that could be "considered valid to the extent that it captures what it sets out to capture."

Results

This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first part presents the nature of publications, the historical series of selected papers, and the resulting documents. The second part presents the results by the main themes embraced in the research objectives.

Nature of Publications

The nature of publications encompasses the types and characteristics of written works, including academic journals, books, conference papers, and reports. These publications serve as mediums for disseminating research findings, theoretical advancements, and practical applications across various fields of study. For

this study, academic journals, reports from international organizations, and publications from civil society organizations were selected.

The analysis which categorizes the selected publications by their nature, reveals a diverse array of sources used for the study. This includes academic journals, which provide peer-reviewed and rigorous research findings. Reports from international organizations, such as the International Labour Office, offer authoritative and globally recognized data and insights. Publications from civil society organizations contribute perspectives rooted in grassroots experiences and advocacy efforts. The combination of these sources ensures a comprehensive and balanced view, integrating scholarly rigor, authoritative data, and practical, on-the-ground insights. This diversity enhances the study's credibility and depth, allowing for a well-rounded analysis of the role of civic society in gender equality and economic development in Nigeria.

The historical series of selected papers shows fluctuations over the years, with a peak in 2016 (5 papers) and a dip in 2020 (2 papers). Overall, the numbers suggest variability in the selection process or research output, without a clear increasing or decreasing trend.

Table 1 below shows the references and the focus of the selected papers.

Table 1: Resulting Documents

S/N	Reference(s)	Focus
1.	Lafenwa (2016)	Civil society and anti-corruption in Nigeria.
2.	Abdullahi and Gana (2017)	Civil society and good governance in Nigeria.
3.	Tonye and Oarhe (2015)	Civil society and corruption management in Nigeria.
4.	Martin and Amos (2021)	Civil society and accountable governance in Nigeria.
5.	Oke and Atufe (2021)	Civil society organizations and democratic tenets in Nigeria.
6.	Bernhard, Hicken, Reenock, and Lindberg (2015).	Civil society and democratic sustainability in Nigeria
7.	Egbosa (2016)	Civil society and regulation of the extractive industry in Nigeria.
8.	Akinyetun, Erubami, Salau, Bakare and Ahoton (2021)	Civil society and social inclusion in Nigeria.
9.	Christopher (2020)	Civil society and Nigeria's Covid-19 response.
10.	Essien (2020)	Civil society, social inclusion and sustainable development in Nigeria.
11.	Monica (2019)	Civil society, women political participation and economic development in Nigeria.

12.	Oboh, Andrew, Zarina and Sofian (2019)	Gender inequality and economic development in Nigeria.
13.	National Bureau of Statistics (2016)	Reports on Men and Women in Nigeria.
14.	NGO Coalition Shadow Report (2017)	Periodic Report of Nigeria on Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
15.	Oloni (2015)	Gender inequality and employment in Nigeria.
16.	Ette (2017)	Gender equality in Nigeria.
17.	International Labour Office (2018)	Gender and employment.
18.	Chukwuemeka, Ezeodili and Aduma (2018)	Development and civil society.
19.	Chukwuemeka (2016)	Women development.
20.	Emmanuel, Deeker and Doreen (2021)	Civil society and socio-economic development.
21.	Samuel (2015)	NGOs and development.
22.	Williamson and Rodd (2016)	Civil society advocacy and democratic norms.
23.	Federal Inland Revenue Service (2018)	Tax obligations of NGOs
24.	ICNL (2018)	Factsheet on NGOs
25.	Fidelis (2019)	Civil society and democratic process in Nigeria.

Source: *Researcher*

Data Presentation and Analysis

From the review process, the researchers discovered specific code trees for each of the themes. This made it easier for the researchers to present the results using ten code trees for each of the themes. As shown in section 1, there are three objectives of the study, which are; (i) to investigate how civil society promotes gender equality and economic development in Nigeria (ii) to identify the challenges that civil society organizations face in their efforts to promote gender equality and economic development in Nigeria (iii) and to pinpoint the best practices and successful strategies to improve civil societies' roles in promoting gender equality and economic development in Nigeria. Therefore, each research objective has a series of questions that are presented below in code trees. The essence is to numerically present the results of the systemic review.

Research Objective One

Objective 1: To investigate how civil society promotes gender equality and economic development in Nigeria.

In determining the role civil society played in promoting gender equality and economic development in Nigeria, the researchers used

ten code trees found in the selected literature. These results from the systemic review as presented below in the code tree.

Code Tree

Table 2: Popular roles of Civil Society in promoting gender equality and economic development in Nigeria

Codes	Count				
	Pivotal Role	**Significant Involvement**	**Moderate Involvement**	**Minimal Involvement**	**Total**
Advocacy for gender-inclusive policies	3	5	8	9	25
Community mobilization to challenge stereotypes and ensure women's empowerment.	12	6	4	3	25
Capacity building through provision of training and support for women and girls to participate in the economy.	9	7	4	5	25
Research and data collection on gender disparities and economic development	3	4	7	11	25
Provide access to resources	5	6	6	6	25
Gender-sensitive services	1	2	9	13	25
Promotion of women's political participation	11	8	4	2	25
Awareness raising about economic development	10	7	5	3	25
Monitoring and accountability	8	7	6	4	25
Networking and collaboration	7	7	7	4	25

Source: *Researcher*

By looking at the code counts from the review, it can be said that the roles of civil society in promoting gender equality and economic development in Nigeria are multifaceted and vary significantly across different initiatives and contexts. The analysis of code counts from literature reveals diverse levels of involvement in various activities, as documented by various authors. It is revealed that civil society organizations (CSOs) play a minimal role in advocating for gender-inclusive policies. However, several studies indicated that civil society plays a significant and pivotal role in the promotion of gender equality and economic development. For example, Lafenwa (2016) highlights the importance of policy advocacy in

fostering an environment where women can thrive economically. This is echoed by Abdullahi and Gana (2017), who discuss the effectiveness of CSOs in influencing policy changes that support gender equality.

Given the code counts in the second data set, it is safe to say that civil societies in Nigeria are greatly involved in communication mobilization as the results showed significant involvement. For example, Tonye and Oarhe (2015) provide examples of how local organizations have mobilized communities to challenge stereotypes and empower women in their study. Martin and Amos (2021) further elaborate on community-driven initiatives that have led to increased participation of women in local governance and economic activities in Nigeria. In terms of capacity building, civil society's role is indispensable as indicated in the data set. Oke and Atufe (2021) discuss various training programs aimed at enhancing the economic participation of women and girls. Some popular training programs organized by civil society in Nigeria include the Women's Rights Advancement and Protection Alternative (WRAPA), Women's Consortium of Nigeria (WOCON), Girls' Power Initiative (GPI), and many more. Also, Bernhard et al. (2015) opined that training programs by civil society organisations in Nigeria have helped to bridge gender gaps in economic participation.

The fourth data set shows a minimal involvement of civil society organisations in research and data collection on gender disparities. Some of the studies that discussed the essential roles of civil society in research and development include Egbosa (2016) and Akinyetun et al. (2021). For example, Egbosa (2016) depicts how civil society utilises data to inform advocacy and policy-making process in Nigeria. Providing access to resources is another area where civil society has made notable contributions. Christopher (2020) discusses the role of CSOs in facilitating women's access to financial resources and business opportunities. Essien (2020) adds that resource provision is critical in enabling women to overcome economic barriers. While the provision of gender-sensitive services has been highlighted by Monica (2019), it is revealed that most of the literature reviewed did not give optimal attention to how gender-sensitive services can help mitigate the effects of gender-based violence and discrimination (Oboh et al. 2019). The rest of the data sets show significant involvement of civil society in political participation promotion, awareness raising, monitoring, accountability, and networking (Oloni, 2015; Ette, 2017; Chukwuemeka, 2016).

Research Objective Two

Objective 2: To identify the challenges that civil society organizations face in their efforts to promote gender equality and economic development in Nigeria

To achieve this objective, the researchers used ten codes trees found in the selected literatures to discuss the challenges faced by civil society organizations in Nigeria.

Code Tree

Table 3: Common challenges that civil society organizations face in their efforts to promote gender equality and economic development in Nigeria

Codes	Count			
	Major challenge	**Moderate challenge**	**Not a challenge**	**Total**
Inadequate funding	21	2	1	25
Cultural norms	6	14	5	25
Government patronage	18	5	2	25

Socioeconomic inequalities	15	6	4	25
Lack of state support	9	11	5	25
Lack of unity	8	10	7	25
Limited capacity	8	13	4	25
Ethnic and religious divisions	14	7	4	25
Environmental challenges	8	15	2	25
Lack of access to information	6	12	7	25

Source: *Researcher*

From the code counts, it can be seen that the major challenges identified in the literature reviewed include inadequate funding, government patronage, socioeconomic inequalities, and ethnic and religious divisions. In his study, Lafenwa (2016) found that many civil society organizations struggle to sustain their activities due to limited financial resources. This sentiment is shared by Abdullahi and Gana (2017) who both noted that insufficient funding hampers the ability to implement large-scale initiatives. Also, the literature indicated that government patronage and political interference are critical issues. Oke and Atufe (2021) explained that reliance on government support undermines the independence and effectiveness of CSOs in Nigeria. This may have explained why Bernhard et al. (2015) pointed out that favoritism and patronage skew the focus of initiatives away from genuine gender equality goals. From the code counts, moderate challenges include cultural norms (Tonye and Oarche, 2015; Martin and Amos, 2021), lack of state support, lack of unity (Egbosa, 2016; Akinyetun et al. 2021; Christopher, 2020), limited capacity and environmental challenges (Coalition Shadow Report, 2017; Emmanuel et al. 2021; Ette, 2017). These challenges illustrate the complex environment in which CSOs operate, highlighting the need for comprehensive strategies to overcome these obstacles and promote gender equality and economic development in Nigeria.

Research Objective Three

Objective 3: To pinpoint the best practices and successful strategies to improve civil societies' roles in promoting gender equality and economic development in Nigeria.

To achieve this objective, the researchers used ten codes trees found in the selected literatures to pinpoint the recommendations made in the literature reviewed.

Code tree

Table 4: Recommendations to improve civil societies' roles in promoting gender equality and economic development in Nigeria

Codes	Count		
	Highly Recommended	Not Recommended	Total
CSOs funding	21	4	25
Effective public policy	14	11	25
Creation of enabling environment for CSOs	16	9	25
CSOs national trust fund	8	17	25
Behavioural modification	19	6	25
CSOs collaboration with NGOs	22	3	25
Improve sustainability	17	8	25
CSOs collaboration with donor organizations	21	4	25
Social change initiatives	18	7	25
Capacity building and technical assistance	14	11	25

Source: *Researcher*

The code counts in Table 3 above showed the recommendations in the literature reviewed. Most of the literature stressed the importance of diversified funding sources for CSOs to ensure sustainability (Lafenwa, 2016). This implies that establishing stable funding mechanisms to reduce dependence on sporadic donations can help to improve the role of civil society organizations in the promotion of gender equality and economic development in Nigeria (Abdullahi and Gana, 2017). Most of the literature indicated that social change initiatives, CSOs collaboration with donor organizations, improving sustainability and behavioural modification is essential (Oboh et al. 2019; Monica, 2019; Akinyetun et al. 2019). However, capacity building and technical assistance, CSO national trust fund, and effective public policy are not highly recommended (Martin and Amos, 2021; Oke and Atufe, 2021). From the above results, it can be concluded that by addressing funding, collaboration, sustainability, and capacity-building issues, CSOs can significantly improve their impact and be able to promote gender equality and economic development in Nigeria.

Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations

The analysis highlights several persistent challenges faced by civil society organizations (CSOs) in Nigeria, including inadequate funding, government patronage, and socioeconomic inequalities. Despite the diverse roles CSOs play in promoting gender equality and economic development, these challenges undermine their effectiveness. The findings also reveal that civil societies face moderate challenges related to cultural norms, limited capacity, and environmental factors. Furthermore, while there

are numerous recommendations to enhance the impact of CSOs, the effectiveness of these strategies often depends on the broader socio-political environment. It is in this light that this study recommends that the Nigerian government create a more supportive environment for CSOs by engaging in open dialogues and actively incorporating their perspectives into policy-making. This can be achieved through regular consultative forums and collaborative platforms where CSOs can voice their concerns and contribute to national policies on gender equality and economic development. The government can establish a national trust fund dedicated to supporting CSOs working on gender equality and economic development. This fund can provide grants and subsidies to CSOs, ensuring a steady flow of financial resources necessary for their operations. Studies have shown that stable funding mechanisms enhance the sustainability and impact of CSOs (Lafenwa, 2016). Implementing legal protections for CSOs is essential to safeguard their independence and effectiveness. The government should enforce laws that prevent political interference and ensure a transparent regulatory framework for CSOs. Effective legal frameworks can protect CSOs from undue political pressure and enable them to operate freely and advocate effectively for gender equality and economic development. While capacity building was not highly recommended in some studies, it remains critical for the long-term sustainability of CSOs. The government can partner with international organizations to provide technical assistance and training programs that enhance the operational capabilities of CSOs. Such programs can focus on strategic planning, financial management, advocacy skills, and monitoring and evaluation techniques, ensuring that CSOs are better equipped to achieve their objectives.

Given to the limitations embedded in this study, it is recommended that future research should focus on the longitudinal impact of CSO interventions on gender equality and economic development. Research should also examine the intersectionality of gender with other social factors, such as ethnicity and class, to better understand the diverse experiences of Nigerian women. Finally, investigating the partnerships between CSOs, government, and private sectors could highlight best practices for collaborative efforts in promoting gender equality and economic development.

References

Abdullahi, M., & Gana, S. (2017). The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Gender Equality in Nigeria. *Journal of Gender Studies*, 12(2), 45-59.

Adibe, J. (2015). Civil Society and Democratic Development in Nigeria. *Nigerian Political Science Review*, 17(2), 89-102.

Aiyede, E. R. (2001). The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Gender Equality and Economic Development. *Journal of Development Studies*, 37(1), 23-41.

Akinyetun, T. S., Erubami, M., Salau, H. A., Bakare, B. E., & Ahoton, L. A (2021). Civil Society and Economic Development in Nigeria. *Journal of Development Studies*, 37(1), 75-93.

Bernhard, M., Hicken, A., Reenock, C., & Lindberg, S. I. (2015). Institutional Subsystems and the Survival of Democracy: Do Political and Civil Society Matter? *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(2), 228-266. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2613824

Boyatzis, R. E. (1998). *Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code Development*. *SAGE Publications*.

Bratton, M. (1994). Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa. *Institute for Development Studies Bulletin*, 25(2), 7-19.

Chambers, S., & Kopstein, J. (2008). Civil Society and the State. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11, 363-386.

Christopher, T. (2020). Civil Society and Women's Empowerment in Nigeria. *International Journal of Gender Studies*, 14(3), 89-105.

Chukwuemeka, E. E. O. (2016). The Impact of Civil Society on Economic Development in Nigeria. *Nigerian Journal of Social Sciences*, 10(2), 50-67.

Chukwuemeka, E. E. O., Ezeodili, S. O., & Aduma, P. (2018). Civil Society Organizations and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria.

African Journal of Political Science, 13(1), 123-141.

Crenshaw, Kimberle. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color." *Stanford Law Review*, vol. 43, no. 6, 1991, pp. 1241–99. *JSTOR*,

https://doi.org/10.2307/1229039. Accessed 24 Nov. 2024.

Denyer, D., & Tranfield, D. (2009). *Producing a Systematic Review*. In D. A. Buchanan & A. Bryman (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Research Methods* (pp. 671-689). *SAGE Publications*.

Edwards, M. (2004). *Civil Society*. *Polity*.

Egbosa, P. (2016). Civil Society and Gender Mainstreaming in Nigeria. *African Journal of Gender and Development*, 5(2), 112-127.

Emmanuel, I., Deeker, A., & Doreen, T. (2021). Advocacy for Gender Equality by Civil Society Organizations in Nigeria. *Gender and Society*, 35(1), 98-115.

Essien, M. (2020). Economic Development and Civil Society in Nigeria. *Journal of Economic Policy and Development*, 23(2), 134-151.

Ette, E. (2017). Civil Society and Governance in Nigeria. *International Journal of Politics and Governance*, 19(3), 210-225.

Federal Inland Revenue Service. (2018). Annual Report. *Federal Inland Revenue Service*.

Fidelis, U. (2019). Civil Society, Gender Equality, and Economic Development in Nigeria. *African Review of Economics and Finance*, 11(1), 88-104.

Gramsci, A. (2004*). Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. (Q. Hoare & G. Nowell Smith, Eds. & Trans.). *Lawrence & Wishart*.

Hsieh, H. F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis. *Qualitative Health Research*, 15(9), 1277-1288.

Ibrahim, J., & Ibeanu, O. (2014). *The Nigerian Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation*. Nigerian Political Science Association.

Ikelegbe, A. (2013). Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Ramifications of Civil Society for a Regional Resource Struggle. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41(1), 117-138.

International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL). (2018). *Civil Society Regulation in Nigeria*. *ICNL Publications*.

International Labour Office. (2018). Women at Work: Trends 2018. *International Labour Office*.

Kabeer, N. (2005). Gender equality and women's empowerment: A critical analysis of the third Millennium Development Goal. *Gender & Development*, 13(1), 13-24.

Kay, K. J. (2008). Gender equality in the workplace: A literature review. *Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship Commission*.

Krippendorff, K. (2004). *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (2nd ed.). *SAGE Publications*.

Kukah, M. H (1999) *Democracy and Civil Society in Nigeria*. Lagos: Spectrum Books. p43.

Lafenwa, S. A. (2016). Civil Society and Democratic Development in Nigeria. *Nigerian Journal of Political Science*, 18(1), 75-94.

Martin, A., & Amos, E. (2021). The Influence of Civil Society Organizations on Gender Equality in Nigeria. *Gender and Development Studies*, 29(3), 301-319.

Moher, D., Liberati, A., Tetzlaff, J., & Altman, D. G., (2015) The PRISMA Group. Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement. *PLoS Medicine*, 6(7), e1000097.

Molyneux, M. (2008). *Women's Movements in International Perspective: Latin America and Beyond*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Monica, N. (2019). The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Inclusive Economic Development in Nigeria. *Journal of*

Economic and Social Studies, 15(4), 205-220.

National Bureau of Statistics. (20s16). Nigerian Socio-Economic Indicators. *National Bureau of Statistics*.

NGO Coalition Shadow Report. (2017). Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Nigeria. *NGO Coalition*.

Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room. (2015). Election Fact Book. *Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre*.

Oboh, A. E., Andrew, I., Zarina, R., & Sofian, S. (2019). Civil Society Organizations and Sustainable Development Goals in Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 12(2), 178-195.

Oke, A., & Atufe, A. (2021). Civil Society Engagement in Promoting Gender Equality in Nigeria. *Nigerian Journal of Social Research*, 21(3), 255-273.

Oloni, E. (2015). The Impact of Civil Society on Economic Development: A Case Study of Nigeria. *Development Policy Review*, 33(4), 567-582.

Omodia, S. M., & Erunke, C. E. (2007). Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. *Journal of Social Sciences*, 14(3), 205-211.

Samuel, A. (2015). Civil Society and Political Change in Nigeria. *Journal of Democracy Studies*, 8(1), 88-106.

Scholte, J. A. (2002). Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance. *Global Governance*, 8(3), 281-304.

Sen, A. (1990). *Gender and cooperative conflicts*. In Tinker, I. (Ed.), Persistent inequalities: Women and world development (pp. 70-83). Oxford University Press.

Todaro, M. P., & Smith, S. C. (2009). *Economic Development* (11th ed.). *Addison-Wesley*.

Tonye, R., & Oarhe, O. (2015). Civil Society and the Challenge of Gender Equality in Nigeria. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 33(1), 49-67.

Utsaha, R. (2014). The Impact of Civil Society Organizations on Economic Development in Nigeria. *Economic Development Quarterly*, 28(4), 362-379.

Williamson, A., & Rodd, H. (2016). Civil Society and Governance. *Governance Studies*, 45(2), 177-195.

THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: AN APPRAISAL

ANDREW BUYENGUM JACKSON
NIGERIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY KADUNA,
fanbi2005@yahoo.com

GAMBO NELSON
NIGERIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY KADUNA,
nelson.gambo2022@nda.edu.ng

KEYWORDS
military rule, democratic governance, incompatibles, The Gambia, AFPRC/APRC

ABSTRACT
Prior to the Nuremberg trial, war crimes of international magnitude were tried on the state actors. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 which would have brought nation-states to order failed as the result of retribution from the great powers. Closely, the Lieber code of 1863, customary international law, and Briand Kellog pact of 1928 provided a very good playground for international peace and order and it was on this basis that the Nuremberg trial took its shape fostered by Henry Dunant's book; A Memory of Solferino in 1864. The book codifies international humanitarian law and is a reference for the codes of the military tribunal at Nuremberg for the trial of the Nazi leaders for war crimes against humanity after the Second World War. The paper delves into the study of the Nuremberg trial and its contribution to the development of international humanitarian law at the Geneva Convention. An analytical approach was used as methodology and written sources were consulted. The findings reveal that the trial enhanced the codification of international humanitarian law by holding responsible individual's crime under the law in the 1949 Geneva Convention article, the formation of the International Criminal Court, and the Right to Protect. However, the trial was criticized for ethnic cleansing and partiality against the German race. The post-Nuremberg trials of individuals under international humanitarian law provided a new order not only for the law of war but also for medical experimentation and Human Rights which will contribute to the burgeoning literature on International Humanitarian Law and the law of war.

Introduction

The precedence of the codification of the international Humanitarian Law (IHL) revolves around customs, psycho-social, and integrity which are knitted on the interest of one state to another. The aforementioned elements of societal relations had had effect on the conduct of human and state relations which have been developed over time, these were the basics for which IHL was developed.

International Humanitarian Law and International law itself cannot be talked about without the mention of Hugo Grotus also known as the father of international law but before then, in the pre-Grotus era, international humanitarian law or international law existed with no codification. The Greeks make great contributions towards peaceful relationships among city-states taking into consideration for acknowledgment of the rules of warfare, diplomacy, and considerable use of arbitration. With the emergence of the Romans, the great genius for governance and administration in the Middle Ages with the formulation of the principle of the *jus gentium* meaning *people's law* used it to exert their influence on their territories and to maintain proportionality among city-states in both war and peacetime.

In 1625, Hugo Grotus published a work titled; de jure belli ac pacis; on the law of war and peace. The work highlighted four main areas namely: states are responsible for the regulation of lives of individuals and violating them is a punishable crime, formation of law of peace is the foundation of his work, punishment of a state by other states for violation of law, and acceptance of natural law or right reason as the primary determining rules (Palmer and Perkins 2015).

With codification in the late 18th and 19th centuries, international humanitarian law saw a new paradigm shift in the international space precisely in the 1860s. The modern international humanitarian law took its shape in a book written by Henry Dunant titled: A Memory of Solferino in 1864. Dunant wrote this book witnessing a bloody war between French and Austrian Armies in 1863 where about 38,000 people were killed or wounded in 15 hours. In this devastating war, no doctor, nurse, medical, auxiliary personnel, or stretcher bearer, was beyond the attack of the enemy. Dunant, based on his experience during the war, made two proposals, first that: a) each state should establish in time of peace a relief society to aid the army medical services in times of war, and: b) states should conclude a treaty that would facilitate the activities of these relief societies and guarantee a better treatment of the wounded (Geneva Convention 1949).

Concerted efforts were made in the international arena by states even prior to the documentation of international humanitarian law by Henry Dunant to help curb the miseries of war at the global order some of which were the Westphalia treaty of 1648, the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the subsequent; Hague convention of 1899 and 1907, Versailles treaty of 1919, permanent court of international justice of 1922 from League covenant, Montevideo convention of 1933 and others could not absolutely defined, try, punished war crime and relief humanitarian needs in war. At the end of the First World War, great powers nearly produced the blueprint for the protection of international humanitarian law both in peace and wartime, effort to subsume them under a broader category of offence against the peace and security of mankind. Brian Kellogg pact or the Paris Pact states that the state should not use war to resolve disputes among nations (Article 1 of the pact provided that) “the high parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective people that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relationship with one another”.

However, the Nuremberg trial became a revolution in the eyes of international law because it changed the historic judgment of war crimes of such international magnitude. Before the Nuremberg trial, states bear the cost of war charges and prosecution in the international humanitarian law but after the Second World War, allied powers by the London agreement set up a tribunal to try the Nazi leaders for war crimes against humanity at Nuremberg Germany in 1945 which set in a new order in the international humanitarian law. However, the Lieber Conference and Customary International Law had tried to codify laws involving individual responsibility and their trial on the international stage.

There is a burgeoning literature on International Humanitarian Law and the law of war. These works were mostly centered on the development of IHL, the Nuremberg trial, and the military tribunal, the development of medical codes for experimentation and

research, challenges of IHL, and the law of war thereby neglecting the relevance of the Nuremberg trial to the development of International Humanitarian Law, the gap which this paper set to narrow.

The Nuremberg Trial

Nuremberg, a series of trials held in Nuremberg, Germany, in 1945 through 1947, in which former Nazi leaders were indicted and tried as war criminals by the International Military Tribunal. After World War II the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials raised in dramatic fashion the question of the liability of individuals under international law specifically, could the Nazi war leaders be properly tried and punished by an international tribunal for "war crimes," crimes against the peace, and crimes against humanity? Even in the Allied countries, several objections were raised: international law had no application to individuals; the accused could not be held personally accountable for acts performed on direction from authorized spokesmen of the German state: the "law" was in the nature of *ex post facto*. Nevertheless, by the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, Great Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., and the United States set up an International Military Tribunal, adopted a charter for its guidance, and then proceeded to the trial of the alleged offenders (Palmer and Perkins 2015).

The Indictment lodged against them contained four counts: (1) crimes against peace i.e., the planning, initiating, and waging of wars of aggression in violation of international treaties and agreements; (2) crimes against humanity i.e., exterminations, deportations, and genocide; (3) war crimes i.e., violations of the laws of war (humanitarian law); and (4) "a common plan or conspiracy to commit" the criminal acts listed in the first three counts (The New Encyclopedia Britannica Vol. 8, 15th ed).

The authority of the International Military Tribunal to conduct these trials stemmed from the London Agreement against major Axis war criminals whose offenses had no particular geographic location. Later, 19 other nations agreed to the terms of this pact. The tribunal was given the authority to find any individual guilty of war crimes (counts 1-3 stated above), as well as to declare any group or organization criminal. If an organization was found to be criminal, the prosecution may put individuals to trial for their membership, and the criminal nature of the group or organization would no longer be questioned. A defendant had the right to get a copy of the indictment, to provide any relevant explanation for the charges brought against him, to be represented by counsel, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses (Bachmann 2007). Each of the four signatory countries picked a member and an alternate to serve on the tribunal. The inaugural session was held in Berlin on October 18, 1945, and was presided over by Soviet member General I.T. Nikitchenko. At the time, 24 former Nazi leaders were charged with war crimes, and numerous entities (including the Gestapo, the Nazi secret police) were accused of illegal behavior.

Beginning on November 20, 1945, all sessions of the tribunal were held in Nuremberg under the presidency of Lord Justice Geoffrey Lawrence (later Baron Trevethin and Oaksey), the British member. On October 1, 1946, after 216 court sessions, 22 of the initial 24 defendants were found guilty. (Robert Ley committed himself to incarcerated, while Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach's mental and physical condition precluded his trial.) Three defendants, Hjalmar Schacht, Franz Von Papen, and Hans Fritzsche, were acquitted. Karl Dönitz, Baldur von Schirach, Albert Speer, and Konstantin von Neurath were all sentenced to 10- to 20-year prison terms. Rudolf Hess, Walther Funk, and Erich Raeder were each sentenced to life in prison. Twelve of the accused were sentenced to death via hanging. Ten of them, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Alfred Rosenberg, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Wilhelm Keitel, and Arthur Seyss-Inquart, were hanged on October 16, 1946. Martin Bormann was convicted and sentenced to death in absentia, while Hermann Goring committed himself before being executed.

The tribunal's decisions dismissed the defendants' primary defences. First, it rejected the argument that only states, not individuals, could be found guilty of war crimes; the tribunal ruled that individuals perpetrate crimes against international law, and that international law provisions can be enforced only by punishing those who commit such crimes. Second, it rejected the claim that the trial and adjudication were post-facto. The tribunal responded that such acts had been regarded as criminal prior to World War II (The New Encyclopedia Britannica Vol. 8, 15th ed, 2007).

The second trial involved 20 doctors and three associates in Nuremberg from December 1946 to August 1947 (the “Nuremberg medical trial”) after the international military trial from November 1945 to October 1946. In November 1945, John Thompson, a neurophysiologist, proposed the concept of medical war crimes. Leo Alexander, a neurologist in Boston, coined the terms thanatology (after Jung's idea of Thanatos, a desire for death) and ktenology (from the Greek word for murder) to describe "a scientific technique of genocide." Thompson and Alexander were sent to Germany on an intelligence mission to assess German medical research, and both ended up playing important roles in the Nuremberg medical tribunal. According to Weindling, Alexander "researched the pathology of Nazi medicine by constructing a topographical anatomy of the German scientific crimes and by localizing the functionaries." He sees the Nuremberg trials as a good occasion to examine not only Nazi psychology but also German mentality, which he defines as characterized by "aggression and servile obedience". Such a viewpoint is, of course, a risky simplification. During the medical trial, the Office of Chief Counsel for War Crimes interrogated more than 2250 people. The defendants depicted themselves as victims of Nazi persecution who were committed to patient care while blaming distant or deceased researchers. For example, Karl Brandt claimed to be genuinely pious, humanitarian, and an admirer of Albert Schweitzer. Joachim Mrugowsky referred to his edition of the ethics of the Romantic physician Hufeland. The defendants claimed that their views were consistent with the Hippocratic Oath, although the oath's text is so ambiguous that it can be interpreted in a multitude of ways, and no German doctor ever took it. The accused also highlighted sterilization legislation in other jurisdictions, as well as experiments on convicts in US prisons. The ethical debate surrounding the trials led to the Nuremberg Code on the Conduct of Human Experiments, which includes the notion of informed consent for experiment subjects. According to Talford Taylor, a chief prosecutor at the medical trial, "Curiously enough, we were educated in large part by our opponents." The trial went on different phases.

The first phase (1939-41), which he refers to as the neurological phase, was linked to the euthanasia project (codenamed T4) and served as a trial ground for the killing tactics that would later be employed in the "final solution." Hitler's order authorizing euthanasia coincided with Germany's invasion of Poland. The programme aimed to eliminate adult patients in mental institutions and resulted in the execution of over 70,000 persons, most of whom were gassed. The second phase, which ran from 1939 to 1944, involved large-scale sterilization and human reproduction studies. The Nazi regime sterilised approximately 400,000 persons with supposedly inheritable illnesses without their consent.

The third phase was military experimentation. There are over 30 experiments underway, including initiatives to investigate people's reactions to high altitude, freezing temperatures, and exposure to incendiary bombs, mustard gas, and other poisons. In other experiments, inmates were purposefully infected with typhus, malaria, and epidemic jaundice to aid in the discovery of vaccinations and efficient treatments. In Dachau experiments, naked female captives were placed outside and made to participate in sexual intercourse as a means of warming up.

The fourth phase involved kid experiments (for example, Josef Mengele's research into racial inheritance). All human experiments in concentration camps had to be approved by Heinrich Himmler. Interestingly, Himmler favored homeopathy (Lichterman 2005).

In addition to war crimes and crimes against peace, the tribunal introduces a new charge: crimes against humanity. After ten months of hearings in which none of the twenty-one suspects pleaded guilty, eleven were sentenced to death, and three were acquitted. The others have been condemned to life imprisonment, ranging from ten years to life. The Jewish genocide, which is recalled throughout the trial, is reduced by the bulk of Nazi crimes. On December 20, 1945, the Allied Control Council issued Law No. 10, which permitted trials to be held in each Allied control zone on the basis of the London Statute and created a common legal framework for the prosecution of war criminals other than those convicted by the IMT. (Ramler 2007). Gen. Telford Taylor presided over twelve trials held at the Nuremberg courthouse from December 9, 1946, to April 14, 1949, before an American tribunal. These lawsuits are known as "the Nuremberg trials." The media paid close attention to the doctors' trial (first trial), the Einsatzgruppen trial, and the IG Farben trial. On April 10, 1948, he sentenced fourteen out of twenty-four prisoners to death. The Nuremberg Code, created by the trial of Nazi doctors, defines medical ethics. Law No. 10 also applies to the

FRG's comparatively forgiving German courts (Fleur 2013).

The Contribution of the Nuremberg Trial to the Development of International Humanitarian Law

The trial of Nazi leasers saw a new approach to international rules governing the law of war and the maintenance of peace in the international space. However, the works of the International Law Commission on the content, forms, and degrees of international responsibility, as well as the practice of some states in the past decades, have shown one outstanding feature: to a large extent, the debate seems to have shifted from the classical emphasis on the obligations of the responsible State, towards an awareness and definition of the rights of the injured State or States visa-vis the responsible one (Riphagen 1981). For the first time in history, individuals were held responsible for war crimes on the international scale. Lieber code and Brian Kellog pact came close to addressing issues of individual responsibilities for war crimes distinct from the status quo of the international customary law; "state practice and opinion juris". Hence, the new order has remarkably torn the curtain between international law and the individual composed by state sovereignty. (Kudriavtsev 1990) assert that: This was indeed a necessary and desirable quantum leap.In a world where observing and respecting human rights is one of the fundamental tenets of international law, dealing with large violations of human rights simply through traditional inter-state processes would be completely out of place. The idea that tyrants may shield themselves from prosecution by drafting laws that legalize crime and injustice following a formal sense of the rule of law has become unacceptable in light of international law's new human-rights-oriented approach. Slobodan Milosevic, the former president of Yugoslavia, was recently arrested and indicted, and Charles Taylor of Liberia was also found guilty under the Nuremberg standards. In post Nuremberg tribunal, other trials continued in Japan, Israel, and America. Articles 2 and 3 of the international Law Commission and Article 25 of the Rome Statue provided the framework for individual responsibility at the International Criminal Court which was predicated by the codes of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.

The war and the Nuremberg law give rise to the hope of creating an international law. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of Genocide by the international military tribunal was adopted by the United Nations on December 9, 1948. The United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948. The proposition contained in the Chater of the international military tribunal retain to this day their legal and political significance that is enshrined in the United General Assembly decision of December 1, 1946, which confirmed the principle of international law recognized by the Chater of the Nuremberg tribunal and enunciated in its verdict (Kudriavtsev 1990).

The Nuremberg trial marked the watershed in the development of international humanitarian law. According to (Tomuschat 2006): Until Nuremberg, State sovereignty had been the fundamental pillar of the international legal order. Even the UN Charter lists the sovereign equality of states as the first of the fundamental principles governing the mutual relationships among states (Article 2(1)). Under the regime of 'classic' international law, what happened inside a state was almost entirely removed from the legal impact of international law. Similarly, criminal law was dominated by the two guiding principles of territoriality and nationality and no international institutions for the prosecution of grave crimes existed. The shield that state sovereignty offered offenders was eliminated by Nuremberg. Political leaders were no longer able to defend their official roles under the International Military Tribunal Statute. The "official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in government departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment," according to Article 7. This idea has been incorporated into all subsequent international criminal court and tribunal statutes. Hitler would have likewise been put on trial at Nuremberg if he had been taken prisoner in Berlin at the close of World War II.

The Nuremberg tribunal also sparked the development and establishment of institutions such as the international Criminal Court (ICC), the Geneva convention of 1949, the Rome Statute of 1998, and Responsibility to Protect

(R2P) 1&2 for the maintenance of world peace and stability.

The trial branded the war-mongers, and demonstrated political, legal, and moral impermissibility of aggression against other peoples. It furthered the emergence, development, and consolidation of the democratic movements in the defence of peace which in our day become a powerful anti-war factor.

Post Nuremberg trial of international medical and humanitarian law is sparked with redress in medical research in both peace war time. The change came as the result of the in human treatment of the Jews by Nazi Germany at the concentration camp. At the trial, the Tribunal adopted a code known as the Nuremberg code which states:

> *…the experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be impossible. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject (Reprinted from Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 1949).*

The subsequent international conferences also align with the codes of Nuremberg. Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibits "mutilation" of civilians and hors de combat which runs through the second, third and fourth Geneva conventions. Additional protocols 1&2 also guarantee prohibition for mutilation of civilians and hors de combat (Additional Protocol 1, article 75 (2), Additional Protocol 2 Article 4(2) adopted by consensus). The Belmont report on the protection of human subjects of biomedical behavioural research 1979 and the declaration of Helsinki 1996 and 2000.

Challenges of the Nuremberg Trial

The Nuremberg trial fashioned a new approach in the international arena regarding humanitarian law and politics by the International Military Tribunal, however, the trial raised so many questions and criticism about the locus standi, actions, and inactions of the tribunal. These raised the following criticism:

First of all, it was felt that the trial had been imposed upon Germany and that the fact alone of justice being dispensed by prosecutors and judges from the four main victorious Powers discredited the proceedings as a 'diktat' (Tomuschsat 2006). The main point of criticism was the lack of impartiality of the bench. There was no judge from a neutral country called to join the judges at the tribunal and no German judge was chosen either. No consideration had been given to ensuring a balanced composition that could not be objected to as representing 'victors' justice' (Tomuschsat 2006).

Second, the Germans were deterred from defending their course, they were also not given a fair hearing and the emotional impact on the interpretation of the law against the Germans was so pronounced (Ramler 2007). According to a multimedia TV presentation at Technology, Entertainment, Design (TED) 2020 assert that: "Nazi in their struggle for self-defence at Nuremberg tribunal, they quoted Justice Wendell Holmes of America for their population control agenda meted on the Jews at the Concentration Camp". In 1927, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes delivered infamous decision on population control by sexual sterilization of inmates to discontinue their bloodlines, therefore their actions for war and inhuman treatment at the Concentration Camp accrued to the Holmes judgment (Due process 1927, supreme.justia.com).

Third, the list of offences under the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal was also denounced as having no solid foundation in international law. The Statute of the IMT provided, in the first place, for crimes against peace and, in particular, criminalized war of aggression (Article 6(a)). Rightly, the defence at Nuremberg argued that until that time no leading statesman had ever been held accountable for launching a war (Tomuschsat 2006).

Lack of consistency also was another challenge at the tribunal due to the fact that the Allied powers were full of vengeance and just like the Paris Peace Conference, they wanted Germany's palm of flesh due to injuries brought by the Nazis as the result of the war. Therefore, there was no justice for the Nazis.

Lastly, there was an outcry of the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal to hear the crimes of the Nazi leaders because nothing of such was heard of in the history of International Law. UN Charter lists the sovereign equality of states as the first of the fundamental principles governing the mutual relationships among states (Article 2(1)). Under the regime of 'classic' international law, what happened inside a state was almost entirely removed from the legal impact of international law. These raised questions as to why was France not indicted during the Napoleonic expeditions and other concerns relating to the subject.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Nuremberg trial was chiefly set to try war crimes of Nazi Germany, the tribunal not just tried War crimes but also developed the already codified international humanitarian law by establishing ex post facto to try individuals in the international tribunal against the status quo. The trial was the first of its kind in the international arena even though arguments were forwarded against the development it set a precedent for the transformation of international humanitarian law at the Geneva conventions in 1949, Additional Protocols 1&2 till date. Also, in reference to the Nuremberg trials, individuals and groups faced tribunals, the international court of justice, and international criminal court for their crimes. Examples of such trials were: the Tokyo trial of 1948, the Bangladesh liberation war crime trial of 1971, the Rwanda civil war crime trial, the Sierra Leone civil war crime trials, the Liberia civil war crime trials of Charles Taylor, the Yugoslavia War crime trials of Slobodan Milosevic and other 161 high ranking officials. However, the tribunal came under heavy criticism that the tribunal was partial, racial, and unjust against the Germans.

Reference

Boleslav L. L., (2005). "Nuremberg Trials: From medical war crimes to Informed consent", Centre for the History of Medicine, Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, British medical journal , Vol. 331, 408.

Directives for Human Experimentation, http://helix.nih.gov:8001/ohsr/nuremburg.phtml Accessed 15/09/2024.

Due process 1927, https://supreme.justia.com accessed 1December, 2024.

https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg accessed February 2024.

https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/icc-statute-1998/article-8#:~:text=1.,2

https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/nuremberg-and-tokyo-war-crimes-trials

https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nuremberg Accessed February 21, 2024.

https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/nuremberg-and-tokyo-war-crimes-trials accessed February 21, 2024.

Jean S. F., (2023). The two most famous trials in history: Nuremberg and Tokyo, (London: Lap Lambert academy publisher, 65-66.

Norman D. P. and Howard C. P., (2015), International relations, (3eds), 279.

Ramler S. (2007). The Origin and challenges of Simultaneous Interpretation: the Nuremberg Trial Experience. *The Japan Association for Interpretation Studies.* (7) 7-18.

Reprinted from Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law (1949). No. 10, Vol. 2, pp. 181-182. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Riphagen, (1981). Second report on the content forms and degrees of international responsibility (part 2 of the draft articles), 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1), at 79, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ 344.

Sascha-Dominik B., (2007). "the legacy of Nuremberg trials- 60 years on" journal of South African law, Vol. 3,

The New Encyclopedia Britannica, (2007). Vol. 8, 15th ed, 834.

The Belmont Report Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research http://www.fda.gov/oc/oha/IRB/toc11.html accessed 15/09/2024.

Tomuschat C. (2006). The Legacy of Nuremberg. *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 4, 830-844.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC RELATIONS STRATEGIES IN LOKOJA AND ANKPA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS, KOGI STATE, NIGERIA

JIBRIN UMAR OMACHI,
GLORIOUS VISION UNIVERSITY, OGWA, jibrinumaromachi97@gmail.com

EZEKIEL S. ASEMAH, PHD,
GLORIOUS VISION UNIVERSITY, OGWA, asemahezekiel@yahoo.com

DANIEL O. EKHAREAFO, PHD,
UNIVERSITY OF BENIN, EDO STATE, talk2ofomegbe@gmail.com

KEYWORDS
Public Relations Strategies, Local Government, Community Engagement, Communication Accommodation Theory, Nigeria

ABSTRACT
This study is a Comparative Analysis of Public Relations Strategies in Select Local Governments in Kogi State, Nigeria. It comparatively examined the public relations strategies employed by Lokoja and Ankpa Local Government Areas in Kogi State, Nigeria, and assessed their effectiveness in managing relationships with stakeholders and fostering community engagement. The Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT) was used as the theoretical framework. A qualitative research approach was employed, involving in-depth interviews with 20 key stakeholders, including Public Relations Officers (PROs), Local Government Chairmen, Councilors, Directors of Administration, and Heads of Departments (HODs) responsible for public relations and communication. The findings revealed that Lokoja's proactive approach, characterized by community engagement and the use of digital communication, has fostered transparency and trust among residents, while Ankpa's reactive strategy has highlighted significant gaps in communication and engagement. The study concluded that public relations strategies play a crucial role in shaping the effectiveness of local governance in Kogi State. It is recommended that Lokoja Local Government Area strengthens its mechanisms for gathering and responding to community feedback, while Ankpa Local Government Area should prioritize the development of a comprehensive public relations strategies that incorporate both traditional and digital communication methods. Recommendations are also made for local government areas to adopt proactive public relations strategies that prioritize community engagement and transparency.

Introduction

Public relations (PR) is a critical discipline that plays a vital role in managing communication and relationships between local governments and their stakeholders. As a multifaceted field, public relations encompass various definitions and perspectives that underscore its significance in governance. According to Asemah & Nwammuo (2018) and Egbulefu & Nwaoboli (2023), public relations can be defined as the strategic management of relationships between an organization and its stakeholders, aimed at building mutual understanding, trust, and support. This definition highlights the importance of strategic communication and relationship management in fostering positive interactions between local governments and their constituents.

Furthermore, Ibrahim (2010) notes that public relations is the art and science of maintaining a favorable image and reputation for an organization through effective communication with various publics. This perspective underscores the necessity for local governments to actively manage their image and reputation to effectively serve their communities. Eze (2013) and Anatusi, Nnabuko & Asemah (2014) add that public relations is a strategic communication process that builds mutually beneficial relationships between organizations and their publics, emphasizing the importance of fostering relationships that benefit both the local government and its stakeholders.

In the context of local government administration in Nigeria, public relations practices are essential for establishing and maintaining positive relationships with various stakeholders, including residents, community organizations, businesses, and civil society groups. As highlighted by Adeyanju & Odunsi (2016), the primary objectives of public relations in this context are to foster transparency, facilitate effective communication, and build trust between local governments and their stakeholders.

Effective public relations strategies enable local governments to ensure that their governance processes are transparent and accountable. According to Nwaoboli, Ogunyemi & Ezegwu (2023), robust public relations strategies allow local governments to make their decision-making processes open and accessible to the public. This includes providing clear information about policies, programs, and initiatives, as well as involving residents in decision-making through public consultations and community forums (Nwosu, 2019).

Public relations strategies also play a vital role in managing potential conflicts or crises. By having robust crisis communication plans in place, local governments can respond promptly, provide accurate information, and address public concerns during challenging times. This proactive approach helps maintain public trust and minimizes the impact of crises. In light of these considerations, this study comparatively examines the public relations strategies of selected local governments in Kogi State, Nigeria, to evaluate their effectiveness in managing relationships with stakeholders and fostering community engagement.

Statement of the Problem

Local governments in Nigeria, including those in Kogi State, often struggle to effectively manage communication and relationships with their stakeholders. This inadequacy leads to significant challenges such as a lack of transparency, insufficient community engagement, and diminished public trust. According to Adeyanju & Odunsi (2016), many local governments fail to establish effective communication channels with residents, resulting in misunderstandings and a lack of awareness about policies and initiatives. Moreover, the tendency to adopt a top-down approach in governance further alienates citizens from the decision-making processes. Without meaningful engagement, local governments risk losing legitimacy and support from the very communities they serve.

Additionally, ineffective public relations strategies can exacerbate crises and diminish public confidence in local governance. Ibrahim (2010) points out that failure to maintain a favorable public image can lead to a loss of trust among stakeholders, while Nwosu (2019) emphasizes the importance of having robust crisis communication plans to address public concerns during challenging times. The lack of strategic public relations frameworks tailored to the specific needs of local governments creates missed opportunities for fostering community participation and collaboration (Eze, 2013). Therefore, this study is set to investigate the public relations strategies employed by Lokoja local and Ankpa local government areas in Kogi State, assessing their effectiveness and

identifying areas for improvement to enhance community relations and governance outcomes.

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the Study are to:

1. Compare and contrast the public relations strategies used by Lokoja and Ankpa Local Government Areas.

2. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of the public relations strategies employed by the select local governments.

Review of Concepts

Conceptualisation of Public Relations

The practice of public relations encompasses a wide range of activities, including the establishment of strategic communication and relationship-building strategies between an organisation or body and its different stakeholders. According to Okigbo (2012), public relations is a strategic communication process that tries to develop and sustain connections that are mutually beneficial between a business and its target audience. The primary objective of public relations is to influence attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors. This definition emphasises the strategic character of public relations, putting more emphasis on the function that it plays in the process of relationship building and management.

The term "public relations" is defined by Asemah, Nkwam-Uwaoma, and Amah (2023) as the deliberate and ongoing endeavor to develop and maintain goodwill and understanding between an organisation and its multiple publics via the use of effective communication. By highlighting the proactive character of public relations, this definition highlights the need of making efforts that are both planned and ongoing in order to cultivate good impressions and connections.

According to Eze (2013), public relations is a communication discipline that focuses on controlling and influencing the reputation and public image of a company. This is accomplished by interacting with stakeholders and making use of a variety of communication platforms. This definition emphasises the role that public relation plays in controlling reputation, interacting with stakeholders via communication that goes in both directions, and making good use of a variety of communication channels.

Asemah (2019) describes public relations as an organisational function that the purpose of which is to form and sustain connections between an organisation and its publics that are mutually beneficial. This is accomplished via the management of communication, the promotion of understanding, and the establishment of trust. This concept places an emphasis on the organisational role of public relations as well as the significance of efficiently managing communication, promoting understanding, and creating trust among various stakeholders.

Overview of Local Government

Local government is a critical component of governance and administration in many countries, including Nigeria. Scholars and experts have provided various definitions of local government, each shedding light on its significance and role within the broader political system. According to Haruna (2023), local government can be defined as the third tier of government that exists between the central government and the grassroots level, responsible for the provision of basic public services and development at the local level. This definition highlights the intermediary nature of local government, serving as a link between the central government and the local communities. It notes the role of local government in delivering essential services and driving development initiatives within its jurisdiction.

Obi (2002) sees local government as a political and administrative authority established by law and entrusted with the responsibility of governance, provision of public goods and representation of the interests of the local population. This definition emphasises the legal framework that establishes local government, granting it the authority to govern and represent the local population. It recognises the responsibility of local government in providing public goods and services that cater to the specific needs of the local communities.

Lastly, Aluko (2008) sees local government as a territorial unit within a state with defined boundaries, responsible for the provision of local public goods and services and accountable to the local population. This view emphasises the territorial aspect of local government, delineating its boundaries and jurisdiction. It

highlights the responsibility of local government in providing local public goods and services that cater to the specific needs of the local population.

Literature Review

Public Relations Strategies for Effective Local Governments Communication and Engagement

Local governments can harness various public relations strategies to effectively communicate with constituents, build relationships, and manage their reputations. One essential strategy is media relations, which involves establishing and maintaining positive relationships with media outlets, including newspapers, television, radio, and online platforms (Baran, 2002). This approach focuses on collaborating with journalists to disseminate information, respond to inquiries, and manage media coverage. Organizing press conferences, issuing press releases, and conducting media interviews are critical components of this strategy, as they help shape public perception and ensure that accurate and timely information reaches the public (Abodunrin & Ogundeji, 2021).

Community engagement is another vital strategy that emphasizes active participation and involvement of local residents in decision-making processes. By creating opportunities for dialogue, soliciting feedback, and incorporating community input into policy-making and service delivery, local governments can build trust and enhance transparency. Organizing town hall meetings, public forums, and community workshops fosters collaboration and ensures that public policies align with the needs and aspirations of the community (Asemah & Yaroson, 2007; Asemah, 2015). Moreover, during emergencies or unfavorable events, crisis communication becomes essential. This strategy involves proactively managing communication, addressing rumors, and promptly responding to public concerns. Developing crisis communication plans and establishing designated spokespersons are critical for maintaining public trust during challenging times (Bello & Ajayi, 2020).

In the digital age, social media and digital communication provide local governments with powerful tools to engage with the public. By creating and managing social media accounts and online platforms, governments can share information, gather feedback, and promote transparency. Social media enables real-time communication and encourages active participation through features like live streaming and online surveys (Ajala, 2001). Additionally, stakeholder relations involve identifying and engaging various stakeholders, such as community leaders and business owners, to build mutually beneficial relationships. Ongoing communication and collaboration help local governments gain support and leverage resources, thus enhancing their reputation within the community (Asika, 2002).

The Role of Public Relations in Local Government Governance and Service Delivery

Public relations plays a multifaceted role in local government governance and service delivery. It contributes to effective crisis management, as highlighted by Cutlip, Center & Broom (2006), who emphasise the importance of public relations professionals in developing crisis communication plans and ensuring accurate and timely information during emergencies. By effectively managing crises and providing transparent communication, public relations helps local governments maintain public trust and confidence.

In understanding public opinion and community needs, public relations professionals conduct valuable research. According to Duru & Ogbonna (2019), public opinion research is a vital function of public relations, allowing local governments to gather insights through surveys, focus groups and other research methods. This research informs decision-making processes, policy development and service delivery strategies, enabling local governments to align their efforts with public expectations and enhance citizen satisfaction.

The development and management of the local government's brand and identity are also essential aspects of public relations. In their book "Strategic Brand Management," Keller & Aaker (1998) highlight the role of public relations in crafting a compelling brand narrative and visual identity for local governments. By creating a positive and distinct image, public relations enhance the reputation and visibility of the government, effectively conveying its values, attributes and contributions to the community.

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are critical for local government initiatives and public relations facilitates their establishment and maintenance. In their research on public-private

partnerships, Sørensen & Torfing (2011) emphasise the role of public relations in fostering collaboration, leveraging resources and jointly addressing community needs. Through effective communication and relationship-building, public relations supports the development and success of PPPs, leading to improved service delivery and community development.

Internal communication and employee engagement are other areas where public relations play a significant role within local government organisations. According to Lerbinger (2012), effective internal communication is crucial for fostering a positive organisational culture. Public relations professionals utilise strategies such as newsletters, staff meetings and training programme to inform and engage employees, promoting teamwork, productivity and service excellence among government staff.

Public-private communication is another vital aspect of public relations in local government. According to Fitzpatrick and Gauthier (2001), public relations facilitate effective communication between the government and private sector stakeholders. By fostering open lines of communication, public relations professionals enable businesses, entrepreneurs and industry associations to collaborate with the government, share insights and contribute to community development. This communication facilitates economic growth, business-friendly policies and mutually beneficial relationships.

Empirical Review

This empirical review provides a comprehensive analysis and synthesis of existing studies relevant to the assessment of public relations strategies in select local governments within Kogi State, Nigeria. Asemah (2009) conducted a study on public relations and organizational management at Jos International Breweries Plc. Utilizing a survey research design, the study employed questionnaires and interviews for data collection. The findings indicated that the brewery did not prioritize public relations as a crucial management strategy, leading to the neglect of its information unit. Consequently, the study concluded that the organization had inadequately integrated public relations strategies into its management, which hindered its ability to achieve objectives. Asemah recommended that the brewery fully embrace public relations initiatives and establish a robust public relations department. This study shares similarities with the current research in its focus on the significance of public relations; however, it differs in scope by examining local governments in Kogi State rather than a single organization, thereby broadening the context and stakeholders involved.

Tokakis, Polychroniou, and Boustras (2019) explored factors affecting crisis management in public administration across various phases, including pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. Their study, conducted in Greece, involved personal interviews with 177 individuals experienced in crisis management from diverse sectors. The findings highlighted critical factors such as leadership decision-making, communication efficacy, and crisis characteristics. The study emphasized the need for thorough assessments of potential consequences from safety incidents and advocated for cultural and structural changes within organizations. While both studies acknowledge effective communication as vital, the current study focuses specifically on public relations strategies in local governments, differing in research objectives. The current study aims to assess the overall effectiveness of these strategies rather than examining crisis management within the broader public administration framework.

Asemah-Ibrahim, Nwaoboli, and Asemah (2022) evaluated the efficacy of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a crisis management strategy. Their study employed a qualitative approach and was framed by the Uncertainty Reduction Theory. They found a strong correlation between effective CSR utilization and its feasibility in crisis management, emphasizing the importance of integrating CSR into organizational practices. While the current study does not focus specifically on CSR, it similarly recognizes the importance of proactive strategies for managing public relations. The key difference lies in the focus of the current study on public relations strategies within local governments rather than a singular emphasis on CSR as a crisis management tool.

In a study by Almuzaini et al. (2021), the effectiveness of risk communication during the COVID-19 pandemic in Saudi Arabia was assessed, focusing on the public's awareness and trust in the Ministry of Health. The study highlighted the government's strategy of engaging various stakeholders, including traditional leaders and community heads, to enhance communication efforts. While both

studies underscore the significance of stakeholder engagement, the current research specifically investigates public relations strategies in local governments in Kogi State. The methodologies also differ, with the current study employing a mixed-methods approach involving surveys and interviews, whereas Almuzaini et al. focused on survey-based research. Despite these differences, both studies contribute to the understanding of effective communication strategies and the critical role of stakeholder engagement in their respective contexts.

Theoretical Framework

Communication Accommodation Theory

The Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT) was developed by Howard Giles and colleagues in the 1970s and 1980s. The theory originated from their observations and research on how individuals adjust their communication styles to match or accommodate the speech patterns, language and behaviours of others in social interactions. Giles and his colleagues proposed that people engage in two main communication strategies: convergence and divergence (Uzochukwu, 2006). Convergence refers to the process of adapting one's communication style to become more similar to the other person, while divergence involves emphasising differences in communication styles.

One of the key tenets of the Communication Accommodation Theory is that individuals adjust their communication behaviour based on social and psychological factors. These factors include the desire for social approval, the need for social identity and the perceived social distance between individuals. People may converge their communication styles to gain acceptance or to establish a sense of belonging with others. Conversely, they may diverge their communication styles to assert their distinctiveness or to maintain a sense of identity (Uzochukwu, 2006).

CAT has received both praise and criticism within the field of communication studies. One criticism is that the theory may oversimplify the complexity of communication dynamics, as it primarily focuses on linguistic and nonverbal accommodation. Critics argue that other factors, such as power dynamics, cultural differences and contextual influences, should also be considered in understanding communication behaviour (Abimbola, 2018). Additionally, some scholars have pointed out that the theory does not adequately address the potential negative consequences of accommodation, such as the reinforcement of stereotypes or the loss of individuality (Oluwadare, 2014).

However, CAT has also received significant recognition for its contributions to the understanding of interpersonal communication. The theory provides insights into how individuals navigate social interactions by adjusting their speech and behaviours. It emphasises the role of accommodation in the formation and maintenance of relationships and highlights the importance of understanding the social context in which communication takes place (Uzochukwu, 2006). CAT has been applied in a variety of contexts, including intercultural communication, healthcare communication and organisational communication, providing valuable insights into the dynamics of communication and relationship management.

One way CAT can be applied is by examining the convergence and divergence strategies employed by local governments in their communication with different stakeholder groups. The theory suggests that individuals tend to adapt their communication styles to match those of others in order to gain acceptance or establish a sense of belonging. In the context of public relations, local governments may employ convergence strategies by adjusting their communication approaches, language and tone to align with the preferences and expectations of specific stakeholder groups. By doing so, they can build rapport, enhance understanding and create a sense of connection with their stakeholders.

Furthermore, CAT can help analyse the perceived social distance between local governments and their stakeholders. The theory suggests that individuals' communication behaviour is influenced by their perception of social distance, which refers to the perceived similarities or differences in social status, culture and power dynamics. By applying CAT to the current study, researchers can examine how local governments accommodate their communication to bridge social distances with stakeholders. They can explore whether the communication strategies employed by local governments effectively address the concerns, values and cultural nuances of various stakeholder groups, ultimately contributing to a sense of inclusion and engagement.

CAT can also shed light on the potential consequences of accommodation in public relations efforts. While accommodation is often seen as a positive strategy for building relationships and managing communication, it is important to consider potential drawbacks. For instance, excessive convergence without maintaining a balance of authenticity and transparency may lead to the perception of insincerity or manipulation. On the other hand, overemphasis on divergence may result in alienating certain stakeholder groups. Applying CAT can help assess whether the accommodation strategies employed by local governments strike the right balance and effectively address the needs and expectations of their stakeholders.

Methodology

This study employed a qualitative research approach, utilizing in-depth interviews as the primary method for data collection. The focus was on selected Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Kogi State, specifically Lokoja LGA, with a population of approximately 791,000, and Ankpa LGA, with a population of around 358,800. Given the qualitative nature of this research, a smaller sample size was considered appropriate to facilitate in-depth exploration of stakeholder perspectives. Purposive sampling was employed to select 20 key stakeholders, including Public Relations Officers (PROs), Local Government Chairmen, Councilors, Directors of Administration, and Heads of Departments (HODs) responsible for public relations and communication. This targeted selection was crucial, as these stakeholders are directly involved in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of public relations strategies within their respective local governments.

The data collection process involved conducting semi-structured interviews with the selected stakeholders, allowing for a flexible yet focused discussion on public relations strategies. This format enabled the researcher to gather rich, contextual information while also allowing participants to express their views in their own words, thus capturing the complexity of their experiences and insights. The interviews were transcribed verbatim to ensure accuracy and fidelity in the data representation. Thematic analysis was then employed to analyze the transcribed data, facilitating the identification of recurring themes and patterns related to public relations practices. Themes were categorized and coded, with the findings presented in a narrative format for clarity and coherence.

Data Presentation

Similarities and Differences in Public Relations Strategies Used by Lokoja and Ankpa Local Government Areas

The examination of public relations strategies employed by Lokoja and Ankpa Local Government Areas (LGAs) reveals distinct methodologies tailored to their unique community dynamics and governance challenges. In Lokoja LGA, public relations strategies are characterized by a proactive and participatory approach. The Public Relations Officer (PRO) emphasized the significance of community engagement, stating, “We regularly hold town hall sessions to discuss community issues and gather feedback directly from residents.” This strategy not only aims to foster transparency but also encourages active participation from stakeholders, ensuring that the voices of citizens are heard in governmental decision-making processes. Furthermore, Lokoja has embraced digital communication tools, expanding its reach and effectiveness. A councilor from Lokoja noted, “Our social media presence has been instrumental in engaging the youth, who are more likely to interact with us online than in traditional settings.” This multifaceted strategy positions Lokoja as a local government that prioritizes open dialogue and responsiveness.

In contrast, Ankpa LGA employs a more traditional and reactive public relations strategy. The PRO described their approach as primarily focused on addressing issues as they arise, stating, “We often react to issues raised by the community rather than initiating discussions.” This method can lead to missed opportunities for proactive engagement and preventive communication. While community meetings are held, several stakeholders expressed concerns about their effectiveness. A councilor from Ankpa remarked, “While we value our community gatherings, many residents still feel uninformed about key initiatives.” This suggests that Ankpa’s reliance on conventional methods may not adequately meet the evolving needs of its constituents, particularly the younger demographics who may prefer more interactive and immediate forms of communication.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Public Relations Strategies Employed by the Select Local Governments

The strengths and weaknesses of the public relations strategies in Lokoja and Ankpa further illuminate their effectiveness in community engagement. Lokoja's strengths lie in its commitment to transparency and proactive communication. As noted by a local government chairman, "Our efforts in transparency have led to increased trust and support from the community." This proactive approach not only enhances public perception but also encourages collaboration between the local government and residents. However, a notable weakness identified in Lokoja's strategy is the inconsistency in following up on community feedback. An interviewee expressed, "Residents sometimes feel their concerns are not adequately addressed after meetings, which can erode trust." This inconsistency highlights the importance of not just gathering feedback but also acting on it to maintain public confidence.

In contrast, Ankpa's strengths include its strong emphasis on personal connections and community gatherings, which resonate well with many residents. One stakeholder from Ankpa remarked, "Our community meetings foster a sense of belonging and trust among residents." However, this strength is significantly undermined by weaknesses in proactive communication and the limited use of digital tools. A councilor from Ankpa lamented, "We need to do better in keeping our people informed; many still don't know about available government programs." This gap in communication underscores the need for Ankpa to modernize its public relations strategies, leveraging digital platforms to enhance outreach and engagement.

Discussion of Findings

The findings of this study highlight significant implications for public relations strategies employed by local governments in Kogi State, particularly in Lokoja and Ankpa. The proactive approach taken by Lokoja, characterized by active community engagement and the use of digital communication channels, aligns with existing literature that emphasizes the importance of strategic communication in fostering transparency and trust between governments and citizens. Eze (2013) posits that public relations serves as a strategic communication process that builds mutually beneficial relationships between organizations and their publics. Lokoja's emphasis on town hall meetings and social media engagement exemplifies this notion, effectively facilitating dialogue and feedback from residents.

In contrast, Ankpa's more reactive strategy presents challenges that resonate with Ayeni's (2017) findings on the role of local government in community development. Ayeni argues that local governments must actively engage with communities to address their specific needs and concerns. The lack of proactive engagement in Ankpa limits its ability to effectively serve its constituents, thereby undermining its governance effectiveness. The inadequacy of communication strategies in Ankpa reinforces the need for local governments to adapt their public relations efforts to meet the evolving expectations of their communities.

The implications of these findings are further underscored by Asemah-Ibrahim, Nwaoboli, and Asemah (2022), who discuss corporate social responsibility as a strategy for crisis management. They highlight the importance of maintaining a positive public image through effective communication and community involvement. Lokoja's proactive strategies, which focus on transparency and community participation, not only enhance its public image but also serve as a foundation for effective crisis management. In contrast, Ankpa's reliance on traditional communication methods may diminish its capacity to navigate crises effectively, as it lacks the necessary engagement and responsiveness required to maintain public trust during challenging times.

Moreover, the Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT) provides a useful framework for understanding the dynamics of public relations strategies in these two local governments. CAT posits that individuals adjust their communication styles to accommodate others, promoting social cohesion and understanding. Lokoja's approach, which actively seeks to accommodate residents' needs through inclusive communication practices, aligns well with this theory. The PRO's emphasis on community consultations and feedback mechanisms demonstrates an effort to bridge the gap between the local government and its constituents. Conversely, Ankpa's less accommodating approach, characterized by reactive communications, may lead to a disconnect between the government and the

community, ultimately hindering effective governance and citizen engagement.

The findings also echo Bello and Ajayi's (2020) assertion regarding citizen engagement and public service delivery in Nigerian local government authorities. Their research highlights that effective engagement strategies are critical for improving service delivery and fostering public trust. Lokoja's successful implementation of public relations strategies that prioritize community involvement serves as a model for other local governments, including Ankpa, which can learn from its proactive stance to enhance their own public relations efforts.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Based on the findings of this study, it is concluded that public relations strategies play a crucial role in shaping the effectiveness of local governance in Kogi State. Lokoja's proactive approach, characterized by community engagement and the use of digital communication, has fostered transparency and trust among residents. In contrast, Ankpa's reactive strategy has highlighted significant gaps in communication and engagement, which impede effective governance and public trust. It is therefore recommended that:

1. While Lokoja has successfully implemented proactive public relations strategies, it is crucial to strengthen the mechanisms for gathering and responding to community feedback. Establishing a formalized system to track concerns raised during town hall meetings and ensuring timely follow-up can further enhance public trust and engagement.

2. Ankpa Local Government should prioritize the development of a comprehensive public relations strategy that incorporates both traditional and digital communication methods. This strategy should focus on proactive community engagement, including regular outreach initiatives and the use of social media to disseminate information about government programs and services.

References

Abodunrin, A. O., & Ogundeji, B. A. (2021). Determinants of effective public relations practice in local government administration in Nigeria. Inter*national Journal of Public Administration,* 44(6), 475-484.

Abimbola, A. (2018). Social media and public relations practice in Nigeria. *Journal of Media and Communication Studies,* 10(2), 23-34.

Anatusi, T. C., Nnabuko, J. O. & Asemah, E. S. (2014). **Corruption and tourism: Restructuring Nigeria's image for development using public relations strategies.** *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (OMAN Chapter)*, 3 (7), 51-65.

Asemah, E. S. (2009). Public relations and organisational management: An assessment of Jos International Breweries Plc. Being a Dissertation Submitted to the Post Graduate School, Benue State University, Markurdi in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of Masters of Science (M.Sc) in Mass Communication.

Asemah, E. S. (2015). Corporate social responsibility and the performance of select food and beverage companies in Plateau State, Nigeria. Unpublished thesis, University Of Uyo, Uyo, Akwa Ibom State.

Asemah, E. S. (2010a). *Public relations and democratic governance in Nigeria*: *A componential*

Asemah, E. S. (2011a). *Perspectives in advertising and public relations (Revised Edition).* Jos: Lizborn Press.

Asemah, E. S. (2011b). *Understanding public relations*. Jos: Lizborn Press.

Asemah, E. S (2012). An overview of public relations as a veritable tool for national development. *International Journal of Communication and Performing Arts,* 4 (1), 66- 75.

Asemah, E. S. (2013). Public relations: Imperatives for building sustainable democracy in Nigeria. *Journal of Contemporary Communication,* 1 (2), 133-141.

Asemah, E. S. (2015). Investigation of the use of social media for public relations practice in

Plateau State, Nigeria. *Media and Communication Review,* 1 (1), 46- 67.

Asemah, E. S. (2019). *Public relations and democratic governance in Nigeria*: *A componential overview* (Revised Edition) Lagos: Atsco Press.

Asemah, E. S. (2022). *Perspectives on advertising and public relations (4th ed.).* Jos: Lizborn Press.

Asemah, E. S., Nkwam-Uwaoma, A. O. & Amah, F. O. (2023). *Advertising and public relations research.* Jos: University Press.

Asemah, E. S & Nwammuo, A. N. (2018). *All about financial and public relations*. Jos: University Press.

Asemah-Ibrahim, M. O., Nwaoboli, E. P. & Asemah, E. S. (2022). Corporate social responsibility as a strategy for crisis management by organisations. *GVU Journal of Management and Social Sciences*, 7(3), 148-159.

Ayeni, A. (2017). The role of local government in rural development: A case study of Nigeria. *Journal of Local Government Studies*, 3(1), 56-69.

Baran, S. (2002). *Introduction to mass communication, Media literacy and culture. 2nd Edition.* New York: McGraw Hill Higher Education.

Bello, M. L., & Ajayi, M. P. (2020). Citizen engagement and public service delivery in Nigerian local government authorities. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 86(1), 163-179.

Cutlip, S. M., Center, A. H., & Broom, G. M. (2006). *Effective public relations* (*9th Edition*). England: Pearson.

Duru, E. J., & Ogbonna, B. U. (2019). Enhancing transparency and accountability in Nigerian local government administration through e-governance. *International Journal of Electronic Government Research*, 15(2), 52-66.

Egbulefu, C. C. & Nwaoboli. E. P. (2023). Twitter netizens perceptions of Nigerian government's public relations strategies in response to the Ike Ekweremadu organ trafficking crisis. *International Journal of Management, Social Sciences, Peace and Conflict Studies* (IJMSSPCS), 6(2), 397-410.

Eze, N. (2013). Public relations as a strategic communication process. *Journal of Strategic Communication*, 7(2), 85-104.

Fitzpatrick, K. R. & Gauthier, C. (2001). Integrating public relations and relationship management in public sector organisations: A case study of a public health organisation. *Journal of Communication Management*, 5(3), 243-264.

Haruna, H. U. (2023). Digital media and public engagement in Nigerian local government authorities. *Journal of Communication and Media Studies*, 3(2), 45-59.

Ibrahim, S. (2010). The art and science of public relations. *Nigerian Journal of Communication*, 8(1), 112-128.

Keller, K. L. & Aaker, D. A. (1998). *Strategic brand management: Building, measuring and managing brand equity*. London: Prentice Hall.

Lerbinger, O. (2012). *The crisis manager: Facing risk and responsibility* (*2nd Edition*). England: Routledge.

Nwaoboli, E. P., Ogunyemi, E. O. & Ezegwu, D. T. (2023). Semiotic analysis of visual propaganda and emotional appeals in MTN's *No be Juju* be that advertising campaign. *International Journal of Multidisciplinary Approach and Studies*, *10*(4), 241-254.

Nwosu, I. (2019). Public relations as a strategic management function. *Journal of Communication Management*, 23(4), 345-364.

Obi, I. (2002). Local government in Nigeria: The search for a viable grassroots governance. *Nigerian Journal of Public Administration and Local Government Studies*, 1(1), 15-28.

Okigbo, C. (2012). Public relations and nation-building: The Nigerian experience. *Public Relations Review,* 38(5), 845-853.

Tokakis, V., Polychroniou, P. & Boustras, G. (2019). Crisis management in public administration: The three phases model for safety incidents, *Safety Science*, 113(1) 37–43.

Uzochukwu, A. (2006). Strategic management of relationships in public relations. *Journal of Public Relations Research,* 18(3), 277-302.

Yaroson, E. S. & Asemah, E. S. (2008). *Theories and models of mass communication*. Jos: Bazaleel Publishers.

HISTORY AND CULTURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ADARA AND ZURU IN KADUNA AND KEBBI STATES FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO 2018

MARABS JOSHUA ANTHONY, PHD
KADUNA STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, GIDAN WAYA, P.M.B 1024, KAFANCHAN, jmarabs@gmail.com

SOJA ZAKKA
KADUNA STATE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, GIDAN WAYA, P.M.B 1024, KAFANCHAN,
zakasoja47@gmail.com

KEYWORDS
History, Culture, comparative, Adara, and Zuru

ABSTRACT
The Adara and Zuru in Kaduna and Kebbi States respectively shared many similarities in their historical trajectory. The historical interconnectedness of these two distinct but historically resembled polities has raised many thoughts in minds as to whether the adara and Zuru were in anyway linked at one point or the other in their historical journey. This work therefore interrogates the fundamental factors that brought these similarities since the earliest time to 2018. In doing the aforementioned, the work will examine the intergroup relations of the diverse but culturally resembled polities of the Adara and Zuru within the context of their origin, nature of their socio-political and cultural links. It will unravel the possible historical melting point of the two nationalities. The work s will use primary (archival records, gazettes, memoirs and oral accounts) and secondary sources (textbooks, newspapers, magazines, articles in journals, online materials, thesis, and dissertations) for data collection, analysis and interpretation. The research will use multiple-group design technique which is expected to conduct many oral interviews across each site of these groups. The composition of the informants will largely be elders from ages fifty and above cutting across both sex (male and female). Since the polities have so much in common in their cultural history, facts from both primary and secondary data that exhibits any form of similarity shall be cross examine and objectively interpreted. At the end, the expected result shall provide the following; trace the origin, migration and settlement pattern of the Adara and Zuru polities, account for the similarities in the nature of the Adara and Zuru socio-political and cultural activities, and examine the possible point of inter-group contact and departure between the Adara and the Zuru.

Introduction

It is important to state *ab initio* that, the Adara and Zuru belong to Chadic speakers of the broad Benue-Congo group of Negro languages.[1] In discoursing the History and Culture of the Adara and Zuru in Kaduna and Kebbi States respectively, it is also important to look at the geographical location of the study area. What became today Zuru land is locate in the south-central potion of the Sokoto State, Nigeria. It occupied an area of estimated at about 9,000 sq km. Zuru is an Emirate which is divided into five administrative districts; Donko, Fakai, Sakaba, and Wasagu and Dabai as epicenter of its administration. As a local government, Zuru is bordered by Gummi Local Government Area in the North and also part of Anka Local Government Area. To the South, it shared border with Niger State. To the south-west, its' land ends a few kilometers west of a large tributary of the Dan Zaki River. Moving northwestward, the land protruded to Yauri Local Government Area, which extended to Sokoto State. Few kilometers to the west, the land connected to Bagudo Local Government Area also in Sokoto State. This western border is then completed in the Northern-West by a Short South-West curve that linked with Gummi Local Government Area.[2]

The Adara land Mass is also estimated at about 6,450 sq with an approximate population of 275, 101 based on the 1991 census figures.[3] The census proved that, in the entire Kaduna state, the Adara were the second largest ethnic group aside from Hausa/Fulani who are basically from the northern part of the state and dominate the Zazzau Emirate in particular. This implies that, in Southern Kaduna, the Adara remained the majority in terms of numerical strength.[4] The land is bounded to the west by the Gbagyi Districts and presently Gbagyi Chiefdom in Chikun and Gwagwada; north-east by Rigachikun; east by Kauru (with a few Kadara settlers); south by Zangon Kataf District of the Atyap Chiefdom, Bajju Chiefdom, Ikulu Chiefdom, and Kamantan; south-west by the Ham Chiefdom and to the west by the Gbagyi in Kaduna State and Koro of Niger state where the Adara community occupy the Eastern part of Fuka which was later included in Kuta District.[5] In 1907, Adara land had four districts – Kajuru, Kachia, Bishini and Bikaratu.

Adara land to the west is characterized by streams and rivers bounded by the Gbagyi district, while mountains and valleys dominate the northern boundary with the Riga-chikun. The eastern part was also characterized by a river that cut across Libere to form the River Kaduna. This river marked the Adara boundary with Kauru, though few of the Adara settled across the river. To the south were the plains and minor streams which join with the Ikulu and Kataf Districts. The south-west where the Adara bounded with the Ham is characterized by light-forest. The Adara boundary to the North-west is known to have been characterized by thick forest, cutting across from Maro to Abuja - Kaduna road to join with Niger state.[6] Adara land is drained by many streams and rivers. These rivers are the River Kaduna at Gefe meeting point, Kutur ariver, Rimau/Kallah river, the Attee/Mokoro river, the Ankwa river, the Ishau river and Kachia/ungwan-ateh river, river Kamshi, Agyoro river, Gurara dam among others. There are also ancient caves in the area. These caves are the historic monuments that explain the origin and migration of the Adara. These include; the Iburu cave in where they called Oparibu,[7] the Ankwa (Unhua) cave, the Ungwaku cave among others.

[1] C.F. Voegolin, (1977) Classification and index of the World's Languages, Elsesevier.

[2] Y. I. Bitiyong, "A Survey in the Zuru Emirate Region, Sokoto State," in *Studies in the History of the People of Zuru Emirate,* ed. A. R. Augi and S.U. Lawal (Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., Ltd 1990), 24-25.

[3] NAK/Zar Prof/ acc 21: (1932), Rough Notes on the Kadara and Kuturmi Tribes.

[4] Iburu Hassan Audu Agya, *A Survey History of the 'Kadara' People,* (Amune Printing Press Ltd, Abuja, 1994), 23.

[5] Yohanna Mamman, Age:60years, Retired Lecturer, Geography Department Kaduna State College of Education, Gidan Waya – Kafanchan, Interviewed with on 27th March, 2018.

[6] Iburu Hassan Audu Agya, *A Survey History of the 'Kadara'…*13.

[7] Rabo Hassan Iburu, interviewed with on 13th September, 2018, at Iburu, age 68years. See also, The Cave at Aparibu Near Iburu in Kajuru Local Government Area.

The Adara and Zuru in Misconception

The problem underscoring the historiography of the Zuru and Adara is the question of aboriginality. Literature on Adara and Zuru abound. However, plethora of these literature did not account for the origin, migration and settlement pattern of these ethnic groups and also offer a contextual and or comparative study of the Adara and Zuru in Kaduna and Kebbi states relations from the earliest time to 2018. Most of the existing literature were documented by the 20th century colonial agents aimed at justifying Indirect Rule on the natives. The colonial traveller's account and anthropologists report on these ethnic groups were marred by colonial sentiment and also characterized by many prejudices and inadequacies particularly on the origin, settlement, religion, and political history of the natives.

Most literature that accounted for Zuru and Adara histories have their roots in colonial sources. The colonial data are characterized with distorted vagaries, and until recently, the natives were left with imaginary oral criticism of what European said their history is. Until now, the history of these polities has been anchored on European travellers, missionaries, anthropologists, colonial administrators or, in other words amateur historians' accounts. For instance, Mallam Hamis in an effort to elaborate this assertion maintained that, what P.G. Harris did in his work titled *The Sokoto Provincial Gazetteer…* which he claimed to have written the history of the Zuru area was a mere discourse on customs, culture, religion and colonial administration/activities in Zuru land which has nothing about the political, economic and social history of the *Alele.*[8]

In the same vain, Iburu and Ibrahim James shared the same colonial account on the tradition of origin for the Adara.[9] Could there be a deliberate attempt on their part to agree with Meek's (colonial account) which linked the Adara origin with a prestigious polity like the Saifawa dynasty of Borno which inform their total agreement with some sort of imaginary stories accounted by M.C. Meek and O. Temple?[10] Under the same precept, Boyd and Hamilton' work on the Tribes of Northern Nigeria ended in describing the geographical treatise than a work on history.[11] What was documented through colonial account is far different from what the people know themselves to be, from their origin, migration, settlement pattern and their socio-cultural, political, and economic history. Though, the distortion of history of most nationalities by the colonial writers was a general phenomenon that characterized the African continent. Therefore, the task of deconstructing and reconstructing the history of Adara and Zuru history therefore becomes a must do responsibility to modern historian who are concerned with the history of the indigenous polities.

The Zuru and Adara in Time Perspective

To say that, the art of historical reconstruction of African history began with the coming of the Europeans is not true. The art of writing itself was said to have started with hieroglyphics in Egypt, which is Africa. Needless to say, the beginning of Africa's distorted history has its roots from the European travelers and anthropologists who recorded that Africa is a dark continent, and has no history. They went further to say, Africa is characterized by fetish practices and barbarism. This postulation has racial undertone, and it was done to prove white superiority over the Blacks Africans. Furthermore, their argument was to further justify colonialism as an alternate way forward to salvage Africa from its so-called backwardness.

[8] B. Swai, "Towards An Explanation of the Underdeveloped State of Zuru History" in *Studies in the History of the People of Zuru Emirate,* ed. A. R. Augi and S.U. Lawal (Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., Ltd 1990), 4.

[9] M. C. Meek, *Tribal Studies of Northern Nigeria* (vol. II London, 1931): 34. He pointed that, most of the tribes which now inhabit southern part of Zaria province initially, were residing at the Eastern side of lake Tangayika. He cited tribes like Kihugu and Kigoma still living at the Eastern side of lake Tangayika and likely being the remaining of Kahugu and Kagoma people of Southern Zaria province.

[10] Monday Mangvwat, "The Evolution of Miskaham Institution Among Mwahavul C. 1750 – 1957 A.D An Aspect of Political Evolution" (BA Dissertation submitted to the Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, 1976): xi-xii.

[11] Y. I. Bitiyong, "A Survey in the Zuru Emirate Region, Sokoto State," in *Studies in the History of the People of Zuru Emirate,* ed. A. R. Augi and S.U. Lawal (Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., Ltd 1990), 26.

However, in the quest for the reconstruction of African history, J. Vansina argued for the validity of oral source in place of an unwritten source. He argued that no written document can provide detail analysis on the history of a people more than what oral account provides on the material history of the people. He further maintained that, no historian can better explain historical event as the one who is familiar with the language of his respondent. The point worthy of note is, how many of these primary sources that claimed Zuru migration were written and documented by the indigenous writers? Virtually all that is said relied on colonial report which is committed to speculations resulting to distortion of the peoples' identity.

It is important to note that, in corroboration with the oral tradition is the archaeological evidence. The question of autochthony of Warrawa, Lelna, Dakarawa, Gwamfawa among others earlier than the purported migration as littered by many writers is not unthinkable. This can be understood through the Stone Axe discovered within the region 3,000 B.C. this discovery was made during the reconnaissance in Zuru region which confirmed the existence of the Zuru people within the region even as far back as the late Stone Age dated about 12,000 B.C.[12] The migration account of some polities like the Warrawa which Bitiyong controversially pointed that they migrated from Borno Empire is not only erroneous but misleading. Furthermore, history has it that, for every migration of a polity, there must be a push factor and clear evidence of chronology in the period when the migration took place. All these were not adequately address by early writers on the Zuru origin.

However, what became peculiar in the history of these two groups that worth studying is that, these ethnic nationalities are far separated by geographical location. Yet, practically exhibit almost the same characteristics virtually in all facets of their human endeavors more closely than even their immediate and closest neighbors. If there was any Adara and Zuru migration from any distant place other than their present location as claimed by colonial reports Meek (1932);[13] Greenberg & Harris, (1963, 1938) certainly it should not be northward migration from Borno. It should be noted that, the Zuru belonged to the Chadic speakers of the Benue-Congo group of Negro languages who are technically related to the Bantu group of languages from Southern Africa as against the Afro-Asiac of the Northern part of the River Ka in Zuru land whose trace of origin can be seen within the lenses of Arabian specie. However, the aforementioned point is the specific problem that necessitated the study of the two diverse but historically and culturally resembled ethnic polities (Adara and Zuru).

Contextualizing Historiography in Zuru and Adara Land

In the 21st century, the quest to ascertain the origin, peopling and formation of communities in Zuru an Adara land has being like hot potatoes in the mouth, due to factors that bothers on historians' prejudices. Yet, the main issue in Zuru and Adara histories is the question of establishing the aboriginality of the people. Several attempts have been made at different quotas to tress the original ancestry of the Zuru and Adara. However, over the years, this effort largely ended in narrating migration and settlement accounts as documented by colonial travelers and anthropologists.

Globally, migration has undoubtedly formed part of human existence. In Africa, the migration spree in the earliest time was factored by many factors. However, the causality that characterized this migration was both human and natural. These circumstances became the basis for their conformity into various patterns of livelihood. Traditional boundaries were tempered with, settlements were adjusted, cultures and traditions were infused and integrated, making inter-group relations more consolidated among close neighbors. The situation occasioned by migration in the pre-colonial era in Nigeria has posed challenges on the autochthonous identities of most ethnic nationalities particularly the minority groups in the north. The Zuru and Adara were not an exception to this challenge.[14] Bitiyong in his work, grouped the peopling of Zuru land into two

[12] T. Shaw, "Preliminary Report on Archeological work in the Wushishi Area, Early 1976, *Zaria Archaeology Papers,* (Vol.9, 1976):1-4.

[13] M. C. Meek, *Tribal Studies of Northern Nigeria* (vol. II London, 1931): 34.

[14] NAK/Zar.Prof/2159: (1935), *Kadara of Zaria: Intelligent Report*, M.R.C.S. Stanley.

basic categories;[15] those that claimed autochthony and the recent migrants. Though, the work was not critical about the heterogeneity of the Zuru Emirate being a land far beyond two groups, yet it provided an impetus for the discourse Zuru within the lens of time and space, particularly their origin and settlements at different epochs. Perhaps, his analysis was informed by the available data within his reach, which were largely colonial source. It should be noted that, the colonial sources are mostly characterized by many prejudices. Another point worthy of note is the fact that some of the available evidence given by the natives were corrupted partly because, among the groups that claimed autochthony, were some that controversies that lingered within the authenticity of their aboriginality. Thus, recent findings has shown that, they actually migrated from other parts of the Northern Nigeria before arriving the Zuru land in the 18th century which they themselves have confirmed and attested to it. In the same vein, there were some among these aboriginals that were erroneously referred to as migrants, but in the real sense they were not migrants, they were only been calved out from part of Zuru by the politics of colonial boundary which was adjusted during Emirate creation.

Therefore, the best way to ascertain the aboriginality of the people of Zuru is to critically examine the pre-colonial boundary of the Zuru Emirate even beyond the Danfodio era up to the post-colonial period. The significance of the Danfodio era is that, it marked the period which migrations to the region for safety began which is a recent development in the history of Zuru people. It is important to note that, the influence of Usman Danfodio Jihad which necessitated the migration of some of these groups to Zuru land did not in any way meant conquest, because there has never being a time in Zuru history where they were conquer by the Danfodio Jihad or the external force of the Kanta period and beyond. During the Kanta, there were several attempts by Kanta and his adventurous to capture Zuru land, since the Zuru are the aboriginals, Kanta tried severally to capture them but failed. The Zuru remained independent polity in their present abode with their rulers fully in charge of their affairs even beyond the advent of the Danfodio just like their neighboring territories - Bukkuyun and Gummi at that time. Thus, those that claimed being autochthonous and the recent migrants.[16] In the Adara experience, recent finding shows they are the autochthonous.[17]

It is pertinent to note that, there were some autochthonous groups that were not by any means easily spotted and captured by the European travelers and anthropologists, on the course of their documentation adventure this was due to their hill-top settlement pattern. As such it was difficult to existentially establish their long presence within their ancestral land without resorting to genuine oral account. The Gwamfawa and Warrawa were however part of these Autochthonous groups that inhabit Zuru land from time immemorial. The Warrawa who where/are derogatorily refers to as Bangawa by the Hausa, lived at mountain top just like their immediate neighbors Dakarkari and Gwomfawa believed that, cultural adherent is the basis of human existence. This quest necessitated their choice of settlement pattern at the mountain top. They would always ensure the availability of water at the fringe of their settlement to support their livelihood. The surrounding land at the foot of the hill was used for farming and hunting. The choice of mountain top was basically for security purpose, the mountain top just like the River *Ka* provided them with basic defense against any form of aggression. However, any eventual security threat or attack from the enemies, the inhabitant would take advantage of the familiar hill-top terrain to inflict pains on their aggressors.

On tradition of origin, there are different views regarding the tradition of origins of some of the groups that formed the larger Zuru Emirate. However, Bitiyong postulated that, the human population of Zuru region is multinational,[18] and can be grouped into two broad categories, thus; the long term ”settlers and or autochthony,” and the “recent

[15] Bitiyong Y. I., “A Survey in the Zuru Emirate Region...26.

[16] Bitiyong Y. I., “A Survey in the Zuru Emirate Region...26.

[17] Marabs Joshua Anthony and Martha Ezekiel Shamang, “A Historical Perspective in the Evolution and Transformation of Traditional Institutions Among Societies in Southern Kaduna Area”, *Kaduna Journal of Historical studies,* (Vol. 7 September 2015) 93-96.

[18] Bitiyong Y. I., “A Survey in the Zuru Emirate Region...26.

immigrants or even temporary strangers,"[19] was not only categorical but factual. The contradiction in his analysis is, most of the ethnic groups classified as long term settlers who laid claims of originality from Hausa land are also lumped as autochthonous.[20] There is difference between long term settler and autochthony. Long term settler has a place of departure while autochthony is an original inhabitant.

Sami maintained that, the zuru land is located at the southern part of River *Ka* which formed the central part or middle-belt of Zuru Emirate. As occupants of the most treacherous and difficult terrain due to the presents of wild animal and other potentials that could attract the attention of enemies due to the situation of the River *Ka*, yet, they devised a skillful strategy to maintain their independence against external aggression occasion by slave riders and conquest. The ancient Zuru people were adaptive to circumstance. They operated an egalitarian society where individuals were allowed the right to self-actualization through available endeavors. Apart of Farming and Hunting which was there major occupation, they engaged in other crafts such as; blacksmith, weaving, pottery, fishing, just to mention but few. Their leaders were shrew administrators of their various independent village states. Their sagacity in planning characterized the uniqueness of the Zuru polities in the region. This in no small way made them developed a unique culture that is viable enough to support their livelihood since their antiquity till date. As means of defense, they chose to live on the mountain-top and other most difficult terrain, often fenced with tall stone. Their walls enhanced their security which helped in outsmarting their enemies in situational face-off.

Since the region was characterized by different uncertainties and risks such as slave raid, possible attacks by wild animals, and other mischief by individuals, they became conscious of their security. They realized that going to the farm in singles would expose them to greater danger. They developed a system of group farming called *Golmo. Golmo* was also a corporate system which formed part of marriage process obligations for youths. This meant that, instead of individuals going to farm separately, a group of organized youths from all the communities who were expected to get married within the next one to seven years, would be assembled at a designated point every morning, which they would move from one prospective father in-laws' farm to another where they would work tirelessly before retiring to their hill tops settlements in the late evening. This team work makes it difficult for any possible attack by an enemy. To enhance more security and increase their weaponry, the Zuru people farm tools such as Hoe and Axe were purposefully designed to be effectively sharp and potable, for farming and defensive purposes.

On glottochronology, Lelna (Dakarkari) has some four genetically related languages whose roots in commonly traced to singular source but long term intergroup contact orchestrated their variation in Zuru land, thus; Bangawa (Warrawa), C'lela, Dunkanci, and Fakkanci.[21] One may not denied disparity in linguistic terms, but Greenberg and Voegeling widen the language azimuth to enable them assert for Lelna the global classification of African languages, which meant that, they Zuru languages belongs to the Benue-Congo group of Negro languages.[22] They were less concern about the assertiveness of autochthony of these groups. The striking point of concern is, the over bearing colonial sources has it that, the Dakarawa, Bangawa, Fakawa, Katsinawa and Dukawa moved together into what is today Zuru land from area outside their present abode.[23] The proponent of this postulation was Harri,[24] and Hamilton Brown,[25] they both maintain that, almost all the groups

[19] Bitiyong Y. I., "A Survey in the Zuru Emirate Region...26.

[20] Bitiyong Y. I., "A Survey in the Zuru Emirate Region...26.

[21] A. H. Amfani, "A Glottochronology of the Four Benue-Congo Languages in Zuruland," in *Studies in the History of the People of Zuru Emirate,* ed. A. R. Augi and S.U. Lawal (Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., Ltd 1990), 47.

[22] J.R. Greenberg, *Language of Africa of Africa,* (Blooming, 1963) and C.F. Voegolin, *Classification and index of the World's Languages,* (Elsesevier 1977).

[23] A.R. Augi, "A Survey of Social and Political History of Zuru Emirate Before 1900" in *Study in the History of the People of Zuru Emirate* ed. A. R. Augi and S.U. Lawal (Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., Ltd 1990), 87.

[24] P.G. Harris, "Notes on the Dakarkari", *Gazetteer*, 310-317.

[25] E.C. Duff and W. Hamilton Browne, *Gazetteer of Kontagora Province*, (London, 1920), 30-31.

presently living in the Zuru land are believed to have migrated into the region from elsewhere.

They made this claim to establish the basis for the assertiveness that, most of these polities came from a popular centralized states. By this, they can justify indirect rule on them through an already established mechanism of a most advanced polity. However, one cannot dispute migration spree which could be a recent phenomenon especially in the 19th and 20th centuries due to some form of factors like political instability orchestrated by the slave trade, jihad movement just to mention but two. These particular factors must have being the push factor that triggered migration for the settler polities of Katsinawa, Wasagu, Zamfarawa, among others in Zuru Land. One may not be too certain to say that there was no migration among the polities that formed the whole of Zuru Emirate in the past. This migration was largely intra Zuru migration. As mentioned earlier, the migration account for Zuru polities by the colonial travelers was to justify the fact that the Zuru inhabitants could at best be governed under the Sokoto Caliphate system. Perhaps, this quest must let colonial account gladiators to assert that the Bangawa had their ancestors from Borno Empire in the present day North-East of Nigeria. The District Head of Donko in a verbal discussion shared the same colonial view as pointed by Hamilton, Browne and Harri.[26] Could this be a deliberate attempt on the part of the colonial travelers and anthropologists to linked the Bangawa (Warrawa) with a prestigious polity like the Saifawa Dynasty of Borno? This might not be far from it due to colonial interest in justifying indirect rule system and to further suggest that most of these polities share things in common with the larger polity in Borno, as such could be manage under the same approach of indirect rulership. This idea, the District Head of Donko was not critical about it. Perhaps, the District Head of Donko, has heard of the Sokoto Jijhad which affected Gobir, more probably, the Warrawa may have left Borno, if they did, as a result of Mai Ali Ghaji's (1472-1608) wars of expansion in the 15th and 16th centuries and the establishment of Birnin Ngazargamu.[27]

The indisputable widespread influence of Borno over the entire Hausa land, Baghirmi, Sahara, up to Benue valley within the 19th century was yet another factor that prompted Hamilton and Harri to think alike in their postulation of the Bornoan tradition of origin for the most populous polities of northern Nigeria.[28] However, in understanding this phenomenon, one should not be too sure to conclude this as it could mislead the general public, hence it largely depend on assumption which is not safe in the historical reconstruction of the tradition of origin of a people. This is because if there were any war between Gobir and Borno, it was the Jihad of Shehu Usman Danfodio which could presumably be the push for Warrawa migration. This meant that the migration took place in the 19th century which is a recent affair. By and large, by this time of the Jihad, the Warrawa and their neighbors had already settled in their respective village states several centuries earlier.

The Zuru and Adara Cultural Institutions

To examine how the Zuru and Adara operated their priestly institution from the earliest time and in relation with the present, cannot be clearly understood outside their traditional institution. In discoursing traditional institution in Zuru and Adara, what comes to mine is the nature and manner in which their cultural institution dishes out their socio-political regulations. This meant that, cultural links between the various polities of Zuru and Adara lands were manifested in similarities of their traditional, political and social organization. However, in Zuru land, there are convergent cultural practices such as M'gila, Golmo, D'biti. Beledima, and Uhola among the homogeneous but linguistically diverse ethnic nationalities under Zuru Emirate. These diverse groups are closely knitted together through cultural practices that within a unique identity as Lelna. In the same vein, the Adara has similar traditional practices embedded in the people's ritual institution that is the *Ahuh* (masquerade). This practice is somewhat similar to the Zuru. However, the impacts of the Adara *Ahuh* (masquerade) traditional ritual practices are largely felt during Festivals. These festivals

[26] Bitiyong Y. I., "A Survey in the Zuru Emirate Region...26.

[27] Abdullahi Smith, "The Early States of the Central Sudan," in History of West Africa, ed J.F.A Ajayi and Michael Crowder (Vol.1, Longman, 1971): 184.

[28] Monday Mangvwat, "The Evolution of Miskaham Institution Among Mwahavul C. 1750 – 1957 A.D An Aspect of Political Evolution" (BA Dissertation submitted to the Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, 1976): xi-xii.

mostly take place during harvest season, basically around the month of October. The traditional practices of Zuru and Adara polities therefore could be more appropriately describe as the consolidated group type of the decentralized state system, characterized by the group's recognition of the authority of the central priest chief, who merely wielded authority and not power.[29]

In *M'gila* tradition of the Zuru, the Chief-Priest is responsible for the transmission of message as received from the *Obangizi Asila* to the Priest-Chief and the elders in the community. While in Adara land, the *Agom Ahuh* is charged with similar function as in the Zuru experience. This shows that the role of community elders cannot be undermine among the Zuru and Adara. However, *Golmo* among the Zuru is one of the most popular cultural practice that buttress uniqueness of every male in the Zuru society. According to the Zuru tradition, *Golmo* is an institution that regulates social conduct and training among Lelna from young ages to adulthood.[30] It comprises social contract for marriage, economic livelihood training, security and defense tactics among other. The intrigue in the whole of *Golmo* cultural practice emphasized brevity and as such became mandatory for every male child to participate according to age grades. In discoursing *Golmo*, it is pertinent to note that exhausting all-encompassing the role and function of the *Golmo* among Lelna is almost an impossible task. This is because of the preternatural activities that characterized the process from the beginning to it maturity. At best, what can be done to bring to public knowledge about the *Golmo* particularly its role, function and operation in the Zuru land is the description of those vagaries that dispense what the physical can see, touch feel and hear.

However, *Golmo* to its Zuru meant a lot that only those it concern and participated or went through its processes and stages could understand its rudiments. This is because there were ritual engagement between the participants through process of initiation that only those involved feels the aura and present of the supernatural especially during initiation and communing with the *Ubangizi.* In the same vein, the Adara sees god (*Onuh/Unom*) the supernatural, and can only be reach through a process of sacrifice to their deity. Most of the Adara deities are stones, and either blood of animal or libation of local beer are poured to evoke the spirit of the ancestors who often intercede on their behalf to the god.

Conclusion

Following the uniformity in most of the socio-cultural and political practices of the Zuru and Adara which are evident in material history (wooden spoons, clay pots, grinding stones, wooden carriers, cloth and mode of dress), settlement pattern, religion (belief, initiation processes to adulthood) cloth, mode of dress, festivals, dance, marriages, among many others. One may be tempted to conclude that, the push and pull forces of migration must have accounted for the migration of these which led to contact of these groups in the past.

Bibliography

Amfani A. H., "A Glottochronology of the Four Benue-Congo Languages in Zuruland," in *Studies in the History of the People of Zuru Emirate,* ed. A. R. Augi and S.U. Lawal (Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., Ltd 1990), 47.

Augi A.R., A Survey of Social and Political History of Zuru Emirate Before 1900 in Study in the History of the People of Zuru Emirate.

Bitiyong Y. I., "A Survey in the Zuru Emirate Region, Sokoto State," in *Studies in the History of the People of Zuru Emirate,* ed. A. R. Augi and S.U. Lawal (Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., Ltd 1990), 24-25.

Duff E.C. and W. Hamilton Browne, Gazetteer of Kontagora Province, (London, 1920), 30-31.

Greenberg J.R., Language of Africa of Africa, Blooming, 1963 and C.F. Voegolin, Classification and index of the World's Languages, Elsesevier 1977.

Harris P.G., "Notes on the Dakarkari", Gazetteer, 310-317.

[29] Mohammed Sani Sami, *A Celebration of the Lelna Culture: Selected Traditional Festivals in Zuru Emirate of Kebbi State*, (Hweraka Resources Ltd., Zuru, Kebbi State, 2005): 16.

[30] Mohammed Sani Sami, *A Celebration of the Lelna Culture: Selected Traditional Festivals in Zuru Emirate* …16.

Hassan Audu Agya Iburu, *A Survey History of the 'Kadara' People,* (Amune Printing Press Ltd, Abuja, 1994).

Hassan Iburu Rabo, interviewed with on 13th September, 2018, at Iburu, age 68years.

Joshua Anthony Marabs and Ezekiel Shamang Martha, A Historical Perspective in the Evolution and Transformation of Traditional Institutions Among Societies in Southern Kaduna Area, in Kaduna Journal of Historical studies Vol. 7 September 2015) 93-96.

Mamman Yohanna, Age:60years, Retired Lecturer, Geography Department Kaduna State College of Education, Gidan Waya – Kafanchan, Interviewed with on 27th March, 2018.

Mangvwat Monday, "The Evolution of Miskaham Institution Among Mwahavul C. 1750 – 1957 A.D An Aspect of Political Evolution" (BA Dissertation submitted to the Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, 1976): xi-xii.

Meek M. C., *Tribal Studies of Northern Nigeria* (vol. II London, 1931): 34.

NAK/Zar.Prof/2159: (1935), Kadara of Zaria: Intelligent Report by M.R.C.S. Stanley.

NAK/Zar Prof/ acc 21: (1932), Rough Notes on the Kadara and Kuturmi Tribes.

Roger Blench, An Atlas of Nigerian Languages, 3rd Edition, Kay Williamson Educational Foundation 8, Guest Road, Cambridge CB1 2AL, United Kingdom.

Shaw T., "Preliminary Report on Archeological work in the Wushishi Area, Early 1976, *Zaria Archaeology Papers,* (Vol.9, 1976):1-4.

Swai B., "Towards An Explanation of the Underdeveloped State of Zuru History" in *Studies in the History of the People of Zuru Emirate,* ed. A. R. Augi and S.U. Lawal (Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., Ltd 1990), 4.

Smith Abdullahi, "The Early States of the Central Sudan," in History of West Africa, ed J.F.A Ajayi and Michael Crowder (Vol.1, Longman, 1971): 184.

Sani Sami Mohammed, *A Celebration of the Lelna Culture: Selected Traditional Festivals in Zuru Emirate of Kebbi State*, (Hweraka Resources Ltd., Zuru, Kebbi State, 2005): 16.

Voegolin C.F., (1977) Classification and index of the World's Languages, Elsesevier.

THE POLITICAL TREND IN CHINA – NIGERIA EXTERNAL TRADE RELATIONS, 1999 – 2021

DIMAS GARBA, PhD
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NILE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, ABUJA, dimasgarba@gmail.com & garba.dimas@nileuniversity.edu.ng, 08036557072

PRINCEWILL OKWARA, PHD
NILE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, ABUJA, princewillokwara@gmail.com

KEYWORDS
China, Nigeria, External Trade, Politics, International Relations

ABSTRACT
This paper examined the political trend in China – Nigeria external trade relations, 1999 - 2021. The general objective of this paper was to offer explanation regarding the dynamics shaping external trade relations between China and Nigeria. The paper adopted qualitative method of collection and data were source from archival and documentary sources which comprised of online and print scientific journal articles were included and excluded based on China-Nigeria external trade relations. The study findings revealed that there is significant evidence suggesting that politics at the international and domestic levels are interlinked and have also played a critical role in shaping the trends of trade between both Nigeria and China. In conclusion the paper revealed that politics has had an important role to play in the synthesis of the trends of trade relations between China and Nigeria. The dynamics of these interconnected political factors therefore offer a fuller explanation for the subsisting trade imbalance between both countries, growing trade notwithstanding. The paper therefore recommended that grassroots avenues of China-Nigeria interaction for trade should be created, sustained, and improved both in China and Nigeria.

Introduction

International trade in contemporary times is a concept that has become quite immersed in complexity. Unlike the relatively trouble-free dynamics of commerce within the state, trade across borders and in-between states has become quite multiplex (Abegunrin, 2021). An in- depth understanding of the burgeoning web of interconnected factors that affect the conduct of international economic relations between countries today is one that has as a crucial feature, the role of competing agendas among national and international actors, and how the actions ensuing from the competing agendas of these actor's influence and shape trade relationships. These competing agendas, which Laswel (1936) conceptualizes as politics that which concerns, among other things, the allocation and distribution of wealth and power transcend the purview of the state and spills over into global politics. Moreover, the dynamics of politics and its multipronged role in shaping international trade relations can be described as reciprocal and not just unidirectional. It is plausible to contend therefore that politics

shapes international trade relations, and international trade relations, in turn, inform the changes in the calibration of politics. Indeed, the reciprocal influence of politics on trade and vice versa is defining more and more the very substance of those salient issues surrounding how international trade is conducted today, the actors who engage in it, how they engage in it, as well how these dovetail with or are hindered by the collision between domestic political pressures and international trade diplomacy (Woolcock, 1999).

The interface between politics delineated as those competing agendas at the systemic, interstate and intra-state levels of intellectual interrogation and international trade diplomacy, often defines the crux of external and multi-lateral trade relations. This trad Perhaps one of the more epochal as well as intriguing examples in recent decades; the rise of China, whose economy boomed at the behest of the Open-Door policies of Deng Xiaoping, as well as the country's ability to impose its political and economic will in the international arena, represents an interesting case in hand in contemporary IPE analysis. (Alves, 2021).

The above issues emanating from the decisions taken by both countries as substantive actors therefore, which stretch from the systemic, inter-state, and intra-state levels of analysis the role of the changing international system; the role of both countries' leadership styles which is a reflection of both countries' domestic realities constitute important points of inquiry regarding how competing agendas at the global and domestic stage has shaped the trend and nature of trade between both countries. Indeed, any analysis that synthesizes the above issues through the multi-perspectival analytical traditional of International Political Economy would undoubtedly furnish a fuller and richer account of the evolution of China-Nigeria trade relations over the period of 1999 to 2021. An international political economy approach therefore, which looks at the above complexities at the systemic, interstate and intra-state levels of analysis suffices in this academic inquiry in that it would offer an eclectic descriptive analysis of China-Nigeria trade within the given time boundary. Hence, this approach should offer in-depth, rich, and holistic explanation from the perspective of politics regarding why both countries' trade trend from 1999 to 2021 has evolved the way it has, as well as offer in-depth context on ways which this understanding will mitigate the challenges militating against healthier and reciprocal trade relations and in so doing, improve trade relations. This summarizes therefore, the background and rationale of this paper.

Statement of the Problem

From the foregoing therefore, the problematique of this research comprises a reconciliation of some of those salient questions and issues which have lingered with respect to the trends of trade between Nigeria and China. Not just trade, but trade relations between both countries. Particularly, as to why despite the claim of a win-win cooperation by China, trade imbalance from 1999 to 2021 persists. Additionally, as to why this win-win cooperation between both countries has occasioned Nigeria's strategic economic alignment with China who is not a traditional trading partner of Nigeria like nations in the West. The thrust of this problematique from the above therefore lies in explaining the role of politics at the international, systemic, and domestic levels of analysis in the synthesis and thus understanding of these aberrances. An in-depth discussion based on this problematique (as reflected in this research report) offered clarification with regard to the complex vagaries from the purview of competing agendas in the distribution and allocation of wealth. In so doing, it attempted to furnish a better understanding of this aspect of China-Nigeria relations. Also, this paper attempted to eliminate the inherent challenges based on such understanding.

Research Questions

In line with the above statement of the research problem, this research sought answers to the following research questions:

i. How has the trends of trade external relations evolved between Nigeria and China over the years?
ii. To what extent has Nigeria domestic politics leadership Style influenced the Country's external trade relations with China?
iii. What are the challenges confronting China-Nigeria external trade relations?

Objectives of the Study

i. Exam the trends of trade external relations evolved between Nigeria and China over the years.

ii. Assess the extent Nigeria domestic politics leadership Style has influenced the Country's external trade relations with China.

iii. Exam the challenges confronting China-Nigeria external trade relations.

Conceptual Review of Politics

Concepts help us to paint a mental understanding of our world whether it be palpable or purely abstract. They are general ideas about phenomena usually expressed in a single word or phrase (Atsiya, 2019). Some concepts are apt while others are hazy; some are precise, while others 17 are conjectural and contestable. Arguably, one of such conjectural and contestable concepts in the social sciences which is one of our primary variables in this research is that of 'Politics'. Indeed, it is worthy of note to point out, as Heywood (2013:2) succinctly does, that '"'Politics' with the capital 'P' refers to the academic study of politics, while 'politics' refers to the meaning of politics''. Our focus here is analyzing the meaning of politics. One of the broad ways which politics can conceptualize is to see it as a social and public activity (Czajka, 2016).

Concept Analysis of International Trade

International trade, the exchange of goods and services between two or more countries, as well as the forces that affect trade alliances, trade agreements, decisions on free trade and tariffs, inter alia, which are usually entrenched into the wider body of a coherent foreign economic policy, all culminate in the ability of states to marshal political instruments of power and statecraft at the utmost levels so as to manoeuvre through the complex realities at the ever-fluid global arena. But a proper understanding of how politics shapes, influences and impacts on international economic relations in general, and international trade relations would be very vital for any nation in the conduct of savvy and effective relations, which, in the case of this study, concerns the politics of Nigeria-China trade relations (Oigbochie, 2024).

Conceptualization of Politics and International Trade

Current research in international political economy (IPE) tend to focus on the impacts of globalization within the larger framework of how it influences transnational economic flows, and how these have generated newer issues and actors which state governments have to grapple with. These new intellectual interests on issues such as giving greater focus to the activities of Transnational corporations, transnational economic agents such as international economic organisations, and transnational economic machineries such as GVCs and GPNs are robust and interesting (Ayodele, 2014). In the area of economics, these evolving issues have stressed traditional international trade theories, for example, as political determinants are not fully accounted for in explaining the dynamics of international trade. More so, the peculiarities surrounding unique external trade arrangements is one that needs multidisciplinary attention.

Theoretical Framework: Complex Interdependence Theory

This theory is adopted for this study for the following reasons: The theory best explains the political economy of Nigeria China trade relations as it serves as an analytic tool that explains the eclectic link between political factors and economic factors. By so doing, the theory provides the context in exploring those salient trends which are underscored by politics at the inter-state level of analysis in China-Nigeria trade relations. Therefore, the theory is suited to the topic and problem area of this study. The theory also emphasizes the complex geopolitical considerations and dimensions of trans state relations, as well as the relatedness of events in the international arena. On this note, therefore, the theory is suited to research question two which explores the influence of international politics to China-Nigeria external trade relations (Ayoola, 2013).

Complex interdependence theory is also adopted for this research as it also reflects a deemphasis on generalizations, taking note of 'issue structure' analytical approaches. Furthermore, it recognizes the role domestic realities play in overall inter-state relations in the international system. Hence, the theory serves

as an analytic tool in explaining the issues raised in our research questions three and four which inquiries about the role of domestic politics by way of the leadership styles on both the Nigerian and Chinese sides, on their external trade 80 relations. Lastly, the eclectic analytic tool of the theory is suited to research question five that seeks to point out the salient challenges bedevilling trade relations between both states in light of the political dimension of both countries trade relations, so as to proffer informed strategies on how trade relations can be improved upon. This is because the theorists posited complex interdependence as not only a theoretical framework that offers a fuller understanding of IR phenomena, but also one that seeks to resolve the issues that this fuller understanding reveals.

Research Method

The researcher collected secondary data from the archival and documentary sources on the other hand that they were systematically selected based on PRISMA templates, which enabled us to establish a step-by-step parameter for quality assessment, as well as ascertaining their relevance to the study. PRISMA stands for 'Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta Analyses'. Although PRISMA is mostly used in the reporting of systematic literature reviews in the health sciences, in recent times, its templates for identifying, screening, ascertaining literature eligibility and as well as literature inclusion has been adopted by researchers in other fields of academic inquiry (Liberatiet, 2009). Search strings for the selection of other online supplementary documentary sources from China, Nigeria, China and Nigeria, Clhina and Nigeria Relations, China and Nigeria Economic Relations and China and Nigeria Trade Relations. Digital libraries and search engines from which documents were assessed and obtained using the above search words include Scopus, Springer, Google Scholar, Libgen, and Jistor. Supplementary journal papers were sourced from a wide range of high quality online and print peer reviewed journals, including relevant and up-to-date print journals concerning China-Nigeria economic relations. The data from archival and documentary sources which comprised of online and print scientific journal articles were included and excluded based on PRISMA templates. Furthermore, supplementary archival data was also obtained from newspaper articles, books, and statistical tables relevant to Nigeria-China trade relations.

The Trend of External Trade Between Nigeria and China

Another trend that emanates in the analysis of China-Nigeria trade relations is the trend of economic collaboration as well as trade diplomacy. It is a well-known contention that the prevailing economic system is one woven in the liberal image of international capitalism, where the means and margins of production within and across borders are ever limited, and global value chains ever complicated and competitive. Indeed, Nicola Phillips avers, the dynamics of Global Value Chains (GVCs), and Global Production Networks (GPNs) shape the global economy; indicating the net-winners and the net-losers (Eleanor, 2021). Therefore, countries that muster up their comparative advantage so as to control these in the game of losers versus winners will always be at an advantage. Nevertheless, there is also the contention that countries such as Nigeria and China need each other. Arguably, Nigeria needs China more than China needs Nigeria. The question then arises; thus, given the strategic partnership between Nigeria and China, can one say that the trade posture between both countries is thin or thick? Nigeria's economic ties with China is one that has been sold as a win-win cooperation. At least this can certainly be argued to be the case from the stance of China when she designated Nigeria as a strategic partner. This is certainly also the sentiments of the President, China Chambers of Commerce in Nigeria, Ye Shuijin, who opined in an interview that economic relations between the two countries are not only cordial, but it is also substantively beneficial to both. In his words, there are about 160 Chinese firms operating in the country [Nigeria]. These firms have employed over 200,000 Nigerians. I believe the Chinese investment in Nigeria now is about $20 billion. Our workforce is 95 percent Nigerian (Hague, 2004).

The volumes of MOUs signed between the two countries on economic collaboration spanning a sizable chunk of Nigeria's sectors, as well as the billions of dollars invested in Nigeria by the Asian giant also gives credence to the above sentiment and demonstrates that the trajectory of this trend. As Ibonye (2021) suggests, the evolving external strategic partnership between the two countries in terms of economic exchanges is one is growing. Not only so, but it will also be beneficial to both Nigeria and China on the long run. Indeed, this

line of thought suggests that it would be in Nigeria's interest to take advantage of this cordial trend to not only partner with China, but, also to emulate the economic strategies that have transmogrified her economy seemingly overnight into become as formidable as it is today. A case in hand to buttress the argument above, yearly data from the Nigerian Office for Trade Negotiation (NOTN) as published in their 2021 Trade Data Quarterly Brochure shows that for the first, second and third quarters of 2021, China alone accounted for over 30 percent of all foreign imports into Nigeria in terms of goods, and has been top since 2017 except for Q4 of 2019 when the United States was first and this was due to the restrictions imposed on Chinese imports as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (NOTN TDQ, 2021; NBS, 2021).

Nigeria's Domestic Politics and China External Trade Relations

The Obasanjo Government, 1999 - 2007

Not least, as the eminent commentator on Chinese affairs, Gregory Mthebu-Salter contends, China's new orientation towards Africa in general and Nigeria in particular in the early 2000s (Mthebu-Salter, 2009). Following through on his peaceful relations with all nations' policy, the Nigerian President made state visits to China in 1999 and 2001. He also made further visits in 2005 and 2006. These visits, it is imperative to note, were substantive and signalled his administration's docility to respond to China's efforts to court the African regional power. More so, the improving relations between Abuja and Beijing had begun to yield results. In 2000, China's CCECC won a contract to construct 5,000 housing units in Galadimawa district, Abuja, which was the first of its kind, to serve as temporary residence for the international crop of athletes attending the 8th All African Games in the Nigerian capital. The following year, the two countries signed agreements on the establishment of a Nigeria Trade Office in China, anda China Investment Development and Trade Promotion Centre in Nigeria (Ibrahim, G.S., & Gimba, 2018) moves that clearly indicated the Obasanjo administration's openness to enhanced China-Nigeria external trade.

As Pat Utomi points out, the 'oil for infrastructure' policy was not simply a federal government policy; it also spilled over to the state government level. State governors also used this opportunity to lead individual delegations to China, seeking investment and development partnerships (Utomi, 2008). This is little wonder given that the general notion of 'China mania' within the country as at then bordered around Chinese aid and support. To the Obasanjo administrations' credit on China relations, a lot of contracts, aid and infrastructural deals were struck. This includes Chinese investment in the power generation, agriculture, road and railway, housing and telecommunication sectors. Whereas the argument can be made from the position of national interest that the Obasanjo administration was able to secure valuable and urgently needed Chinese FDI, which according to data from SAIS-CARI amounted to about $6.3 billion by the end of 2007, in terms of trade in goods, the administration performed dismally. Admittedly, back in 1999, the country was just recovering from crippling economic sanctions, and it had just come out of a regime that was not privatization friendly. Notwithstanding, after two terms, the administration was not able to effectively stimulate the private sector, neither was it able to diversify the economy a point which cannot be overemphasized given the dynamics of trade imbalance between both countries. In evaluating the argument therefore, of pundits who aver that China-Nigeria trade especially as guided by the Obasanjo administration's policy of 'oil for infrastructure', was bad business for the Nigerian economy, given the gapping and ever-widening trade imbalance since the incipience of external economic relations, it is imperative to note that China cannot be blamed for such trade imbalance. On their part, they were motivated to protect their national interest. Whereas credit should be given to the Obasanjo administration for the FDI inflows which were the fruits of the many MOUs signed between both countries, it was not made up for in any way, by external trade in goods, given that the administration was not able to fully unleash the economic potentials of the country. 158 In the final analysis given that Obasanjo's 'oil for infrastructure' policy and his 'Shuttle Diplomacy' to some extent influenced external trade between both countries by bringing in urgently needed Chinese FDI from 1999 to 2007 through the signing of multiple MOUs with China, his leadership style, to some extent, influenced the trajectory of China-Nigeria trade.

Yar'Adua's Political Administration

Due to the dearth of data during the short period of Yar' Adua's conservative presidency, it has been concluded that little was achieved in terms of external economic relations, especially given the fact that most of the oil for infrastructure' deals of the Obasanjo administration were either cancelled or suspended due to alleged non-transparency (Ikenberry, 2008). Nevertheless, the administration, whose policy implementation was cut short when the president died in 2010 recorded some achievement in China-Nigeria economic investments in terms of FDI. For instance, because of circumspection on the part of Chinese companies, China's CHINAPEC announced a $7.2 billion deal to purchase Addax Petroleum which was a well-established Canadian oil company in Nigeria at the time. Other deals on infrastructure suffered setbacks. For example, the Mambila project never kicked off as a result of funding issues. The details surrounding the percentage which the Federal government and China's Export Import Bank had to contribute for the project as at then had not been thoroughly thrashed out. On the trade front, while trade continued to grow between both nations, the year 2008 was particularly dismal for Nigeria in terms of trade deficit. Also, from 2007 to 2010, the country experienced consistent trade deficits.

The commodities traded were the same as during the former administration: oil products to China and a wide variety of finished products to Nigeria. Nigeria's inability to diversify the economy and revamp domestic production, the culprit for this. This then begs the question whether Nigerians were truly appalled with Chinese dumping of knockoff products or whether it was a bitter-sweet experience. Notwithstanding, from the position of National interest, it would seem to be the case that Yar' Adua's conservatism influenced the trajectory of Chinese investment given the cancellation of oil contracts. Perhaps, had the contracts been approved, the Kaduna refinery could have been operational by now thereby reducing Nigeria's dependence on foreign refineries. In the final analysis, it would be cumbersome to contend that his administration's leadership style meaningfully impacted on China Nigeria trade relations during his time as president because he passed away after three years. But from the little that can be evaluated, his administration did not do much.

The Goodluck Jonathan Government, 2010 - 2015

The leadership style that defined the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan was one that gave the impression of having evoked sentiments of unifying the various factions in the country. His administration inherited the deep-seated problems of the polity from domestic woes defined by massive unemployment to the deficiencies in Nigeria's infrastructure. More so, the country was yet to diversify the economy-a point that had been clamoured for by technocrats and intellectuals alike and was still heavily reliant on oil exports. These provide context for the President's drive to transform the economic outlook of the country. This was well articulated in his inaugural address when he described the new decade as one of development and transformation (Nwabia, 2018).

In terms of FDI, from 2010 to 2015, Chinese FDI inflow into various sectors of the economy immensely increased. This was owing to the many on-going infrastructural projects in various sectors. 167 In contrast, from 2003 to 2009, estimated Chinese FDI stock in Nigeria was $1.03 billion (Egbula, 2011). As can be seen in table 6, total new Chinese FDI inflows into the country during Jonathan's tenure amounted to $1.238 billion. This indicates that during the Jonathan administration, there was an upward trend in terms of Chinese FDI inflows into the country, further buttressing the point that external economic exchange increased during the Jonathan administration. Total Chinese exports to Nigeria from amounted to $39.6 billion. Total Nigerian exports to China amounted to $16.1. Thus, resulting in a $23.5 billion in deficit against Nigeria. However, when compared to the trade deficit of former administrations, and given the upward trend in FDI inflows from China, external economic exchange during the Jonathan administration was better off. Notwithstanding, the inability of his administration to diversify the economy so as to better position the country in external trade with China was a cause for concern. Still on the trade front, the administration's effort to dovetail Nigeria's interest with that of China from a position of national interest yielded significant results. In 2014, external trade between both countries surpassed external trade between Nigeria and her trade allies. While it could be argued that the United States discovery of Shale Oil reserves in 2013 contributed to the reduction of oil exports from Nigeria, it does not fully explain the rapid increase of China-Nigeria trade in 2014 a factor

which, in consideration of the foregoing, can highly be attributed to the explorative leadership style of aggressive economic diplomacy not only on the Chinese side, but also, of the Jonathan administration. In the final analysis, while many challenges vitiate China-Nigeria trade, the fact that Nigeria's economy remains largely dependent on oil remains a paramount concern. Given that both FDI inflows from China and external trade increased during his time as president, the evidence suggests that the leadership style of President Jonathan immensely influenced China-Nigeria trade relations (IMF, 2021).

Muhammad Buhari Political Administration, 2015 – 2021

After his ascendancy to the presidency, the new President, who ran on the mantra of 'change' from the outset, made it clear that his leadership style would be one defined by massive reforms, especially one that cracked down on all forms of corruption, insecurity and injustice. His inaugural address, many opine, hit all the right notes on the issues. Significantly, the avowed outlook of the new administration got the praise many observers in the West who were displeased with the state of insecurity in Nigeria based on the strategic implications of rising radical Islamic terrorism around the globe (Oigbochie, 2024). This is very important given the background of corruption which the former administration was blamed to have condoned, the dreadful insecurity ushered in by the radical Islamic sect Boko Haram especially of the kidnapping of the Chibok girls, and the sentiments of dissatisfaction among Nigerians of the many domestic's problems bedevilling progress and prosperity.

External economic relations between Nigeria and China during his time in office has also been topsy turvy. After the completion of the Kaduna railway which really kicked off during the previous administration, China-Nigeria economic relations at the federal level have been mostly loan-based. In 2018, the administration obtained a loan of $328 million from China which it explained was to be used in upgrading the country's telecommunications and IT infrastructure. Specifically, the National and Communication Technology Infrastructure Backbone (Turcsanyi, 2019). Also in 2017, the administration sought to borrow $5.85 billion from China to be used for the modernization the of rail networks in country (Reuters, 2017). Furthermore, in 2016, the president also sought a loan of $6 billion for other infrastructural projects (Adunbi& Stein, 2019: 5). Fairly recently in 2021, the Nigerian senate approved yet another loan of $17 billion from China, most of which would be used to service the lingering Mambila Power Project which President Xi approved back in 2016.

Challenges Confronting China-Nigeria External Trade Relations

The following are the challenges confronting China-Nigeria external trade relations;

Trade Deficit

In the case of China-Nigeria external trade, the evidence from time series data clearly shows that since 1999, Nigeria has suffered a consistent and widening trend of balance of trade deficits with China as a result of mostly one-way trade. It is important to note that according to the data from IMF DOTS (2021), no year was an exception. From 1999 to 2019, available data shows that gross trade deficit with China stood at $68.4 billion. More so, the trade deficit has been growing at an alarming rate of an average of 8 percent each year, with an average annual trade deficit of $2.8 billion. This also underscores that fact that Nigeria is yet to penetrate the immense opportunities which the Chinese market offers. What is more, the inflow of FDI from China has not been able to supplement this widening trade imbalance. According to available data from SIAS-CARI total Chinese FDI stock from 2003 to 2017 amounts to about $19.6 billion This figure is only $28.5 percent of the total trade deficit with China.

Ill Treatment of Nigerian Nationals in Nigeria and China

Another issue which constitutes a challenge to China-Nigeria trade relations is the bad treatment of Nigerians not only within the Nigerian state where Nigerians work in Chinese companies, but also, in China. An empirical study by Charles Okafor in 2011 of some Chinese companies in Nigeria revealed that Chinese companies domiciled in Nigeria meted out bad treatment to Nigerian nationals. His study came to the conclusion that many Chinese companies tend to maintain harsh labour practices for Nigerian staff. What is more, the study also garnered that most Nigerian nationals are also discriminated against, as they tend to favour

offering job positions to Chinese nationals in Nigeria (Oke, 2019).

Restricted Knowledge Transfer

Closely related to the above is the issue of restricted knowledge transfer between Nigerian nationals working in Chinese companies, and Chinese nationals. According to an exhaustive 2016 survey by Yunnan Chen and others, it was discovered that only few Nigerians occupied managerial positions in Chinese companies within the country. This is significant because it is in such positions that knowledge transfer can effectively happen. This is because it requires specialised training to occupy such positions. Similarly, the study also submitted that there was little to no evidence of systematic skills and technology transfer in all of the companies sampled across the country (Oatley, 2021). This is supported by Ibonye's study (2021), which establishes that the goings on in many African domiciled Chinese companies betrays the cooperative conceptualization of China-African relations, as portrayed in the FOCAC, and rather seems to establish a China-centric module of globalisation.

Poor Nigeria Infrastructure

The state of poor infrastructure in Nigeria is another crucial challenge to the efficiency of external economic ties between China and Nigeria. The state of infrastructure in Nigeria is poor, especially when compared to other countries. Indeed, as a result of the dynamics of globalization, the limits of the economic outlook of any country with poor infrastructure is ever shrinking. Studies have linked poor infrastructure to lethargic economic growth and sustained underdevelopment. In fact, many scholars agree that one of the main reasons why China leaped from a poor aggregation society into becoming the largest economy in the world today is attributable to their aggressive revolution in infrastructure; from state-of-the-art roads, railways, airports, hospital, and housing to sustainable power generation distribution, which has helped to boost their industrial output. In all of the above-mentioned sectors, Nigeria is lagging far behind.

Findings

With respect to the first objective of this paper revealed that within the timeframe of 1999 to 2021, three main trends have stood out: an upward trend of FDI inflows into various Nigerian sectors from China, a sustained trend of balance of trade deficits and its accoutrements against Nigeria, and a sustained trend of efforts at external collaboration and trade diplomacy.

Secondly, analysis indicates that former President Buhari's administration focused more on financial credits from China over oil contracts and Chinese FDI. This was established on the grounds that compared to his predecessors, his administration recorded the highest inflow of Chinese financial credits which indications show is likely to increase. Still, his administration was nevertheless unable to ameliorate the sustained trend of trade deficits with China. The general import of the role of Nigeria's domestic politics as it relates to the country's leadership style on both country's trade relations is significant.

Thirdly, while both countries have set out to engage in robust economic coordination as spelt out in their strategic partnership, analysis shows that the challenges bedevilling external trade, which ranges from the trade deficit, infrastructural paucity in Nigeria, ill-treatment of Nigerian nationals in China and Chinese companies in Nigeria and Chinaphobia' among Nigerian policy makers and intellectual alike have to be decisively addressed so as to immensely improve trade relations between both countries

Conclusion and Recommendations

From the paper findings the research made the following recommendations on the political trend of China-Nigeria external trade relations.

Given that it was found that the trends of trade between both countries are mostly benign, this study recommends that all means of maintaining, and even improving external economic cooperation between both countries should be pursued and enhanced. This can be achieved through implementing policies such as cultural exchanges, enhancing the Nigeria China Trade office, and holding special joint China-Nigeria trade workshop which will strengthen and exemplify the strategic partnership which both countries have.

Similarly, Nigerian political elites should tap from the wealth of experience of past leaders so

as to ascertain the best pragmatic means of engaging China. This is based on the findings that show that Nigerian presidents have struggled regarding a workable foreign trade policy towards China. Given that the 'oil for infrastructure' policy of the Obasanjo administration achieved little given that China does not depend on Nigeria for its oil supplies in Africa, which also dovetails with why the subsequent 'oil for cash' policy of the Yar' Adua administration also failed, subsequent administrations must re-strategies and take oil off the table. Subsequent administrations should focus on areas which serve Nigeria's best interest such as engaging China in areas such as technology transfer.

More so, on account of the findings which are corroborated by previous studies on the growing trend of trade deficits on the part of Nigeria, the Nigerian government should diversify its economy away from the fracking of fossil fuels. This is ever more critical now when alternative means of power generation has drastically driven down the profitability margins of oil exports and given that oil products represent the major Nigerian export commodity to China. Although recommendations which point to alternative sources of national income such as bolstering the agricultural and the manufacturing sectors are germane, this paper strongly recommends that the Nigerian political elite enact policies which also focus on the service sector which driven by globalisation, equally holds immense economic potentials for the country. This should provide the country with critically needed leverage, as well as alternative trade options which should reduce and even reverse the trend of trade deficits with China and ensure optimum economic benefit for Nigeria.

References

Abegunrin, O. &Manyeruke, C. (2021). China's Power in Africa: A New Global Order. AG, Switzerland: Palgrave McMillan.

Alves, A.C. (2013). 'China's 'Win-Win' Cooperation: Unpacking the Impact of Infrastructure for-resources deals in Africa'. South-African Journal of International Affairs, 20 (2), 207-226

Atsiya, G., &Tenuche, M. (2019). 'Nigeria-China Economic Relations and Development in Africa, 2006-2016'. Journal of African Foreign Affairs, 6.2

Ayodele, T., &Sotola, O. (2014). 'China in Africa: An Evaluation of Chinese Investment.' Initiative for Public Policy Analysis (Working Paper Series).

Ayoola, T.J. (2013). 'Nigeria-China Trade Relations: Implication on the Nigerian Domestic

Economy'. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 4 (17).

Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Nigeria (2024, April 13). Nigeria, China sign deal on 'free flow' of yuan. Retrieved from mofcom.gov.cn.

Eleanor, A. (2021). 'China's Foreign Minister Revives Belt and Road on 5-Country Africa

Tour'. The Diplomat.com

Hague, R., &Harrop, M. (2004). Comparative Government and Politics (6th. ed.). New York, United States: Palgrave Mcmillan.

Ibonye, V. (2021).'The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and knowledge transfer in China-Nigerian development cooperation. 'Asian Journal of Comparative Politics. Retrieved from journals.sagepub.com.

Ibrahim, G.S., &Gimba, Z. (2018). 'China-Nigeria Economic Relations: The Need for Greater Resource Management for Development'. International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development, 2 (3), 176-188.

Ikenberry, G.J. (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs, 87 (1), 23-37.

International Monetary Fund (2021). Nigeria, China, United States, Euro-area trade volumes. Retrieved from data.imf.org 02/03/2021.

Jafar, A. (2007). The Growing Relationship Between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Microeconomic, Trade, Investment and

Aid Links. The World Bank Research Observer. 22,1, 103-130.

Mthebu-Salter, G. (2009). 'Chinese Investments in African Free Trade Zones: Lessons from Nigeria's Experience.' South African Institute of International Affairs.

Nwabia, C.H. (2018). China: Africa's new Economic Partner or Colonizer? A Case Study of

Nigeria-China Relations (bachelor's thesis, University of Tallinn, Estonia).

Oigbochie, A. E., Ajalie, S. N., & Okwara, P. (2024). Non-monetary Compensation and Employees' Performance in the Transmission Company of Nigeria, Abuja. Asian Journal of Advanced Research and Reports, 18(6), 338-345.

Oatley, T. (2012). International Political Economy (5th ed).New York, United States: Longman.

Odo, O.S. (2016). 'Nigeria's Quest for Development through International Cooperation: The Case of her Economic Relations with China.' International Journal of Innovative Research & Development, 5 (8), 198-206.

Oke, M., Okonoda, O., & Oshinfowokan, O. (2019). 'Nigeria-China Trade Relations: Projections for National Growth and Development.' International Journal of Business and Management, 13 (8), 77-89.

Turcsanyi, R. (2018). Chinese Assertiveness in the South-China Sea. Prague, Czech Republic: Springer.

LOCALITY AND STEREOTYPICAL CONCEPTS AS PREDICTORS OF VOTING ATTITUDES AMONG PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ADULT NIGERIAN EMPLOYEES

UGOCHUKWU, CHRISTIAN OGBOGU[1], JACOB IGO[2], CASMIR NNAEMEKA NWANKWO[3], BASSY JOHN-JIREH[4]

[1, 2 & 3]DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, MADONNA UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA.

[4]DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, MADONNA UNIVERSITY NIGERIA.

Email id: [1]ugochukwuc@madonnauniversity.edu.ng & onudugo101@gmail.com, [2]bassy@madonnauniversity.edu.com, [3]jacob-igo@madonnauniversity.edu.ng & marcellinusigo@gmail.com, [4]atpeacecentre@gmail.com

KEYWORDS
Locality, Stereotypical concepts and voting attitude

ABSTRACT

The study examined the Locality and Stereotypical Concepts as the Predictors of Voting Attitude among Public and Private Adult Nigerians Employees. Locality as an established place one resides, and stereotype originally demoted a solid metallic printing plate containing stock image that is difficult to change once cast was measured with Gender Stereotype Scale (GSS) developed by Sekhar & Parameswari (2020), and voting attitude as the consistent manner of feeling and beliefs of how a person views the electoral process that predispose one to act in a certain way during voting was measured using Attitude to Voting Scale (AVS) developed by Obiechina (2009). Two hypotheses was formulated and tested, two hundred and six (206), (volunteered (62) and drawn (144)) participants using accidental and convenience sampling technique from eight states within four geo-political regions (East, South, West and North) of the country (Anambra, Abia, Cross River, Bayelsa, Ondo, Oyo. Kanu and Kaduna) participated in the study. They were 122 males and 84 females with their age ranged between 27-59 years, average mean age of 30.69 and standard deviation age of 4.63. The study design was cross-sectional, correlational and hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used as the statistical package. Results of the data analysis shows that gender, locality and stereotype significantly ($\beta = .36$; $t = 4.09$, $p < .01$; $\beta = .37$*; $t = 4.66$, $p < 0.1$ and $\beta = .26$; $t = 4.69$, $p < .01$) predicted the voting attitude of the studied participants. These significant results were discussed alongside with the literature reviewed, implications and recommendation were made.*

Introduction

Voting as the action of choosing an eligible personality in an election forms an intrinsic part of democracy because technically it is connected with movement that stimulate by or as by life stream of every election. But then, democracy-government by the people, direct or representative; unprivileged class can only be as good as the quality of the decision making process that voters use to elect their leaders. For this reason, Plato, in the *Republic*, posits that democracy comes into being when there is an equal share of freedom and power (Plato, the Republic, 2000). If this being the case, the fact that voters rely on locality, stereotypes-facial appearances, gender, self-image and fixed idea-to elect leaders leaves voting much to be desired as it has posed a great concern to the integrity and transparency of election. It is quite startling and absolutely appalling that some voters bank on the political facial-self-image and locality of individuals to select their candidates which further places more doubt to the credibility of voting. To this effect, stereotype-a relatively fixed and oversimplified generalization about a group or class of people may be used when making quick, decisions (Ogbogu, 2018). In other words, using stereotypes for a category of people could amount to zooming them out of the circuit of rational which could naturally translate into casting them out of the circuit of humanity since the rational faculty is that which makes us human. And when this comes into play, such categories of people will be denied certain quintessential rights, such as politics, civilization and socialization as the case may be. Stereotypes encourage prejudice and may arise for a number of reasons which include, ethnocentrism, sentimental discrimination and physical attack (Vega, 2018). Coming from a tripartite view of intergroup attitude, stereotypes reflect expectations and beliefs about the characteristics of the members of groups perceived as different from one's own, prejudice represents the emotional response, and discrimination refers to actions (Fiske et al; 2008).

Voting attitude on the other hand is a psychological construct, an enduring pattern of evaluative responses towards a person, object, or issue. According to frequently quoted classical definition, it is a more or less consistent patterns of affective, cognitive, and conative or behavioural responses (or of feeling, thinking and behaving) towards a psycho-political object, but the consistency implied by this definition is a supposition that is frequently unmatched by reality, and it is possible to have voting attitude towards something without ever having opportunity to express it in behaviour. Election or voting attitude cannot be complete in isolation of stereotype and locality which refers to the particular area, place or geographical location an individual resides and this boils down to the fact that they are constants in every election or anything that has to do with voting.

In a simpler formation, voting attitude which is flexible depends hugely on the influence the stereotypes and locality have on it during voting. In the same vain, stereotype has a great influence on the voting attitude be it gender, age, ethnicity etc. for instance, when a female candidate is contesting against a male candidate in an election, the majority of voters assume that the female cannot have such a position because for them, some delicate positions should be for the men and women belongs to the kitchen and bedroom as wrongly perceived. This would make the female folks have that wrong conception/impression and make them refuse to come out and vote thereby affecting their voting attitude. Locality on its own has a way of making people in an under develop areas feel their votes do not count because they feel that voting is meant for people that stay in high brow areas hence when development comes it does not go to make them, thereby making them reluctant to vote. In a nutshell, stereotype be it gender or ethnicity affects the voting strength of the people whereas, voting attitude, on the other hand, is a strong variable because many people have the poor mentality of voting saying afterwards their vote would not count based on the canker worm called rigging. In recognition of the foregoing point of fact, this study seeks to examine the predicting, nature of locality and stereotypical concepts on voting attitude among public and private Nigeria employees.

Statement of the Problem

Elections form a very important component of the democratic process. Thus, there are no less important in a developing policy plagued insatiability in succession crisis attendant to flawed electoral processes, while the principle was introduced in Nigeria almost a century ago, rancor and controversies. Indeed, disputes pertaining to electoral system and process have truncated the democratic process since in the less than half-a-century of Nigeria's existence as an independent state. The return to civil rule after a long period of military interregnum was

expected to usher in an enduring democracy in the wake of the world-wide wave's democratization. Yet the elections of the leaders were as flawed as the previous elections, heightening calls for a reform of the electoral laws.

The idea was to strengthen the system's capacity to conduct free and fair elections that could serve as a basis for orderly transfer of political power and a building block of democratic consolidation. In order to achieve that, the voting attitude of electorate must be considered and transformed positively. There have been so many stereotypes toward voting which most times is linked to the locality of an individual thereby affecting the voting attitude of individuals toward voting; these stereotypes include gender, ethnicity, religion, social-political class etc. For instance, people in rural area are considered incapable of handling political office or position as the case may be, thereby, limiting their chances, of contesting for political position. Worst still, this particular group might not be allowed to vote because they were not enlightened and their votes do not count. Also, they do not have the motivation to come out for electoral activities because they, on their own part, feel their votes no matter how they vote will be manipulated. Hence, the issue of locality as regards the urban/cities and rural comes into clearer perspective in there is no fair play in the administration of changes or opportunities which of cause, is as a result of the concept formation nurtured by people from rural environment. This is what this study seeks to address, to extrapolate the influence of predicting nature of locality and stereotype on the voting attitude of Public and Private Adult Nigerian Employees. Having a better grasp of this study, the following research questions guided the study:

i. Will locality significantly predict the voting attitude of the sampled participants?

ii. Will stereotype significantly predict the voting attitude of the sampled participants?

iii. Will locality and stereotype jointly significantly predict voting attitude of the Public and Private Adult Nigerian Employees?

Aim/Purpose of the Study

The study is designed to investigate if:

i. Locality will predict voting attitude of the sample participants.

ii. Stereotype will predict voting attitudes of the sampled participants.

iii. Locality and stereotype will jointly predict voting attitude of the Public and Private Adult Nigerian Employees.

Theoretical Position

Sociological Model of Voting Behaviour (Berelson et al, 1954)

Accordingly, the theoretical assumptions of the sociological model of voting behaviour is defined in three essential works: the People's Choice (Lazarsfeld et al, 1944), Voting (Berelson et al, 1954) and Person influence (Peter, 1967). From their research and model, Lazarsfeld et al, (1944), assert that an individual learns the partisan predisposition conformable to the political traditional of membership or reference groups. In view of this, this model makes much of the social characteristics of each individual or the properties of group variables than attitudes to issues or candidates having an effect on the final voting decisions and party choices. Of course, sociological model the argument continues, links voting behaviour to group membership, suggesting that elector tend to adopt a voting pattern that reflects the socio-economic position of the group to which they belong rather than developing a psychological attachment to a group on the basis of family influence. This model highlights the importance of a social alignment, reflecting the various divisions and tensions within society. Furthermore, the most significant of these divisions and tensions are class, gender, ethnicity and religion. In simple terms, the sociological model is based on the premise that voting attitude and behaviour is affected by one's social class (Peter, 1967). Again, Lazarsfeld et al; (1944), whose previous interests had focused on the study of the psychological mechanisms involved in the processes of people's choice holds that the act of voting is an individual act, affecting mainly by the personality and the attitude of the voter. Attitude as a context is

dependent on the personality of the individual which is a sum total of the various location, he/she has found him/herself. The theory on its own opines that voting has to do with the attitude and personality of the individual involved.

Integrated Model of Stereotype Threat (Schmader et al; 2013)

Although numerous studies demonstrate the effects of threat on performance, questions remain as to specific cognitive factors that underlie these effects especially as it relates to voting behaviour. Schmeader et al; (2013) originally speculated that attempts to suppress stereotype-related thoughts leads to anxiety and the narrowing of attention thereby suppressing the choice of picking a candidate and attitude of an individual towards voting. The integrated model of stereotype threat focused on three interrelated variables:

- Stress arousal
- Performance monitoring which narrows attention.
- Efforts to suppress negative thoughts and emotion

Schmader et al; (2013) suggest that these three variables summarize the pattern of evidence that has been accumulated by past experiments on stereotype threat. For example, stereotype threat has been shown to show poor attitude towards voting as many see it that they are sidelined and hence no need of voting. A number of studies looking at physiological and neurological responses support Schmader and his colleagues' integrated model of processes that produce stereotype threat.

Supporting an explanation in terms to stress arousal, "one study argues that African-Americans under stereotype threat exhibit larger increases in arterial blood pressure (Blascovich et al; 2011). Individuals under stereotype threat display increased heart rates, stereotype threat may also activate a neuroendocrine stress response, as measured by increased levels of cortisol while under threat. The physiological reactions that are induced by stereotype threat can often be subconscious and can distract and interrupt cognitive focus from the task. Stereotype threat causes a lot of reluctance of individuals towards voting and these leads to poor of turnout and poor attitude of people to compete during an election like we have in Nigeria.

Clearly, Nigerians consistently fallen victim to the manifestations of stereotype in the voting attitude and behaviour of its citizens. With an overly pronounced recourse to ethnicity and religion which have marred Nigerian's politics, choice of votes and voter's decisions in electioneering in Nigeria is heavily determined by ethnicity and religion. For one reason, the electoral choice of Nigerians are ethnically and religiously coloured as party formations are ethnically and religiously designated and motivated. These attitudes, in their manifestations, generally underrate people from other ethnic and religious groups and even see them as infidels, and so, are not fit for political responsibilities. The fatal effect of religiosity and ethnicity on electoral activities in Nigeria has remained unceasing even after more-than 60 years of political independence and the struggle for the attainment of national integration and unity. This situation besides going unabated has in recent years assumed a more perilous and dangerous dimension. These indices are apparently experienced in every of our socio-political, religious and economic stage and have also been blamed for the many woes that have befallen Nigerian's voting attitude and behaviour. Such problems as electoral malpractice and inability to practice governance have their basis, to a large extent, in ethnicity and religiosity.

The Investor-Voter Model (Davies, 2008)

The investor-voter model focused on how business elites, not voters, play the leading part in political systems and it states that, since money driven political systems are expensive and burdensome to ordinary voters, policy is created by competing coalitions of investors not voters. According to the theory, political parties (and the issues they campaign on) are created entirely for business interests separated by the interests of numerous variables, such as labor-intensive and capital-intensive, and free market and protectionist business. In furtherance, this model assumes a measure of rationality on the part of the voter who expects a modicum of casting his/her vote for a particular candidate in whose political programme(s) he/she has a stake. This process is normally the preview of election financing and class rule, identifying the process by which people come to hold governmental offices funded by a clique or cabal

with economic and political interests to persevere and project.

In Nigeria, the Investor Voter Model could be likened to what is called "money politics" and it is based on the ascendancy registering its presence in just about all the registered parties. For one thing, this model paves way for the political bourgeois in the country to dominate and occupy key elective and appointive political positions and offices in the country. These political Lords and their lieutenants will then control the power of the state and in turn, authoritatively decides who gets what, when and how. Money seems to have taken a centre stage in the political process in many countries in Africa and Nigeria in particular. It is sad to note that money now plays the increasing critical role in political and electoral processes to the extent that the word "money politics" with a pejorative connotation, has crept into the country's political lexicon. The problem with this situation is that the electoral process is often compromised resulting in elections not being free and fair (Davies, 2008, Ovwasa, 2014). The major worry however, is the noticeable corrupting influence of money politics and its negative impacts on the country's democracy as it has done more harm than good in the attitudinal and behavioural-pattern of voters' (Saliu & Lipade, 2005).

Elite-Voter Theory (Mills 1956)

The emergence of elite-voter theory as a paradigm of explaining social reality is credited to the works of Gaetano Mosca (1855-1941), Vilfrado Pareto (1848) and Charles W. Mills, (1916-1962). Central to their argument is that a small minority inevitably rules the masses in society. Actually, this theory emphasizes the ways in which a small minority manipulates and rules the masses because of their materials, intellectual or even moral abilities. Mills. (1956), on the other hand, asserts that some individuals (elites) are born with differential intrinsic intellectual endowments which he calls "residues". And that social mobility in an ideal society will favour those endowed with the power of persuasion and force. In every society, there is and must always be a minority which rules. In any type of society at any point of history, there are two classes of people; a class that rule and a class that is ruled. The former contains a few numbers of people and poses all political power and privileges whereas the later consist of large number of people and are subjected to rule of former and provides essential instrument for political organization. Elites are persons who, by virtue of their strategies locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially (Welzel, 2008). No doubt, Nigerian's political power is accessible only to the privileged rather than openness to contestation as advertised by political analyst and this, as a point in fact, continues to impair democratic governance in the Nigerian polity (Welzel, 2008). Annoyingly, the security apparatus is scandalously being used by the core-elites to repress the masses and silent the hard-core opponents in the bid to maintain state power. These minority groups that rule derived its original power almost invariably from force or coercive services such as the monopoly of military function. But then over time, this coercive services power is routinely transformed into hegemony. The minority ruling circle is composed of all those who occupy commanding political positions. It overtime undergoes changes in different ways. Sometimes, it is through a recruit of people from the lower echelons of the society into the ruling elite group. At other times, a new group is incorporate into the governing elite or by a complete replacement by a "counter-elite" through a revolution. These changes in the composition of the elite group have been termed circulation of elite. All these put together will in turn, be like opening the Pandora's Box to the poor innocent masses. Therefore, sociological theory was considered as a complementary theory in explaining voting attitude and behaviour.

Empirical Position

Stereotype has a hypnotic power on the voting attitude and behaviour and this boils down to the fact that it determines the gender, age ethnic and religion, of the candidates for political positions. Thus, it seems obvious that stereotyping influences candidate evaluation with regard to issue of competence. For one thing, voters may use candidate gender as an "information shortcut" to estimate the features of the politician, as they might use other demographic characteristics or partisanship to evaluate political candidates (Popkin, 1991). In a society with a traditional division of labour, gender stereotypes tend to be strong, that is they are shared by both men and woman and have a profound effect on voting attitudes and behaviour (Nwachukwu et al, 2014). As this view continues, Dolan, (2010) worked on gender stereotypes, candidates' evaluations and voting

for women candidates. He opines that elections involving women candidates in the United States can offer unsetting examples of voter gender stereotypes, but research on women candidates provides little in the way of available data that allows us to link stereotypes to voter decision-making. This study reports result from a 2010 survey designed to examine gender stereotypes, candidate evaluations and voting behaviour in the U.S House elections with women candidates running against men. In general, stereotypes are not a central part of candidates or voting decisions, but the political party of the woman candidate can shape their role in candidate evaluations and vote choice. On the predictive nature of gender stereotype on voting attitude and behaviour. Sarah, (2017) who investigated the psycho-demographic behaviour on voting attitude on behaviour goes further to observe that gender has a significant influence on voting attitude and behaviour and thus recommends that authorities should create a level playing ground for different gender and age bracket.

Similarly, Sarah (2017) opines that most research demonstrates that many voters use gender stereotypes to evaluate candidates, but does that stereotyping affect women's electoral success? In her paper, she tries to make headway in answering that question by combing a novel empirical strategy with local election data from California. Her empirical strategy relies on two key findings from the existing literature: first, that individuals are more likely to rely on stereotypes when they have less information about the candidates, and second, that the average voters in elections held concurrently with national elections have less information about local candidates that the average voters in off-cycle elections. She proposes that we can therefore estimate the electoral effect of increased gender stereotyping by examining the difference in women's win rates in higher information (off-cycle) and lower-information (on-cycle) elections, and how that difference varies by consistency and the office sought. Her preliminary results shows that the effect of increased stereotyping is more negative for female candidates in Mayoral races than in city Council races, and also that the effect of greater stereotyping is more negative for women running in conservative cities than in more liberals cities. Thus, she concludes that there probably isn't a single, one size-fits all answer to the question of how gender stereotyping affects female candidates, but rather that the direction and magnitude of the effect varies across contexts.

Locality has it deciding influence on election and the voting attitude of voters. For one reason, it focuses on the geographical background, be it rural or urban/city of which the candidate is suitable for which political position. Where is the candidate from? Is the person from a rural community or is he/she from an urban/city area? These and many more are some of the questions voters ask themselves before choosing their candidates. Hence, the location of a person already creates a division in the minds of voters thereby affecting their voting attitudes as to who they will choose as their candidates (Otiato, 2007). People from rural areas have a lower education level, poor means of transporting voters materials and personnel's and less access to information technology which is why it is hypothesized that these citizen will especially rely on non-policy voting instead of policy voting to determine their vote choice. However, the opposite is expected from the urban/city population, who would vote more policy oriented and less non-policy oriented. In comparison to the different electoral outcomes in rural and urban/city areas, the differences in voting attitude and behaviour are small and actually the other way round than expected. Rural voters vote slightly more policy oriented, while urban/city voter focus more on non-policy voting (Otiato, 2007). The effect of interpersonal environment as measured by the degree of heterogeneity of political party preferences among important others in an individual's social network was investigated using a national probability sample in Japan and Regional sample in New Zealand by Liu and Ikeda (2010). In both culture, the interpersonal environment exerted significant and consistent effect on individual voting preferences.

To bring this to clearer perspective, Otiato (2007) worked on voters' behaviour in general elections in kenya from 1992-2007 and its implications for the development of liberal democracy. Consequently, this study endeavours to examine the factors that structure voting behaviour namely: purposive corporate social bonds, primordial corporate social bonds and socio-demographic variables. The study adopted a cross-sectional survey research design with a multi-stage sampling technique, inferential statistics such as ANOVA, t-test and linear regression were employed to test relationships, predictions and draw conclusions. Research findings obtained revealed that region, religion and income were the best predictors of voting behaviour. Voters in the then Nyanza (LUO) were highly influenced by

social bond in their voting behaviour, while Islam hada persuasive influence in shaping voting behaviour of its adherents more than any other religion. Voters earning more than Ksh 10,000 were found to be independent of social bonds in their voting behaviour. On the basis of these findings, the researchers concluded that this might be some kind of modern-day functionalism. Some form of function tangible or intangible that some regional or religious affiliation perform for voters which is why they are more likely to stick to one of their kind (or against as the case may be) or vote the highest bidder for those with low incomes. It was also concluded that it is because of lack of civic education coupled with strong primary social bonds (that is, in-group identity writes large). This means that voter is more likely to vote for candidates who originate from their regions, conforming voters' strong attachment to the notion of home district.

Every country has its own fair share of the empirical evidence/review and its own corresponding effect on the voting attitude and behaviour. While there may be some traces of locality and stereotype influencing voting attitude and behaviour in Nigeria, the choice of candidates in Nigeria is greatly influenced by the day-today and lived experienced of its citizens. Now looking at the Nigerian political arena, the voter's attitude and behaviour has greatly been influenced by ideological-psycho-social, psycho-political or socio-economic variables such as inflation and unemployment. On the one hand, ideology has become a major influence on votes Nigeria, especially the rural areas in such a way that what people belief in prompts their decision as to whom they will vote for. On the other hand, socio-economical variables, to a large extent influences people's vote because every rational being will want consciously vote for leaders that truly represent them, change their socio-political, socio-psychological and socio-economic status quo.

Hypotheses

- There will be significant prediction of locality on voting attitude of public and private adult Nigerian employees.
- There will be a significant prediction of stereotype on voting attitude of public and private adult Nigerian employees.
- There will be a joint significant prediction of locality and stereotype on voting attitude of the study participants.

Method

Participants

Two-hundred and six (206) (volunteered (62) and drawn (144)) using accidental and convince sampling technique from eight states within the four geo-political regions (East, South, West and North) of the country (Anambra, Abia, Bayelsa, Cross-river, Ondo, Oyo, Kanu and Kaduna participated in the study. They comprised 122 males and 84 females with their age ranged from 27-59 years, average mean age of 30.69, and standard deviation (SD) age of 4.63. Their marital status were 82 single and 124 married. Their educational status were (92) secondary-WEAC, GCE and NECO and (144) tertiary-NCE, Diploma, Degree, Masters and Ph.d. Their years of job tenor or service ranged from 5-35 years. One hundred and fourty-four (144) were Christian, sixty two (62) Muslims, while non-traditionalist (Pagan). Their nature, designation, features and names of their establishments were not variables of interest.

Instrument

Two instruments was used for the study which includes: The attitude to voting scale (AVS) developed by Obiechina (2009). This scale is 24 item rating scale designed to asses adults perception and attitude towards voting. Items on the scale were like live-point likert format where: SA-strongly Agree-5 to strongly disagree-1 point. Sample items in the scale include; interest in voting develops as election approaches; voting behaviour is influenced by personal appeals; people vote for candidates that will improve their standard of living etc. Obiechena (2009) reported internal consistency .84 Cronbach alpha, split half reliability .79 cronbach alpha, face and concurrent validity score of .48. The second instrument used for the study was Gender Stereotype Scale (GSS) developed by Sekhar & Parameswari (2020). This is a 23 item scale measuring gender stereotype and has internal consistency of .85 Cronbach alpha, split half reliability of .76 Cronbach alpha, face and concurrent validity score of .40. To revalidate the instrument in our context, the researchers in a pilot study obtained an internal consistency value of .82 Chronbach alpha, split half reliability of .68 Cronbach alpha, face and

concurrent validity value of .38. This ensured the adapted nature of the GSS in our context.

Procedure

The researchers administered the instruments to the participants (62 volunteered and 144 drawn) from the eight states within-four geo-political zone of country (East, South, West and North) at their leisure time when visited and instructed them on how to fill the instruments administered and return within 40 minutes interval, and the researchers were standby to render assistance to those who might have problems understanding the items on the instruments. On the whole a total of 220 instruments was administered of which 210 was retrieved, still some participants skipped vital items within the returned instrument, while some items within the instruments was mutilated making it a total (4). These four (4) badly affected instruments was discarded, remaining 206 which was formally and properly filled and eventually was used for data analysis.

Design/Statistics

The study was a survey type while the design was a combination of cross sectional and correlational in nature. Multiple regression analysis was the statistical package used. It is cross sectional because the participants of the study were assessed at a particular point in time, correlation was adopted because the focus of the study was correlation between the predictor variables and criterion variable.

Result

Table 1: The mean, standard deviation and corrections of demographic variable, predictors and interior variables are shown in table 1.

S/No	Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Mean	SD
1	Age	-							-	-
2	Gender	.26	-						-	-
3	Marital Status	.29	.75**	-					-	-
4	Religion	.03	-.06	.06	-				-	-
5	Locality	-.13	.62**	-.48	-.04	-			-	-
6	Stereotype	-.7	-.32**	.37**	.05	-.21*	-		40.50	13.15
7	Voting Attitude	-.12	-.63**	-.62*	-.6	.41**	.48**	-	75.58	12.28

Note: *p<.05; **p<.01

Table 1 shows that age, gender, marital status, locality and stereotype were significantly correlated with voting attitude: age (r = -.12; P<.05); gender (r = 63; P<.01); marital status (r = -.62; P<.01); locality (r = 41; P<.01), and stereotype (r = 48; P<.01). However, among the demographic variables, it was only religion that was not significantly correlated with voting attitude.

Table II: Hierarchical regression of voting attitude on gender, locality and stereotype

Variables	Voting Attitudes		
N = 206	ΔR^2	Beta	t
Step 1	.46**		
Age		.09	1.55
Gender		.36*	4.09
Marital Status		.02	.31
Religion		-.01	-.21
Locality		-.37*	4.66
Step 2	.05*		
Stereotype		-.26	4.69

Note: *p<.06, **p<.01

Table II shows the result of hierarchical regression analysis of the participant's voting attitude on gender, locality and stereotype. In the hierarchical regression analysis, all the variables were entered two steps. In step 1, the demography variable was entered, variables entered in step 1 accounted for a significant 46% variance in the participants voting attitude. The results of the analysis indicated that among the demographic variable studied, gender (β = .36*; t = 4.09, P< .01) and locality (β = .37*; t = 4.66; P<.01) significantly predicted voting attitude among the participants. However, age marital status and religion did not show any significant relationship with voting attitude among the poor participants. In the step II stereotype (β = -.26; t = 4.69; P< .01) significantly predicted voting attitude among the study participants, though in a negative direction.

Discussion and Conclusion

The major aim of this study is to determine the predicting nature of locality and stereotype in voting attitude of Public and Private Adult Nigerian Employees. As a result, two hypotheses were postulated and tested. First that there will be a significant prediction of locality on voting attitude among the sample participants. The result of the study concurred with first hypothesis and the findings is consists with previous other studies such as, Otiato (2010) who discovered that interpersonal environment exerted significant and consist effects individual voting preference. They opine that people in urban areas have more turnouts during selections than people residing in rural areas. To this effect, candidates focus more in campaigning in urban/cities areas where they are sure that will have massive turnout. Locality as seen from the study has a great effect towards voting attitude and this because the place a person resides greatly influence whether the person will come out and vote or not. In Nigerian for instance, we have two areas human residents in, it is either the rural area. Due to some variables like accessibility of roads and educational exposure people residing in urban/city areas come out to vote in mass compared to people residing in rural areas. The rural dwellers see it that they are neglected by the authorities and government due to poor infrastructures so they tend to be so reluctant in coming out to vote. Another variable is academic and learning exposure, as many resides in urban/city areas are academically sound and learned as they know the implications of not voting which would lead to the wrong person stepping into the position.

The result of the hierarchical regression analysis supported the anticipation that stereotype (that e.g, gender, age, marital status and religion) would predict voting attitude of the studied participants. Consequently, the second

hypothesis was partially accepted. This is line with Olapedgba (2007) who investigate the psycho-demographic behaviour on voting behaviour and attitude and goes further to observer that gender (sex) has a significant influence on attitude and behaviour of voting and thus recommends that authorities should create a level playing ground for different and age brackets. A significant body of the work suggests that voters ascribe to women candidates, certain stereotype policy competencies and personality characteristics. In terms of gender linked personality traits, women candidates are generally viewed as more compassionate, expressive, honest and better able to deal with constituents than me. Men are viewed as more competent, decisive, stronger leaders, and possessing a greater ability to handle crises (Burrel, 2008; Paul & Smith, 2008). Assumptions about women candidates generally conform to stereotyped think about position issue as well. Women are assumed to be more interested in, and more effective at dealing with, issues such as child care, poverty, education, health care, women's issues and the environment than are men, while men are thought to be more competent at dealing with economic development, physical and social development, security and life protection, military, trade, taxes, agriculture etc. (Dolan, 2010; Alexander & Anderson, 1993).

Perhaps the most important aspect of stereotypes of women candidates is that ideas about the abilities and competencies of female and male candidate may serve as a basis for voters to choose or reject particular candidate much of the literatures on stereotype and sex raise concerns that the presence of gender stereotypes could mean that people would fail to see women candidates as having the set of skill/abilities or policy interest to be viable leaders (Lawless, 2004). Indeed, a role of gender stereotypes in voter's choice and attitude is supposed to be known as a baseline gender preference. Many people have underlying preference to be represented by a woman or a man and that this predisposition is determined, in part, by gender stereotypes. However, results of previous work suggests that there is no clear evidence as to whether stereotypes will consistently hurt or help women candidates. But the results of this study show from regression analysis that gender, age and locality have a lot of significant towards the voting attitude.

Implication of Findings

The study has provided evidence that locality and stereotype are strong predictors to the voting attitude of the study participants. From this, it implies that people look at the particular place a candidate comes from and this determines if they would vote for the person or not. People prefer to vote for people from known background, culture or ethnic group as the feel that they would benefit more from in and get what they call the national cake, they feel or believe that people from other ethnic or cultural background may not bring development to their areas, so whenever a candidate is not from their tribe they tend to have poor voting attitude towards voting. Also, for locality, it implies that people dwelling in urban/city areas tend to vote more than people residing in rural areas, this is basically due to education, social, psycho-social and physical exposure and they also tend to get their information and material for voting earlier than people residing in the rural areas. When the rural resides see or observed that these things are not made available to them, they tend to sit down, perceive and feel that they are neglected during voting and this will in turn lead to poor voting attitude and behaviour towards voting.

Moreso, the gender of a person is a predictor of participants choice or voting attitude as some people perceived or feels that some positions are meant for male candidates therefore when a female aspirant comes for it they tend to vote for their male counterpart like what we have in executive positions like counselor for wards Chairman for L.G. A, Governor for state and President for the country. Therefore, a lot of sensitization has to go on if this barrier and stereotype must be overcome.

Recommendation

Based on the study, the following recommendations have been made known for further consideration such as, seminars, workshops, symposium should be made possible and held to sensitize people on the importance of voting and why people have to come out and vote appropriately for the candidate of their choice, government should make electoral reforms to make sure that everyone irrespective of their locality, age and gender be given a level play ground to context for a position or in an election. When electing officers in political parties some localities and women should not be

neglected, they should be given a fairground in other to motivate electorates to votes. Following the analysis, this study stands on the existing hypotheses analyzed and research questions to prove that locality and stereotype has a greater predicting nature on the voting attitude and behaviour. However, the study also recommends that the political arena of our action and its narratives could be changed as regards the voting attitude and behaviour of voters.

To this end, government officials and citizens alike should work in paripassu such that everybody would have an equal right to exercise his or her franchise, in this way, we will have a better nation which will select her leaders, leaders who will have the common good at heart which will in turn make our nation a well-ordered society and entity.

Limitation of the Study

There is limited literature available reporting on studies conducted on predictor variables on the criterion variable in varying Nigerian context. Due to this limited available of literature in our context, literatures were drawn from more international context. A limitation to the present study is also the sample size (n = 206) which was small based on finance available, thus, making it difficult to generalize the results to the entire population. By increasing the sample size and conducting research at more than one nations, it may yield an increase in results and more of a willingness to participate. There was a hindrance with the distribution and collection of the measuring scales as few participants were not willing to participate in the study until they motivated (intrinsically & extrinsically).

Conclusion

The manifestations of locality and stereotype during elections have come to stay, and this stems from the fact that voters always have a way of casting a certain tag which could be on the basis of age, gender, religion, ethnicity, tribe etc. On the candidates during election which, perhaps, determine whether or not they would vote for these candidates. On the other hand, locality wields such great commending influence on voters' attitude and behaviour as it hand picks potential candidates for political positions based on the geographical, socio-psychological, socio-political and socio-economic location of the candidates in question. However, the location and geographical background of political aspirants be it rural or urban/city has gone a long way in creating a division in the minds of voters as to whom they will choose as their leader. Along this line, the place a candidate comes from determines if voters will vote for him or her. Concurrently, it has been suggested that people residing in the urban/city areas tend to vote more than people residing in the rural areas which could be due the perceptions and feeling of neglect coming from the side of the rural areas resides plus the fact that it is believed that the urban/city areas have more access to the social, psycho-social and physical resources needed from them to participate in voting activities which thus creates a lackadaisical voting attitude and behaviour.

References

Alexander, D. & Kristi, A. (1993). Gender as a factor in the attribution of leadership trits. *Political Research Quarterly 46, 527-545.*

Berelson, B. R.; Razarsfeld, P. F. & Mcphee, W. N. (1954). *Voting*: *A study of opinion Formation in a presidential campaign.* Chicago University press.

Blascovieh, J.; Seery, M. D. J.; Mugridge, C. A; Norris, R. K. & Weisbuch. M (2011). Predicting athletic performance from cardiovascular index of challenge and threat. *Journal of Experimental Psychology, 40.683-688.*

Burrel, S. (2008). *The impact of Gender Quotas. Oxford:* Oxford University press.

Davies, S. (2008). *The changing American voter*, Cambridges, Mass: Harverd University Press.

Dolan, M. (2010). *Social judgement: assimilation and contrast effects in communication and attitude change.* New Haven 12 Yale University Press.

Demia, R. (2001). Some effects of proportions on group life: Skewed sex ratios and responses to token women. *American Journal of Sociology, 82(1): 965-90.*

Fiske, I., Susan, I. & Fartie, D. (2008). *Party identification and Beyound*. New York: John Willey.

Lawless, J. (2004). Woman, War, and Winning elections gender stereotype in the post September 11th Era. *Political Research Quarterly, 57, 479-490.*

Lazarsfeld, P. F., Berelson, B. R. & Gaudat, H. (1944). *The people's choice: how he voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Mills, S. R. (1956). *The Power Elite:* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nwachukwu, S, Chika, V. & Kalu, A. (2014). Critical Mass Theory Revisited; the Behaviour and Success of token women in State legislatures. *Politics and Gender, 1(1):97-125.*

Obiechina, S. (2009). Attitude to voting scale. *Journal of Higher education, 2(1), 539-552.*

Ogbogu, U. C. & Bassey, J. J. (2019). Education and Good governance: A Psycho-political Analysis. *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Review, 9(1) 772-180.*

Ogbogu, U. C. (2018). Ethnic stereotype as a predictor of Interpersonal Relationship Among Young Adults. *Abia State University (ABSU) Journal of Sociology, 1(2), 182-293.*

Olapegba, A. (2007). A theory of Human Motivation. *Psychological Review. 50(4), 370-396.*

Otiato, V. (2007). Religiously base politics. *Religious elites and the public social Forces, P (3); 765-86.*

Ovwasa, B. (2014). Conceptualizing Stigma. *Annual Review of Sociology, 27:363-385.*

Paul, D. & Smith, J. (2008). The effect of increased Women's representation in parliament: the case of Rwanda. *Parliamentary Affairs, 61(2), 237-258.*

Peter, P. (1967). *Platform or Personality: The role of Party leaders in elections.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Plato, M. (2000). *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory.* New Heaven: Yale University Press.

Popkin, S. I. (1991). *Reasoning Voter*: *Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaign (2nd ed.)* Chicago University Press.

Saliu, J. & Lipade, E. (2008). The Bothersomeness of inconsistency in R. P. Abelson, E., Eronson, W. J., Meguire; Film Newcomb, M. J., Roseberg & P. H. Tannen Baum, (eds). *Theories of cognitive consistency; a source book (PP 393-399). Chicago Rand Mcnally.*

Sarah, S. (2017). *How women legislate.* Oxford University Press.

Schmader, T. & Johns, M. (2013). Converging evidence the stereotype threat reduces working memory capacity. *Journal of personality and social psychology, 85, 440-452.*

Sekhar, A. & Parameswari, J. (2020). An adoption of gender stereotype scale. *Journal of the Indian Academy of Applied Psychology, 46(1), 45-53.*

Vega, R. (1966). Religious elites and public Opinion: the Impact of the Bishops' Pace Pastoral. *Review of Politics, 54(1), 112-43.*

Welzel, A. (2008). Quotas and qualifications: the impact of gender quota laws on the qualifications of legislators in the Italian parliament. *Political science review 1, 26.*

A STUDY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN NIGERIA: A LESSON OF EUROPEAN UNION

DR. SURAJO YAHAYA MUHAMMAD
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, BAYERO UNIVERSITY, KANO, symuhammad.pol@buk.edu.ng

RABIU ADAM MUHAMMAD
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, AL-ISTIQAMA UNIVERSITY, SUMAILA KANO,
muhammadrabiuadam23@gmail.com, mrabiuadam.pol@ausumaila.edu.ng

KEYWORDS
Electoral Process, European Union, International Governmental Organization & Independent National Electoral Commission

ABSTRACT
The focus of this paper is to explore the contributions of European Union. EU on Electoral system in Nigeria with particular reference to 2015 general election, to identify the challenges faced by European Union EU during the monitoring of the conduct of Nigerian general election and to offer alternative recommendations on how European Union EU would strengthening election monitoring in the Republic of Nigeria, particularly during the 2015 general election. The paper adopted qualitative method of data collection and content analysis was used to analysed the data more so, the paper also relied mainly on the secondary source of data drawn from websites, international agencies, documents report, journals, article in newspapers, magazines and books. The paper also unveils that the European Union electoral support has contributed to the deployment in Nigeria of the fact-finding missions as election observers to enhance the integrity of election. The paper however, discovered that most of the electoral assistance that was given to Nigeria and Independent National Electoral Commission INEC as an institution that is in charge of electoral activities in order to have fair and credible electoral system were given with the aim for Independent National Electoral Commission INEC to increase its capacity to deliver more professional electoral activities, and despite this the European Union EU officials that are sent are not enough to cover the monitoring of elections in the entire nation. The paper therefore recommended that in order for electoral system to be free, fair, credible and internationally accepted, some things need to be done. Government must to place priority on voter education and Independent National Electoral Commission INEC should be more independent, its source of fund should not be from executive arm of government. Adequate funds should be provided

at the appropriate time, these will lead to free, fair, credible and transparency in the electoral process.

1.1 Introduction

The necessity for continental regional and sub-regional, international governmental organization to strengthen electoral system in Nigeria cannot be over emphasized this has made countries Nigeria inclusive to allow international governmental organization for effective intervention without necessarily compromising the national interest of each state. However, electoral system in Nigeria is bedeviled by a number of challenges which hinders the smooth conduct of elections in Nigeria, the manifestation of such challenges ranging from technical, financial, logistical, operational, and administrative weakness culminate to produce undesirable outcome during elections, this perhaps and orders made international governmental organization to provide support and assistance to countries Nigeria inclusive to ensure smooth, free, fair credible and transparent elections.

Election is one of the prerequisite of democratic governance and the building block of democratic consolidation. Electoral system is one of the hall mark of democracy in any modern society. The aim of electoral management body therefore, should be endanger a free and fair election that would guarantee the emergence of credible leader's. Good management of election can make government to be both responsible and responsive to the needs of the people. Free, fair and credible elections have been observed to be improbable in developing countries because of the institutional weakness on the election management.

The demise of military rule in the Nigerian 1999 (Fourth Republic) ushered in a new era for democratically elected government to steer the course of the Nigerian people. There were seven elections (1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019 and the recent 2023 general election. Since the country return to democratic dispensation in 1999. However, the ability of the country to conduct transparent and credible elections has become a mirage. The 1999, 2003 and 2007 election has been considered as the most controversial. There was continual degeneration in the conduct of these elections as a result of fragile election management, logistic deficiencies, rampant electoral rigging and lack of transparency in the system every election conducted tended to be worse than the previous one. This more or less negates the quality of these elections to meet international standards. The 2007 election marked the first successful transition of leadership by an elected government to another (Ibrahim and Ibeapnu, 2009). So also the second transition of leadership by leading party to an opposition party in 2015.

This paper therefore, seeks to explore the contributions of European Union EU on electoral system in Nigeria with particular reference to 2015 general election, to identify the challenges faced by European Union EU during monitoring the conduct of the elections and to offer alternative recommendations on how European Union EU would strengthening election monitoring in Nigeria.

1.2 Methodology

Secondary sources were used which includes related literature reviewed such as, Books, Journals, Scholarly Article Magazines, Newspapers, Websites, International Agencies & Documents Reports. However, the Paper also adopted Content Analysis as a Systematic Techniques used to interpret textual data.

1.3 Literature Review and Conceptual Clarifications

International Governmental Organizations

Held (1995), maintained that decisions made by quasi-regional or quasi supranational organizations (IGOs) such as EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) diminish the range of decision open to given national majorities. The idea of a community which rightly governs itself and determines its own future as an idea at the very heart of democratic polity itself is accordingly today deeply problematic.

That is why David (1995), assets that, it is based upon the recognition that democracy within a particular community and democratic relations among communities are interlocked, absolutely inseparable and those new organizational binding mechanisms must be created if democracy is to develop in the decades ahead. He further argued that although it is important to separate out arguments about transforming the organizational form of the state from arguments about the pertinence of the concept of modern state itself. The recognition that some of the duties and functions of the state are and most be performed at and across different political levels, local national, regional and international does not entail the idea of the state itself as wholly defunct.it entails that this idea must be adapted to stretch across borders. Therefore, an international governmental organization is an organization composed primarily of sovereign states, or other intergovernmental organizations. International governmental organizations are established by treaty or other agreement that acts as a charter creating the group. E.g., United Nation UN, African Union AU, World Bank and the European Union EU.

The role of international governmental organizations as seen from democratic peace researchers is that they alter state behavior; this indicates that international governmental organizations either bring conflict or peace in electoral process. However, Law (2007), maintains that international governmental organizations are considerable; they have also come to be seen as actors in their own right. An international governmental organization can give legitimacy to an undertaking that a state cannot act alone. This is mostly common to the United Nation UN, but it is equally true of almost any other international governmental organizations.

Robert Dahl cited in (Shapiro and hacker 1990) shares similar perspective with Law, because he indicates that an international governmental organization are organization that are necessary to many needs and goals that advocate for democracy contend that are best served by democratic governments. He also further maintains that they can sometimes assist a non-democratic country to make difficult transition from a highly undemocratic to a more democratic government. However, international governmental organization can help to expand human rights and the rule of law which happens to be among the important aspect democracy.

Electoral System

Emphasis will also be made on electoral system, an election according to the (Hutchinons: encyclopedia), is the process of appointing or selecting a person to public offices or a political party to govern by voting. It is indeed a vital political right of expression of choice. In line with the above, Godwin and Norton 1992 cited by (Oddih in Jega and Ibeanu 2007), election is a formal process of selecting a person for public offices or accepting or registering a political position by voting. They further that an election is one of the means by which a society may organize itself and make specified formal decisions, adding that where voting is free, it acts simultaneously as a system for making certain decisions regarding the power relations in a society.

Igbuzor (2011) assert that election are crucial because they give the procedure that allows members of an organization or community to choose representatives who will hold positions of authority within it.in any democratic system, it is crucial that elections be free and fair, Mackenzie (1967) identified four conditions for the conduct of free and fair election namely:

a) An independent judiciary to interpret the electoral laws.

b) An honest, competent nonpartisan electoral body to manage the elections

c) A developed system of political parties.

d) A general acceptance by the political community of the rules of the game.

Having achieving these can be said that a countries electoral system is in a progressive state. Andrew (2005), is of the view that electoral system is one of the most important institutional decisions for any democracy; this means it is a fundamental political process, at a more basic level; electoral systems translate the votes cast in a general election into seats won by parties and candidates.

Here electoral system is an important aspect of election because political institution shape the rules of the game under which democracy is practiced, and it is often argued that the easiest political institution to manipulate for good or for bad, is the electoral system. In translating the votes casts in a general election into seats in the

legislature, the choice of electoral system can effectively determine who is elected and which party gains power, while many aspects of a country political framework are often specified in the constitution and can also influence the way parties campaign and the way political elites behave, thus helping to determine the broader political climate, they may encourage or retard the forgoing of alliances between parties and they can provide incentives for parties and groups to be broadly based and accommodating, or to base themselves on narrow appeals to ethnicity or kinship ties.

King (2000) went further to state that electoral system can be divided into three general types; there is the plurality electoral system, majority electoral system and also proportional representation.

The choice of electoral system is one of the most important institutional decisions for any democracy, this also show that electoral system for example in Nigeria defines and structure the rules of political game, they help determine who is elected, how is fought, the role of political parties and most importantly, who governs.

For Chukwu (2007), an electoral system is a system which includes election observation and verification of activities carried out by local and international bodies or both. It also includes the establishment of institutions and structures that will mobilize the populace towards involvement in the electoral process and provides the rules.

Theoretical Framework

Given the focus of this paper, which is to examine the extent of contributions by the EU as an international governmental organization in strengthening electoral system in Nigeria, Institutionalism theory will serve as a theoretical guide.

The core of his contribution to this view of the world has been to explore how international institutions operate and its emphasis on the significance of institutions in the context of interdependence. But his exploration of institution and interdependence has taken place in the context of an awareness of how they are affected by others, broader factors. Hence, they did not assume that institutions and interdependence are the most important aspects of contemporary world politics that they somehow contain the unique key history. Indeed, they only make sense if they are fit into the larger puzzle. Keohane and Nye (1972) build their theory by focusing on how economic interdependence affected arrangement for governance, pioneered by Ernst B. Haas 1958 and thereby begin with a special theme of international organizational on transnational relations.

Power and interdependence contained an incipient theory of institutions in the form of what Nye and Keohane called an intergovernmental organization model of regime change. That power and interdependence was a puzzle of why state establishes international regimes-rule-oriented institutions that limit their member's legal freedom of action.

The major assumption of the theory is that institution performs important tasks for state enabling them to cooperate. In particular, institutions reduce the costs of making, monitoring and enforcing rules, transaction cost, provide information, and facilitate the making of credible commitments are reciprocity. The relationship between institutional theory and the paper is that, the theory relates to the paper intergovernmental organizations plays the role of power and interdependence in a state which enable the Nigerian state to cooperate so as to strengthen the electoral system of the country.

1.4 Discussion of Findings

Traditional paradigms in the world politics offer hard contrasting interpretations of the role of international governmental organizations (IGOs). Liberal institutional theory argues that IGOs foster nonviolent conflict resolution and constrain the advent of disputes, functionalists conceive IGOs as capable of transforming state preferences and promoting pacific global relations.

The IGOs influence on the democratization process mostly could be found in the electoral support or electoral assistance which covers a wide range of activities. It may include (funding) support for the design of an electoral system, determination of electoral boundaries, voter registration, voter education, voter education, voter training for political parties and the media. It usually includes building the capacity of an electoral management body EMB and making a contribution to its administrative costs.

Starting from the end of 1990s, election monitoring bodies (EMBs) and their operational partners turned to another key challenge: building trust across the various stakeholders involved in the electoral system process, in particular the electorate, political parties domestics, regional and international observers, civil society organizations and the media (Bargiacchi et al 2011.4) focus shifted from acquiring basic operational activities to organize electoral event which had in the previous decade undermined the EMBs work to solving political, financial and logistical constraints undermining credibility of the EMBs.

Although, electoral system is one of the major pillars of democratic governance which receives considerable attention from international agencies (IGOs), therefore it is an undeniable fact that election is one of the most significant aspects of democratic governance. Furthermore, the development and implementation of electoral cycle approach represent a critical shift in international electoral assistance from short term event-based support to longer term comprehensive assistance with increased focus on sustainability i.e. through capacity development of assistance efforts (Bargiachi, 2011). Therefore, the data yield that, since 1999 Nigeria's development partners have been active in supporting election. Donors programs have collaborated with a wide range of Nigerians stakeholders, supported institutional reforms necessary to facilitate the electoral process and provided assistance to strengthen accountability mechanism to improve electoral system. (Nigeria's electoral assessment team 2010.6).

Election pose extremely complex logistical challenges, these include printing voting materials, equipping voting stations, training large numbers of temporary staff, establishing secure method for country tabulating and communicating results and establishing procedures for dispute resolution(ICAI, 2012) cited in Maduagwu (2016).

Since election in Nigeria have been regarded as flawed by both Nigerians and the international community, with each poll progressively worse than the last, i.e. according to many domestic and international observers, then what has changed during this wave (4th republic) is the normative weight given to human rights and to democracy as a human right- in international discourse, treaties, law and collective actions. The old conception of sovereignty is grooming under the weight of international scrutiny of domestic governance (Maduagwu, 2016.2). The world community is increasingly embracing a share normative expectation that all states seeking international legitimacy should manifestly "govern with the consent of the governed"- in essence. A "right to democratic governance" is seen as a legal entitlement (Franck, 1992) cited in Maduagwu (2016).

Elections depend on the exercise of political right by citizens and political competitors , they are in important test of the integrity of democratic institution (INEC) just as genuine credible elections are prerequisite for achieving democratic governance (NDI.2008) despite the growing IGOs interest in facilitating democratic activities (strengthening electoral system) in transitional countries (as it was in 1999 at the dawn of the Nigeria's fourth republic up till now) the dynamic of international institutions are poorly understood.

To ensure electoral integrity, electoral support initiatives cover a broad range of activities to meet a myriad of electoral and socio-economic challenges and ECOWAS address these challenges through development cooperation with both the European union (EU) and (AU). The support of the EU and AU is critical to the success of the future initiatives of ECOWAS and to the enhancement of the quality of election in ECOWA member state.

An electoral assistance, EU assistance support has contributed to the deployment of fact-finding missions as election observers to enhance the integrity of elections which Nigerian has been a prime beneficiary Maduagwu, (2016).

European Union Intervention in Nigerians General Elections

Guiding Principles for Electoral Assistance

Electoral assistance donor and implementation organizations have governed substantial experience in the implementation of project based on the electoral cycle approach. It has then become possible to evaluate the key lessons learnt in order to make future electoral assistance more effective. To this end, the European commission, DFID-UKAID and the United Nations development program have commission external evaluations carried out in 2009, 2010 and 2011 and 2015 (currently in progress. (IDEA, 2016). (Democracy in

Development Global Consultations on the E U's role in Democracy Building).

Promoting Synergy between Election Observers and Electoral Assistance

Whereas electoral assistance means "technical or material support given to electoral system", electoral observation entails "the purposeful gathering of information regarding an electoral process, and the making of informed judgments on the conducts of such a process on the basis of the information collected by persons who are not inherently authorized to intervene in the system. Assistance and observation represent complementary activities and when coordinated, can create opportunities for the maximization of election support.

During the period under investigation one hundred (100) EU observers came to Nigeria to monitor the elections and they were distributed to six (6) geo-political zones of the country. Some of the issues discovered during the writing of this paper include:

- delimitation of electoral boundaries
- Financing of Campaigns
- Cost of Election
- Media Access
- Voter registration (Including Audit of Voter Based on Biometric and Automated Finger Prints Identification System)
- Results Aggregation
- Electoral Violence
- Electoral Disputes Resolution Mechanism (INEC 2015 General Election Report).

Similarly, the total support from development partners for 2015 general election was 5,207,260,433.55 (five billion two hundred and seven million, two hundred and sixty thousand, four hundred- and thirty-three-naira, fifty-five kobo). (INEC 2015). It was essentially provided through the sponsorship of workshops, seminars, conferences, enlightment programs and the engagement of consultants as well as technical aids in the office of the chairman, INEC. This facilitated the reviews, promotions and delivery of electoral services towards the successful conduct of the 2015 general election as reported in the INEC repot 2015. So therefore, the data yielded that the funding's of EU specifically which was granted through UNDP and DGD in sum of 1,525,129,488.88. (One billion, five hundred and twenty-five million, one hundred and twenty-nine thousand, four hundred and eighty-eight naira. Eighty-eight kobo was used by the institution (INEC) to support the activity of voter education and enlighten as also adapted from (INEC 2015 general election report).

A number of components were identified by this paper which helped in achieving the objective;

Promoting Credible, Transparent and Sustainable Electoral System

- Strategic planning, policy and operational capacities of INEC were strengthened.
- Electoral system,(voter registration and voter education) were improved through information and communication technology (ICT)
- Professional capacity of INEC electoral institute and INEC are improved.
- Professional capacity of and collaboration between INEC and SEIC including collaboration with INEC are improved.
- Capacity parties is strengthened (INEC 2015 general election report)

Enhancing Participation by Women, Youth and other Marginalized Groups

- Legal reforms and women's empowerment initiative to promote affirmative and women's empowerment in politics and elections were undertaken.
- Pool of women aspirants for elective offices at various levels enlarged.

Development Capacity of CSOs Involved in the Electoral Process

- Zonal network and individuals CSOs were strengthened.
- CSOs are present in all the 6 geopolitical zones and adopt a rigorous methodological approach that ensures that observation reports are credible, independent and effectively harmonized.
- Civil society capacity to carry out election observation is enhanced which main activities were
    1. Support CSO effort to undertake election observations, including thorough training, data collection and analysis during election
    2. Support documentation and analysis of lesion learnt from election observation
    3. Support the review, design and implementation of voter/ civic education working closely with INEC, the national orientation agency, CSO and the media.
    4. Establish an innovative small medium grants scheme available to CSO community based organizations non-governmental and associations to conduct voter education and public information activities on Deeping democratic values and principles. Priority will be given to women-based groups to ensure women's participation in all aspect of electoral process.
    5. Enhance CSO collaboration with INEC and other actors on civic and voters education including development of materials based on various channels of communication and targeting a broad spectrum of voters, more specifically women, people with disabilities and first term voters.
    6. Provide institutional support and training of CSOs to undertake media monitoring during elections
    7. Support media-based initiatives, including training, to promote self-regulation in relation to the coverage of elections. (EU Annex 2014).

European Union (EU) and the Challenges of Electoral Process in Nigeria

Domestic observers put much reliance on the international governmental organization especially EU which has been widely known for wide capacity of monitoring across the length and breadth of the world. And the fact that EU observers are not adequate to monitor the entre 774 local governments in Nigeria cannot compile a comprehensive report.

On the other hand, INEC claimed that, in its capacity to ensure accreditation of international observers during the general elections, it takes some series of guidelines which cover such things as the process of selection and accreditation of observers, code of conduct, responsibilities of both observers and INEC, as well as detailed description of political parties and electoral system in Nigeria in order to ensure transparency and accountably in the electoral process as well as delay and absence of election materials in some places had led to delay in the start of the election on time in many places which created conflict among supporters of different political parties.

Another challenge faced by the EU in the monitoring of election in Nigeria during the period was insecurity, this is very clear particularly in the North East and South-South of Nigeria where terrorist prevented the smooth conduct of the election, Borno state is an example.

Another challenge faced by the EU representatives during the conduct of the elections was absence of networks in many part of the country particularly the rural areas which militates against the smooth monitoring and dissemination of information.

Lack of electricity in the rural areas made the EU observers reluctant in staying for a very long time in the rural areas to effectively monitor the elections.

Conclusion

Based on the data collected and the reports from the international governmental organization on the role they played in strengthening electoral system in Nigeria confirms the relevance and importance of their interference in Nigeria's electoral system during the 2015 general elections are the most relevant elections in the fourth republic, however, it has been observed that overreliance on the data and reports from the international governmental organization has been as the most notable challenge that I have been able to identify in terms of electoral activities in Nigeria that hinders the smooth progress of electoral system in Nigeria, although election observers are likely to adopt more aggressive attitude to a country's election and its managers in early post authoritarian election but yet the domestic observers put much reliance on the international governmental organization especially EU which has been widely known for wide capacity of monitoring across the length and breadth of the world.

Recommendations

1. INEC to organize elections more professionally as well as to ensure the independence of electoral bodies, which will also help in ensuring the transparency and accountability of the accreditation of international governmental organization, and ward off undue influence from undemocratic government or external players.
2. Election materials should be adequate and delivered to every Centre on time in order to commence the process of the elections as scheduled.
3. Adequate security measure should put in place to enable the EU observers fell secured everywhere in the country during the conduct of an election, this would give them the peace in mind to discharge their monitoring task effectively.
4. This paper also recommends that, there should be effective internet networks connectivity across all the polling centers of the country, this can be achieved in collaboration with government and private telecommunication companies.
5. Electricity was also recommended by this paper of to be provided in all the remote area in order to enhance EU election monitoring.
6. Independent national electoral commission must enforce the provision of the law and that is one sure way of getting criminal elements masquerading as party agent off the street and off the polling units. INEC must make it clear to the political parties that any party agents that are not accredited and found near any polling units on election day will be arrested and prosecuted and the prosecution should be ensured.

References

Attashiru, M.J (2015) Election Management in Nigeria: The evolution of the Nigerian electoral process 2010-2015, Safari Books Ltd, Ibadan.

Attahiru M.J & Okechukwu I. (2007) "Election and the future of Democracy in Nigeria"

Bargiacchi F. and Bakken, M. (2011) The Electoral Cycle Approach: Effectiveness and Sustainability of Electoral Assistance. Istituto di studi di politica internazionale (ISPI) working paper.

EU Support to Nigeria's electoral cycle (2011-2015) II, of the Commission decision on the Action Document. ANNEX 2016.

European Union Observation Mission, Final Report Federal Republic of Nigeria 2015.

Independent Electoral Assistance final report 2010

Independence National Electoral Commission INEC final report 2015.

NDI final report, 2007 General Elections.

Ibrahim,O.Ibeanu(2009), Direct Capture: "the 2007 Nigerian Elections and Subversion of Popular Sovereignty". Published by CDD.

Law, M.D. (2007), "intergovernmental organization and their role in security sector reform".

Maduagwu, A.A and Adaku C. (2016). External influence on the democratization process in Nigeria: the support to elections. National institute for policy and strategic studies (kuru) and center for inter African and human development studies (CIDES) Jos.

Nigerian civil society situation room. Report on Nigeria's 2015 general elections 28th march & 11th April 2015 (July 2015)

Nigerian journal of electoral and political behavior: national electoral commission, NEC, vol 1, no 1, September 1990. A National electoral commission publication No, 8 1990.

Shapiro I. and Hacker C. (1999), "Democracy's edge" (can international organization be democratic? Skeptics view by Robert a Dahl.

INTERNET BANKING AND ADOPTION OF STUDENTS: A CASE OF NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, MAIDUGURI STUDY CENTRE

MUHAMMAD AJID BUKAR
DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA (NOUN)
ajidbukar@gmail.com

HARUN BAKARI RANN
DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI, MAIDUGURI, BORNO STATE
hrbakari@unimaid.edu.ng

ABUBAKAR HASSAN
DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER ENGINEERING, UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI, MAIDUGURI, BORNO STATE
abubakarhassan523@gmail.com

KEYWORDS
Information technology, internet, banking, information, technology adoption

ABSTRACT
Internet banking is a great innovative financial service which is less expensive, provides the flexibility of time and space, and have brilliant customer service experience. Commercial banks around the world are offering internet banking to customers to leverage on its advantages. However, these services remain underutilized by their customers, particularly in developing countries like Nigeria. Several studies have explored factors influencing technology adoption. But a comprehensive analysis within the context of the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) specific to internet banking remains underexplored. Furthermore, most of the research focuses on specific aspects, such as security or usability, without integrating a holistic view encompassing performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, facilitating conditions, behavioral intention, and actual usage behavior. This study investigates the factors influencing the adoption of internet banking among students at the National Open University of Nigeria, Maiduguri Study Centre, employing the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) Model. The study adopted a survey design, and the population consists of 944 registered students at the Maiduguri Study Centre. A sample size of 282 was determined using the Yamani formula, and simple random sampling was employed to select participants. The data was analyzed using both descriptive and inferential statistics techniques using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS). Findings from the study revealed that users believe that internet banking enhances their

financial management effectiveness and efficiency. They find internet banking easy to use, but the relationship between effort expectancy and adoption is not significant. Users feel influenced by important individuals and their friends or family to use internet banking services. They also believe they have the necessary resources and skills for effective internet banking. Age is not a significant predictor of perceived use behavior. Gender, experience, performance expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions positively influence perceived use behavior. Effort expectancy does not significantly impact perceived use behavior. The overall model explains a significant portion of the variance in perceived use behavior ($R^2 = 0.476$), with a good fit (Adjusted $R^2 = 0.462$). The standard error of the estimate is 0.618. The study recommends financial institutions to provide user-friendly guides, customer support, and tools to enhance facilitating conditions and remove any barriers to usage.

Introduction

The introduction and acceptance of Internet banking as a new digital innovation for business and trade has the capability to minimise the cost of banking transactions and operations. It is customer friendly, cheaper, provides flexibility of time and space, has superior customer services and offers an array of services. All such benefits can enhance customers' online banking experience (Akhter et al., 2022; Chang et al., 2020). However, despite its potential benefits, a significant portion of the population remains hesitant to fully adopt and utilize internet banking platforms (Venkatesh et al., 2003).

Several existing studies have explored factors influencing technology adoption, yet a comprehensive analysis within the context of the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) specific to internet banking remains limited. Furthermore, existing research often focuses on specific aspects, such as security or usability, without integrating a holistic view encompassing performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, facilitating conditions, behavioral intention, and actual usage behavior (Davis, 1989; Venkatesh et al., 2003). As a result, this study aims to investigate the multifaceted elements of UTAUT and their interplay in the context of internet banking adoption. By delving into these key constructs, this study seeks to unravel the complex motivations, perceptions, and societal influences that shape users' decisions and behaviors regarding internet banking adoption.

Research Problem

The advent of internet banking has revolutionized the way individuals interact with financial services, offering enhanced convenience and efficiency. However, despite its potential benefits, a significant portion of the population remains hesitant to fully adopt and utilize internet banking platforms. Understanding the determinants and inhibitors of internet banking adoption is critical for both users and the banking industry.

Research Questions

This study seeks to answer the following research questions:

1. How do users perceive the usefulness of internet banking in enhancing their financial activities?
2. How do users perceive the ease of use and user-friendliness of internet banking services?
3. How does social influence impact users' intentions to adopt internet banking?

4. What factors significantly influence users' intentions to adopt internet banking in their financial routines?

Literature Review

Internet Banking and customers Adoption

Internet Banking (IB) is an umbrella term for all those banking activities performed by customers either electronically or online without going through the hassle of reaching out to brick-and-mortar banks. It encompasses the delivery of banking services via different channels such as the Internet, managed networks, personal computers, etc. In addition, it allows the use of the Internet and the Worldwide Web to allow customers to carry out financial activities in a virtual space. IB extends traditional banking services by making banking services available at any time, providing ease of access, removing the inconvenience of queues, banking hours, reducing operating costs to banks, etc(Inder et al., 2022).

Information System (IS) research has long studied how and why individuals adopt new information technologies. Within this broad field of specialization, there have been several streams of research (Venkatesh et al., 2003). Hassan & Farmanesh (2022) proposed and examined a conceptual model that explains the key factors influencing customers' intentions and usage of Internet banking, Mobile banking, and Telebanking in Jordan. Chang et al., (2020) developed a theoretical model by integrating the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and the Theory of planned behaviour (TPB) model with E-service-quality model to investigate the factors affecting the adoption of Internet banking in Mongolia.

Inder et al., (2022) conducted a study to determine the antecedents of behavioural intentions to adopt e-banking in an emerging economy such as India using Structural Equation Modelling (SME). Hammood et al., (2023) developed a conceptual model by incorporating perceived risk and trust into the technology acceptance model (TAM) theory toward internet banking. Shaikh et al., (2023) examined the factors that drive non-users of digital banking services rendered by Pakistani Islamic banks to adopt digital banking using the Diffusion theory of Innovation (DOI).

Esendemirli et al., (2024.) identified the factors influencing the adoption of digital banking in the Nigerian youth market. The research model extends the technology acceptance model (TAM) by further examining the impact of awareness, culture, social norms, perceived trust, perceived security on behavioural intention. Jouda et al., (2020) investigated the factors that determine user acceptance of mobile banking applications in Palestine by developing a new acceptance technology model that incorporates the decomposed theory of planned behaviour along with perceived trust. Jerene & Sharma, (2020) conducted a study to identify factors that determine bank customers' intention to adopt e-finance technologies in Ethiopia. It was confirmatory study to validate the integration of technology acceptance model (TAM) with customer awareness and subjective norm factors. Buhari, (2021) performed study on the impact and adoption of mobile banking services by customers while taking Kano State metropolis as a case study. (Pavithra & Geetha, 2021) performed a study to identify the factors affecting the customers' perception towards digital banking services, to know the satisfaction level and preference towards digital banking services.

Al-Gharaibah (2020) developed an extended a model to predict and explain customers' behavioural intentions regarding adopting online banking in Malaysia based on Technology Acceptance Model. Kumar et al., (2023)study was to investigate the role of perceived financial cost, perceived risk, and trust in the adoption of mobile banking services by users. The study extends the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) to explain the adoption of mobile banking services by young Indian customers. Wen Ni, (2020) investigated the relationship of core constructs such as trialability, compatibility, observability, perceived usefulness, and perceived ease of use with consumer's intention to adopt digital banking services in Malaysia based on technology acceptance model (TAM) and innovation diffusion theory (IDT).

However, most of the existing research often focuses on specific aspects, such as security or usability, without integrating a holistic view encompassing performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, facilitating conditions, behavioral intention, and actual usage behavior. This study aims to investigate the multifaceted elements of UTAUT and their

interplay in the context of internet banking adoption.

Theoretical Framework

Researchers have developed many theories and models to explain why people adopt new information systems. These theories and models formulated include the technology acceptance model (TAM), the theory of reasoned action (TRA), the theory of planned behaviour (TPB), the decomposed theory of planned behaviour (DTPB), the innovation diffusion theory (IDT), the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) and the social cognitive theory (Hassan & Farmanesh, 2022). UTAUT has been a dominant approach towards the subject in the banking sector as it addresses users' perspective. This is the focus of current research and in line with the research questions of this study. In view of the justifications highlighted above, this study adopts the UTAUT as theoretical foundation.

UTAUT model is a widely used model in the field of information systems that seeks to explain the factors that influence individuals' intention to use a technology. The UTAUT model identifies four key constructs that influence individuals' intention to use a technology: performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions. Performance expectancy refers to the degree to which an individual believes that using the technology will help them perform better. Effort expectancy refers to the degree to which an individual believes that using the technology will be easy. Social influence refers to the degree to which an individual is influenced by the opinions of others. Facilitating conditions states the degree to which an individual believes that the necessary resources and support are available to use the technology (Sijuade et al., 2024). The key components and aspects of the UTAUT model are depicted in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) model (Venkatesh et al., 2003).

Methodology

Research Design

A survey design was adopted for this study to obtain the information from respondents regarding the influencing factors that facilitate the adoption of internet banking.

Population and Sampling Technique

The study population consists of the entire students at National Open University of Nigeria, Maiduguri Study Centre. The number of the population was obtained from the total number of registered students of NOUN Maiduguri Study Centre as of 2023 session was nine hundred and forty-four (944) on the registration website (https://www.nouonline.net/gapi_regstat.php).

A sample size of 282 was obtained using Taro Yamane formula. The study adopted a simple random sampling method, because it is simple, easily applied and ensures no bias. The formula for the sample size determination is:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)2}$$

Where:

n is the sample size needed,

N is the total population size (944 registered students in this case),

e is the level of precision or margin of error (expressed as a decimal).

$$n = \frac{\mathrm{N}}{1 + \mathrm{N\ (e)\ 2}}$$

$$n = 282$$

Method of Data Collection

The primary source of data was used in the study to investigate factors influencing the adoption of internet banking among the students at Maiduguri Study Centre, NOUN. The primary data were obtained using self-administered questionnaires to the registered students using simple random sampling techniques. The questionnaire was adapted from the previous studies and the quantitative data was analysed based on the modified 5-point Likert scale of strongly Agree, Agree, Undecided, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree to analyse the data.

Method of Data Analysis

The study used both descriptive statistics and regression models to analyze the data using SPSS software package.

The regression model equation is given as follows:

$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \beta_5 X_5 + \beta_6 X_6 + \beta_7 X_7 + \varepsilon$ Where:

X_1= Age

X_2= Gender

X_3= Experience

X_4= Performance Expectancy

X_5= Effort Expectancy

X_6= Social Influence

X_7= Facilitating Conditions

Y (Perceived Use Behavior): This is the dependent variable which in this study represents how users perceive and engage with internet banking based on the UTAUT model.

$\beta 0$: The intercept or constant term, representing the baseline level of perceived use behavior when all independent variables are zero.

$\beta 1$ (Age): This coefficient represents the impact of age on perceived use behavior. It quantifies how a one-unit change in age affects perceived use behavior while holding other variables constant.

$\beta 2$ (Gender): This coefficient quantifies the influence of gender on perceived use behavior, indicating the effect of being male (or female) on user behavior.

β3 (Experience): This coefficient reflects how user experience with internet banking impacts their perceived use behavior. More experienced users are likely to have different perceptions and behaviors.

β4 (Performance Expectancy): This coefficient indicates the impact of users' perceptions of performance expectations on their use behavior, following the UTAUT model's principles.

β5 (Effort Expectancy): This coefficient represents how users' perceptions of the effort required to use internet banking affect their use behavior.

β6 (Social Influence): This coefficient quantifies the influence of social factors on perceived use behavior. It's an essential component of the UTAUT model.

β7 (Facilitating Conditions): This coefficient represents how users' perceptions of the facilitating conditions for internet banking impact their perceived use behavior.

ε: The error term or residual captures unexplained variability in perceived use behavior that is not accounted for by the independent variables.

Data Presentation and Analysis

A total of 282 copies of questionnaires were distributed to the respondents and all copies of the questionnaires were returned. All the 282 returned questionnaires were filled.

Demographic Statistics

Table 1 shows that most of the respondents (47.2%) falls within the age range of 25-34. The data highlights that 67% of the study participants are male, while 33% are female. About half of the participants (51.4%) hold a Bachelor's degree. 23.8% of the participants have an income of less than ₦30,000. A significant majority of participants (55.3%) are single, while 44.7% are married. 42.9% of the participants are unemployed.

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Age (Years)		
Under 18	0	-
18-24	47	16.7
25-34	133	47.2
35-44	58	20.6
45-54	32	11.3
55 years & above	12	4.3
Gender		
Female	93	33.0
Male	189	67.0
Highest Level of Education		
SSCE	12	4.3

Diploma/NCE	83	29.4
Bachelor's degree	145	51.4
Post Graduate Degree	42	14.9
Income		
Less than ₦30,000	67	23.8
₦30,000 - ₦49,999	45	16.0
₦50,000 - ₦99,999	49	17.4
₦100,000 - ₦199,999	50	17.7
₦200,000 - ₦299,999	22	7.8
₦300,000 - ₦499,999	35	12.4
Marital Status		
Single	156	55.3
Married	126	44.7
Current Occupation		
Employed (full-time)	50	17.7
Employed (part-time)	37	13.1
Self-employed	74	26.2
Unemployed	121	42.9

Source: Field Survey (2023)

Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)

The variables were subjected to EFA in accordance with the UTAUT model which include performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, facilitating conditions, behavioral intention and use behavior.

Table 2 presents the results of a Factor Analysis on Performance Expectancy, which aims to examine the perceived performance benefits associated with using internet banking.

Table 2. Factor Analysis on Performance Expectancy

Item	Mean (Std. Dev.)	Components (Communalities)	Correlations and Sample Size Adequacy				
Using internet banking would enhance my effectiveness in managing my financial activities	4.32 (0.910)	0.812 (0.660)	0.812[a]				
Internet banking would make my financial tasks more efficient	4.23 (0.845)	0.881 (0.775)	0.676 ***	0.881[a]			
Internet banking would enable me to accomplish my tasks related to finance more quickly	4.38 (0.909)	0.828 (0.686)	0.590 ***	0.676 ***	0.828[a]		
I believe using internet banking would make managing my finances easier	4.24 (0.908)	0.887 (0.786)	0.5588 ***	0.738 ***	0.695***	0.887 [a]	
Internet banking would improve my financial decision-making	3.93 (1.093)	0.817 (0.668)	0.596** *	0.617***	0.541***	0.711	0.817 [a]
Cronbach's alpha					0.896		
Eigenvalues (% of variance)					3.575 (71.509)		
KMO (Bartlett's test of sphericity)					0.853 (851.94***)		

a = sample adequacy, and *** denotes significance at 1 %.

Table 3 illustrates the result of Effort Expectancy which indicated that perception of using internet banking.

Table 3. Effort Expectancy

Item	Mean (Std. Dev.)	Components (Communalities)	Correlations and Sample Size Adequacy				
Using internet banking would enhance my effectiveness in managing my financial activities	4.22 (0.963)	0.896 (0.806)	0.896[a]				
Internet banking would make my financial tasks more efficient	4.06 (1.007)	0.931 (0.868)	0.830 ***	0.931[a]			
Internet banking would enable me to accomplish my tasks related to finance more quickly	4.14 (1.026)	0.901 (0.812)	0.726 ***	0.770 ***	0.901[a]		
I believe using internet banking would make managing my finances easier	4.04 (1.048)	0.900 (0.811)	0.708***	0.780***	0780***	0.900 [a]	
Internet banking would improve my financial decision-making	3.54 (1.231)	0.112 (0.013)	0.017	0.070	0.079	0.119	0.112 [a]
Cronbach's alpha					0.804		

Eigenvalues (% of variance)				3.306 (66.130)	
KMO (Bartlett's test of sphericity)				0.833 (924.771***)	

a = sample adequacy, and *** denotes significance at 1 %.

The findings on Social Influence as shown in Table 4 revealed the respondents' perceptions regarding the impact of social factors on their adoption of internet banking are highlighted.

Table 4. Social Influence

Item	**Mean (Std. Dev.)**	**Components (Communalities)**	**Correlations and Sample Size Adequacy**				
People who are important to me think that I should use internet banking	3.92 (0.966)	0.728 (0.530)	0.728[a]				
I feel pressured by people who are important to me to use internet banking	3.05 (1.294)	0.809 (0.655)	0.476	0.809[a]			
People who influence my behavior think I should use internet banking	3.39 (1.180)	0.860 (0.739)	0.570	0.660 ***	0.860[a]		
The recommendations of my friends or family would influence my decision to use internet banking	3.48 (1.243)	0.843 (0.711)	0.532	0.597***	0.602***	0.843 [a]	
I would use internet banking if my peers were using it	3.554 (1.196)	0.805 (0.649)	0.419	0.533	0.628	0.667	0.805 [a]
Cronbach's alpha					0.868		
Eigenvalues (% of variance)					3.283 (65.651)		
KMO (Bartlett's test of sphericity)					0.832 661.595***)		

a = sample adequacy, and *** denotes significance at 1 %.

The analysis of Facilitating Conditions as depicted in Table 5 focuses on the factors that enable or hinder the effective use of internet banking.

Table 5. Facilitating Conditions

Item	Mean (Std. Dev.)	Components (Communalities)	Correlations and Sample Size Adequacy				
I have the resources necessary to use internet banking effectively	3.97 (0.952)	0.853 (0.728)	0.853[a]				
I have access to the technology needed to use internet banking	4.01 (0.964)	0.887 (0.787)	0.757 ***	0.887[a]			

The internet connection I have is reliable for internet banking activities	3.89 (1.021)	0.850 (0.723)	0.641 ***	0.699 ***	0.850[a]		
I have the required skills to use internet banking effectively	4.06 (1.000)	0.918 (0.843)	0.697***	0.767***	710***	0.918 [a]	
I am familiar with the process of using internet banking	4.21 (0.930)	0.887 (0.787)	0.667***	0.676***	0.698**	0.851	0.887 [a]
Cronbach's alpha					0.926		
Eigenvalues (% of variance)					3.868 (77.369)		
KMO (Bartlett's test of sphericity)					0.854 (1127.72***)		

a = sample adequacy, and *** denotes significance at 1 %.

Table 6 focuses on Use Behavior, which examines the extent to which participants currently engage with internet banking for their financial activities.

Table 6. Use Behavior

Item	Mean (Std. Dev.)	Components (Communalities)	Correlations and Sample Size Adequacy				
I currently use internet banking for my financial transactions	4.40 (0.843)	0.807 (0.651)	0.853[a]				
I frequently conduct financial activities through internet banking	4.17 (0.904)	0.888 (0.789)	0.672 ***	0.887[a]			
I have a history of using internet banking	4.05 (0.970)	0.887 (0.786)	0.639 ***	0.733 ***	0.850[a]		
I find myself using internet banking whenever possible for financial tasks	4.14 (0.909)	0.928 (0.861)	0.660** **	0.7844** *	0.800***	0.918 [a]	
Internet banking is a regular part of my financial routine	4.10 (1.067)	0.869 (0.756)	0.96** *	0.697***	0.704**	0.806	0.887 [a]
Cronbach's alpha					0.923		
Eigenvalues (% of variance)					3.844 (76.872)		
KMO (Bartlett's test of sphericity)					0.888 (1080.24***)		

a = sample adequacy, and *** denotes significance at 1 %.

The model in Table 7 exhibits a moderately strong positive correlation (R = 0.690) and explains a substantial portion of the variance in the adoption of internet banking (R Square = 0.476, Adjusted R Square = 0.462). The model's standard error of the estimate (0.618) reflects the accuracy of its predictions. These statistics suggest that the model is reasonably effective in predicting the adoption of internet banking based on the included predictors.

Table 7: Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
	0.690[a]	0.476	0.462	0.618

a. Predictors: (Constant),

Table 8 illustrates the regression model used in the study.

Table 8. Result from Regression Model

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.703	0.260		2.702	0.007
Age	-0.022	0.037	-0.027	-0.607	0.545
Gender	0.211	0.080	0.118	2.633	0.009
Experience	0.351	0.053	0.325	6.651	0.000
Performance Expectancy	0.285	0.052	0.308	5.535	0.000
Effort Expectancy	0.049	0.052	0.059	0.949	0.343
Social Influence	0.095	0.045	0.109	2.113	0.036
Facilitating Conditions	0.130	0.050	0.147	2.602	0.010

Constant: The constant term in the model represents the estimated value of the dependent variable when all other predictor variables are set to zero. In this case, the constant is 0.703, and it is statistically significant (p = 0.007).

Gender: The coefficient for Gender is 0.211 with a Beta value of 0.118. This suggests that being male (as indicated by a higher value for Gender) is associated with a higher likelihood of adopting internet banking. This effect is statistically significant (p = 0.009).

Experience: The coefficient for Experience is 0.351 with a Beta value of 0.325. This indicates that individuals with more experience in using internet banking are more likely to adopt it. This effect is highly significant (p = 0.000).

Performance Expectancy: The coefficient for Performance Expectancy is 0.285 with a Beta value of 0.308. It suggests that a positive perception of performance benefits strongly influences the adoption of internet banking. This effect is highly significant (p = 0.000).

Social Influence: The coefficient for Social Influence is 0.095 with a Beta value of 0.109. Social influence, represented by the opinions of important individuals, also plays a role in adoption, and this effect is statistically significant (p = 0.036).

Facilitating Conditions: The coefficient for Facilitating Conditions is 0.130 with a Beta value of 0.147. Having the necessary resources and conditions for internet banking has a positive impact on adoption, and this effect is statistically significant (p = 0.010).

Discussion of Findings

The data indicates a significant presence of NOUN students in the age group of 25-34 (47.2%). This is consistent with previous studies that have shown that individuals in this age range are generally more open to adopting new technologies, including internet banking (Venkatesh, et al., 2003). The predominance of male respondents (67%) in this study aligns with some existing research that suggests males are slightly more inclined to adopt internet banking services (Akhter et al., 2020). The majority of participants in this study hold Bachelor's degrees (51.4%), indicating a higher education level among the sample. This aligns with research that suggests higher education is often positively

associated with technology adoption (Venkatesh, et al., 2003).

The majority of respondents (79.8%) use the internet daily, which reflects a high level of internet access and engagement. The relatively low percentages for "Rarely" and "Never" suggest a tech-savvy and digitally connected group. This high internet usage frequency aligns with the expectation that people who use the internet frequently are more likely to embrace internet banking (Wen Ni, 2020).

The data indicates that the vast majority of participants (83.3%) use their mobile phones for online activities daily. This trend is in line with the growing use of mobile devices for various online tasks, including internet banking. It's well-documented that mobile banking is gaining popularity due to the convenience it offers (Inder et al., 2022).

A significant percentage of participants have used internet banking services, with 70.2% indicating regular use. This suggests that a substantial portion of the respondents have prior experience with internet banking. Regular users may be more comfortable and satisfied with the service, which can positively influence their continued adoption (Akhter et al., 2020).

The findings also indicate a significant percentage (49.3%) of respondents who have been using internet banking for more than 5 years. This suggests a well-established user base, and their extended experience may indicate high satisfaction and trust in internet banking (Hassan & Farmanesh, 2022).

The positive and statistically significant relationship between gender (being male) and internet banking adoption is supported by prior studies suggesting that males are more likely to adopt online banking services (Hassan & Farmanesh, 2022). The strong and highly significant relationship between experience and internet banking adoption is consistent with the technology acceptance literature, which often emphasizes the role of experience in shaping attitudes and behaviors (Davis, 1989). Experience not only increases familiarity with technology but also enhances the perception of ease of use and usefulness, driving adoption (Venkatesh et al., 2003).

The positive and highly significant relationship between performance expectancy and adoption aligns with the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT), which emphasizes the significant impact of perceived usefulness on technology adoption (Venkatesh et al., 2003). This result suggests that individuals who believe that internet banking improves their financial management and efficiency are more likely to adopt it and these findings are consistent with prior studies highlighting the central role of perceived benefits in technology adoption (Pavithra & Geetha, 2021).

The positive and statistically significant relationship between social influence and adoption is consistent with the UTAUT model's social influence component (Venkatesh et al., 2003). This result suggests that individuals are influenced by the opinions and recommendations of important people in their adoption decisions. Prior research has also highlighted the role of social networks in promoting technology adoption (Kumar et al., 2023). The positive and significant relationship between facilitating conditions and adoption aligns with prior studies emphasizing the importance of having the necessary resources and conditions for online banking (Wen Ni, 2020).

Conclusion

The study has revealed that age is not a significant predictor, while other factors play crucial roles in adoption of internet banking by the students. Experience emerged as the strongest positive influence, underscoring the importance of users' prior exposure to internet banking. Additionally, performance expectancy, gender, social influence, and facilitating conditions all positively impacted perceived use behavior. These findings provide valuable insights for financial institutions aiming to promote internet banking adoption. The overall model fit was strong, explaining a significant portion of the variance in perceived use behavior. This suggests that the UTAUT model is a valuable framework for understanding user behavior regarding internet banking adoption. However, it's crucial to note that while age and effort expectancy did not significantly influence perceived use behavior in this study, their potential impact should not be disregarded entirely, as individual contexts and specific user groups may yield different results.

References

Akhter, A., Asheq, A. Al, Hossain, M. U., & Karim, M. M. (2020). Exploring customer intentions to adopt mobile banking services: Evidence from a developing country. Banks and Bank Systems, 15(2), 105–116. https://doi.org/10.21511/bbs.15(2).2020.10

Akhter, A., Karim, M., Jannat, S., & Islam, A. K. M. (2022). Determining factors of intention to adopt internet banking services: A study on commercial bank users in Bangladesh. Consulting Publishing Company Business Perspectives, 17(17), 125–136.

Al-Gharaibah, O. B. (n.d.). Predictors of E-banking Service Adoption in Malaysia Using an Extended Technology Acceptance Model. www.ijcmit.com

Buhari, M. A. (n.d.). Impact And Adoption Of Mobile Banking On The Nigerian Customers In A Covid 19 Pandemic Era(A case study of Kano state metropolis). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367822905

Chang, Y.-C., Enkhjargal, U., Huang, C.-I., Lin, W.-L., & Ho, C.-M. (2020). Factors Affecting the Internet Banking Adoption. Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia, 54(3). https://doi.org/10.17576/jem-2020-5403-9

Davis, F. D. (1989). Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and user acceptance of information technology. MIS Quarterly: Management Information Systems, 13(3), 319–339. https://doi.org/10.2307/249008

Esendemirli, E., Olawale, A. A., Celik, S., & Oguz Karahan, M. (n.d.). Digital Banking Adoption: Evidence from the Nigerian Youth Market. International Journal of Contemporary Economics and Administrative Sciences, 14–35. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13871769

Hammood, W. A., Aminuddin, A., Hammood, O. A., Abdullah, K. H., Sofyan, D., & Rahardi, M. (2023). Conceptual model of internet banking adoption with perceived risk and trust factors. Telkomnika (Telecommunication Computing Electronics and Control), 21(5), 1013–1019. https://doi.org/10.12928/TELKOMNIKA.v21i5.24581

Hassan, H., & Farmanesh, P. (2022). Customer adoption of self-service technologies in Jordan: Factors influencing the use of Internet banking, mobile banking, and telebanking. Management Science Letters, 12, 193–206. https://doi.org/10.5267/j.msl.2021.11.002

Inder, S., Sood, K., & Grima, S. (2022). Antecedents of Behavioural Intention to Adopt Internet Banking Using Structural Equation Modelling. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 15(4). https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm15040157

Jerene, W., & Sharma, D. (2020). The adoption of financial technology in Ethiopia: a study of bank customers perspective. Journal of Banking and Financial Technology, 4(1), 53–63. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42786-020-00015-0

Jouda, H. M., Jouda, H., Jarad, A. A., Obaid, T., Mdallalah, S. A., & Awaja, A. (n.d.). The 1 st international Conference on Information Technology and Business ICITB2020 Mobile Banking Adoption: Decomposed Theory of Planned Behavior with Perceived Trust. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3660403

Kumar, R., Singh, R., Kumar, K., Khan, S., & Corvello, V. (2023). How Does Perceived Risk and Trust Affect Mobile Banking Adoption? Empirical Evidence from India. Sustainability (Switzerland), 15(5). https://doi.org/10.3390/su15054053

Pavithra, C. B., & Geetha, K. (2021). FACTORS AFFECTING CUSTOMERS' PERCEPTION TOWARDS DIGITAL BANKING SERVICES. In Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education (Vol. 12, Issue 11).

Shaikh, I. M., Amin, H., Noordin, K., & Shaikh, J. M. (2023). ISLAMIC BANK CUSTOMERS' ADOPTION OF DIGITAL BANKING SERVICES: EXTENDING DIFFUSION THEORY OF INNOVATION. Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, 9(1),

57–70. https://doi.org/10.21098/jimf.v9i1.1545

Sijuade, A., Ogunyote, J., Okediran, O., Omidiora, E., & Olabiyisi, S. (2024). Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology in Evaluating Voters' Intention Towards the Adoption of Electronic Forensic Election Audit System. FUOYE Journal of Engineering and Technology, 9(1), 76–83. https://doi.org/10.4314/fuoyejet.v9i1.12

Venkatesh, V., Smith, R. H., Morris, M. G., Davis, G. B., Davis, F. D., & Walton, S. M. (2003). USER ACCEPTANCE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: TOWARD A UNIFIED VIEW 1. In User Acceptance of IT MIS Quarterly (Vol. 27, Issue 3).

Wen Ni, T. (2020). Factors Influencing Behavioural Intention towards Adoption of Digital Banking Services in Malaysia. International Journal of Asian Social Science, 10(8), 450–457. https://doi.org/10.18488/journal.1.2020.108.450.457

HERITAGE LANGUAGE USE AND ATTITUDE AMONG EFIK MIGRANTS IN LAGOS STATE, NIGERIA

NWAGBO, OSITA GERALD
DEPARTMENT OF LINGUISTICS, AFRICAN AND ASIAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS, LAGOS, NIGERIA,
osynwagbo@gmail.com

OYEKA, CHIAMAKA NGOZI
DEPARTMENT OF LINGUISTICS, AFRICAN AND ASIAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS, LAGOS, NIGERIA,
coyeka@unilag.edu.ng

KEYWORDS
Language use, language attitude, Efik, language maintenance, Migration

ABSTRACT
Maintenance of minority languages in an urban cosmopolis is a huge challenge given the multiplicity of ethnic groups some of which are numerically dominant. Several studies have been carried out on maintenance of native languages in urban centers, but none has been undertaken on Efik in Lagos, Nigeria. Consequently, this study examines the state of Efik language in Lagos where the Efik are a minority group with a view to estimating language use and attitude toward native and host community languages. Through purposive and snow-ball sampling, a total of 176 families were selected for the study, and the questionnaire was used to elicit information from respondents. The result shows that parents who had high proficiency in Efik (Efik major) were more inclined to inter-generational transmission of Efik than parents with less proficiency in Efik (Efik minor). However, exogamous marriages played a significant role in the linguistic experience of Efik minor respondents, as ethnic disparities evinced the need for a neutral code (English) among spouses. In the case of attitude, there was symmetry in result as the two groups avowed positive inclination towards their native language and host community language. However, whereas the Efik minor reflected their attitude in practice with reference to Yoruba, the Efik Major did not. And, whereas the Efik Major reflected their attitude towards Efik in practice, the Efik Minor did not. The result provides the need for systematic and sustained effort towards reviving Efik, especially in multilingual spaces where its existence is precarious.

Introduction

In many urban centers in Nigeria, and most of Africa, there is hardly anyone who speaks one language only; the norm is to speak one's mother tongue or another indigenous language and the official language or a language of wider communication. A city such as Lagos, the former capital of Nigeria boasts of having within it, the highest concentration of different ethnic groups in Nigeria. As a matter of fact, there is scarcely any ethnic group that is not represented in Lagos. Aside the major ethnic groups (Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba) who are dominant, there are hundreds of other minority groups that share the geographical space. Although the Yoruba is the host community by virtue of ancestry, Lagos is seen as a home for all Nigerians and beyond. Due mainly to economic and commercial factors, and not least by the hospitable and accommodating nature of the Yoruba, the host community, many Nigerians from both rural, semi-urban and other urban centers have flocked to Lagos to live. This has resulted in the linguistic landscape of Lagos simulating that of Nigeria coupled with a motley amalgam of ethnic voices resonating in both external and nuclear domains.

However, the voices that are mainly heard in Lagos are the voices of the dominant Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa due to numeric. Consequent upon the same incidence of numbers, minority voices are less heard. It could be said that the voices of the majority groups have, over the years, silenced or drowned the voices of the minority groups in Lagos. Given the fact that in urban centers, minority groups encounter mainly people of the major ethnic groups, the use of their languages is grossly limited. In the neighborhoods, markets, schools, hospitals, buses and other transit modes, which represent common contact points in the city, minority groups are condemned to use a neutral language or the indigenous language of the host community, if they have facility in it. It is mainly in insider or nuclear interactions that these groups are opportune to use their indigenous tongues. However, even in the home, which is the best setting to use and transmit the ethnic tongue, there is still a battle for the survival of the heritage language. The external environment, in the form of the neighborhood, and school, for instance exert pressures on the home which affect language choice and use. It is easier for immigrant parents to maintain their heritage language, due mainly to history of using the language, coupled with the fact that, they may have been raised in a community where the heritage language is dominant. But such privilege is not enjoyed by immigrant children who found themselves in a multilingual space where their heritage language is not dominant, and whose history of heritage language use is restricted to limited interactions at home with parents.

There are two major blocks of ethnic and linguistic minorities in Nigeria; the Niger Delta and the Middle Belt areas of Nigeria. Adegbija (2004) categorises minority languages in Nigeria into three groups: those which have more than one million speakers like Fulfulde, Efik, Kanuri, Tiv, Ijo, Edo, Nupe, Igala, Idoma, Ebira, Ibibio; those which have about 100,000 speakers and the rest with less than 100,000 speakers. Thus, Efik is one of the major minority languages in Nigeria. Generally, such major minority languages are dominant in some states and local government levels where they function as unofficial official languages while the non-dominant ones are restricted to informal settings. It is based on this condition that this study examines language use among migrant Efik minorities in Lagos State; this is with a view to estimating the languages they used at home and the attitudes they evinced towards their native language and the language of the host community.

Hypotheses

Three hypotheses were developed and tested for this study as follows:

Ho1: There is no significance effect of demographics of age and other spoken languages on the choice of language used at home

Ho2: There is no significant effect of attitude towards indigenous language and attitude towards host community language on language use at home

Ho3: There is no significant difference between Efik with high proficiency and Efik with low proficiency on Attitude towards Indigenous Language, and Attitude towards Host Community Language

The Efik

The Efik are one of the minority ethnic groups in Nigeria, going by numeric. In political segmentation they are domiciled in Cross River

State and Akwa Ibom State, two of the six states in the South-South geo-political groups in Nigeria. The Efiks live along the basins of the lower Cross River, the Calabar River, the Kwa River, Akpa Ikang River, Eniong Creek, and the Bakassi Peninsular (Encyclopedia Britanicca, 2008). Efik is the native language of the Efik people. According to Offiong and Ansa (2013), Efik is classified under the Benue-Congo branch of the Niger-Congo language family going by Greenberg (1963), while Faraclass (1989) classified Efik under the Lower Cross sub-group of the Delta-Cross, an off-shoot of the enlarged Cross River group which is a major component of the Benue-Congo sub family. It is the official language of Cross-River State and widely spoken as a lingua franca throughout the Cross-River region. According to Noah (2004), Efik is one of the first indigenous languages to be reduced to writing. However, despite this early written tradition, the vitality of the language is still undermined due to attitude of the speakers. Offiong and Ansa (2013) posit that the speakers are not interested in studying it as a course in school, coupled with the fact that the history, literature and orthography of the language remain undeveloped.

Heritage Language Use

In the view of the Canadian Legal Information Institute (1991), Heritage language (HL) is seen as "a language other than one of the official languages of Canada that contributes to the linguistic heritage of Canada". It is used in reference to languages, brought to host societies by immigrants except aboriginal languages such as English and French (Cummins and Danesi, 1990). In terms of status in a multilingual setting, Yearwood (2008: 62) conceives the term as a "non-majority language spoken by an individual or group considered to be a linguistic minority". Similarly, Montru, (2010: 4) defines heritage language speakers as people "of a linguistic minority who grew up exposed to their home language and the majority language". This view is also shared by Valdes (2001) who avers that, it is a language used by people who grew up in families where a language that is not the dominant language is spoken. Later, Valdes (2005) expanded this earlier definition by including endangered indigenous languages in the fold of heritage languages. While acknowledging the status-based definitions, Polinsky and Kagan (2007) state that usually heritage language speakers arrive in their host community with competence in their indigenous language, but later, due to influence of social environment, develop a high level of proficiency in the dominant language. With respect to acquisition, HL speakers normally acquire their indigenous language via daily interactions with members of the family and kinsfolk in addition to some formal instructions, in some cases (Schwartz, 2010). As a result, the term heritage language may comprise the first languages of immigrants in different host communities and also indigenous languages of the native population. Other names used to depict heritage languages include "ethnic language, native language, ancestral language (Cummins & Danesi, 1990).

Research in the field of heritage language use has gained much traction among scholars (Fishman 1991; Guardado, 2002; Cummins & Schecter, 2003; Garcia, 2003; Cavallaro, 2005; Park, 2011). Heritage Language Maintenance (HLM) is a term used to delineate the efforts heritage language speakers make to maintain their ethnic or indigenous languages, in the immigration context. Maintenance of such language is deemed needful due to the minority status of the language amidst dominant languages in the host community. Generally, Mesthrie, 1999:42) defined Language maintenance as "the continuing use of a language in the face of competition from a regionally and socially powerful or numerically stronger language". Underlying this view is the fact that immigrants intentionally and deliberately use their heritage language, as a means of forestalling the encroachment and intrusion of the dominant societal languages. In the view of Kelleher, (2010), HLM refers to perceptions and behaviors related to the maintenance of a particular heritage language used by immigrants who hold cultural ties with this language, aside the dominant language in the host community. A major factor responsible for the conscious efforts in maintaining the heritage language is to avert the tendency of shift to the dominant language; a term known as language shift, which is concomitant to language maintenance.

The phenomenon of language shift is seen as the result of failure to maintain a language. In simple terms, when a community or individuals fail to use their language, shift to another language is possible. Language shift, the converse of language maintenance technically involves a drift from the use of the home language to the use of a more dominant community language, as a consequence of pressures from the dominant group (Fishman

1966; Rumbaut, 2009). The causes of language shift have been identified by several researches; in most instances, parents attach more premium to the utilitarian values of the dominant language, in relation to their children's educational success and upward social mobility (Holmes, 2008; Guardado, 2006; Lanza & Svendsen, 2007); many children are more interested in being accepted in the new society by their peers from the dominant language group, and therefore tend to prefer and favour the dominant language (Gogonas, 2009; Baker, 2011); the lack of institutional and community support of the heritage language in the immigrant setting is considered a major setback for maintenance and a catalyst for shift to the mainstream language (Guardado, 2006; Kopeliovich, 2011); the negative attitude of immigrant children who are so overwhelmed by the mainstream language they think their heritage language is not needful (Kopeliovich, 2011; Hasbun, 2005), as well as absence or inadequate instruction in the heritage language in school, despite a willingness to maintain the heritage language (Lee (2002).

However, language shift does not occur instantaneously; it is seen as an incremental and gradational process that takes some generations. In his three-generation model of immigrant language shift, Fishman (1970) maintains that the first generation of immigrants arrive with the new language and use it in the home with kin; the second generation are influenced by the dominant societal language and therefore are bilingual in the heritage and mainstream language, while the third generation have insufficient knowledge of their heritage language, having shifted to the dominant societal language. In support of this position, Churchill (2003: 32) opines that "the vast majority of immigrants and their descendants appear destined to continue the pattern of their predecessors where most lose the heritage language within three generations". Other researchers, however, are of the view that a shift or actual heritage language loss can take place over two generations (Brown, 2011; Fillmore, 2000). Incidentally, language shift or loss is detrimental to immigrants due to limited and constrained means of accessing and understanding their indigenous culture (Portes and Hao, 2002), loss of ethnic identity and self-determination (Moses, 2001), and constrained chance of developing self-esteem and positive self-image (Hinton, 1999).

The method

The mixed method (quantitative and qualitative) was adopted in this study for the purpose of collecting both numeric and subjective data. The population and locale of the Efik in Lagos is indeterminate, and consequently, three clusters representing the domains for most minority groups in Lagos were purposively selected, and they include Orile, Oshodi and Ajegunle. Through purposive and snow-ball sampling, a total of 176 respondents comprising 46 from Orile, 59 from Oshodi, and 71 from Ajegunle participated in the study. Data was elicited from respondents with the aid of a 2-page questionnaire. The focus of the inquiry was in the areas of language use in the home and language attitudes towards indigenous and host community languages. Additionally, unstructured interview was carried out with the aim of eliciting subjective opinion of respondents on areas which the questionnaire could not ascertain, and also to validate the quantitative data.

Data and Analysis

The analysis is undertaken by distinguishing between two groups of Efik in the sample; the first group is Efik with high frequency in speaking Efik, henceforth EHFQ; these are respondents who claimed in the questionnaire to have a native-like proficiency in Efik and who spoke Efik frequently, while the second group is Efik with low frequency in speaking Efik, henceforth ELFQ; these represent respondents with a low proficiency in Efik and who did not speak Efik frequently. In this study, it is reasoned that these two groups may not use their native language in the same way, and also may not have the same attitudes towards the languages in their repertoire. The Chi-Square test and T-test were used in the statistical analyses of data.

Table 1: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

		EHFQ (N = 136)		ELFQ (N = 40)		Total (N = 176)	
Variable	**Characteristics**	**Num.**	**%**	**Num.**	**%**	**Num.**	**%**
Age Group (years)	20-30 years	42	30.9	12	30.0	54	30.7
	31-40 years	32	23.5	22	55.0	54	30.7
	41 years +	62	45.6	6	15.0	68	38.6
	Total	136	100.0	40	100.0	176	100.0
Sex	Male	58	42.6	6	15.0	64	36.4
	Female	78	57.4	34	85.0	112	63.6
	Total	136	100.0	40	100.0	176	100.0
Occupation	Trading	46	33.8	16	40.0	62	35.2
	Schooling	32	23.5	2	5.0	34	19.3
	Working	58	42.6	22	55.0	80	45.5
	Total	136	100.0	40	100.0	176	100.0
Marital Status	Single	50	36.8	6	15.0	56	31.8
	Married	76	55.9	32	80.0	108	61.4
	Divorced	10	7.4	2	5.0	12	6.8
	Total	136	100.0	40	100.0	176	100.0

Source: Field Survey 2017.

The demographic data reveals that, out of the total number of respondents, those who were 41 years + accounted for the majority among the EHFQ, while respondents who were 31-40 years were the majority in the ELFQ group. In terms of sex, the females were more in number for both EHFQ and ELFQ groups. The data on occupation shows that workers and traders were more in number than students, while married respondents accounted for the majority in both groups. The discrepancy in the numbers with respect to age, sex, occupation and marital status was the result of the sampling method used in data collection which restricted study population to only those who were available at the time. There was no pre-determined plan to achieve symmetry in the number of respondents across the demographic variables.

Table 2: Language background

		EHFQ (N = 136)		ELFQ (N = 40)		Total (N = 176)	
Variable	**Characteristics**	**Num.**	**%**	**Num.**	**%**	**Num.**	**%**
First language/Mother tongue	Efik	136	100.0	40	100.0	176	100.0
	Total	136	100.0	40	100.0	176	100.0
Second language	English	136	100.0	40	100.0	176	100.0
	Others	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
	Total	136	100.0	40	100.0	176	100.0
Other language(s)	Efik	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
	Yoruba	26	19.1	22	55.0	48	27.2
	Igbo	12	8.9	2	5.0	14	8.0
	Missing	98	72.0	16	40.0	114	64.8
	Total	136	100.0	40	100.0	176	100.0

Source: Field Survey 2017.

The data above indicates that Efik is the first language and mother tongue of all the respondents, and English is their second language. Other languages spoken are Yoruba and Igbo; a majority of the ELFQ reported speaking Yoruba in addition to Efik and English, while a minority of EHFQ reported speaking Yoruba. Yoruba is the language of the host community, Lagos. Although Lagos is home to all ethnic groups in the country, the Yoruba are the hosts with a dominant population. A minimal number of respondents from both EHFQ and ELFQ reported speaking Igbo in addition to Efik and English. Though Igbo are an internal migrant group in Lagos like the Efik, they represent the most dominant group in population apart from the host community. It is either that the Efik picked Igbo as a result of constant interaction with the Igbo in Lagos where they are ubiquitous, or they learnt Igbo due to constant contact with the Igbo in the South East where the Efik and Igbo share some boundaries. On the whole, this data shows that all the respondents are bilinguals mainly in their indigenous language and English which is a second language to majority of Nigerians.

Table 3: Language Use at Home

The data on language use at home shows the languages used by respondents at home in different role relations such as spouses, siblings and children. The data is presented below

		EHFQ (N = 136)		ELFQ (N = 40)		Total (N = 176)	
Variable	**Characteristics**	**Num.**	**%**	**Num.**	**%**	**Num.**	**%**
Language used with spouse	Efik	6	4.4	0	0.0	6	3.4
	Yoruba/English	0	0.0	3	7.5	3	1.7
	Efik/English	70	51.4	10	25.0	80	45.4
	English	0	0.0	19	47.5	19	10.8
	Missing	60	44.1	8	20.0	68	38.7
	Total	136	100.0	40	100.0	176	100.0
Language used with children	Efik	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
	Yoruba/English	0	0.0	6	15.0	6	3.4
	Efik/English	56	41.1	0	0.0	56	31.8
	English	30	22.0	28	70.0	58	32.9
	Missing	50	36.8	6	15.0	56	31.9
	Total	136	100.0	40	100.0	176	100.0
Language used with sibling(s)	Efik	10	7.3	0	0.0	10	5.7
	Yoruba/English	26	19.1	10	25.0	36	20.4
	Efik/English	100	73.6	10	25.0	110	62.5
	English	0	0.0	20	50.0	20	11.4
	Total	136	100.0	40	100.0	176	100.0

Source: Field Survey 2017

The data on language use at home reveals some discrepancies in the number of respondents that use a particular language among the two groups. In spousal interaction, 76 respondents for EHFQ out of 136, and 32 respondents for ELFQ out of 40 which corresponds with the number of those married in the two groups, responded to the inquiry on language used with spouse in the home setting. Among EHFQ, a significant majority 51.4% used a combination of Efik and English, while an insignificant minority 4.4% used only Efik in interaction between spouses. Among the ELFQ, an insignificant majority 47.5% used English only,

while a minority 25.5% used a combination of Efik and English, and Yoruba and English 7.5%. It is understandable that bilingual interaction accounted for a higher proportion of exchanges among the entire respondents (45.4%), and also that Efik was used solely by a minimal number of the EHFQ respondents, but it seemed odd that a number of ELFQ respondents used only English and also Yoruba/English. An inquiry to ascertain the reasons yielded the following results:

> ***ELFQ 1*** *(female): My husband na Yoruba so we no use Efik…I know small Yoruba and sometime I speak Yoruba to him and he is happy. But he no dey speak Efik, so no Efik for our talk.*
>
> ***ELFQ 2*** *(female): I married a Yoruba man, yknow, and we live in Lagos which is Yoruba land, and… I meet a lot of Yoruba people…my husband's friends, relations and some time we travel to his home town, Ilesha. So, it is natural, I mean, I have been able to pick some Yoruba, but not much. I speak a little Yoruba with him and we go back to English, but English is the main language when we talk…Yes, English is dominant.*
>
> ***ELFQ 3*** *(male): We no speak Efik for house because my wife is Yoruba woman, from Oyo. Na me dey try to speak small small Yoruba with her sometime…but she no dey speak Efik at all…she say Efik too hard.*
>
> ***ELFQ 4*** *(male): Me and my wife come from different places, so that is why we don't use Efik to talk in the house. I am Efik but my wife is Ibo. She is from Anambra State. Sometime if I speak Efik she laugh at me…she say my language is funny. So we don't use Efik.*
>
> ***ELFQ 5*** *(female): Yes, my husband is Efik and I am also Efik. But y'see, he does not speak Efik…He was born in Kano and he grew up there. His father was Efik but his mother was Idoma, that is Benue state. According to him, his father was a driver, driving all these big haulage truck from East to North. It was in one of the trips that he met his mother in Gboko and they married. So his parents were speaking only Pidgin…Yes his father was not educated and his mother too. Because of that he doesn't speak Efik but he understands small. When I speak it to him, he responds in English.*
>
> ***ELFQ 6*** *(female): We no fit speak my language (Efik) because my husband is Edo, Bini. I no understand his own and he no understand my own. So na Pidgin we dey take talk, or sometime he use English, but my own na Pidgin all the time.*

The interview result shows two reasons why the ELFQ used mainly English or a combination of Yoruba and English instead of Efik in their interactions. The major reason is exogamous marriage, that is, marriage between people from two distinct ethnic groups, as seen in the responses of ELFQ. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, and the second reason is language loss which is also an outcome of mixed marriage as evidenced in the response of ELFQ. 5. In the instance of mixed marriages, the Efik respondents were proficient in their languages but did not use it for the sake of their partners, but in the case of language loss, the Efik respondent did not have facility in the Efik language due to history of language abandonment.

The data on language used with children revealed that more parents used a combination of Efik and English or English only in interacting with their children. In parent-child interaction, 86 respondents for EHFQ out of 136, and 34 respondents for ELFQ out of 40 which corresponds with the number of those married and divorced in the two groups, responded to the inquiry on language used with children in the home setting. Among EHFQ, a simple majority 41.1% used a combination of Efik and English, while a minority 22.0% used only English in interacting with their children. In the case of ELFQ, a different result was obtained; a significant majority 70.0% used only English, while an insignificant minority 15.0% used a combination of Yoruba and English. The implication of this result is that, a good number of the EHFQ were consciously transmitting their ethnic language to the subsequent generation while reasonable number were not. In the instance of ELFQ, non-transmission of the heritage language is the case; rather English is generically transmitted on account of exogamy, and a minimal number transmitted Yoruba, instead of their heritage language. What this translates to is that most of the children among the ELFQ will be proficient in a foreign language, while a little number will grow up speaking an

ethnic language that is not their own, with the attendant implications on ethnic identity.

The data on language used with siblings reveals a dominance of the use of Efik/English in such fraternal interactions. Among EHFQ, a significant majority 73.6% used a combination of Efik and English, while a minority 7.3% used only Efik. Non reported using only English in sibling interactions. This result is consistent with the fact of being pro-Efik in use of language. Incidentally, an insignificant minority 19.1% used a combination of Yoruba and English in sibling interaction. In contrast, a majority 50.0% among the ELFQ used only English, while a minority 25.0% used Efik/English and Yoruba/English in such interactions. This is a marked result indicating a subtle gap in social relationship among siblings. The use of a formal and foreign language in nuclear interactions is an exception to the rule, but largely, it is indicative of a weak or weakened foundation in the heritage language.

Language attitudes

The presentation of data on language attitude comprises attitude of respondents to their indigenous language and attitude of respondents to host community language.

Attitude towards indigenous language

The inquiry on attitude towards Efik is premised on three propositions as follows: ethnic identity, value of Efik and inter-generational transmission of Efik. The three propositions were used to evaluate respondents' opinion on language and ethnic identity, the prestige and intrinsic value of their mother tongue and their ability to transmit their indigenous tongue to their children. The data is presented below.

Table 4: Attitude towards indigenous language (Efik)

Items		EHFQ (N = 136)					ELFQ (N = 40)					Total (N = 176)				
	Characteristics	Descriptive Statistics					Descriptive Statistics					Descriptive Statistics				
		Num.	**%**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Category**	**Num.**	**%**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Category**	**Num.**	**%**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Category**
Efik is my ethnic identity	Strongly Disagree	0	0.0	3.60	0.575	4	0	0.0	3.55	0.749	4	0	0.0	3.59	0.617	4
	Disagree	0	0.0				6	15.0				6	3.4			
	Agree	48	35.2				6	15.0				54	30.7			
	Strongly Agree	88	64.8				28	70.0				116	65.9			
	Total	136	100.0				40	100.0				176	100.0			
Efik is very prestigious	Strongly Disagree	0	0.0	3.69	0.464	4	0	0.0	3.60	0.591	4	0	0.0	3.67	0.495	4
	Disagree	0	0.0				2	5.0				2	1.1			
	Agree	42	30.9				12	30.0				54	30.7			
	Strongly Agree	94	69.1				26	65.0				120	68.2			
	Total	136	100.0				40	100.0				176	100.0			
It is important for my children to speak Efik	Strongly Disagree	0	0.0	3.68	0.470	4	2	5.0	3.40	0.928	3	2	1.1	3.61	0.613	4
	Disagree	0	0.0				6	15.0				6	3.4			

	Agree	44	32.4				6	15.0				50	28.4			
	Strongly Agree	92	67.6				26	65.0				118	67.0			
	Total	136	100.0				40	100.0				176	100.0			
Pooled Mean Response				3.66	0.339	4			3.52	0.608	4			3.63	0.418	4

Source: Field Survey 2017. SD = Standard Deviation. Category: Strongly Agree = 4, Agree = 3,Disagree = 2, Strongly Disagree = 1.

The measurement of language attitude revealed a great symmetry and slight discrepancy in the result of EHFQ and ELFQ. All the EHFQ were positive in the inquiry on Efik and ethnic identity as 64.8% strongly agreed and 35.2% simply agreed. In contrast, while a majority of ELFQ 70.0% strongly agreed and 15.0% simply agreed, an insignificant minority 15.0% disagreed with the proposition. The implication of this result is that the attitude of the respondents towards Efik in relation to ethnic identity was positive. The difference between the two results, however, is that, while EHFQ reflected their belief in practice by using Efik mainly in different role relationships, the ELFQ did not act according to their belief, thereby yielding a covert prestige. On the question of Efik and prestige, all the EHFQ were positive in their estimation; out of the total number, 69.1% strongly agreed and 30.9% simply agreed with the proposition. On the contrary, 65.0% of the total number of ELFQ strongly agreed and 30.0% simply agreed with the proposition, while an insignificant minority 5.0% disagreed. The evaluation of prestige is their response to the value of Efik. Given the positive inclination, there is no doubt that they had a high regard for Efik as a language. The fact that some of them did not reflect this positive evaluation in their behavior towards Efik is one of the sensitive realities of attitude measurement.

The respondents' belief about transmitting Efik to their children shows the same pattern as the earlier inquiries. Among the EHFQ, a majority strongly agreed to the proposition that it is important for their children to speak Efik, while a minority simply agreed, and none disagreed. In contrast, among the ELFQ, while a majority strongly agreed 65.0% and a minority simply agreed, 15.0%, an insignificant minority disagreed 15.0% and also strongly disagreed 5.0%. This result is correlated and consistent with the result of the inquiry on language used with children; while a majority of the EHFQ used a combination of Efik and English, a majority of the ELFQ used only English in interactions with their children, and none reported using Efik with their children. It is noteworthy that whereas no EHFQ respondent reported negative response to the inquiries on attitude, a minority of the ELFQ did. This result suggests that while many of the ELFQ respondents did not match their belief with action, some of them did. However, due to the mercurial and amenable nature of attitude, it is expected that, in future positive attitude may correspond with positive behavior among the ELFQ respondents. A statistical summary of the result showed symmetry in attitude of both groups of respondents to their indigenous language. This is shown below.

Table 5: Summary of attitude towards Indigenous Language (Efik)

Items	EHFQ (N = 136)				ELFQ (N = 40)				Total (N = 176)			
	Mean Response Rating				Mean Response Rating				Mean Response Rating			
	Mean	SD	Category	RI	Mean	SD	Category	RI	Mean	SD	Category	RI
Efik is my ethnic identity	3.60	0.575	4	Low	3.55	0.749	4	High	3.59	0.617	4	Low
Efik is very prestigious	3.69	0.464	4	High	3.60	0.591	4	High	3.67	0.495	4	High
It is important for my children to speak Efik	3.68	0.470	4	High	3.40	0.928	3	Low	3.61	0.613	4	High
Pooled Mean Response	3.66	0.339	4		3.52	0.608	4		3.63	0.418	4	

Source: Field Survey 2017. SD = Standard Deviation. RI = Relative Index. Category: Strongly Agree = 4, Agree = 3, Disagree = 2, Strongly Disagree = 1.

Attitude towards host community language

The inquiry on attitude towards Yoruba is hinged on three propositions as follows: acquisition of Yoruba by parents, the value of Yoruba, and acquisition of Yoruba by their children. The three propositions were used to gauge respondents' opinion on assumption of another ethnic identity, the prestige and intrinsic value of Yoruba and perception of children acquiring another ethnic identity. The data is presented below.

Table 6: Attitude towards host community language (Yoruba)

Items		EHFQ (N = 136)					ELFQ (N = 40)					Total (N = 176)				
	Characteristics	Descriptive Statistics					Descriptive Statistics					Descriptive Statistics				
		Num	**%**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Category**	**Num**	**%**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Category**	**Num**	**%**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Category**
It is important for me to speak Yoruba	Strongly Disagree	10	7.4	2.84	0.800	3	2	5.0	3.00	0.641	3	12	6.8	2.88	0.768	3
	Disagree	26	19.1				2	5.0				28	15.9			
	Agree	76	55.9				30	75.0				106	60.2			
	Strongly Agree	24	17.6				6	15.0				30	17.0			
	Total	136	100.0				40	100.0				176	100.0			
Yoruba language is prestigious	Strongly Disagree	6	4.4	2.81	0.735	3	0	0.0	2.90	0.545	3	6	3.4	2.83	0.696	3
	Disagree	34	25.0				8	20.0				42	23.9			
	Agree	76	55.9				28	70.0				104	59.1			
	Strongly Agree	20	14.7				4	10.0				24	13.6			
	Total	136	100.0				40	100.0				176	100.0			
It is important for my children	Strongly Disagree	4	2.9	2.76	0.691	3	0	0.0	3.00	0.555	3	4	2.3	2.82	0.668	3
	Disagree	30	22.0				4	10.0				34	19.3			

to speak Yoruba	Agree	92	67.7				30	75.0				122	69.3			
	Strongly Agree	10	7.4				6	15.0				16	9.1			
	Total	136	100.0				40	100.0				176	100.0			
Pooled Mean Response				2.80	0.583	3			2.97	0.476	3			2.84	0.563	3

Source: Field Survey 2017. SD = Standard Deviation. Category: Strongly Agree = 4, Agree = 3, Disagree = 2, Strongly Disagree = 1.

There is semblance in the attitude of both groups of respondents towards the host community language; both EHFQ and ELFQ expressed a similar psychological disposition towards Yoruba. On the question of relevance, a majority of the two groups thought that it was important for them to speak Yoruba. Whereas 55.9% and 17.6% of EHFQ simply agreed and strongly agreed with the proposition, respectively, 19.1% and 7.4% simply disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively to the statement. In the same manner, 75.9% and 15.0% of ELFQ simply agreed and strongly agreed with the statement, while 5.0% simply disagreed and strongly disagreed with the proposition. The implication of this result is that the respondents positively evaluated Yoruba, the language of their hosts. In reality though, going by the language practice evidenced in home language use, there is little validation for this consideration among the respondents. It was only the ELFQ group that showed an inkling of gravitation towards Yoruba, as seen in the result of language use in the home. The EHFQ, who were more in number, did not report any use of Yoruba in any of the role relations. This is an indication that, although the group did not use Yoruba in their home practically, they thought that it was important for them to do so due to the facts of host-migrant relationship.

On account of value of Yoruba as an indigenous language, a majority of respondents in both groups thought that Yoruba is prestigious. Out of the total, 55.9% and 14.7% of the EHFQ simply agreed and strongly agreed to the proposition respectively, while 25.0% and 4.4% simply disagreed and strongly disagreed with the statement respectively. Following the same trend, a significant majority, 70.0% and 4.0% of ELFQ simply agreed and strongly agreed with the statement respectively, while a minority, 20.0% simply disagreed and none strongly disagreed with the proposition about the prestige of Yoruba. The implication of this result is that, the respondents understood the clout of Yoruba as one of the three most dominant languages in Nigeria, with respect to numeric, but also the language of their hosts. However, in comparison with Efik, it seems that, the respondents thought that their indigenous language is more prestigious than Yoruba. No respondent among EHFQ either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that Efik is prestigious, while a paltry 2 respondents (5.0%) among ELFQ simply disagreed with the statement that Efik is prestigious. In contrast, 34 respondents (25.0%) and 6 respondents (4.4%) of EHFQ disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively with the proposition that Yoruba is prestigious, while 8 respondents (20.0%) among ELFQ also disagreed with the statement on value of Yoruba. Given the apparent status of Yoruba as one of the national languages in Nigeria due to spread and number of speakers, it is obvious that the respondents' evaluation which subtly places Efik above Yoruba may be an outcome of ethnocentrism or ethnic bias.

The inquiry on the imperative for the children of respondents to speak Yoruba yielded an analogous result from the two groups. It is noteworthy that, all the respondents submitted reports on this question, irrespective of marital status. This means that while the married respondents reported on the basis of their children, the unmarried responded to the question prospectively, in anticipation of their future children. Among EHFQ, a majority 67.7% simply agreed and 7.4% strongly agreed with the statement, while a minority 22.0% simply disagreed and 2.9% strongly disagreed with the proposition on the importance of their children speaking Yoruba. In the case of ELFQ, a majority 75.0% simply agreed and 15.0% strongly agreed with the proposition, while a minority 10.0% simply disagreed and none strongly disagreed. The implication of this result is that majority of respondents were comfortable with their children being bilinguals in two indigenous tongues, Efik and Yoruba. This is to suggest that they wanted their children to either integrate or assimilate into Yoruba society. For the EHFQ who are favourably disposed to bequeathing Efik to their children, integration is the preferred strategy whereby the children learn the host community language while maintaining their own. For ELFQ who were not so keen in transmitting their mother tongue to their offspring, assimilation is the preferred strategy whereby the children are expected to adopt the host community language at the expense of their own.

On the whole, it is notable that, despite varying dispositions toward Efik expressed by the two groups, they avowed identical sentiments with respect to host community language. This position is statistically demonstrated below.

Table 7: Summary of attitude towards Host Community Language (Yoruba)

Items	EHFQ (N = 136)				ELFQ (N = 40)				Total (N = 176)			
	Mean Response Rating				Mean Response Rating				Mean Response Rating			
	Mean	SD	Category	RI	Mean	SD	Category	RI	Mean	SD	Category	RI
It is important for me to speak Yoruba	2.84	0.800	3	High	3.00	0.641	3	High	2.88	0.768	3	High
Yoruba language is prestigious	2.81	0.735	3	High	2.90	0.545	3	Low	2.83	0.696	3	Low
It is important for my children to speak Yoruba	2.76	0.691	3	Low	3.00	0.555	3	High	2.82	0.668	3	Low
Pooled Mean Response	2.80	0.583	3		2.97	0.476	3		2.84	0.563	3	

Source: Field Survey 2017. SD = Standard Deviation. RI = Relative Index. Category: Strongly Agree = 4, Agree = 3, Disagree = 2, Strongly Disagree = 1.

On the strength of the foregoing findings, it is pertinent, at this stage to evaluate the three hypotheses developed for this study. The hypotheses were conditioned on language use and attitude, as shown below

Hypotheses 1: There is no significance effect of demographics of age and other spoken languages on the choice of language used at home

Table 8: Association between Socio-demographic profiles and Efik Language Use at Home

Socio-Demographic Factors	Characteristics	Language Use at Home		Chi-Square	Df	Sig.
		EHFQ (N = 136)	ELFQ (N = 40)			
Age (in years)	20-30 years	77.8%	22.2%	17.470	2	.000
	31-40 years	59.3%	40.7%			
	41 years +	91.2%	8.8%			
Other language(s) used	Efik	75.0%	25.0%	8.980	3	.030
	Yoruba	58.8%	41.2%			
	English	82.3%	17.7%			
	Others	100.0%	0.0%			
Total		77.3%	22.7%			

Source: Field Survey 2017. Sample size (N) = 176. Methodology: Chi-square test of Association

The Pearson Chi-Square test results revealed that age and other spoken language(s) have significant effect on language use at home at Chi-Square value = 17.470 and 8.980, since p<0.05 respectively. The implication of this result is that such socio-demographic factor as age and other spoken language(s) influenced language use at home among the Efik respondents in the sample. In other words, different age groups' choice of language in the home differed from the choice of other age groups, and choice of language at home between those who spoke other languages apart from Efik/English and those who spoke only Efik/English also differed. Thus, the hypothesis is rejected

Hypotheses 2: There is no significance effect of attitude towards indigenous language and attitude towards host community language on language use at home

Table 9: Association between Attitude towards Indigenous Language (Efik), Attitude towards Host Community Language (Yoruba), on Language (Efik) Use at Home

Socio-Demographic Factors	Characteristics	Language Use at Home		Chi-Square	Df	Sig.
		EHFQ (N = 136)	ELFQ (N = 40)			
Attitude towards Indigenous Language (Efik)	Strongly Disagree	0.0%	0.0%	7.140	2	.028
	Disagree	0.0%	100.0%			
	Agree	75.9%	24.1%			
	Strongly Agree	79.3%	20.7%			
Attitude towards Host Community Language (Yoruba)	Strongly Disagree	100.0%	0.0%	10.135	3	.017
	Disagree	94.7%	5.3%			
	Agree	70.7%	29.3%			
	Strongly Agree	80.0%	20.0%			
Total		77.3%	22.7%			

Source: Field Survey 2017. Sample size (N) = 176. Methodology: Chi-square test of Association

The Pearson Chi-Square test results revealed that attitude towards indigenous language (Efik) and attitude towards host community language (Yoruba) have significant effect on language use at home at Chi-Square value = 7.140 and 10.135 (p<0.05) respectively. The results imply that attitude towards indigenous language (Efik) and attitude towards host community language (Yoruba) strongly influenced language use at home. Thus, the hypothesis is rejected as language use at home is affected by attitudes towards Efik and attitudes towards Yoruba.

Hypothesis 3: There is no significant difference between EHFQ and ELFQ respondents on Attitude towards Indigenous Language, and Attitude towards Host Community Language (Yoruba)

Table 10: Group Statistics and Independent Samples t-test

	Language Use at Home	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean Difference	T	Df	Sig.
Attitude towards Indigenous Language	EHFQ	136	3.6569	.33931	.14020	1.878	174	.062
	ELFQ	40	3.5167	.60835				
Attitude towards Host Community Language	EHFQ	136	2.8039	.58298	.14020	-1.613	174	.108
	ELFQ	40	2.9667	.47621				

Source: Field Survey 2017. Sample size (N) = 176. Methodology: Independent Samples t-test

The test, assuming equal variances, shows that there is no significant difference between respondents who used Efik and who did not on attitude towards indigenous language, and similarly on attitude towards host community language. The result implies that the hypothesis is accepted. Hence, respondents who used Efik and who did not share similar attitude towards indigenous language and attitude towards host community language.

Discussion

The discussion of results follows the trajectory of marked findings. First is the issue of non-transmission of Efik as a consequence of exogamy, followed by the dominance and sole transmission of English, and lastly the intrusion of the host community language in the migrants' homes.

In every multilingual and multiethnic city such as Lagos, one of the central interactional issues that usually arise is the choice of language both in public and home domain. Language choice is a major concern, especially in exogamous marriages, where the parents come from different ethnic groups. In mixed marriages, one of the major challenges that confront parents or couples is a common language to adopt for inter-personal interaction, in addition to the need to transmit the parents' indigenous languages to the children. Such decisions are complex and sensitive due to considerations of identity projection. Even in patriarchal African societies, men do not always have their way as language matters are not resolved by fiat but by conscious and deliberate practice. Holmes (2008) posits that mixed marriages lead to two critical state of affairs, language shift to a dominant language in the vicinity, and displacement of mother tongue of either the husband or the wife. In many circumstances, one parents' language is abdicated by the children. In rare cases, which is becoming common in contemporary times, both parents' indigenous languages are relinquished by the children due to the tendency to use a neutral language as a compromise. The shift from an indigenous language to a neutral language is a process of marginalisation that eventually leads to language endangerment if not checked. It is posited in this paper that, in mixed marriages, language choice is determined by the parents, to a great degree. Depending on cultural considerations, parents are in pole position to influence either the adoption of one of the parents' language or both. In most African societies, especially Nigeria, east of the Niger, children are expected to speak the language of their father because that is the language of the clan; the language that confers on the child membership of his/her ethnic group. Incidentally, depending on the occupation of the father, mothers spend more time with the children and usually exploit the opportunity to transmit their own tongues to the children. But both parents can consciously transmit their languages to their children if they desire, because children posses an innate capacity to acquire as many languages as possible (Baker, 2006; Montrul & Potowski, 2007). The One-Parent-One-Language (OPOL) strategy has been used by many parents to pass their languages to their children. The strategy involves each parent speaking their own language to the children, who eventually grow up with facility in both languages. In support of this position, De Groot (2011) evaluates the age effects of early exposure to two languages or more, and claims that early in life humans have a superior capacity to acquire languages in their environment. Thus, exogamy is not a deterrent or impediment in impartation of ethnic tongues but a stimulus that drives onward conveyance of dual heritage languages to future generations.

Non maintenance of Efik and consequently language shift to English at home among the sample is evident. As shown in the analysis, in both groups, quite a considerable number of parents spoke only English to their children; not to add the number of Efik/English interactions across role relations. The dominance of English in this context is not in doubt, given the official status of English in Nigeria coupled with its utilitarian benefits. It is noted by Romaine (2003: 528) that 'the inability of minorities to maintain the home as an intact domain for the use of their language has often been decisive for language shift'. This view is confirmed by Oller, Jarmulowicz, Gibson, & Toff, (2007) that minority children often experience a progressive shift from the home-language to the dominant language in the community, in this case, English. It is understandable that parents want to, from the onset, equip their children with the language which would facilitate their education, since English is the official medium of instruction in schools in Nigeria, irrespective of subject. This translates to the fact that English is their first language, though not their mother tongue, and in this transitory period, they are monolinguals in English. They will have to learn their mother tongue later as a second language, if they are opportune. Undeniably, the sequence of acquisition of the first (L1) and second (L2)

languages shows the language preferred by parents. Prioritizing English over Efik due to socio-economic factors pits the children in a precarious state with respect to learning their mother tongue. The usual sequence of acquiring the mother tongue at home, which is the traditional domain for the mother tongue, and the second language later in school, is a more acceptable norm for achieving compound bilingualism. The reverse, as evidenced in this study is problematic because it enhances and promotes monolingualism which is anachronistic. Exposing children to English at home, and further formally educating them in English at school leaves them no room to encounter and learn the mother tongue. When they eventually come in contact with the mother tongue later in life, it may either be too difficult or too late for them to learn, due to certain natural caprices and vagaries. De Groot (2011) submits that early in life humans have a better capacity for learning languages which declines with maturation. Initial exposure of children in their mother tongue has been found to be beneficial to the child, parents, and society, as it is related to promotion of self-esteem, learning of another language later, social control, traditional relationships and attitudes, cohesion and solidarity within minority groups (Edwards, 1984; Adegbija, 1994). It may seem attractive to have children who speak English only, but such exposure is detrimental to their ethnic identity and to the global quest for diversity. It is injurious to raise children in a language that expresses a foreign culture and world view. Since language is a vehicle used to transmit cultural resources, as posited by Fishman (1966), those children may not be rooted in the Efik culture, and they are bereft of that all important symbol which qualifies an individual as a member of Efik speech and cultural community. Without their ethnic language, such children are like outsiders, and may be treated so by other Efiks. The natural tendency of children to acquire languages implies that immigrant children exposed to a cocktail of languages are in prime position to acquire, at least two languages at the same time (Simultaneous bilingualism) or at different times. These two languages may include either the heritage language or host community language or may not include any of them. Thus, the ability of immigrant children to acquire their indigenous language rests squarely on the shoulders of parents. If parents grant their children sufficient exposure to the heritage language, they will acquire it in addition to the school language otherwise, children will acquire the school language at the expense of the heritage language. A major dimension in heritage language transmission is the lifestyle of city dwellers. The hustle and bustle associated with existential challenges leaves parents with little or no time to attend to their children's linguistic needs. Consequently children are left at the mercy of the linguistic environment.

The entrance of the host community language in the migrants' homes is a natural consequence of language contact. The first generation which represents parents may hold on tenaciously to their heritage language, but their children or second generation usually acculturate by picking the language of their host society. Hoff (1968) states that migrants who use the host's language are usually children, and they eventually bring the language into their homes and also serve as interpreters to their parents when the need arise. It is easy for children to acquire the host community language as a result of frequent associations and interactions, especially in the neighborhoods and schools. The language policy in Nigeria, as contained in the National Policy in Education (2004) prioritizes the child's L1 and the Language of the Immediate Community (LIC), but is silent on internal migrants' languages. This deficiency means that migrants who are students but far removed from their states like the Efik, have no option than to learn the language of their immediate community, in this instance, Yoruba, instead of their mother tongue. This scenario gives rise to two sets of bilinguals in the sample; those who speak two indigenous languages (Efik and Yoruba) as found among Efik Major, and those who speak only one indigenous language (Yoruba) which is not their own, as seen among Efik Minor. The grave implications of proficiency in Yoruba is identity dilemma, whereby the person sees him/herself as more a Yoruba and less an Efik or sees him/herself as both Yoruba and Efik. Additionally, given that identity is not limited to Self-perception but also to Other perception, when the person speaks Yoruba he/she may be mistaken by others as Yoruba.

Conclusion

Migration is a major factor in language maintenance as it reduces migrants' languages to a minority status, thus making it vulnerable to extinction in that setting. More impacting is the fact that, the children born in the new country/city or locale are more predisposed to adapting or adjusting to the linguistic pattern to suit life in the new place. If these second generation are not granted opportunity for

frequent contact with their home land, in addition to sustained practical use of the native language at home, they are bound to shift loyalty to the language of the host community or language of wider communication, with all its implications for identity projection. Irrespective of positive attitude towards a heritage language, reflecting that attitude in strategic domains such as the home is a major factor in language maintenance. Children do not just adapt to any language in their environment, but to that language that is systematically projected to them. Since, in Lagos State, regional languages such as Efik is not used in the education system, either as a subject or instructional tool, it behoves the parents and other concerned parties to re-strategise by first becoming purveyors and ambassadors of Efik, and by extension models of Efik identity and culture that the future generation will find irresistible.

References

Adegbija, E. (1994). "Language Policy and Planning in Nigeria" in *Current Issues in Language Planning*, Vol. 5, No. 3 pp. 58-61.

Baker, C. (2011). *Foundations of bilingual education and bilingualism*. (5th ed.). Tonawanda, NY: Multilingual Matters

Baker, C. (2006). *Foundations of bilingual education and bilingualism (4th edition).* Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters.

Brown, C.L. (2011).Maintaining Heritage Language Perspectives of Korean Parents. *Multicultural Education,* Vol. 12, (3), 46 – 58

Canadian Legal Information Institute. (1991, February 01). *Canadian heritage languages institute act*. Retrieved December 15, 2010, from http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-1991-c-7/latest/sc-1991-c-7.html

Cavallaro, F. (2005). Language maintenance revisited: An Australian perspective. *Bilingual Research Journal,* 29(3), 561-582.

Churchill, S. (2003). *Language education, Canadian civic identity and the identities of Canadians.* Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Cummins, J. & Danesi, M. (1990). *Heritage languages: The development and denial of Canada's linguistic resources,* Montreal: Our Selves Education Foundation.

Cummins, J., & Schecter, S. R. (2003). Situating learning in home, school, and community. In J. Cummins, & S. R. Schecter (Eds), *Multilingual education in education: Using diversity as a resource* (pp. 1-16). Portsmouth: Heinemann

De Groot A.M.B. (2011). *Language and Cognition in Bilinguals and Multilinguals: An introduction.* New York: Psychology Press

Edwards J. (1995). *Multilingualism*, London: Routledge.

Faraclass, N. (1989). The Cross River Languages, in J. Bender Samuel (Ed), *The Concept and its Evolution*, Calabar: University of Calabar Press.

Fillmore, W. L. (2000). Loss of family languages: Should educators be concerned? *Theory into Practice*, 39(4), 203-210.

Fishman J. A. (1991). *Reversing language shift: Theoretical and empirical foundations of assistance to threatened languages*. Clevedon, U.K.: Multilingual Matters.

Fishman, J. (1966). "Language Maintenance and Language shift as a field of inquiry". In J. Fishman (Ed.), *Language Loyalty in the United States* (pp. 424 – 458). London, UK: Mouton and Co.

Garcia, M. E. (2003). Recent research on language maintenance. *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics,* 23, (1) 22-43.

Gogonas, N. (2009). Language shift in second generation Albanian immigrants in Greece. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 30(2), 95-110, doi: 10.1080/01434630802307908

Greenberg, J.H. (1963). *The Languages of Africa*. Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Guardado, M. (2002). Loss and maintenance of first language skills: Case studies of Hispanic families in Vancouver. *The Canadian Modern Language Review*, 58(3), 341-363.

Hasbun, L.H. (2005). Why a preference for English as a foreign language over a heritage language. *Filologia Linguistica*, 2,(1) 107-118

Hinton, L. (1999). *Involuntary language loss among immigrants: Asian-American linguistic autobiographies* (Report No. EDO-FL-99-10). Washington, DC: Office of Educational Research and Improvement. (ERIC document Reproduction Service No. ED436982).

Hoff, H. (1968) "The Young Refugee" in *Growing up in a Changing World*. London: World Federation for Mental Health.

Holmes, J. (2008). *An introduction to Sociolinguistics*. Harlow, England: Pearson Education.

Kelleher, A. (2010). *Who is a heritage language learner?* Retrieved from http://www.cal.org/heritage/pdfs/briefs/Who-is-a-Heritage-Langua ge-Learner.pdf

Kopeliovich, S. (2011). How long is 'the Russian street' in Israel? Prospects of maintaining the

Russian language. *Israel Affairs*, 17 (1), 108-124.doi: 10.1080/13537121.2011.522073.

Lanza, E. & Svendsen, B.A. (2007). Tell me who your friends are and I might be able to tell you what language(s) you speak: Social network analysis, multilingualism, and identity. *International Journal of Bilingualism,* 11(3), 275-300.

Lee, J. S. (2002). The Korean language in America: The role of cultural identity in HL learning. *Language, Culture and Curriculum,* 15(2), 117-133.

Mesthrie, R. (1999). Fifty ways to say 'I do': tracing the origins of unstressed do in Cape Flats English, South Africa. *South African Journal of Linguistics,* 17(1), 58-71.

Montrul, S. (2010). Current issues in heritage language acquisition. *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics*, 30, 3-23.

Montrul, S., & Potowski, K. (2007). Command of gender agreement in school-age SpanishEnglish bilingual children. *International Journal of Bilingualism*, 11(3), 301–328.

Moses, M. S. (2000). Why bilingual education policy is needed: A philosophical response to the critics. *Bilingual Research Journal*, 24(4), 333-354.

Noah, P. (2004). Toward a more phonemic Efik orthorgraphy, In O. Ndimele (Ed), *Language and Culture in Nigeria. A Festschrift for Okon Essien* (pp, 587-594), Port Harcourt: Emhai Press.

Offiong, A.O. & Ansa, S. (2013). The Efik Language: A Historical Profile. *Research in Humanities and Social Sciences,* Vol. 3, (21)

Oller, K., Jarmulowicz, L., Gibson, T., & Toff, E. (2007). First language vocabulary loss in early bilinguals during language immersion: A possible role for suppression. *Proceedings of the 31st Annual Boston University Conference on Language Development*, 474–484.

Park, S. M. (2011). The role of ethnic religious community institutions in the intergenerational transmission of Korean among immigrant students in Montreal. *Language, Culture and Curriculum*, 24(2), 195-206.

Polinsky, M., & Kagan, O. (2007). Heritage languages: In the 'wild' and in the classroom. *Language and Linguistics Compass*, 1(5), 368–395.

Portes, A., & Hao, L. (2002). The price of uniformity: Language, family and personality adjustment in the immigrant second generation. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 25(6), 889- 912.

Romaine, S. (2003)."Multilingualism" in *The Handbook of Linguistics*, Mark Arnoff& Janie Rees – Miller (eds.), U.K: Blackwell Publishers.

Rumbaut, R. G. (2009). A language graveyard? The evolution of language competencies, preferences and use among young adult children of immigrants. In T. G. Wiley, J. S. Lee, & R. W. Rumberger (Eds.), *The education of language minority immigrants in the United States* (pp. 35-71). Bristol, UK: Multilingual Matters. Russian language. Israel Affairs, 17 (1), 108-124.doi: 10.1080/13537121.2011.522073.

Valdés, G. (2001). Heritage language students: Profiles and possibilities. In J. K. Peyton, D. A.

Ranard & S. Mc Ginnis (Eds), *Heritage languages in America: Preserving a national resource* (pp. 37-77). Washington, DC: Center for Applied Linguistics.

Valdes, G. (2005). Bilingualism, heritage language learners and SLA research: Opportunities lost or seized? *The Modern Language Journal*, 89(3), 410-426.doi: 10.1111/j.15404781.2005.00314.x.

Yearwood, E. (2008). Psychosocial implications for heritage language maintenance. *JCAPN*, 21, (1), 62-63.

SPATIO-TEMPORAL CHANGES IN LAND USE/LAND COVER DYNAMICS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE AREA OF OGUN STATE, NIGERIA

SAMUEL ADEBAYO OLANREWAJU, PhD
DIRECTOR OF PHYSICAL PLANNING, TAI SOLARIN UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, IJAGUN, IJEBU-ODE, OGUN STATE, adebayoolanrewaju03@gmail.com

KEYWORDS
Land use/land cover, geo-spatial, Development Pressure Area, Ogun state

ABSTRACT
Land use/land cover (LULC) character constitutes an important component affecting human interactions to live, work and recreate in the physical environment. Examines changes in LULC in the Development Pressure Area (DPA) of Ogun State, Nigeria covering a period of 30 years (1990 to 2020). Geographic Information System was used to identify, classify, analyse, categorise and situate LULC characteristics. Empirical observations revealed changes in the land use/land cover character in the DPA sub-region of Ogun State, Southwest Nigeria. A spatio-temporal analysis of the morphology was a phenomenal (88.04%) expansion of built-up area from 13,354km2 in 1990 to 111.691 km2 in 2020, while forests and agricultural lands declined by 46.5% in same period causing deficit in land resources availability. Built development has usurped other relevant land uses like open spaces, green belts and wet lands around the metropolitan areas of the DPA. Growing population and increasing influence of unplanned developmental processes are the main forces behind the major shift of forests and agricultural lands into physically built-up categories. Effective planning policy should be enacted to checkmate the growth of the area.

Introduction

The configuration of the physical environment at any point in time influences human interaction with it and impacts how the occupants of the environment live, work and recreate. The process of human-environment interaction produces the kinds and dimensions of human impact on the environment in terms of houses built, neighbourhoods created, cities developed and the socio-spatial relationships among the components. The morphological expression of the ensuing landscape obtaining at any point in time within the spatial fabric induces a spatio-temporal analysis to elicit the land use and land cover (LULC) characteristics in any delimited area (Aguda and Adegboyega, 2013). Land use is the process (functional role) and land cover is the product (physical attributes) of human interaction with the physical, social and economic environments (Agbola et al., 2014; Nanda et al., 2014) and both influence each other to produce the emergent landscape across both space and time.

Sinha (2018) argues that sprawl is an undesirable form of development because negative externalities are associated with it.

Infrastructure and facilities are always the byproduct of any development characteristics of urban landscape. Studies on such infrastructures as health facilities, water supply, housing, transportation, waste management, telecommunication amongst others have been documented (Jimoh and Wahab 2016, Jimoh 2022, Jimoh and Famewo 2022, Jimoh and Abdullahi 2022, Jimoh and Famewo 2022, Jimoh and Famewo 2023 Jimoh and Balogun 2022, Jimoh 2018, Jimoh 2021) and have continually constitute the concrete part of the development bulk. It is within the ambit of these infrastructural development dynamics that this study attracts a significant focus.

Statement of the Problem

In a bid to explore the environment, human activities of mining have had effect on the underlying geology for building and industrial materials, lowlands are filled, mountains are reduced and valleys levelled to create building and living conveniences for man, the drainage is affected by dredging or sand filling to suit the overriding interests of potential land developers, vegetation is affected by bush clearing for farming, lumbering and logging for building materials, roads, rails and tracks are constructed on land surfaces, the seas, oceans and space are navigated and a host of other exploration and intervening activities.

Furthermore, the associated low development costs of land in the DPA pulls attraction from the proximate over congested Lagos megalopolis which shares political but physically blurred boundaries with the region immediately south of the DPA, particularly along areas such as Ojodu, Alagbole, Akute, Ijoko, Oke-Aro Alagbado, Alakuko, Sango-Ota axes, which have grown to a conundrum. The infilling of new entrants into the DPA stimulates increasingly unplanned urban built densities associated with spontaneous expansion of settlements and diminishing public space causing fragmentation, disconnectedness and without corresponding economic transformation.

In addition, the high rate of in-migration from Lagos and other parts of Nigeria coupled with natural population increase have contributed to the sporadic upsurge in the monumental lateral expansion of built development of residential housing, industrial factories and large religious holdings in the DPA within the last few decades. This trend of population explosion is most likely to continue as it was projected that by the year 2025, one-third of the entire population of Ogun State will reside in the DPA alone which is just about one-twentieth of the Ogun State landmass (Ogun DPA Report, 2005). The over-arching implications of this are obvious.


Meanwhile literature on land use/land cover change abound. For instance, Ozdogan (2020) focuses on remote sensing, land cover mapping and machine learning and explores the application of deep learning techniques for accurate land cover mapping. However, Song (2020) revolves around urbanization, LULC and ecosystem services examining the effects of urban expansion on ecosystem services. Goldblatt (2021) centres around remote sensing, land cover mapping, machine learning and urbanization, discussing the potential of machine learning algorithms for predicting land cover changes while Vadrevu (2022) investigates the effects of LULC changes on ecosystem services in Africa. The intersections demonstrate a shared focus on understanding complex relationships between human activities, environmental changes and technological innovations.

Despite all the aforementioned studies on land use/land cover change, there are still a dart of empirical investigation on the dynamics and interplay of development in pressured areas. This study therefore, examines the spatio-temporal trend in LULC changes dynamics in the DPA of Ogun State from 1990 to 2020 and relates how these have accentuated urban sprawl.

The Study Area

The study area for this research is the Development Pressure Area of Ogun State in South Western Nigeria. Ogun State lies approximately between longitudes 20 45′ E and 40 45′ E; and latitudes 60 15′ N and 70 60′ N. With a land area of about 16,980 square kilometres, representing around 1.8 percent of Nigeria's total land mass of 924,000 square kilometres, Ogun State is ranked 24th largest of the 36 States in terms of land mass in Nigeria. It is bounded to the west by the Republic of Benin, to the south by Lagos State and a 20-kilometre stretch of the Atlantic Ocean, to the east by Ondo and Osun States and to the north by Oyo State (Figure 1). It is accessible to other States in Nigeria and the outside world through the International Airport and sea ports in Lagos State as well as international road network within the West African sub region.

The Ogun State Development Pressure Area, (DPA), as defined by the Ogun State Regional Plan, is the area immediately north of Lagos and under a severe development pressure particularly from the neighbouring Lagos metropolis. It covers about 30 kilometres radius from the Lagos-Ibadan Expressway and Ogun River intersection at Isheri (Ogun State Development Pressure Area Report, 2005) (Fig. 2).



FiMangure 1: Ogun State within the national context

Source: Ogun State Regional Plan Main Report, March 2007

The DPA under reference, as defined by the Ogun State Regional Plan, is roughly delineated by an imaginary arc extending in a clockwise configuration from Ajilete-Igbodo axis to the south west, Ilogbo-Ifo axis to the west, Mokoloki-Ofada axis to the north and Mosimi-Ogijo axis to the east. The area, which cuts across portions of five local government areas of Ado Odo/Ota, Ewekoro, Ifo, Obafemi-Owode and Sagamu (Fig. 2), covers about 950 square kilometres. The DPA is one among the six sub-regions designated by the Ogun State Regional Plan. According to the Ogun State Regional Plan 2005-2025 DPA Report, three factors were identified as being responsible for the existence of a development pressure in the area: First, the rapidly increasing in-flow of people from Lagos metropolis into the area, especially the poor people who cannot afford the rent demanded in Lagos and need to move into more affordable locations. Second, there is pressure from property developers in search of land for development and sale of landed properties. Third, Religious groups have also found the area attractive for its availability of large affordable land for their developments. (Ogun DPA Report, 2005).




Figure 2: The study area in the context of Ogun State
Source: Ogun State Development Pressure Area Report, June 2005

Materials and Methods

The spatio-temporal analysis of the study area detailing the spatial configuration of the study area between 1990 and 2020 was carried out by means of Geographic Information System (GIS) enabled technique. The application of geo-spatial techniques of Landsat remote sensing enabled the description of the time-dimensional application for the creation of the land use and land cover maps to assess the extent of urban built development. The process involved Satellite data selection, preprocessing, classification, interpretation and final land use/land cover maps.

With the application of geo-spatial techniques of Landsat remote sensing, the following list describes the adopted sequence applied in this study, for the creation of the land use/land cover maps to assess the extent of built development:

1. Satellite data selection

2. Satellite data preprocessing

3. Satellite data classification

4. Satellite data interpretation

5. Final land cover maps.

Satellite data were selected from the year 1990 to 2020 at 10 years' interval. The satellites images collected are:

- Landsat 4-5 thematic mapper for 1990. Landsat 4-5 TM image data files consist of seven spectral bands. The resolution is 30 meters for bands 1 to 7.

- The Landsat 7 Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus (ETM+) sensor for 2000 and 2010. Landsat 7 ETM+ images consist of eight spectral bands with a spatial resolution of 30 meters for bands 1 to 7.

For Satellite data pre-processing, the Universal Transverse Mercator Coordinate System (UTM)-WGS 1984 Zone 31 was deployed. All Landsat 7 scenes collected since May 30, 2003 have data gaps due to the Scan Line Corrector (SLC) failure therefore Focal Analysis algorithm tool was deployed to fill the line gaps using the ERDAS Imagine 14 package. Landsat TM enhanced false colour composites RGB (red, green, blue) were used for the interpretation and delimitation of the land cover classes.

For the classification the ISODATA method was applied in ERDAS Imagine 14 to identify area of the same pixel values. For Satellite data interpretation thematic maps were produced using ERDAS to show the different land cover classes differentiated using colours as seen in the image. LULC type of the same colour has a total number of pixel values. The total number of pixels' value is therefore multiplied by the pixel resolution (30, 30) for Landsat TM. The total area was used to calculate the percentage change of each class of the different years. For final land cover maps the results of the supervised classification provide a basis for visual interpretation. The final maps were therefore embellished in ArcGIS 10.1.

Results and Discussions

Descriptive explanations were made hereunder to expatiate on the landscape features revealed in the maps provided. Each year of study was taken in turn to present a livid discussion on the images captured on the diagrams and the related statistical analyses drawn from them in the relevant Tables. Each of the major components of the LULC classification and characteristics were examined and discussed. Classification and categorization of land use/land cover are usually purpose-driven based on the materials involved as well as purpose of the study. For instance, Ade and Afolabi (2013) in their study of urban sprawl in the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria aggregated four categories of Built-up, Rock Outcrop, Vegetation and Water Body. However, Nanda, et al (2014), in their Vishav drainage basin of the Pir Panjul range in India case study report of LULC dynamics, identified nine classes of Dense Forest, Sparse Forest, Agricultural Land, Horticulture, Built-up, Water Body, Snow/Glacier, Wetland, Grassland, and Wasteland. This study identifies five broad classes of LULC and they include: Dense Forest, Secondary Forest, Built-up Area, Agricultural Land and Water Body.

The classified images of the study area in 1990 (Figure 3) shows a low level of built-up area. Tracts of settlements were dotted along the major routes of Alagbado-Ota-Ifo axis to the west, Mokore-Magboro-Ibafo-Loburo axis to the east and Ofada-Mokoloki axis to the north of the study area. A comparative analysis of the classification (Table 1) shows that the built-up area constitutes 5.94 per cent while dense forest covers the greatest chunk of 56.77 per cent. The secondary forest covers 29.56 per cent; agricultural land covers 6.79 per cent while water body covers 0.94 per cent. The 1990 LULC displays a large area of green space which reflects a conservation of about 86.33 per cent of the total land coverage accounted for by dense and secondary forests.

The threat to the natural habitat as at 1990 was only 12.73 per cent of the total landscape. Within the 87.27 per cent apparently free from the threat, 65.76 per cent was accounted for by dense forest, 32.23 per cent by secondary forest and 0.94 per cent by water. Within the quantum of land use constituting threat to the natural habitat, 46.68 per cent was accounted for by built-up area while 53.32 per cent was taken up by agricultural activities. The unfolding narratives indicate that there is a relatively high carrying capacity of the natural habitat for human, fauna and flora activities in the study area. The land cover profile for 1990 assures of positive ecological balance and engenders fresh air, availability of ample land for agriculture, forestry, wildlife, housing and urban development that are capable of enhancing quality of live and well-being of the inhabitants.




Figure 3: Land cover pattern for 1990
Source: Author's Field Analysis

The LULC classification for 2000 (Figure 4) displays a marked expansion of the built-up area along the three major axes of Alagbado-Ota-Ifo, Mokore-Magboro-Ibafo-Loburo and Ofada-Mokoloki. The settlements expansion pattern has become more nucleated filling up the relatively dispersed characteristic feature of the 1990s. The built-up area (Table 1) accounts for 17.87 per cent, the dense forest covers 40.45 per cent, the secondary forest covers 32.81 per cent, and agricultural land covers 7.93 per cent while water body accounts for 0.94 per cent. A gradual expansion of the built-up area is noticeable visually and corroborated statistically as the study revealed 73.26 per cent land conservation in 2000, a decrease of 13.07 per cent from 86.33 per cent in 1990. Consequently, urban sprawl was beginning to take its toll in the study area in the 2000s at the rate of 17.87 per cent up from 5.94 per cent in the 1990s.

The built-up area attracted the greatest boost among other land uses by 11.53 per cent over the 5.94 per cent coverage for 1990, secondary forest increased by 3.25 per cent and agricultural land by 1.14 per cent, while dense forest declined by 16.32 per cent and water body remains constant at 0.94 per cent. Therefore, the

consumptive propensity of human activities generated by expanding built-up area was on the rise at the expense of forest reserves and agricultural land and other natural resources. Hence, optimal liveability of the inhabitants is threatened, by way of diminishing land and natural resources that constitute common good and natural conservation. The scenario infers a dwindling supply of the earth's finite resources as against an increasing demand for use and consumption of available community resources

Table 1 Summary of land use/cover classification statistics for 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2020 in the development pressure area of Ogun State

Class Name	1990		2000		2010		2020	
	km^2	%	km^2	%	km^2	%	km^2	%
Dense Forest	127.561	56.77	90.895	40.45	80.150	35.67	56.338	25.07
Secondary Forest	66.416	29.56	73.721	32.81	60.004	26.70	37.604	16.74
Built-up Area	13.354	5.94	40.148	17.87	58.250	25.92	111.691	49.71
Agricultural Land	15.249	6.79	24.603	7.93	23.281	10.36	16.827	7.49
Water Body	2.114	0.94	2.114	0.94	3.054	1.34	2.396	0.99
Total	224.694	100	224.694	100	224.694	100	224.694	100

Source: Author's Field Analysis

The 2010 character of urban sprawl displays two expanding conundrums to the west and east of the study area respectively. The western sector built-up area sprawls from Alagbado through Ijoko to Ota and then to Ifo while the eastern sector extends densely from Mokore along Ibafo, Mowe to Loburo and another budding expanse around Ogijo. The two sectors are dissected by River Ogun somehow dividing the study area into almost two equal halves (Figure 5). The built-up area has taken about a quarter (25.92%) of the total area (Table 1).




Figure 4: Land cover pattern for 2000
Source: Author's Field Analysis

The area left as green belt conservation has reduced to 62.37 per cent in 2010 from 73.26 per cent in 2000. The toll on the natural habitat calls for concern with respect to the depletion of natural resources particularly as the dense and secondary vegetation were giving way to expanding built-up area. It is also striking to note the increase in area covered by water body from 2.114km2 (0.94%) in 2000 to 3.054km2 (1.34%) in 2010. This could be a result of some explanatory factors that borders on natural influences such as global warming induced increase in precipitation resulting in natural flooding through heavy downpours of rainfall, and anthropogenic influences of human activities induced expansion of built-up areas and increased constructional activities causing reduction in natural infiltration, increased surface water run-off and retention, increased impermeability of the soils, industrial water discharge, dredging of river channels, channelization, sand-filling, industrial and municipal water discharges, land-fill sites and others.

The continuous expansion of the built-up area as a result of in-migration of people and natural population increase were eating into other land uses. As the built-up area increases, the green space for agriculture and flora and fauna preservation decreases. This reduces ecological resources as evident in this research

with the empirical data indicating a progressively diminishing earth's finite resources as against an increasing composite-built development consumption of the biophysical environment. The upsurge in the population causes increased consumption of land resources; soil, water and vegetation and social amenities; housing, commuting, schooling, healthcare, security, electricity, and other allied services. This is evident in the loss of green space by 10.89 per cent between 2000 and 2010.




Figure 5: Land cover pattern for 2010
Source: Author's Field Analysis

The 2020 land use/land cover displays a classification profile that has almost half of the entire study area (49.71%) as built-up area. This phenomenal increase in the built-up area has increased the density of infilling of the buildable area. As can be viewed in Figure 6, urban sprawl has spread to the erstwhile forests and the brink of rivers and streams. Almost all available space has been built up. The conurbation has been densified along Ota-Ifo-Ijoko back to Alagbado axis and along Mokore-Magboro-Ibafo Mowe-Ofada axis. Only tracts of other land uses were restricted to the central portion straddling River

Ogun and its tributaries and on the eastern portion of the study area.

The other land use/land cover coverage is: Dense Forest; 25.07 per cent, Secondary Forest; 16.74 per cent, Agricultural Land; 7.49 per cent and Water Body; 0.99 per cent. Another striking feature of the 2020 profile is the reduction in agricultural land use/land cover from 10.36 per cent in 2010 to 7.49 per cent in 2020 and of water body from 1.34 per cent in 2010 to 0.99 per cent in 2020 (Table 1). The reduction in agricultural land use shows lesser engagement of the land for agriculture. The reduction in water body might be due to lowering of groundwater levels which affects water supply. Increased human activities have equally decreased the amount of water body possibly by over-abstraction, water being consumed more quickly than it is being replaced, in the period under reference. A graphic analysis of the features of land use and land cover (Figure 7) shows the relationship among the various land uses classified for the study.

To showcase the successive transformation in the land use/land cover in the period under review, a comparative display of the emergent situation across the years selected is shown in Figure 7. The successive decline of forest cover as against the successive increment of the built-up area is glaringly evident. A progressive expansion of the built development is apparent along the major communication routes. This trend of built development is traceable in the 1990 profile to a ratio of about 1:20 of the total area coverage, being 13.354 of 224.694 square kilometres. This grew in prominence into conurbations in the succeeding years up to 2020 expanding to a ratio of about 10:20 of the total area coverage being 111.691 square kilometres of the total land area of 224.694 square kilometres (Table 1).




Figure 6: Land cover pattern for 2020
Source: Author's Field Analysis

The built development that evolved in the 1990s as a budding leaf around Sango-Ota axis, as dotted spots along the outlining areas from Sango-Ota to Ifo, Ijoko and Alagbado axes and as a strip or string along Mowe-Ibafo transportation route has grown steadily through 2000s and 2010s into expansive densities of sprawling developments. The trend has culminated in the 2020s as a conundrum, particularly along the Alagbado-Ijoko-Sango-Ota-Ifo axes and the Isheri-Mowe-Ibafo corridors. Other adjoining areas within the DPA landscape were not spared the encroachment of built development into other land uses. Apparently, the excessive proliferation of built development has progressively transformed the erstwhile land cover from green to brown. Increasing human activities of building and construction for housing and settlement development accounted for the expansion of the built-up area over other land uses.

A close examination of the proportional distribution characteristics of the major LULC components shows a consistent decline in the forested land cover from 1990 to 2020 (see Figure 8). On the contrary, there is also a consistent upsurge in the growth of built development at a greater scale or proportion than other land uses, lending credence to the fact of development pressure on the available resources. In the absence of meaningful urban planning to regulate the spate of the exploding urban physical expansion, the associated social and environmental consequences of incongruous land use, environmental degradation, compromised aesthetics and urban blight may be irreversible




Figure 7: Comparative land use/cover pattern
Source: Author's Field Analysis




Figure 8: Proportional distribution of land use/cover between 1990 and 2020
Source: Author's Field Analysis

A further insight into the changing dynamics of land use/land cover in this study is the analysis of the degree and direction of the change over the time of the review. The trend of change was examined by observing the products of periodical change per land use component divided by the total sum of change for all components per period as a multiple of a hundred to express the change as a percentage. The evolved character of periodical changes in the land use in the study area is such that as much as 36.666 square kilometres of dense forest representing 45.71 per cent of the relationship was lost within the 1990 to 2000 period. However, the built-up area was expanded within the same period by 26.794 square kilometres being 33.46 per cent of the total for that component (Table 2). This pattern of change continued between 2000 and 2010 where the dense and secondary forested land cover diminished by 23.97 and 30.60 per cent respectively, whereas the built-up area component alone shored up by 40.38 per cent within the same period (Table 2). A graphical illustration of the evolved trend of the changing landscape features of land use/land cover pattern is also charted (Figure 9).

Considering the overall change between the base and apex year, 1990 and 2020, almost half of the entire land mass, 49.96 per cent of dense and secondary forest has been conceded in contradistinction to the built-up area which has expanded also by almost half being 49.11 per cent. The remaining 0.93 per cent was accounted for by agricultural land (0.79 per cent) and water body (0.14 per cent). A graphical illustration of the evolved characteristics of change in LULC under discourse is depicted to reflect the pattern in a positive and negative comparison of direction of the changes among the various LULC components (see Figure 10). The equilibrium is set at zero (0), the negative side is the quantum of loss of land per component in square kilometres while the positive side reflects the amount of land consumed by expansion or growth of the particular land use/land cover component.




Figure 9 Chart showing trend of land use/land cover change over time

Source: Author's Field Analysis

Table 2 Trend of land use/land cover change in the study area

Class Name	1990 – 2000		2000 – 2010		2010 – 2020		1990 - 2020	
	Area Change km²	% Change	Area Change km²	% Change	Area Change km²	% Change	Area Change km²	% Change
Dense Forest	-36.666	45.77	-10.745	23.97	-23.812	22.39	-71.223	35.57
Secondary Forest	7.305	9.09	-13.717	30.60	-22.400	20.98	-28.812	14.39
Built-up Area	26.794	33.46	18.102	40.38	53.441	50.05	98.337	49.11
Agricultural Land	9.354	11.68	-1.322	2.95	-6.454	6.05	1.578	0.79
Water Body	No Change	No Change	0.94	2.10	-0.658	0.63	0.282	0.14
Total	80.119	100.00	44.826	100.00	106.765	100.00	200.232	100.00

(*Trend*) percentage change = observed change ÷ sum of change x 100

Source: Author's Field Analysis




Figure 10 Proportional direction of change in land use/land cover in the study area
Source: Author's Field Analysis

The evolving settlement pattern over the time series evaluated in this study and its effect on the land use/land cover and liveability of the study area puts to perspective the changing landscape, the habitation generated and the consequences on the environment. The ensuing pattern of habitation giving rise to the nature of urban/built-up development reflects a continuous growth and expansion of sprawling-built development across the length and breadth of the DPA (see Figure 11). A look at the character of the urban/built-up area shows a massive settlement expansion through the years from 1990 to 2020 with the developed built form almost surpassing the yet to be developed land.

Considering the scale and dimension of urban built-up development in this study, it is deduced from this discourse that within the span of thirty years, built development grew rapidly from 13.354 square kilometres in 1990 to 111.691 square kilometres in 2020 (Table 3). This represents a concomitant increase of 88 per cent within the time frame under review. If this rate of urban built-up expansion is related to the entire 224.694 square kilometres, about half of the entire landscape of the study area is completely built as at 2020. This trend also displays a successive expansion of the built-up development with average decennial increase of not less than 3 per cent (Table 3). A close examination of the composite land use/land cover imagery shows the complexity of the interrelationship of the evolving landscape through the periods under review (Figure 12). It shows built development extending to all possible areas almost unrestricted.




Figure 11 Pattern of built development
Source: Author's Field Analysis




Figure 12 Composite land use/cover for 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2020
Source: Author's Field Analysis

Table 3 Urban sprawl quantitative analysis

Year	Extent of urban area (km²)	Total area	Rate of change km²	% Change	Decennial rate of Change km²	%
1990	13.354	224.694	--	5.94	--	--
1990 – 2000	40.148	224.694	26.794	17.87	2.679	3.35
2000 – 2010	58.250	224.694	18.102	25.92	1.181	4.04
2010 – 2020	111.691	224.694	53.441	49.71	5.344	3.24

Source: Author's Field Analysis

Pattern of Built Development

The pattern of built development in the DPA displays a sprawling configuration. The sprawling occurs along the major transport corridors. This character buttresses multiple nuclei theory of invasion of transport routes generated by agglomeration. The explosion of settlement expansion from Lagos metropolis has spread into the study area giving rise to conundrums along the Lagos-Sango Otta-Ifo axis and Lagos-Ibafo-Mowe axis. The morphology of the settlement spread is such that is characterized by a mixture of densely built-up urban centres interspersed with leap frog extension of built-up areas into the urban fringes. Generally, the image captured reflects a progressive expansion of the built-up area from 5.94% in 1990 to 49.71% in 2020. This was a marked contrast to other major components of land uses and land cover namely; dense forest, secondary forest, agricultural land and water bodies, which altogether accounted for 94.06% in 1990 and 50.29% in 2020. The emergent picture of land use/land cover development indicates an advanced stage of horizontal extension, a stage of discontinuity. The future therefore portends the consolidation of the present situation to prevent urban blight. Actionable measures should be taken to forestall undesirable consequences of uncontrolled urban development.

The relationship between the major components of land uses and land cover is such that the built-up area was expanding almost ten times whereas other land uses and land cover components have reduced by almost two times within the same period of about three decades. To this effect, it can be safely inferred that the built-up area was expanding in a geometrical progression while other land use components were sliding to give way for the increasingly expanding built-up area. However, the performance of the other land use components is such that the dense forest slides from 56.77 per cent in 1990 to 25.07 per cent in 2018, secondary forest slides from 29.56 per cent in 1990 to 16.74 per cent in 2020, while agricultural land and water body increased slightly from 6.79 per cent in 1990 to 7.4 per cent in 2020 and 0.94 per cent in 1990 to 0.99 per cent in 2020 respectively.

Effect of sprawl on the natural and built environment

The toll of the depleting natural resources and conservation area (dense and secondary forests) on the natural habitats is variously astounding. The interplay between the built-up area as a consumptive component of LULC and forests, agricultural land and water body as conservation component of LULC accounts for the process and product of the natural and built environment.

There is the perceived increasing loss of green space for agriculture, flora and fauna preservation as a result of urban sprawl which intuitively threatens ecological balance. Settlement expansion has caused an increase in the consumption of land resources; soil, water and vegetation, and social amenities; commuting, schooling, health care, security, electricity and others, resulting in resource and amenity deficits. All these triggers the threat to the natural habitat, the decline in the quantum of land for agriculture, forestry, wildlife, housing and urban development and negative impact on the quality of life and well-being of residents along those land uses.

The intervening process of urban sprawl has created a widespread usurpation of rural land space by accelerated proliferation of urban development in the study area. The changing landscape is dictated by human behavioural attitudes which seek to maximize benefits from the physical, social, cultural and economic environments as the common good upon which the social dynamics to build infrastructure for human survival and sustenance rests.

Consequently, many of the original dispersed settlements were fast disappearing and being overrun by unprecedented urban settlement expansion in the study area. Some of the erstwhile dispersed settlements have been dismembered. They were no longer identified by their original names and identities. Beyond this, many of the residents in this category suffer acute accessibility problems as access to their settlements or neighbourhoods were hindered by imposed prevention of thoroughfare across acquired large land holdings. The emergent land use causes route diversion which led to prolonged inter-township journeys, increased transport costs and restricted modal choice of transportation. Although some of the villages were transformed by way of resettling them in newly built modern houses, as was the case of Oloparun Satellite Village by the Redeemed Christian Church of God. However, some of the residents were feeling insecure from the

psychological point of view. They expressed social, economic and environmental deprivations.

The emergent settlements were nucleated continuum forming conundrum along Agbara-Atan-Sango Otta-Arigbajo-Ifo axis, Magbon-Akeran-Mowe-Ibafo-Loburo axis, and Ogijo-Odonguyan axis. These settlement expansions were merely intersected or limited by Ogun River course to the western and central area, and by Owiwi river course to the eastern area of the DPA.

Conclusion

The essence of the foregoing discourse is to provoke awareness of the associated potential debilitating effects of the seemingly unrestricted and unregulated built development in the Ogun State DPA. Thus, the pattern and dimension of the changing land use/land cover have been identified, classified, categorized and the main forces behind them analysed in this discourse. This spotlights the implication of the pattern of settlement spread as a determinant of the person-environment relationship. The pattern influences residents' access to land and other natural resources for housing, transportation and other socio-economic activities.

The cluster pattern of buildings and built-up areas impact land use, land conservation and reticulation of municipal facilities and services which influences the liveability of the environment. The consequences of urban sprawl characterized by rapid expansion of built development are: increasing pressure on available infrastructure, disappearance of green belts and open spaces, expansion of impervious areas and loss of wet land. Others are unlimited outward development in low density and leapfrog form at the outer reaches of a metropolitan area, premature or poorly planned conversion of rural land to other uses. These are exacerbated by the lack of central ownership or planning and highly fragmented land use governance. If the trend continues, there is bound to be the continuous destruction of the country side being stripped of natural vegetation, promotion of pollution of different sorts of soil, water, air and noise within the ambient sprawling environment and the vitality of existing urban areas undermined. The fact remains that the land area is finite and could not be expanded beyond some defined limits.

In effect, there is the auspicious need to initiate positive pro-active measures to forge a favourable balance between the ever-consumptive human induced built development and the susceptible natural habitat. Efforts should not be spared to create actionable measures capable of regenerating the ambient environment to support and sustain the expanding-built development. Regulatory agencies in land use and built development must be strengthened and made vibrant enough to enshrine and implement appropriate strategies to govern land use within designated political constituents. The systemic policy framework for planning should embrace established legal framework, planning norms and regulations for guiding and nurturing physical development. The legal framework constitutes the available enabling laws, ordinances, official prescriptions deployed by government for urban and regional planning related activities. People-centred policies and procedures for land acquisition and use can be explored within neighbourhood units to be formulated among community-based organizations.

References

Agbola, S. B., O. M. Kasim and M. O. Coker. 2014. "Dynamics of Land Use and Land Cover Change in Ibadan Region, Nigeria" Land Use/Cover Changes in Selected regions of the World: Vol IX I. Bicik, Y Himiyama, I. Ferance and L. Kupkwa ed, Prague: IGU/LUCC, Faculty of Science, Charles University, 43-48

Aguda, A. S. and S. A. Adegboyega. 2013. Evaluation of Spatio-Temporal Dynamics of Urban Sprawl in Osogbo, Nigeria using Satellite Imagery & GIS Techniques", International journal of Multidisplinary and Current Research, ISSN: 2321-3124, 60-73

Goldblatt, R. 2021 "Using machine learning to predict land cover change" Journal of Applied Earth Observation and Geoinformation, 96, 102324 doi: 10.1016/j.jag 2021.102324

Jimoh U.U and Wahab W.B, (2016), Health care Financing and Budgetary Allocation in Ondo State, British Journal of Medicine and Medical Research, Vol16 (5), 1-9.

Jimoh U.U and W.O Abdullahi (2022) Generation and composition of Biomedical Waste in Selected Hospital in Akure south Local Government Area, Nigeria, African Journal of Biomedical Research, 25 (1) 73-81

Jimoh, U.U, (2022) Spatial and Seasonal Pattern of Flood Inundation in Lokoja, Kogi State, Nigeria. Forum Geografi, 36

Jimoh, U. U and F Balogun (2022) Environmental Challenges against Health Care Utilisation in a Marginalised Communities of Sagamu Local Government Area, Ogun State, Nigeria. African Ethnography, Vol (4)20 -37

Jimoh, U.U. (2018). Effects of PZ Chemical Waste on Water Quality and Household Health Chall0enges in Odogunyan Community, Ikorodu Lagos St ate, Nigeria, Ethiopian Journal of Environmental Studies and Management Vol 11. No 6. 654 – 665.

Jimoh, U.U. (2021) Physical Planning Standard of Health Care Facilities in The Rural Communities of Ondo State, Development in practice, Taylor and Francis, Vol. No. 6 717-725

Jimoh,U.U and Famewo. A (2022) Occupational health risks of informal e-waste Activities on major landfills and e-village in Lagos State, Nigeria. Journal of Public Health Policy, Vol. 43. No.3 335-346

Jimoh,U.U and Famewo. A (2023) Involvement of Teenagers in E Waste Activities On the Major Landfills in Lagos, African Journal of Biomedical Research 25 (1) 73-81

Jimoh,U.U and Famewo. A (2022) Inequality of Public Health and Effects of Health Care Accessibility on Patient Referral System in Ondo State, Caleabevi Scientific Research Journal, Vol 2 (1) 16-25

Nanda, A. M., R. A. Hajam, A. Hamid and P. Ahmed. 2014." Changes in Land Use/Land Cover Dynamics using Geospatial Techniques: A Case Study of Vishav Drainage Basin" Journal of Geography and Regional Planning, 7(4), DOI: 10.5897/JGRP2014.0443, 69-77.

Ogun State Development Pressure Area Report, 2005.

Ozdogan, M. 2020. "Global Land Cover Mapping with Deep Learning" Remote Sensing of Environment. 237, 111533. doi: 10.1016/j.rse 2020. 111533

Sinha, S. K. 2018. "Characteristics of Urban Sprawl: A Cross-Cultural Analysis" Review of Research, 7 (11), ISSN 2249-894X, 1-6

Sony. C. 2020. "Mapping Urban Expansion and its impact on Ecosystem Services" Landscapes and Urban Planning. 203, 103885 doi: 10.1016/j.landurbplan 2020.103885

Vadrevu, K. P. 2022. "Land use/land cover changes and their impact on Ecosystem services" Environmental Research Letters. 17(4) 044002 doi: 10.1088/1748-9326/ac53c4

CONFLICTS AND SECURITY INTERVENTION IN ARMED CONFLICT IN BENUE STATE

DOMINIC AONDONA IORNUMBE
INSTITUTE OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, NASARAWA STATE UNIVERSITY, KEFFI,
dominiciornumbe@gmail.com

PROFESSOR ANDREW ZAMANI
PROFESSOR LIMAN ABDULLAHI NUHU
I.G.D.S NASARAWA STATE UNIVERSITY KEFFI

TANKO SHAWULU PAUL PhD
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, NIGERIAN ARMY UNIVERSITY BIU,
shawulu002@gmail.com

KEYWORDS
Armed conflict, Security agencies, Intervention, Governments, Benue Communities

ABSTRACT
The armed conflict phenomenon in Benue State is widely recognized and constantly discussed in the local and international community as a major source of concern bedevilling national security and an existential threat to the indigenous population, even though the governments at all levels had adopted numerous measures considered as strategically important to bring the situation to an end. Among these efforts is the deployment of security agencies to coordinate themselves in a manner that could produce a joint force operation to end the conflict and restore peace and stability. Nevertheless, the outcome from the security intervention is coloured with mixed reports of success and many challenges that surpassed the success achieved. From the litany of extant literature reviewed, it is evident that the security agencies recorded commendable success in tackling the perpetrators of the armed conflict. Yet, much is left to be desired due to the fact that the armed conflict situation is progressively worsening even with the continued presence of the military and other security agencies in Benue State. The security agencies have been found to fail, according to studies. As a result, the future of restoration of peace and stability remains bleak and worrisome. The research recommend that Government should be more proactive in the implementation and provision of infrastructure designed for farmers and herders' resource use to avoid a situation where these incessant upheavals would affect agricultural production and food security of the nation. The research used secondary data. Frustration aggression and system theories were used.

Introduction

Armed conflict in Benue State has reached the status of an unprecedented, unnecessary and violent phenomenon in the middle-belt region of Nigeria. The two-decade-old armed conflict inevitably endangered human lives to an unbearable degree. The persistent occasional attacks on the communities constantly cause vicious destruction of human lives and their properties as well as disruption of social, economic, commercial, and agricultural activities of the inhabitants. The socioeconomic implications of this conflict is the experience of social and food insecurity in Benue state which has earned the tag of the food basket of the nation.

Benue State has a history of armed conflict that includes herder-farmer-clashes, military operations, militia and other violent incidents. The height of the armed conflict in Benue State is recognizably the Fulani herdsmen and farmers violent engagement. Historically, the dispute between the Fulani Herdsmen and indigenous farmers of Benue is said to have started in the early 1800s (Yaro & Tseer, 2019). The conflict has worsened over time, with peaks in 2014 and 2018. Invariably, the ceaseless incidents of episodic skirmishes caused the mass killings of the state inhabitants growing progressively worse all these years. There are 23 local government areas in Benue, and many of them have been taken over by the herdsmen. Concerted government efforts to control and bring to an end this conflict have been yielding no desired results. Legally, the Benue State government, in a bid to ensure an end to the herders-farmers violence, enacted the popular Anti-grazing laws captioned "A Law to Prohibit Open Rearing and Grazing of Livestock and Provide for the Establishment of Ranches and Livestock Administration, Regulation and Control and for Other Matters Connected Therewith" in 2017. These laws were passed and established for implementation to serve as a form of deterrent to herders who allow their herds to graze indiscriminately into farmlands. Unfortunately, its implementation has been grossly ineffective. Besides, and prior to the establishment of the anti-grazing law, every other approach the Benue State government and the Nigerian federal government adopted and put in place as interventions has failed at the moment, the Nigerian Army is in place in Benue State in greater strength, and the Inspector General of Police has been directed by the Nigeria's president to restore order to Benue. Yet, much is left to be desired. In fact, the lack of political will to systematically and genuinely implement effectively all plans and methods that have been adopted to bring this situation to an end is one of the major reasons why the farmers-herdsmen crisis in Nigeria still persists with regular reports of killings and destruction of properties. The crisis in Benue State is one that should be taken seriously by all the stakeholders in the security system in the country, as it has a negative impact on the socio-economic and political ecology of the state and the nation at large.

Existing literatures focused on food security, climate change and military operations. This study will attempt to fill this gap. Furthermore, various literatures in the Benue valley have no under pining solution to the armed conflict hence the gap. The existing literature on the Benue valley seems to be silent on the root cause of the armed conflict and its mitigating efforts. This study will attempt to fill this gap.

Research Questions

1. What are the underlying causes of armed conflicts in Benue state Nigeria?
2. What are the consequences of the armed conflict situation on the peace, security, growth, and development of Benue State?

Objectives of the Paper

The insight into the hydra-violent phenomenon of armed conflict in Benue State with its negative effect on the population and the nation and with the view to further research to assess the effectiveness of security agencies intervention to end the situation. The objectives are to

1. Review the perceived causes of the armed conflict situation that has been persisting in Benue State.
2. Elaborate further on the consequences of the armed conflict situation on the peace, security, growth, and development of Benue State,

Review of Literature

The Concept of Security

The term "security" has meant different things in different context and at different times (Rothschild, 1995). In its common interpretation from previous times, it relates to survival, to protection from threats to existence and being relatively free from harm inflicted by others. In academic usage, it generally relates to the protection of something that is valued, which may be physical life, democracy, identity, etc. According to Wolfers, (1952), security means some degree of protection of values previously acquired. The precise measurement for security is therefore impossible; clearly, a nation can have more security or less security. Perfect, complete security is unattainable.

The Macmillan Dictionary, (2017), defines the term security as "the protection or the safety of a country's citizens and its secrets", emphasizing the overall security of a nation. This indicates that the welfare/protection of people comes first above all other protections that a nation may be willing to guard. Security simply means safety of citizens

Armed Conflict

According to Nnoli (2003), armed conflict and its multi-dimensional consequences has been as obstacle to progress, political stability, economic prosperity and overall economic development of Nigeria. Violence provoked by conflicts, has often turned the people's intention from creative production to creative destruction.

Violence according to World Health Organization means the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development and deprivation (WHO, 2002). Armed violence in Nigeria has been a matter of great concern as the country is characterized by a lot of violent crimes and conflicts.

Muggah (2001) has observed that the nature of armed violence tends to vary according to situational variables such as normative and behavioural culture, gender and demographics.

Armed means any form of conflict involved use of any form of weapons that is capable of causing harm and dead of people.

The Impact of Small Arms on Armed conflict in Nigeria

The violence ridden country of Nigeria is a sad showcase of the insecurity, human rights and humanitarian costs of the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms. Quantities of arms have circulated the country despite the instruments, laws and prohibitions against their possession and use. This has given rise to the rampant misuse of such weapons by state and non-state actors alike. The widespread availability of small arms to abusive actors in Nigeria as elsewhere greatly contributes to armed violence coupled with further atrocities and also makes peace harder to achieve. The most direct impact of small arms and armed violence is the sheer number of deaths and injuries incurred by their misuse and application respectively in Nigeria state.

The deaths and injuries resulting from firearms have been simultaneously described by different researchers as a 'scourge', an 'epidemic', a 'disease' and a 'preventable global health problem' (Small Arms Survey, 2001:214). Armed conflicts in Nigeria have caused unprecedented deaths and injuries ranging from hundreds to thousands in number. Examples of such conflicts are the Aguleri-Umuleri, Ife-Modakeke, Tiv-Jukun, Ugep-Idomi, Oku Iboko-Ikot Offiong, Mangu-Bokkos and Igbo Ora conflicts. Others are the Kano and Kaduna religious riots, the Niger Delta, Zango Kataf, Tafawa Balewa and Jos crises, and most recently, the Boko Haram insurgency. On that same note, crime rates have been exacerbated by the increase in availability and proliferation of small arms throughout the country. Also, crime, especially armed robbery, is a primary concern of citizens in Nigeria.Furthermore, the right to life is guaranteed under the Nigerian constitution and also international law, both in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article III, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article IV. The right to life is also guaranteed in International humanitarian law. Nigeria is bound under various international treaties and *jus cogens* of international human rights to protect these rights (Chuma-Okoro, 2001:293).

Besides their misuse in the violation of people's right to life, armed conflict have been used for other nefarious purposes. Frey (2004:380) has noted that: arms facilitate an entire range of human rights violations, including rape, enforced disappearance, torture, forced displacement, and forced recruitment of child soldiers. Communities that suffer from an

atmosphere of armed criminal or political violence may suffer a wide range of violations to their international rights to education, healthcare, development and their right to participate in government - to name a few. Clearly, the above is prevalent in Nigeria as it has already been observed by Anyim (2012), using the Jos experience. The gender perspective of the impact of small arms and armed violence on Nigeria is quite expository. Small Arms Survey (2001) noted that: Consideration of gender is particularly relevant in the discussion of direct effects since a disproportionately large percentage of both aggressors and victims (during conflict or peace) are men and yet women are explicit targets of certain types of armed violence - simply because they are women. Some forms of violence like - domestic abuse, sexual assault, and rape are uniquely conditioned for gender-based relations, which means that understanding their dynamics is critical for effective intervention.

Interestingly, Anyim (2012) noted again that during the Benue crises, the fear of sexual harassment forced women into forming alliances with soldiers and militia as a means of safety and escape. Consequently, there was increase in unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases. He however pointed out that women and children were not only victims in the crises but that they also participated in the killings in Benue. The socio-economic impact is also enormous. Small Arms Survey (2001) noted that: violence creates an atmosphere of anxiety, with negative multiplier effects that erodes the human, economic, and social capital of communities. Widespread armed violence inflicts various social and economic costs on individuals and states, including medical treatment and rehabilitation; destruction of physical infrastructure; internal displacements of persons; refugee flows; losses in productivity and foreign investment; general disruption of economic, social, civic and political activities. At the macroeconomic level, small arms proliferation and armed violence discourage foreign investment, as well as domestic savings, as people lose confidence in a country's prospects for growth.

Armed conflict, crime and domestic violence also damage prospects for economic development, affecting school enrolment rates and overall productivity. Furthermore, armed conflict and crime impose significant constraints on the ability of affected countries to implement national development programmes. On the one hand, national resources are diverted away from social welfare for purchase of arms to protect the security of civilians. On the other hand, vital infrastructure needed for development initiatives is put in jeopardy by arms-related anxieties (Small Arms Survey, 2001). In the 2012 of the Nigerian Federal Government, N 921 billion (USD 5.5 billion - almost 20 percent of the country's whole budget) was allocated to security spending (Owen, 2012). This might seem necessary but the fact still remains that there is a clear accent on procurement rather than on human resources development or structural or procedural changes that might make security institutions more effective.

Benue State has, for the past two decades walloped in violent aggression due to the herders-farmers confrontation. The unpleasant experience from this unpredictable no-end-insight of this conflict phenomenon cannot be overemphasize. Sadly, it is a reality that in all violent confrontation between groups where sophisticated arms are illegally sourced and used for the aggression, much is always lost such as killing of people and destruction of properties (Okoli & Atelhe, 2014). Ikpanor and Aondoaver (2021) in their study report, posited that over 5,000 people, including children and pregnant women, were killed, and tens of thousands were forced to leave their ancestral homes. The armed conflict dominated by the herders-farmer violent engagements which has been occurring unabated over the past decades is major existential threat security and peaceful coexistence of the people.

By any reason whatsoever, and the source of the conflict, the fact remains that the armed conflict situation particularly the Fulani herdsmen and farmers of various ethnic groups in Benue, has induced poverty, hunger and deliberate subjection of the people to homelessness in their land. This is because armed conflict has forced the expulsion of the inhabitants of the communities in many of the local government areas in the Benue State where the violent groups have occupied (Yaro & Tseer, 2019, Mohammed et al., 2021). The unwanted displacement of people has induced the loss of agricultural, socioeconomic or commercial, educational activities as well as impinging development. Furthermore, this has made criminal acts, such as banditry and armed robbery, easier. It also accounts for the numerous ethno-religious clashes that has become a basic characteristic of Nigeria's weakness (Faror2021). These attacks are by armed groups which sometimes, happened at night or even during the daytime, depending on the attackers' calculations.

Security Agencies Intervention in the Armed Conflict in Benue State

The escalation of violence in Northeast and Middle Belt Nigeria necessitated the deployment of a heightened security presence across the region. Through the initiation and development policies and strategies to arrest the armed conflict situation in Benue State, during leadership of the then President Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015). Due to the absence of a Comprehensive National Security Policy and Strategy document for the country (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP), (2015), launched a framework for a holistic and more coordinated approach and response to security concerns in the country called the National Security Strategy (NSS) Jatau (2017). The NSS identified major security issues and assigned roles and responsibilities to the government, civil society, private agencies and individuals in addressing these issues, including counterterrorism and cyber-security strategies.

Considering the birth of the National security strategy document as a stimulus to coordinated approach and response to addressing the issues of rising armed conflict in Nigeria, it is imperative to discuss the security intervention with a supporting theory. This is to ensure that quest to examine the impact of security agencies intervention in the armed conflict situation in Benue State comprehensively explained and understood. Doing so therefore, Galula (1964) Counter-insurgency theory is found to be suitable to align the aim of the paper. The theory propounded by French war veteran, David Galula, rest on belief that, success in fighting armed conflict there will be need for combination of military and social actions under strong control of a single authority (Counter-Insurgency, 2018). Galula further emphasized that the development and success of counter-insurgency campaign should be hinged on the heart of the "political machine" and effectively coordinated efforts to achieve the intended outcome. This coordination can be massively achieved through committees and integrated military-civilian hierarchies (Itumo &Nwobashi, 2015,). According to Galula, a victory in a counterinsurgency is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization. But it is the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population

The invention of this security strategy document led to the evolvement of Joint security operation which is a collaboration among the military, police, and department of state security services, Nigeria security and civil defense for purpose coordinating intervention to curb the progressive and worsening violence in all the Nigeria States including Benue. These joint operations were meant to enhance coordination and resource sharing, leading to more effective control efforts. Invariably, in response to this idea, the Federal Government in February 2018 established its first joint security taskforce codenamed Operation Ayem Akpatuma with the mandate to tackle the rising wave of armed herdsmen attacks, farmers-herders clashes, cattle rustling, kidnapping and armed banditry by local militia (Ogunleye,2018).

The joint force operation claimed to have recorded some successes in the few security operations it undertook within the first three months of its lifespan. In May 2018, the taskforce was disbanded, and in its place, another sister security taskforce named Operation Whirl Stroke (OPWS) was established with the same mandate (Olowolagba, 2019). Worthy of note also is that these two security task forces comprised personnel of the Nigerian military (Army, Air force, and Navy), the Nigeria Police Force, DSS, and NSCDC), with a military general as its commander/head. From the 32 security offensive operations it undertook within the first year (2018) of it's existence, Olowolagba (2022) reported that Operation Whirl Stroke (OPWS) has so far launched successful attacks in over 130 security parades against armed herdsmen, militia gangs, suspected bandits, and kidnappers in parts of Benue State as at December 2021.

In addition to the regular Nigeria Police Force, the DSS, State Government\s Livestock Guards, and the various local community vigilante groups that are charged with the mandate of maintaining internal security across Benue State, there are, of course, a plethora of ancillary security outfits charged with such similar mandate whose presence are visible in the state. These ancillary security agencies that are expected to play complementary role to that played by the Nigerian police and DSS, among others include the following: the Nigeria Correctional Service (NCS),the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Vehicle Inspection Office (VIO), Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Commission (ICPC), Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corp (NSCDC), among others.

The general expectations were that these security agencies would collaborate or work in synergistic cooperation among themselves both

as autonomous bodies and in their joint security operations against threats to public safety and internal security in in Benue state and Nigeria as whole (Gbanite 2010; Odoma, 2012; Alemika, 2003; Omogui, 2006; Marizu, 2007). This view was that, in a situation whereby the various security agencies in Nigeria play their roles well, especially in mutual collaboration, cooperation or synergy with one another and amongst themselves as widely envisaged by society and the constitution, the increasing wave of violent crimes and other threats to internal security would have been drastically eliminated. The approach to intervention in the armed conflict revolves around two major strategies and these include the kinetic and non-kinetic methods.

Basically, the joint force operation involving the military and other force organizations have the expertise use variety of tools that they can use to win a war, using both kinetic and non-kinetic. Defining these terms is not always straight forward, particularly non-kinetic, as it sometimes seems to be the category for "everything else". Kinetic can be briefly defined as those capabilities focused on "physical force and systems that immediately support the use of physical force", and non-kinetic as those capabilities "relevant to irregular warfare" (Hurley et al., 2009). Besides, the federal government and State apart from the releasing the force organization act appropriately to control the armed conflict, employed many approaches that focused on dialogue to complement the forces efforts.

Nature/Outcome of the Security Agencies Intervention

According to Amnesty International (2018) report, the Nigerian Federal Government, State Governments, the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigerian Army are the secondary actors of the conflict. Actually, at some level of the security intervention success was acclaimed to have been recorded by joint force operations. These successes saw the arrest and neutralizing of perpetrators or members of the various armed groups (Gabri, 2024). In a series of recently conducted operations, troops of the Nigerian Army have successfully quelled the nefarious activities of notorious kidnappers and rescued their hostages in Benue State. Acting on actionable intelligence, troops raided a notorious kidnap syndicate hideout in Sankara, Ukum Local Government Area, resulting in the neutralization of three terrorists and the rescue of two hostages. The operation also led to the recovery of one AK-47 rifle, one locally fabricated gun, assorted mobile phones, a camouflage uniform, and one motorbike (Gabri, 2024).

Apparently, these operations have improved coordination among security agencies, leading to more successful raids and operations. Yet, occasional inter-agency rivalry and lack of unified command can reduce overall effectiveness. The security forces deployed to these areas have a mandate to maintain peace, their officers have been implicated in widespread human rights abuses against civilians consequently eroding public confidence in the security sector and alienating security forces from the citizens they are charged to protect, thus thwarting the effectiveness of their mandate (Impactometrics International, 2022). This has culminated into the failure of executing their expected coordinating responsibility to achieve the desires outcome. In the light of this, the effectiveness of security agencies in Benue State has been mixed, with reported successes and challenges.

The security agencies failure led to many unusual and unfortunate incidence. For example, not long ago, on 30th May, 2024 Lieutenant Bot Elisha and 10 other passengers who were kidnapped traveling on board a Peace Mass Transit Bus from Abuja to Port Harcourt by armed, though they were later rescued. This was aptly captured in an interview with military personnel in Makurdi. Many joint force members were killed at different organized surprised attacks by these gunmen. The security forces were found unable to prevent the clashes most of the times. Some evidence and witness testimonies show that some officers are corrupt, and they cooperate with the attackers. Instead of being a trustworthy organ of the state and protect their citizens, the security forces in Nigeria disrupt the current situation. In a related development, troops on a search and rescue operation have successfully extricated from Kidnappers' den, Warrant Officer Ogbonna Charles, a serving soldier of the Nigerian Army, who was abducted in the Goh Area of Gwer West Local Government Area of Benue state. The soldier, who was abducted on 25 May 2024, in Naka, is currently undergoing medical checks following his rescue.




Figure 1: The Study Area showing zones of armed conflict
Source: Ministry of Land and Survey, Makurdi

Data Collection

The data primarily used to achieve the objective of the paper were obtained from secondary sources. Secondary sources data are published work of researchers who took their time to do painstaking research on the situation of armed conflict in Benue State found in text-books and journal articles, newspapers, magazines and official documents found online found online and in libraries.

Frustration and Aggression Theory

Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (1939). According to them, the central thesis of Frustration and aggression theory is that aggression is always a function of frustration and the occurrences of aggressive behavior always presuppose the existence of frustration. They further defined aggression as any behavior which is intended to injure, cause harm, pain to the individual to whom it is directed. According to Zillmann (1979), the major tenets of the theory are;

a. frustration instigates behavior that may or may not be hostile or aggressive;

b. And any hostile or aggressive behavior that occurs is caused by frustration.

The theoretical significance of this theory is its ability to concisely explain the reasons for violent conflict between the farmers and herdsmen. Environmental conflict from the perspective of this theory is a product of the frustration of herdsmen as a result of severe ecological changes and Boko Haram incessant attacks in their home state with the resultant effects such as the death of many cattle which are their most treasured possession, cattle rustling and migration to the south. All of which makes the herdsmen put on aggressive behavior which is a derivative of the previous frustration

they have encountered as a result of grazing in the face of adverse weather condition, scarcity of environmental resources and security threats from Boko Haram attacks. Therefore, the destruction of farm crops, properties, houses and massive death toll that perpetually fill up the front-page of the national dailies are the product of aggression that evolves from frustration and sense of deep loss on the side of the herdsmen.

Frustration Aggression Theory is adopted as the major theory because it explains the reason for conflict. When individual expectation is not met, it can easily be frustrated and once he is frustrated, he will exhibit hostile behavior which will lead to aggression hence result to conflict which is the situation between farmers and herders in different communities in Benue State.

Conclusion

The issues of armed violence have been a source of great security concern in Nigeria. This paper has therefore provided an analysis of the causes, impact attempt at curbing and challenges of insecurity in Benue state Nigeria, thereby linking it with its attendant armed violence that is characterised in violent conflicts and criminality. The paper has also explored the dynamics of armed violence in Nigeria and showed that armed groups, criminal gangs and even some bad elements within security operatives are highly involved in the perpetuation of violence on even innocent citizens.

It is however pertinent to note that inasmuch as there is a link between small arms availability or proliferation and armed violence, small arms or their proliferation is not the cause of violent conflicts in Nigeria. Moreso, it is not also the cause of armed robbery and other crimes. Socio-economic factors like poverty, underdevelopment, unemployment, corruption, bad leadership and also the structural or root causes of violence need to be addressed.

There is therefore no doubt that small arms availability and proliferation in Nigeria has helped to increase the intensity of violent conflicts, crime and security operatives' brutality. The government has a prime responsibility to nib the issues of small arms and armed violence in the bud. It should tackle socio-economic factors that give rise to violence and also ensure that there is effective and well-enforced legislation and policy that guide firearms use; improved border controls; training of security personnel; cooperation between armed forces and security forces; cooperation with neighbouring countries; and increase its focus on human security. Until these are done, small arms and light weapons will continue to be a challenge for Nigerians for many years to come.

Recommendations

i. The Federal Government should formulate and effectively implement policies and programmes capable of addressing the root causes of armed conflict in Nigeria such as poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, the dearth of infrastructural facilities, uneven development, among others.

ii. The Government should be more proactive in the implementation and provision of infrastructure designed for farmers and herders' resource use to avoid a situation where these incessant upheavals would affect agricultural production and food security of the nation.

iii. The Federal Government should re-organize the country's intelligence system and build a capable and more proactive security apparatus in country, so as to checkmate the incessant bombings, robbery, kidnapping and violent crimes/crises by hoodlums all over the country.

iv. There is the need for collective security arrangement by Federal, State and Local Governments in Nigeria. This arrangement should produce a committee at village, community, local, state and federal level with the responsibility of providing sensitive security information for security agencies on areas of operation, for easy identification of criminals, their sponsors and hideouts in Nigeria.

References

Alemika, E. E. A. (2003). Police accountability in Nigeria: Framework and Limitations.

Audu, N. M. and Zakimayu, T. B. (2021) Appraising the Nigeria Police Force Fight against Terrorism and Insurgencies in Nigeria, 1960-2020. UZU JOURNAL: VOL. 8. NO. 1, 240-252

Enor, F. N., Magor, S. E. and Ekpo, C. E. (2019). Contending Perspectives and Security Implications of Herdsmen Activities in Nigeria. International Journal of Research GrantHalaayah , 7(7): pp.265-286.

Faor, T. T. (2021), A History of the Conflict between Herdsmen and Farmers in the Benue Valley, 1999-2018. Aboki Publishers. Benue State, Nigeria. Pp 80-81

Gbanite, M. (2001). National Security and Intelligence under Democracy. The way forward. New Jersey, U.S.A

Ikpanor, E. T. and Aondoaver, E. T. (2021). Armed Fulani Herdsmen Activities on the Benue Taraba Boarder: The Resultant Effect on National Security. Benue Valley Journal of Herder-Farmer Crisis, Vol.4. ISSN 2736-0423 Pp 1-20

International Crisis Group. (2018). Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/westafrica/nigeria/262stopping- nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence

Marizu, C. O. (2007). Inter forces harmony. An address delivered by the Air Officer Commanding Logistics Command at the Conference of Military, Police and paramilitary Public Relations Officers Forum (MILPOPPROF), Lagos, 8thFebruary.

Mbumega, A. &Anaele, C. O. (2019). Inter-agency cooperation: An approach to conflict management and security provisioning in Nigeria. European Journal of Peace & Security, 21 (4), 184-199. News Situation Tracking - Nigeria Agro-Pastolralist Conflict vol. 2

Odoma, S. (2014). Superiority struggles and inter-agency feud in Nigeria. Global Journal of Human, Social Sciences, Sociology and Culture. 14(5): 33-41.

Okoli, A. C., and Iortyer, P. (2014). Terrorism and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria: Insights from Boko Haram insurgency. Global Journal of Human-Social Science (F), 14(1), 1.0. Retrieved from https://globaljournals.org/GJHSS_Volume14/6-Terrorism-and Humanitarian-Crisis-in-Nigeria.pdf

Okoro, J. P. (2018) Herdsmen/Farmers Conflict and its Effects on Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria. Journal of Peace, Security, and Development Volume 4, No. 1, Pp.143-158. ISSN: 2360-9435

Omoigui (2006) The Bakassi story available from <http//www.Omoigui.com> (Accessed 18t October, 2024.

Yaro. D.S. & Tseer. T. (2019). Exploring the State of Human Insecurity in Nigeria: The Root Causes of The Farmers-Herdsmen Conflict in Benue State and Its Manifestation on The Livelihood of Rural Farmers and Pastoralists. ADRRI JOURNALS; VOL. 16, No. 6 (4), 2343-6891 www.adrri.or

(Osimen Goddy Uwa Akintunde Bamidele Anthony 2015). Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Proliferation and Problem of National Security in Nigeria. International Affairs and Global Strategy Vol.29,:12-20 ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online)

Ayissi, A. and Sall, I. (eds) (2005) Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Handbook for the Training of Armed and Security Forces, Geneva: United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

Florquin, N. and Berman, E. G. (eds) (2005) Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Regions, Geneva: Small Arms Survey Publication.

Hazen, J. M. and Horner, J. (2007) "Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective" The Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 20. Ibrahim, M. (2003) Democracy and the Menace of small Arms of Small Arms proliferation in Nigeria, Lagos: Centre for Democracy and Development.

Chuma-Okoro, H. (2011) "Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Nigeria: Legal Implications" in Law and Security in Nigeria.

Nte, N.D. (2011) "The Changing Patterns of Small and Light Weapons (SALW) Proliferation and the Challenges of National Security in Nigeria", Global Journal of Africa Studies 1 (1): 5-2

John, I. A. Mohammed, A. Z; Pinto, A. D and Nkanta, C. A. (2007). Gun Violence in Nigeria: A focus on ethno religious conflict in Kano, Journal of Public Health Policy 28, 420-431

Kofi, A. (2010), Millennium report to UN General Assembly (UNGA), New York, USA.

Ocheche, S. (2005) "Cooperating with Civilians and the Security Forces in Efforts to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons" in A. Ayissi and I. Sall (eds) Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Handbook for the Training of Armed and Security Forces, Geneva: United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

Aderinwale, A. (2005) "Civil Society and the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons" Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Handbook for the Training of Armed and Security Forces, Geneva: United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

Ndime, D. (2005) "Corporation between States to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons" in A. Ayissi and I. Sall (eds) Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Handbook for the Training of Armed and Security Forces, Geneva: United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

Adejo, P.Y. (2005) "Crime and Cross-Border Movement of Weapons: The Case of Nigeria" in A. Ayissi and I, Sall (eds), Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Handbook for the Training of Armed and Security Forces, Geneva: United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

Adejo, P.Y., (2005) 'Crime and Border Movement of Weapons: The Case of Nigeria' In Ayissi A. and I. Ibrahim (eds) Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa. Geneva: UNIDIR.

Collier, P. (2009) Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous in Places. New York: HarperCollins Publishers

Ginifer, J. and Ismail, O. (2005) Armed Violence and Poverty in Nigeria. Centre for

International Cooperation and Security, University of Bradford. Retrieved from <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/afr_pdf/africa-nigeria-2005.pdf> on 20/05/2013.

Human Rights Watch (2003) 'The Warri Crisis: Fuelling Violence' Human Rights Report, November. Retrieved from <http://www.hrw.org> on 20/10/2010

IRIN (2006) 'Guns Out of Control: The Continuing Threat of Small Arms' In IRIN Indepth,

May. Retrieved from <http://www.IRINnews.org> on 27/05/2013

Khakee, A. (2005) 'Gun Culture in Nigeria: Removing Small Arms and Increasing Safety in the Niger-Delta Region' In Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control. Geneva: UN Mandated University for Peace. September.

Naagbanton, P. (2006) 'The Proliferation of Small Arms, Armed Groups and Violent Conflict s in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria' Retrieved from

<http://wwwcehrd.org/files/dangerous_armed_groups_in_delta.doc> on 10/07/2010

Pytlak, A. (2010). Small Arms and Light Weapons: Africa-A Resource Guide for Religions for Peace.

Malam, B. (2014). Small arms and light weapons proliferation and its implications for West African Regional Security. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 8(4), 260269

Christopher, L. (1995) United Nation Research Institute for Social Development; The Social

FROM COLD WAR DYNAMICS TO CONTEMPORARY COMPLEXITIES: UNRAVELING THE GEO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICA AND RUSSIA RELATIONS

AZUBUIKE, CALLISTUS FRANCIS
POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, NNAMDI AZIKIWE UNIVERSITY, AWKA,
cf.azubuike@unizik.edu.ng, ***https://orcid.org./0009-0000-8443-3329***

OLADIRAN AFOLABI, PHD
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMATIC STUDIES, BOWEN UNIVERSITY, IWO, NIGERIA.
oladiran.afolabi@bowen.edu.ng, *https://orcid.org./0000-0002-1720-8495*

ANTHONY NGONADI, PHD
POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, TANSIAN UNIVERSITY, UMUNYA, ANAMBRA STATE,
anthony.ngonadi@tansianuniversity.edu.ng

IFEANYI ELEAZAR UMEOZOR
POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, TANSIAN UNIVERSITY, UMUNYA, ANAMBRA STATE,
ifeanyi.umeozor@tansianuniversity.edu.ng

KEYWORDS
U.S.-Russia relations, Cold War legacies, Geopolitical dynamics, Strategic competition, Cooperation

ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the multifaceted nature of U.S.-Russia relations, spanning from the Cold War era to contemporary time. Through an analysis of historical legacies and critical insights, the study explores the enduring influence of Cold War dynamics on bilateral relations and the complexities of strategic competition amidst mutual distrust between Russia and the United States of America. Key historical events, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and NATO expansion, are examined to elucidate their continued impact on contemporary policies and attitudes. Guided by the realist theory, the study adopted a descriptive and analytical research design. While utilizing data collected largely from secondary sources, the research delves into contemporary challenges including cybersecurity threats, economic interdependencies, and proxy conflicts, underscoring the intricacies of navigating U.S.-Russia relationship in the 21st century. The study concludes that while Cold War legacies present significant challenges to U.S.-Russia relations, there is room for constructive engagement and cooperation. Both countries possess agency and the capacity to transcend historical grievances through dialogue, diplomacy, and mutual understanding. It is recommended that policymakers prioritize diplomacy and strategic communication in addressing mutual grievances and fostering greater cooperation between the two countries.

Introduction

The geopolitical dynamics between the United States and Russia have been a central feature of international relations for much of the 20th and 21st centuries. From the intense rivalry of the Cold War era to the multifaceted complexities of contemporary nuances, the relationship between these two powers has continued to shape global politics profoundly in several ways. The Cold War, a period marked by ideological confrontation, nuclear arms race, and proxy wars, established a framework of adversarial competition that continues to influence the bilateral relations of today. Although the Cold War officially ended in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its echoes reverberate through current geopolitical tensions, economic sanctions, cyber conflicts, and regional disputes. The end of the Cold War brought a brief period of hope for a cooperative international order. The United States, as the preeminent global power, and Russia, emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union, navigated a new era of relations. Initial cooperation, marked by agreements on arms reduction and economic assistance, soon gave way to disagreements over NATO expansion, interventions in the Balkans, and differing visions for the post-Cold War order (Gaddis, 2005). These issues, coupled with domestic changes within both nations, contributed to a resurgence of rivalry.

The Cold War era established a foundation of mutual distrust and strategic competition that continues to influence U.S.-Russia relations. The ideological clash between American capitalism and Soviet communism not only defined global alliances but also fostered a zero-sum game mentality, where gains for one side were viewed as losses for the other. This period saw numerous confrontations, including the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, each reinforcing the adversarial nature of the relationship (Friedman, 2000). The collapse of the Soviet Union did not fully dismantle this adversarial framework. Instead, it transformed it. Russia, under leaders such as Boris Yeltsin and later Vladimir Putin, sought to reassert its influence and resist Western encroachment, while the United States aimed to consolidate its global leadership and promote a liberal international order. The resulting dynamic has been one of intermittent cooperation overshadowed by deep-seated suspicion and rivalry.

One of the most contentious issues in post-Cold War U.S.-Russia relations has been the eastward expansion of NATO. Initially, NATO's expansion was presented as a means to stabilize and integrate Eastern European countries into the Western political and security architecture. However, from Russia's perspective, this expansion represented a strategic encirclement and a betrayal of assurances given during the reunification of Germany (Sarotte, 2014). The inclusion of former Warsaw Pact members and Baltic states into NATO has been particularly provocative for Russia, exacerbating fears of Western dominance in its near abroad. This expansion has had significant implications for U.S.-Russia relations. It has fueled Russian nationalism and justified militaristic policies under Putin, who has used the NATO threat to consolidate power domestically and legitimize foreign interventions. The NATO-Russia relationship has thus become a microcosm of the broader U.S.-Russia rivalry, with each expansion or military exercise reinforcing mutual suspicions and strategic competition.

The U.S. and Russia have also found themselves on opposing sides in various regional conflicts and proxy wars, further complicating their relationship. In Syria, for example, Russia's military intervention in support of Bashar al-Assad directly challenged U.S. interests and strategies in the region. Similarly, the conflict in Ukraine has seen the U.S. providing support to the Ukrainian government, while Russia backs separatist movements (Stent, 2019). These regional conflicts are not merely local disputes but are viewed by both nations as strategic battlegrounds where they can assert their influence and counter each other's policies. The involvement in these conflicts reflects the broader geopolitical chessboard, where the U.S. and Russia engage in indirect confrontations through proxies, complicating diplomatic efforts and fueling further animosities.

Ideological and political differences continue to be a significant source of tension. The U.S. promotes a liberal democratic model, emphasizing human rights, free markets, and democratic governance. In contrast, Russia, under Putin, has embraced a more authoritarian model, emphasizing state control, nationalism, and a resistance to Western liberalism (Aron, 2013). These contrasting visions for domestic governance and international order underpin many of the conflicts and disagreements between the two nations. The ideological clash is evident in issues

such as human rights, electoral interference, and governance standards. The U.S. often criticizes Russia for its domestic policies, including the suppression of dissent and curtailment of political freedoms, while Russia accuses the U.S. of hypocrisy and interference in its internal affairs. These ideological disputes add another layer of complexity to an already fraught relationship.

Looking forward, the future of U.S.-Russia relations remains uncertain, with potential for both conflict and cooperation. Areas such as arms control, counter-terrorism, and space exploration present opportunities for collaboration. The New START Treaty, which limits strategic nuclear weapons, is a notable example of successful cooperation that enhances global security (Gottemoeller, 2021). However, the underlying mistrust and strategic competition pose significant obstacles to a broader and more stable partnership. To navigate these complexities, both nations will need to address the historical legacies and contemporary challenges that shape their interactions. Building trust, engaging in dialogue, and finding common ground on mutual interests will be essential for mitigating the adversarial aspects of the relationship and fostering a more cooperative international order.

One can argumentatively say that the relationship between the United States and Russia is characterized by a deep and enduring complexity, shaped by historical legacies and contemporary challenges. From the Cold War's ideological confrontations to today's multifaceted geopolitical chessboard, understanding this relationship requires a nuanced analysis of the various factors at play. As both nations continue to navigate their interactions, the potential for both conflict and cooperation will depend on their ability to reconcile past grievances with future aspirations. The echoes of the Cold War may still reverberate, but the path forward lies in addressing the contemporary complexities with a strategic and open-minded approach.

In the vein of the foregoing, this paper explores the evolution and complexities of U.S.-Russia relations from the Cold War period to the present by examining how historical legacies, economic sanctions, cyber conflicts, and potential areas for cooperation have shaped bilateral relations between these two countries.

Methodology

The research design is both descriptive and analytical, providing a comprehensive overview and in-depth analysis of the multifaceted geopolitical interactions between the United States and Russia.

Research Design

The research employs a descriptive and analytical design to explore the various dimensions of U.S.-Russia relations. By describing historical events, policies, and actions, and analyzing their implications, this study seeks to uncover patterns and themes that have defined and continue to influence this critical geopolitical relationship.

Data Collection

The study primarily relies on data collected from secondary sources. These sources include, Peer-reviewed journal articles that provide theoretical frameworks, empirical studies, and scholarly analyses on U.S.-Russia relations. Comprehensive texts by experts in international relations and history that offer detailed accounts of historical events, policy decisions, and strategic interactions. Official documents from U.S. and Russian government agencies that present policy statements, strategic plans, and diplomatic communications. Credible news sources that report on recent developments, key events, and expert opinions related to U.S.-Russia relations. The secondary sources were meticulously selected based on their relevance to the research objectives and the credibility of the sources. Academic and government publications were however prioritized for their reliability.

Data Analysis

Data collected for the study were content analysed; involving a systematic, thematic review and interpretation of data collected in line with the main arguments, theories, and empirical evidence presented.

Theoretical Framework

This study is guided by the Realist theoretical framework, which contends that states are the primary actors in international relations, and their

behavior is largely driven by the pursuit of power and security in an anarchic international system. Realism posits that states prioritize their own interests above all else, leading to competition, conflict, and the formation of alliances to ensure survival and dominance (Morgenthau, 1948). Realism as a theory of international relations can be traced back to classical realist thinkers such as Thucydides and Machiavelli. However, the modern formulation of realism is often attributed to Hans Morgenthau, whose seminal work "Politics Among Nations" (1948) laid the foundation for contemporary realist thought.

Realism is based on the premise that the international system is anarchic, meaning there is no overarching authority to regulate state behavior. States must therefore rely on their own capabilities to ensure survival and security. Realism argues that states are rational actors driven by self-interest, seeking to maximize power and maintain relative advantage over other states (Waltz, 1979). Realism has faced criticism for its state-centric focus, which overlooks non-state actors and other factors such as ideology, culture, and economic interdependence. Additionally, critics argue that realism's emphasis on power politics can lead to a cynical view of international relations and overlooks opportunities for cooperation and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Keohane, 1986).

This theory provides a useful framework for understanding the dynamics of U.S.-Russia relations, particularly in the context of strategic competition and geopolitical maneuvering. Given the historical legacy of the Cold War and the ongoing power struggle between the United States and Russia, realism's focus on state interests, power dynamics, and security concerns is highly relevant. In analyzing the impact of Cold War-era mentalities and structures on current U.S.-Russia relations, realism offers insights into the strategic calculations and behavior of both countries. The enduring rivalry between the United States and Russia can be understood through a realist lens, as both states seek to maximize their power and influence in the international system. Realism helps explain why historical legacies such as ideological confrontation and strategic competition continue to shape contemporary policies and attitudes between the two countries. Additionally, realism underscores the importance of power dynamics and security concerns in driving U.S.-Russia relations, highlighting the challenges and opportunities for cooperation in a context of strategic competition and mutual distrust.

Analyzing the Historical Legacies of the Cold War in US-Russian Relations

The Cold War era laid the foundation for the modern geopolitical landscape between the United States and Russia. Scholars such as Gaddis (2005) argue that the ideological confrontation and strategic competition during this period established long-lasting patterns of mutual distrust and rivalry. The Cold War saw numerous confrontations, from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Vietnam War, which reinforced an adversarial mindset that persists today (Friedman, 2000). The dissolution of the Soviet Union did not eradicate these deep-seated suspicions but rather transformed them, as the newly formed Russian Federation sought to reassert its influence in the post-Cold War world. The relationship between the United States and Russia has undergone significant changes since the Cold War, influenced by a complex interplay of historical events, geopolitical shifts, and ideological rivalries. By examining key historical events and primary sources such as declassified documents, speeches, and memoirs, we can gain insight into the evolution of this pivotal bilateral relationship.

The Cold War era indeed laid the foundation for the modern geopolitical landscape between the United States and Russia. Scholars such as Gaddis (2005) argue that the ideological confrontation and strategic competition during this period established long-lasting patterns of mutual distrust and rivalry. While Gaddis (2005) provides a comprehensive analysis of the Cold War's impact on U.S.-Russia relations, it is crucial to recognize that the legacy of this period is not merely one of conflict but also of cautious engagement. For instance, the establishment of various arms control agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), demonstrated a capacity for cooperation amidst rivalry. This duality suggests that while adversarial patterns are significant, the potential for constructive dialogue has always been present.

Friedman (2000) emphasizes the enduring nature of Cold War mentalities, but his argument can be expanded by considering the transformative global changes post-1991. The immediate post-Soviet era saw Russia undergoing significant political and economic upheavals,

which influenced its foreign policy direction. As Russia stabilized, its leadership, particularly under Vladimir Putin, began to pursue a more assertive foreign policy, aiming to restore its status as a global power. This resurgence can be seen as both a continuation of Cold War-era ambitions and a reaction to the perceived encroachments by Western powers, especially NATO.

Furthermore, ideological underpinnings of the Cold War have evolved into a new form of political competition. He argues that the spread of democracy and market economies post-Cold War was seen as a direct threat to Russian political elites who favored a controlled political environment (McFaul, 2018). This has led to a geopolitical struggle where Russia perceives the promotion of democratic values by the U.S. as an existential threat to its regime stability McFaul's argument therefore highlights a critical evolution in the ideological conflict from a binary capitalist-communist divide to a more complex confrontation between democratic and autocratic governance models. This shift underscores why contemporary U.S.-Russia relations cannot be fully understood without considering the internal political dynamics of both nations. The ideological competition is now interwoven with domestic legitimacy, making the rivalry more entrenched and less likely to be resolved through traditional diplomatic means.

The strategic dimensions of the Cold War legacy, particularly the military and security apparatuses that both America and Russia inherited formed the central of analysis in Legvold (2007); where he posits that the extensive military-industrial complexes developed during the Cold War have continued to influence national security policies and priorities in both the United States and Russia. These institutions, deeply rooted in the political and economic fabrics of both nations, perpetuate a security dilemma where each side's defensive measures are perceived as offensive threats by the other (Legvold, 2007). The point of emphasis here is that the enduring influence of military-industrial complexes provide a crucial understanding of why de-escalation has been challenging; as the entrenched interests of these complexes foster a climate of perpetual preparation for conflict and feeding into mutual distrust.

In exploring the cultural and identity aspects of the Cold War legacy, Tsygankov (2016) argued that Russian foreign policy is heavily influenced by a historical narrative of resilience and opposition to Western dominance. He asserts that this narrative is a cornerstone of Russian national identity and plays a crucial role in shaping its foreign policy decisions. The U.S., on the other hand, often views its global role through a lens of moral and political superiority, leading to frequent clashes with Russia's self-perception as a great power deserving of respect and influence (Tsygankov, 2016). The focus here is on cultural and identity factors adds a valuable dimension to understanding U.S.-Russia relations. The deep-seated historical narratives and identity constructs make the relationship not just a geopolitical contest but also a clash of national psyches. Recognizing these cultural underpinnings can help in crafting more nuanced diplomatic strategies that acknowledge and respect the historical and emotional drivers of Russian foreign policy.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in intense ideological confrontation and strategic competition. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 epitomized the brinkmanship and nuclear tensions of this era. Documents from the U.S. National Archives provide insight into the tense negotiations and high-stakes diplomacy that prevented nuclear conflict, demonstrating the dangers and possibilities of superpower rivalry (National Archives 1963). In the 1980s, there was a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations, partly due to the leadership of figures like Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. Reagan's renowned speech at the Berlin Wall in 1987, where he urged Gorbachev to "tear down this wall," symbolized the changing geopolitical landscape. Gorbachev's memoirs offer insight into the internal reforms and external diplomacy of his tenure, including negotiations that led to significant arms control agreements like the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (Reagan, Gorbachev 1981).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a profound shift in global politics, signaling the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar world order led by the United States. Declassified documents from both U.S. and Russian state archives illuminate the internal dynamics and external pressures that contributed to the Soviet Union's collapse, as well as the challenges and opportunities that followed (National Archives, Russian State Archives 1992).

Post-Cold War Era: NATO Expansion and Strategic Realignments the Post-Cold War period witnessed the expansion of NATO eastward, a development that strained U.S.-Russia relations.

Speeches by key political figures such as Vladimir Putin provide insight into Russia's perspective on NATO enlargement, which it perceives as a threat to its security and sovereignty. Declassified documents from the U.S. National Archives offer context for NATO's expansion and reveal the strategic calculations behind this contentious policy decision (National Archives, Putin 2002).

In recent years, U.S.-Russia relations have been characterized by a mixture of cooperation and competition, with both sides navigating a complex geopolitical landscape. Historical analyses and biographies offer valuable insights into contemporary developments, from the negotiation of bilateral treaties like the New START Treaty to ongoing conflicts in regions such as Ukraine and Syria (National Archives, Russian State Archives, National Archives, Putin 2018).

NATO Expansion and Its Implications for US-Russian Relations

One of the most significant and contentious issues in post-Cold War U.S.-Russia relations has been NATO's eastward expansion. Sarotte (2014) argues that while NATO's expansion was intended to stabilize and integrate Eastern European countries into the Western political and security framework, it was perceived by Russia as a strategic move to squeeze the Russian state and hence a violation or breach of promises made during German reunification negotiations. Mearsheimer (2014) further argues that this expansion has been a principal driver of renewed tensions, contributing to a resurgence of Russian nationalism and militaristic policies under Vladimir Putin.

The viewpoints of Sarotte (2014) and Mearsheimer (2014) underscore a fundamental disagreement between Western and Russian perspectives on NATO expansion. From the Western viewpoint, expansion is seen as a necessary measure to ensure the security and democratic development of Eastern European countries that were once under Soviet influence. However, Russia perceives this move as a direct threat to its sphere of influence and national security, feeling betrayed by what it considers broken promises from the West during the reunification of Germany. Sarotte's (2014) argument about NATO's expansion being seen as a strategic encirclement by Russia resonates with the historical context of Russian security concerns. The perception of encirclement can be traced back to the invasions Russia faced over the centuries, reinforcing a strategic culture that prioritizes buffer zones and spheres of influence. This historical perspective helps explain why contemporary Russian leaders, including Putin, view NATO's expansion as a significant threat, prompting a more assertive and nationalistic foreign policy. Mearsheimer (2014) adds that the perceived breach of promises has led to a resurgence of Russian nationalism and militaristic policies. This resurgence can be observed in Russia's actions in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Eastern Ukraine (ongoing). These actions are often justified by the Kremlin as necessary to protect Russian-speaking populations and counter NATO's influence. This perspective, however, is seen by the West as aggressive expansionism, further deteriorating relations.

A perspective that is also crucial in US-Russian relations shows that Russia's response is not just a strategic calculation but also a reflection of deeply ingrained historical narratives and identity politics (Tsygankov ,2015). Understanding this can help in crafting diplomatic approaches that acknowledge and address these historical sensitivities. As argued by Tsygankov (2015), NATO's expansion has reinforced a sense of siege mentality in Russia; as Russia's strategic culture, deeply influenced by its historical experiences of invasions and geopolitical isolation, now views NATO's eastward movement as an existential threat. This a politico-cultural perception, which taps into the Russian collective memory and national identity (Tsygankov , 2015).

However, analyzing a broader geopolitical implication of the expansion, Charap (2017) argued that it has led to a security dilemma in Europe. In other words, NATO has expanded, Russia has felt increasingly threatened, leading to a militarized response. This cycle of action and reaction has destabilized the region, making cooperative security arrangements more difficult to achieve. His perspective (Charap's concept of a security dilemma) provides a framework for understanding the reciprocal nature of U.S.-Russia tensions. Each side's efforts to enhance its security inevitably reduce the security of the other, leading to a vicious cycle of escalation. Recognizing this dynamic is essential for formulating policies that seek to break this cycle and move towards mutual security assurances.

Looking at NATO's expansion from another angle, McFaul (2018) observed that even though it was controversial, it was equally necessary to

ensure the security and democratic development of Eastern Europe. The main crux of the argument here is that, the decision was not aimed at encircling Russia but at preventing the resurgence of authoritarianism and instability in the post-Soviet space. While acknowledging the tension it has caused, McFaul (2018) could not but still maintain that the benefits to regional security and democracy justify the expansion. This viewpoint introduces a normative argument about the right of Eastern European countries to seek security and integration with Western institutions. This is clearly a challenge to the narrative that NATO expansion is solely a provocation to Russia. It emphasizes the agency of Eastern European states and their legitimate aspirations, which often get overshadowed in the discourse of U.S.-Russia relations.

Contemporary Geopolitical Realities in American-Russian Relations

Several issues come to play in the analysis of the contemporary realities of American-Russian relations. Some of the contending issues relates to: economic sanction as strategic tools of engagement, the Resurgence of Russian influence and strategic alliances, the shifts in American foreign policy, noticeable competition and cooperation in global affairs, the concern for cyber security, Arms Control and Nuclear Proliferation; and the issue of Energy and the associated Politics. A peep into some of these issues will suffice in the next section of this paper.

Economic Sanctions as a Strategic Tool

Economic sanctions have emerged as a key instrument in the U.S. toolkit for responding to Russian actions perceived as aggressive or destabilizing. Connolly (2018) examines the impact of these sanctions, particularly those imposed following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. The sanctions targeted critical sectors of the Russian economy, aiming to pressure Moscow into altering its policies. However, the effectiveness of sanctions remains debated, as they have also led to Russia's economic pivot towards other global partners, notably China, thereby reshaping international economic alignments.

The use of economic sanctions against Russia has been a subject of extensive debate among scholars and policymakers. Connolly (2018) provides a thorough analysis of how these sanctions have affected the Russian economy, highlighting that while they have caused significant economic pain, they have also driven Russia to strengthen its economic ties with countries like China. This realignment is significant as it indicates a shift in global economic power dynamics, potentially undermining the strategic objectives of the sanctions. While the primary goal of sanctions is to compel a change in behavior, their effectiveness is often limited by the targeted country's ability to adapt and seek alternative economic partnerships. In Russia's case, the pivot towards China has not only mitigated some of the economic impacts but also fostered a closer geopolitical alignment between the two nations, which could counterbalance American and Western influences.

In a sense, the broader economic implications of sanctions on Russia, particularly in the energy sector is worthy of exploration and this was the conern of Korhonen (2019), when he argues that the sanctions have accelerated Russia's efforts to diversify its energy exports away from Europe and towards Asia This shift is part of a broader strategy to reduce economic vulnerability to Western sanctions and to capitalize on the growing energy demand in Asia (Korhonen, 2019). Korhonen's insights highlight a strategic adaptation by Russia that undermines the long-term effectiveness of Western sanctions. By redirecting its energy exports, Russia not only mitigates the immediate economic impact but also strengthens its economic resilience. This diversification reduces Europe's leverage over Russia and complicates efforts to use economic sanctions as a tool for geopolitical influence.

In the same vein, the political and economic dimensions of EU sanctions against Russia formed the subject critical analysis in Natalia Dreyer and Nicu Popescu ,2014). They argue that while sanctions have succeeded in signaling the EU's disapproval and in imposing economic costs, they have also reinforced Russia's narrative of Western hostility. This has bolstered domestic support for Putin and justified the Kremlin's authoritarian measures under the guise of defending national sovereignty (Dreyer & Popescu, 2014). Dreyer and Popescu’s argument suggests that sanctions can have counterproductive political effects. Instead of weakening Putin’s regime, sanctions may consolidate his domestic power by framing the West as a common adversary. This dynamic illustrates the complexity of using sanctions as a tool for political change, where the external

pressure can strengthen rather than weaken the resolve of the targeted regime.

Moreover, sanctions are more effective internationally from a broader perspective, focusing on their design and implementation; as multilateral cooperation and the consistent application do maximize their impact (Moret ,2016). This understanding suggests that unilateral sanctions, such as those often imposed by the U.S., are less effective than those supported by a broad coalition of countries (Moret, 2016). There is therefore need for international cooperation as critical factors in making economic sanctions effective. Following from here then, it is obvious that the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia could be enhanced through more coordinated efforts among Western allies and other global powers. This approach would increase the economic and political pressure on Russia, making it harder for the Kremlin to circumvent the sanctions through alternative alliances.

The issue of Cyber Conflicts and Information Warfare

The digital age has indeed introduced new dimensions to the U.S.-Russia rivalry, with cyber conflicts and information warfare becoming prominent aspects of their interactions. Rid (2020) explores how cyber capabilities have been used to influence political outcomes and create societal discord, as evidenced by allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. These cyber confrontations signify a shift from traditional military power to sophisticated information operations, underscoring the complexity and unpredictability of contemporary U.S.-Russia relations.

Rid's (2020) analysis highlights the evolution of conflict in the digital era, where traditional military power is supplemented, if not supplanted, by cyber capabilities and information warfare. The use of cyber tools to manipulate political processes and shape public opinion represents a new frontier in statecraft, blurring the lines between war and peace, and challenging traditional notions of sovereignty and security. Rid's (2020) exploration of cyber conflicts and information warfare provides crucial insights into the changing nature of geopolitical competition. However, it is essential to recognize that while cyber capabilities offer new avenues for influence, they also present significant challenges in attribution and escalation control. The inherently covert and deniable nature of cyber operations makes it difficult to hold perpetrators accountable and to deter future attacks effectively.

The concept of "soft power" is also germane in the context of cyber conflicts. The emphasis is on the importance of shaping perceptions and influencing behavior through non-coercive means(Nye, 2011; Singer ,2018). Nye (2011) argues that while cyber capabilities can be used for offensive purposes, they are equally valuable as tools of persuasion and persuasion. His perspective suggests that cyber conflicts are not just about disrupting systems but also about shaping narratives and projecting influence. Soft power offers a complementary lens through which to understand cyber conflicts. In addition to their disruptive potential, cyber operations can also be leveraged to win hearts and minds, influencing public opinion and undermining adversaries' legitimacy. Recognizing this dual nature of cyber power is crucial for crafting effective strategies that harness the full spectrum of cyber capabilities.

Still in the vein of the foregoing, Singer (2018) observes that the democratization of cyber capabilities has blurred the distinction between state and non-state actors, making it challenging to attribute cyber-attacks and to enforce accountability. Singer's analysis underscores the need for a multifaceted approach to cyber security that addresses both state and non-state threats (Singer, 2018). This perspective broadens the scope of cyber conflicts beyond traditional state-centric analyses, recognizing the diverse range of actors involved in shaping the cyber landscape. This is a broader view which highlights the interconnectedness of cyber threats and the need for comprehensive strategies that address both state-sponsored and non-state cyber activities. Cyber threats therefore transcend traditional geopolitical boundaries and there is the need for international cooperation in combating them

The Potential for Cooperation in American-Russian Bilateral Relations

Despite the prevailing adversarial relationship, there are areas where U.S. and Russian interests align, offering opportunities for cooperation. Gottemoeller (2021) discusses the success of arms control agreements, such as the New START Treaty, which have been crucial in enhancing global security. Stent (2019) identifies other

potential areas for collaboration, including counter-terrorism and space exploration. However, the underlying mistrust and strategic competition pose significant challenges to expanding cooperative efforts. Gottemoeller (2021) and Stent (2019) provide valuable insights into the potential for cooperation between the United States and Russia, highlighting areas such as arms control, counter-terrorism, and space exploration. These areas represent critical domains where shared interests could transcend political differences and foster constructive engagement. However, it is essential to recognize that cooperation in these areas is contingent upon addressing the underlying mistrust and strategic competition that characterize the broader bilateral relationship. Gottemoeller's (2021) emphasis on arms control agreements like the New START Treaty underscores the importance of diplomatic engagement in reducing nuclear proliferation and enhancing global security. However, the efficacy of such agreements depends on both parties' commitment to compliance and verification mechanisms, which can be undermined by geopolitical tensions and domestic political pressures.

The historical patterns of U.S.-Russia relations and possible strategies for rebuilding trust and cooperation also exist (Goldgeier and McFaul, 2017). A Combination of confidence-building measures, diplomatic dialogue, and reciprocal concessions is essential for overcoming the legacy of mistrust and advancing mutual interests. The path to cooperation may be challenging, it is not insurmountable (Goldgeier & McFaul, 2017). However, achieving sustained cooperation will require sustained political will and a commitment to addressing underlying grievances. The potential for economic cooperation between the United States and Russia, particularly in energy markets (Hill and Gaddy, 2018). Despite political tensions, economic interdependence in sectors like energy creates opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation. This analysis suggests that leveraging economic incentives can help incentivize constructive engagement and mitigate geopolitical conflicts (Hill & Gaddy, 2018). Economic interdependence is therefore a stabilizing factor in bilateral relations while the potentials for mutually beneficial outcomes in energy markets, provides a pragmatic pathway for reducing tensions and fostering cooperation in US-Russia relations.

Conclusion

Historical legacies, such as ideological confrontation, strategic competition, and mutual distrust, continue to shape contemporary policies and attitudes in Russo-American relations. Specific Cold War events and ideologies, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and NATO expansion, have left a lasting imprint on the countries bilateral relations. These historical events have continued to contribute to the current atmosphere of strategic competition, mistrust, and geopolitical maneuvering between these two great countries. The Cold War legacies present significant challenges to U.S.-Russia relations, but there is also room for constructive engagement and cooperation. Both countries possess agency and the capacity to transcend historical grievances through dialogue, diplomacy, mutual understanding, and enhancement of strategic communication and exploration of areas of Mutual Interests.

References

Aron, L. (2013). The Putin Doctrine: Russia's Quest to Rebuild the Soviet State. Foreign Affairs, 92(4), 18-29.

Charap, S. (2017). Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia. International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Connolly, R. (2018). Russia's Response to Sanctions: How Western Economic Statecraft is Reshaping Political Economy in Russia. Cambridge University Press.

Friedman, T. L. (2000). The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Gaddis, J. L. (2005). The Cold War: A New History. Penguin Press.

Goldgeier, J. M., & McFaul, M. (2017). Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War. Brookings Institution Press.

Gottemoeller, R. (2021). Negotiating the New START Treaty. Brookings Institution Press.

Hill, F., & Gaddy, C. (2018). Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin. Brookings Institution Press.

Korhonen, I. (2019). Sanctions and the Energy Sector: Lessons from Russia. BOFIT Policy Brief, Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition.

Legvold, R. (2007). Return to Cold War. Polity.

McFaul, M. (2018). From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin's Russia. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), 77-89.

Moret, E. (2016). Sanctions and Stability: What the Future Holds. European Leadership Network.

Nye, J. S. (2011). The Future of Power. Public Affairs.

Rid, T. (2019). Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Sarotte, M. E. (2014). A Broken Promise? What the West Really Told Moscow About NATO Expansion. Foreign Affairs, 93(5), 90-97.

IMPACT OF HOUSING QUALITY ON THE HEALTH STATUS OF RESIDENTS OF ONA-ARA LOCAL GOVERNMENT OYO STATE: APPLICATION OF BODY MASS INDEX

U.U JIMOH
POPOOLA SHAKIRAT O.
DEPARTMENT OF URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING, FACULTY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, IBADAN, NIGERIA
uujmoh@gmail.com and soluwatoyin376@gmail.com

KEYWORDS
Housing quality, Health Status, Substandard housing, Body Mass Index, Ona Ara

ABSTRACT
This study examined the impact of housing quality on the health status of residents of Ona-Ara Local Government Area of Oyo State, Nigeria. The study was anchored on the concepts of healthy housing while data were sourced primarily and secondarily. A multi stage procedure was adopted in which the two housing schemes in Ona-Ara were purposively selected. Consequently, 150 houses constituting 50% of 300 houses enumerated were picked for the study. Thereafter, questionnaire containing the social structural characteristics, hosing condition and the relationship between housing condition and the health status were administered to the residents in the study area. Data were analysed using correlation, while health status was measured using the Body Mass Index (BMI). The study revealed, residents in Ogbere housing estate exhibited higher rates of overweight BMI. There was a significant association between housing quality and health status (r). There was a health risk associated with substandard housing. Therefore, raising awareness, adherence to sanitation laws, promoting healthy lifestyles are recommended.

Introduction

Cities, epitomized by high population densities, an array of infrastructural facilities and services, thriving industries, and specialized professional services, serve as hubs of innovation, culture, and economic activity. This urban shift herald development and progress, offering unparalleled access to employment opportunities, educational institutions, healthcare facilities, and resources that shape modern societies. However, the allure of urbanization comes with a caveat: the shadow of unintended consequences looms large, particularly in developing nations like Nigeria. These repercussions manifest as challenges such as unhealthy lifestyles, inadequate housing, and heightened exposure to environmental stressors, underscoring the complex tapestry of opportunities and obstacles that define the urban experience in emerging economies.

Housing quality plays a crucial role in influencing the overall health status and well-being of individuals and communities. The links between the quality of housing and the health of its occupants has been a subject of interests for researchers and policy makers worldwide. The quality of housing conditions plays a decisive role in the health status of the residents. Many health problems are directly or indirectly related to the building itself because of the construction materials used and the equipment installed, or the size or design of the individual dwellings. The past decade has brought an increasing number of researches and numerous publications on the influence of living conditions on the health of occupants, the evidence base for the complex effects of housing conditions on health is growing (Lowry, 1991; Ranson, 1991; Ineichen, 1993; Burridge and Ormandy, 1993; Raw and Hamilton, 1995; Fiedler, 1997; Dunn and Hayes, 2000. The need to enhance the living conditions of people in any society cannot be overemphasized. Where people live is at the very core of their daily lives (Pollack et al., 2008). The residential space of a person's home plays a central role in shaping his health and well-being (Murphy, 2006). The health status of the people has serious consequences on the economy of the country where they reside, as a healthy workforce is a requirement for a vibrant economy. The unhealthy individual is not only unproductive but also cannot take care of themselves and their dependents; they may eventually become an economic and security burden to society.

Nigeria, like many developing countries, faces challenges in providing adequate housing that meets health standards and promotes well-being. This research investigates the connection between housing quality and health status This study aimed at contributing valuables insights to the existing literature on housing quality and health, emphasizing the urgency of promoting healthy habits, strengthening governmental oversight and enforcement mechanisms to safeguard the well-being of residents in the Jegede and Sawia housing-related health disparities, also, the research seeks to inform evidence-based policies and intervention that promote healthy living.

Statement of Problems

The housing deficit for Nigeria as of the year 2023 is estimated to be 28 million, indicating that the country needs at least 28 million housing units to provide adequate for the population. Nigeria's population has been growing by 3.2% annually, based on the 2006 population census estimate. This increased the population from 140 million in 2006 to an estimated 242 million in 2023. Consequently, this might compound the present situation of overcrowding and obsolete housing infrastructure. The nature of housing, its environment and its location play crucial roles in determining its occupants' ways of life. It affects the way they spend their income, leisure time, health and attitudes to social relations. Scott (1953) described pure, adequate water and safe removal of waste products as the foundation on which good housing, good nutrition and healthy living can be built.

The rapid rate of urbanization and its attendant socioeconomic consequences have been a tremendous concern, especially to all professionals in human settlement and policymakers and analysts. In Nigeria, the cities continue to grow beyond control, management capacity and resources. Standard living is out of the reach of the average individual, and the basic services and infrastructure are becoming luxuries in many neighborhoods. Rapid urban growth is creating largely unmet demands for urban facilities, roads, public transport and solid waste management.

Physical, mental and social health is affected by the living conditions, and housing quality plays a decisive role in the health status of any resident. Many health problems are either directly or indirectly related to the buildings because of the construction materials used and

the type of individual dwellings (Jackson, 2003). Housing has a very important influence on health and well-being. It provides shelter, security, safety and privacy. Housing is essential and comprises vital services and facilities, constituting the physical environment that connects individuals with the community in which they evolve. Therefore, environmental amenities like waste disposal, water supply, electricity, access road, location of services and social infrastructure like health and recreation are all part of the packages designated as housing. Inadequate maintenance and upkeep due to a lack of funds, resources and knowledge of housing structure and infrastructure within the housing scheme can result in the deterioration of infrastructure, unsafe living conditions, and reduced housing quality, which can further impact the health status of the residents. Housing quality and health of residents in informal settlements are characterized by inadequate housing, lack of basic services, overcrowding, high levels of violence, insecurity, disaster conflict, forced eviction and corporate land grabbing Ogunbiyi (2011). Also, the housing quality assessment conducted by Oloyede (2013) evaluated housing quality based on housing standards and building regulations coupled with the nature of facilities and conditions of the dwellings, the findings revealed that the housing quality in the study area is satisfactory with the provision and good condition of the essential facilities. In most of the previous studies on housing quality and health, series of health status indicators had been used to assess relationship between housing quality and health. Other related studies on health includes, Jimoh and Wahab 2016, Jimoh 2022, Jimoh and Famewo 2022, Jimoh and Abdullahi 2022, Jimoh and Balogun 2022, Jimoh 2018, Jimoh 2021. Body Mass Index (BMI) and as an indicator of health status to examine the effects of housing quality on health remains a major gab, hence the need for the study.


This study, therefore, examines the impact of housing quality on the health status of residents in Jegede and Sawia housing schemes of Ona-Ara Local Government. This is done with the view to propose strategies to mitigate the negative consequences of housing quality on health.

Study Area

The research was carried out in Ona-Ara Local Government, Oyo state of Nigeria. The local government has a population of about 265,059, according to the 2006 population census, and a land mass of about 3,570. Ona-Ara LG comprises eleven wards, and its headquarters is in Akanran village. Major towns and cities are Olorunsogo, Gbedun, Olunloyo, Araromi, Amuloko, Akanran etc. Jegede and Sawia housing Schemes were located in one of the major areas of the local government, i.e., the Olorunsogo district.

FIG. 3.1 OYO STATE WITHIN THE NATIONAL CONTEX

Plate 1: Oyo State within the National Context



Sources: Oyo State Ministry of Land, Housing and Urban Development.


Plate 2



Ona- Ara Local Govt. Map within the Context of Oyo State.

Source; Ministry of Land Housing and Urban Development.


Plate; 3



ONA-ARA LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

Sources; Ministry of Land Housing and Urban Development.

Plate; 4



Source; Google Earth, 2024.

Plate; 5



Source; Google Earth, 2024

Methodology

A cross-sectional survey design was adopted while both primary and secondary data were sourced. A multi stage procedure was adopted in which the two housing schemes in Ona-Ara were purposively selected. Consequently, 150 houses constituting 50% of 300 houses enumerated were picked for the study. Thereafter, questionnaire containing the social structural characteristics, hosing condition and the relationship between housing condition and the health status were administered to the residents in the study area. Data were analysed using descriptive and inferential (correlation and simple linear regression analysis) statistics, while health status was measured using Body Mass Index (BMI).

Table 1: Sample Size

Housing schemes	Sample Frames	Sample size 50%	No of questionnaire

Lam Adesina housing	108 occupied houses	54 houses	54
Ogbere housing	192 occupied houses	96 houses	96
Total	300 occupied houses	150 houses	150

Source; Author's Survey, 2023

Findings and Discussions

Investigation on socio structural characteristics of the respondents in the study area revealed that, there were more occupied houses in Ogbere housing scheme than in the Lam Adesina housing scheme. Also, the study revealed that retiree or the aged constituted the higher (36.0 %) number of respondents, suggesting reliability of information provided by the respondents to generate adequate inferences for the study. As illustrated by the survey, the retiree/ aged had spent more than ten years in the neighbourhood (54.0) and the household size is minimal (3-4), which allows for privacy and good air space (see table 2) Also, most housing types were bungalows which constituted (65.3%), this implying an accident and stress free while climbing staircases.

Table; 2 Social-Structural Characteristic of the Respondents in the Study Area.

Age	**%**	**Year Spent**	**%**	**House hold Size**	**%**	**Building Structure**	**%**
Below 20	6.0	Below 2	17.3	Below 2	14.0	Tenements	4.7
20-29	12.0	3-4	22.7	3-4	**51.3**	Block of flats	4.7
30-39	16.7	5-6	2.0	5-6	5.3	Bungalow	**65.3**
40-49	15.3	7-8	2.0	7-8	11.3	Detached house	8.7
50-59	11.3	9-10	0.0	9-10	1.3	Semi detached	2.7
60 & above	**36.0**	Above 10	**54.0**	Above 10	14.7	No response	4.0
No response	2.7	no response	2.0	No response	2.0		
Total	100		100		100		100

Source; Author's Survey, 2023

Condition of the Housing Schemes

The survey conducted on the condition of housing on the two housing schemes in Ona-Ara LG revealed that essential facilities that could make housing habitable were provided (electricity, water, toilets, kitchen, fence, refuse disposal, burglary-proof access road) and the majority of the facilities were in very good condition to improve the quality of life. The proportion of houses that had efficient electricity supply in the study area accounted for 94.8% implying that respondents will enjoy power-dependent amenities like pumping water machines, that could ensure the availability of water at all times. Those houses that had toilet facilities accounted for 96.7% of the respondents but few houses lack

the facility and this could negatively affect the health of people living in such area. About 84.7% of the respondents had access to Well water being the major source of water supply in the study area. However, due to lack and of good sanitation and adequate water treatment thereby making it undrinkable. The information obtained during the interview revealed that the people lack awareness about water treatment; hence, they depend on a sachet of pure water for drinking. Unfortunately, some of the water sources were located very close to the septic tanks, which is against public health and environmental sanitation laws.

Furthermore, the study revealed that, 98.0% availability of effective drainage system in the study area. This will enable the residents to mitigate any potential hazards associated with flooding and ground water contamination which as some direct health relationship relationship with the residents. More than half (97%) of the houses surveyed had access to road accessibility, providing smooth transportation within the area, while burglary proof and fences which provided safety and security to keep the mind of the inhabitant at rest accounted for 93.3% in the study area.

Table 3: Housing Quality in the Study Area

location	Electricity				Refuse				Access road				Burglary				Drainage				Water				Toilet				Fence				Kitchen			
	Avail		N/A		Avail		N/A		Avail		N/A		Avail		N/A		Avail		N/A		Avail		N/A		Avail		N/A		Avail		N/A		Avail		N/A	
	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%	Y	%	N	%
Lam	51	94.4	3	5.6	32	59.3	22	40.8	53	98.2	1	1.9	52	96.3	2	3.9	53	98.2	1	1.9	53	98.2	1	1.9	53	98.2	1	1.9	52	96.3	2	3.8	51	94.4	3	5.6
Ogbere	91	94.8	5	4,2	79	82.3	17	18	94	97.9	2	2.0	94	97.9	2	2.0	94	97.9	2	2.0	88	91.7	8	8.4	92	95.8	4	4.2	88	94.7	8	8.4	88	91.7	8	8.3
Total	142	94.2	8	5.3	111	74.0	39	26	147	98.0	3	2.0	146	97.3	4	2.7	147	98.0	3	2.0	141	94.0	9	6.0	145	96.7	5	3.3	140	93.3	10	6.7	139	92.6	11	7.4

Source; Author's Survey, 2023.

Respondents on Housing quality and health status using Body Mass index in the study area

Investigating the relationship between Housing quality and health status, survey was conducted on the relationship between housing quality and health status of the residents using partial correlation. The following variables were weighted for housing quality; availability of electricity, mode of refuse disposal, accessible road, provision of burglary proof house, availability and condition of drainage system, provision of fence, availability and condition of toilet facility, sources and condition of water supply and availability of kitchen. These are the determinants of housing quality.

From the table 4, Body Mass Index was used as a determinants of health status, according to the computed result, 46% of the respondents overweight BMI were discovered. The result indicated that the inhabitant of the study area who were mostly aged were overweight, and overweight body mass index enable such individual vulnerable to cardiovascular diseases such as heart failure, hypertension, heart attack etc.

However, result of multinomial regression was computed to show whether health quality is a function of health status. The outcome of the multinomial logistic regression analysis as summarized in table 7 shows that 30% (r2 = 0.304)of housing quality contributed to health status and 70% are other factors in human environments like proper dietary habits, individual life style, regular exercise among others influence good health status.

It could be inferred from the analysis that although housing quality is not a function of health status but there is a relative relationship between them and therefore, most of the respondents who were aged (above 60 years) and had been residing in the neighbourhood for more than 10 years in such a conducive environment with good housing quality not considering other health factors were likely to face BMI related diseases (hypertention, heath attack, daibetis etc) The result corroborated the work of Akinbamijo (2012) where a significant relationship was found between the health status of residence and housing quality measure in terms of available facilities. Thus, there is a strong relationship between housing quality and the health of the residents.

Table 4; Body Mass Index

Health Status (BMI)	No of Respondents	Percent total
Underweight	13	8.7
Overweight	69	46.0
Healthy Weight	52	34.7
Obesity	13	8.6
No Response	3	2
Total	150	100

Source; Author's Survey, 2023.

Table 5: Relationship between Housing Quality and Body Mass Index

Table5	Likelihood Ratio Tests	
	Model Fitting Criteria	Likelihood Ratio Tests

Effect	-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model	Chi-Square	Df	Sig.
Intercept	21.349[a]	.000	0	.
Electricity	23.945[b]	2.596	8	**.957**
Refuse Disposal	29.613[b]	8.264	8	**.408**
Access Road	21.564[b]	.215	4	**.995**
Burglary proof	21.349[b]	.000	4	**1.000**
Drainage system	28.423[b]	7.074	4	**.132**
Fence	22.805[b]	1.456	4	**.834**
Toilet	21.349[b]	.000	4	**1.000**
Water	21.349[b]	.000	4	**1.000**
Kitchen	27.597[b]	6.247	4	**.181**

Source; Author's Survey, 2023.

Results

P= 0.000,

r of BMI and electricity =**1.000**

r of BMI and Refuse Disposal= 0.415 r of BMI and Access Road=0.402

r of BMI and Burglary proof=0**.449**

r of BMI and Drainage System= 0**.459** r of BMI and Fence=0.379

r of BMI and Toilet=**0.578.**

Table 6 Model Fitting Information

	Model Fitting Criteria	Likelihood Ratio Tests		
Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	Df	Sig.
Intercept Only	63.425			
Final	21.349	42.076	52	.836

Source; Author's Survey, 2023

Overall significance of the model is: p= 0.836: its greater than 0.05.

Table 7 Pseudo R-Square

Cox and Snell	.245
Nagelkerke	**.304**
McFadden	.172

Source; Author's Survey, 2023

R^2 = 0.304 that is; 30%

Only, 30% of the influence of housing conditions on the health status is explained by the model.

That means, there are 70% other factors that contributed to the resultant health status of the people.

Conclusion

The result of the study recorded many inhabitants of the study area with overweight Body Mass Index and a minimal report of healthy weight despite availability and functional facilities. This is an indication that other factors contributed to the resultant health status of people. Landlord associations should help enlighten their members on many useful ways to improve the quality of their life through provision of recreational facilities in the neighbourhood, good life style etc. Stakeholders in the Ministry of Environment / Urban Planning must carry out rigorous sensitization and enlightenment campaigns on the health implications of improper sitting of sanitation facilities in residential areas.

References

Agbola, S. B., Egunjobi L., and Olatubara, C.O (eds) (2007). Housing Development and Management; A Book of Readings. Ibadan; Urban and Regional Planning, University of Ibadan

Agbola, T. Nigerian Housing Debacle, An inaugural lecture Dept. of Urban and Regional Planning University of Ibadan, 20

Akinbamijo, O.B (2012) 'Attribute of Urbanization and Health Attainments in a core Residential District of Oshogbo, Nigeria' https//independent. Academia.edu.

Corbo, G.M., Forastiere, F., Agabiti, N., Dell'Orco, V., Pistelli, R., Aebischer, M.L., Valente, S. and Perucci, C.A. (2001) 'Effect of gas cooking on lung function in adolescents: modiyer role of sex and immunoglobulin E', Thorax, Vol. 6, No. 7, pp.536–540.Dunn, J. R. (2000) Housing and Health Inequalities: Review and Prospects for research, Housing Studies, 15(3), 341-366.

Elsevier B. V., (2011) The Impacts of Poor Housing Conditions and Thermal Discomfort

Ineichen, B. (1993) Homes and Health How Housing and Health Interact, E&FN Spon London

Jackson, R.J. (2003) 'The impact of the built environment on health: an emerging field', AmericanJournal of Public Health, Vol. 93, No. 9, pp.1382–1384.

Jimoh U.U and Wahab W.B, (2016), Health care Financing and Budgetary Allocation in Ondo State, British Journal of Medicine and Medical Research, Vol16 (5), 1-9.

Jimoh U.U and W.O Abdullahi (2022) Generation and composition of Biomedical Waste in

Selected Hospital in Akure south Local Government Area, Nigeria, African Journal of Biomedical Research, 25 (1) 73-81

Jimoh, U.U, (2022) Spatial and Seasonal Pattern of Flood Inundation in Lokoja, Kogi State, Nigeria. Forum Geografi, 36

Jimoh, U. U and F Balogun (2022) Environmental Challenges against Health Care Utilisation in a Marginalised Communities of Sagamu Local Government Area, Ogun State, Nigeria. African Ethnography, Vol (4)20 -37

Jimoh, U.U. (2018). Effects of PZ Chemical Waste on Water Quality and Household Health Chall0enges in Odogunyan Community, Ikorodu Lagos State, Nigeria, *Ethiopian Journal of Environmental Studies and Management* Vol 11.No 6. 654 – 665.

Jimoh, U.U. (2021) Physical Planning Standard of Health Care Facilities in The Rural Communities of Ondo State, *Development in practice*, Taylor and Francis, Vol. No. 6 717-725

Jimoh,U.U and Famewo. A (2022) Occupational health risks of informal e-waste Activities on major landfills and e-village in Lagos State, Nigeria. *Journal of Public Health Policy,* Vol. 43. No.3 335-346

Ranson, R. (1991) Healthy Housing – A Practical Guide, Published by E&FN Spon on behalf of the WHO Regional Office for Europe, Chapman & Hall, London.

Raw, G.J. and Hamilton, R.M. (1995) Building Regulation and Health, Building Research Establishment Report 289, BRE, Watford.

Raw, G.J., Cayless, S.M., Riley, J., Cox, S.J. and Cheyne, A. (2000) 'A risk assessment procedure for health and safety in buildings, Building Research Establishment, report 402, London. Lowry, S. (1991) 'Housing and Health', British Medical Journal, London.

Lowry, S. (1991) 'Housing and Health', British Medical Journal, London.

Moriske, H.J., Szewzyk, R. and Leonidas, M. (2003) Mould Guide – Guide for the Prevention, Investigation, Evaluation and Remediation of Indoor Mould Growth, Newsletter No. 32, WHO Collaborating Centre for Air Quality Management and Air Pollution Control, Berlin, pp.2–6.

Morrow, V. (2001) Networks and Neighbourhoods: Children and Young People's Perspectives, Health Development Agency, London, UK.

Mozingo, L. (1995) 'Public space in the balance', Landscape Architecture, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp.42 47.

Nicol, Simon. (2006): The Relationship between Housing Conditions and Health – Some Findings from the WHO LARES Survey of 8 European Cities. Paper presented at the ENHR conference "Housing in an expanding Europe: theory, policy, participation and implementation" Ljubljana, Slovenia 2 – 5 July 2006.

Nubi, T.O (2002): „Procuring, Managing and Financing Urban Infrastructure: Towards Integrated Approach" Paper presented at a National Workshop on Land Management and Property Tax Reform in Nigeria. Organized by Estate Management Department, University of Lagos, Akoka.

Olukolaj0, M.A., Adewusi, A.O.,and Ogungbenro, M.T,.(2013) 'Influence of Housing Condition on the Health of Residents of Urban Core of Akure, Nigeria',International Journal of Development and Sustainability, Vol 2 No 2, pp. 1567-1579.Onibokun, A.G (1985). Housing in Nigeria: A Book of Reading. Nigeria: Nigeria Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER).

Shaw, M. (2004) 'Housing and public health', Annual Reviews of Public Health, Vol. 25, pp.08.1 08.22.

Steinfeld, E. and Danford, G.S. (1999) 'Theory as a basis for research on enabling environments', in Steinfeld, E. and Danford, G.S. (Eds.): Enabling Environments. Measuring the Impact of Environment on Disabilit and Rehabilitation, Kluwer Accademic/Plenum Publishers, New York.

Thomson, H. Petticrew, M. and Douglas, M. (2003) Health impact assessment of housing

Improvements: Incorporating Research Evidence, Journal of Epidemiology Evaluating unity Health, 57, 11-16.

Turunen Mari, Paanala Ari, Villman Juha, Nevalainen Aino & Haverinen-Shaughnessy Ulla

(2010). Evaluating housing quality, health and safety using an Internet-based data collection and response system: a cross-sectional study. Environmental Health, 2010, 9:69. doi:10.1186/1476-069X-9-69

World Health Organization (1990), Health principles of housing, Geneva. Retrieved from http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/1989/9241561270_eng.pdf.

World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe (2001) WHO Symposium on Housing and Health in Europe, 2001 Jun 6-8; Bonn, Germany.

Wilkinson, P., Armstrong, B. and Landon, M. (2001) Cold Comfort: The Social andEnvironmental Determinants of Excess Winter Deaths in England, 1986– 1996, Policy Press, London.

N-POWER PROGRAMME AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN ONDO STATE: 2016-2020

[1]APELA OLAKUNLE AUGUSTINE, PhD; [2]AKOMOLAFE FEMI AUGUSTINE, PhD; [3]SHINDALI NASIRU, PhD & [4]OMIKUNLE YEWANDE LIZY, PhD

[1, 3 & 4] DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF ABUJA.

[2]DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF KASHERE GOMBE STATE

Corresponding: +2348032559440, Email: kunlexdot197@gmail.com, austinesq@fukashere.edu.ng

KEYWORDS
public policy, poverty, N-Power Programme, Poverty Alleviation

ABSTRACT

The paper examined the N-Power Programme and Poverty reduction in Ondo State of Nigeria between 2016 to 2020 in order to ascertain its impact on the general society where it was implemented and if it has achieved its stated objective. System theory was employed to explain the relationship in the study, while Survey research design was adopted which entails the collection of data from both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data were gathered via questionnaires. The population of N-Power Volunteers in the three LGAs selected formed the total population of the study and the Taro Yamane method was designed to determine the sample size of 369. Simple random technique was employed in the study with Chi- Square to test the hypotheses. The findings of the study show that N-Power Programme has significant impact on poverty reduction in Ondo State and Nigeria at large beyond the volunteers Base on this, the study recommends that N-Power Programme should be pragmatically tailored towards skill acquisition and entrepreneur that can give birth to self-reliance after the expiration of the programme. Second, N-Power Programme should be expanded with legal backing by the legislature in order to prevent political influence.

1. Introduction

Over the years, unemployment and poverty have become life acid with a sour taste in the developing economies as they cast shadow over the development. Mutiullah (2010:6) justified this statement by saying that "unemployment is one of developmental problems that faces every developing economy in the 21st century. Unemployment and the incidence of poverty have engulfed the economy of this country in such a way that youths and young graduates are living in perpetual hopelessness". The Nigeria universities and other tertiary institutions are producing graduates each year without the hope of any job, and this situation has resulted to different form of social vices such as; banditry, kidnappings, oil bunkering, pipe vandalism, militancy, political thuggery, prostitution, illegal trafficking, cultism and many others (Odeh and Okoye 2014).

As a matter of fact, the misery and the frustration of the citizens foisted a state of hopelessness and the majority of the youths resulted to any means to sustain their life either crook or counterfeit. That is why we continue to experience internet fraud and all sort of criminalities.

The consequences of unemployment obviously reach beyond the person out of work, touching children, spouses, the economy and society at large (Duncan, 2001). Many of these effects can be traced backed to the psychological consequences of unemployment. Besides economic hardship and partly as a result of it, many unemployed persons suffer lowered self-esteem, depression, anxiety, shame, physical illness, marital problems and isolation from family and friends perhaps because they cannot afford to socialize or because they do not want to burden others with their problems or they are ashamed (Micheal, 1968). In most cases, isolation from society may also result if the duration of unemployment is long. People begin to feel alienated and see the nation's political and social institution as callous and uncaring.

A negative social outcome of unemployment is severe and evil poverty. Two manifestations of the numerous social and economic components of poverty are a lack of income and insufficient productive resources to sustain a life. The following are all symptoms of poverty: inadequate housing, a hazardous environment, social discrimination, increased morbidity and mortality as a result of illness, limited access to quality education and essential services, and starvation and malnutrition (Akomolafe, Agunbiade & Ndayako, 2018). In reality, poverty cannot be defined in an absolute sense (Agumagu, 2000). One definition of poverty is that individuals are impoverished when they are unable to fulfil their most basic needs, as different individuals have varying perspectives on what it means to be impoverished.

Its also very important for us to be informed that designing good and developmental policy that can mitigate the excessive incident of poverty is not a big problem in Nigeria, but how to concretize it to achieve its stated objective become problematic. Almost all of the successive governments of Niger have developed a series of targeted programs, plans, and policies that are designed to cultivate the country's abundant young (Jimoh 2014). Many Nigerians continue to endure the severe reality of poverty, despite the establishment of numerous Poverty Alleviation programs with the stated objective of combating poverty in Nigeria. In reality, the proportion of the population that lives in destitution has increased.

Poverty reduction has always been an issue confronting every government which every reasonable government strives to tackle ((Okoroafor & Akomolafe, 2018; Zoaka and Akpen, 2012). The fight against poverty and unemployment is a key component of development of any country. The administration of President Muhammadu Buhari initiated anti-Poverty Programme in Nigeria which was tagged N-Power. Under the Social Investment Programmes (SIP), the N-Power Programme is a job creation and empowerment initiative. Its objective is to mitigate destitution and unemployment among Nigeria's youth and graduates. By establishing a framework for pervasive and applicable employment, skill development, and acquisition, it addresses the issue of youth unemployment and connects its foundation and outcomes to the enhancement of insufficient public services and the expansion of the economy as a whole (Bisong 2019).

The N-power initiative attempted to make up for previous attempts to alleviate poverty by providing five hundred thousand (500,000) graduates with a direct job.

Statement of the Problem

Only little attention have been devoted to the studies of N-Power Programme by researchers with a submission that the programme has contributed to poverty reduction of the volunteers alone. However, the studies have neglected the effect of the programme on the general society where it was implemented and neither has there been any research work related to subject of inquiry in the selected local government areas of Ondo State which make the study to be relevant. It is on this note that this study seeks to assess N-power programme and poverty reduction in Ondo state of Nigeria in order to ascertain the extent to which it has achieved its intended stated objectives of reducing poverty

2.0 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Public Policy has been conceptualized in various ways by different scholars, the denotation and connotations have been the subject of disputation in the literature. To this regard, there is no one mined among the analysts as to what the correct definitions of the public policy should be. The controversy is over the boundary of what should constitute public policy. A cursory examination of a few conceptions and operationalizations will therefore suffice.

Ujo (2011) conceptualized Public Policy as a government decision or non-decision designed to deal with various social problems such as kidnapping, armed robbery, electoral violence and oil bunkering. According to this scholar, the two important features of this definition are government decisions or non-decision and social problems. The governmental decisions are aimed at providing solution to particular problem. Howlett and Cashore (2014) have a similar view with Ujo by saying that Public Policies are government actions which contain goals and the means to achieve them. One fact about these definitions is that, in Policy making, it must involve both a technical and political process of articulating and matching actors' goals and the means, and that, Public Policies are specifically designed to prosecute specific societal problems.

Sapru (2004) conceptualizes Public Policy as a course of action taken or adopted by those in power in pursuit of certain goals or objectives. According to this scholar, there is an emphasis on a goal which government intends to achieve. These could be on poverty, unemployment, health issues, education etc. Government therefore adopts a policy to address such problem. It is then we begin to see poverty reduction programme, educational policy, health care policy, economic policy etc. Government attends or influences whatever happens in the societies through the repertoire of policy, and it indicates the direction towards which action is sought. It involves a deliberate choice of action by the government to attain those goals and objectives.

Concept of Poverty

Poverty needs to be understood. It is not a state of being, but a state of mind. Poverty thinking needs to be dealt with to prosper. Ray (2019) opines that Poverty causes people to have a sense of lack in everything. It controls the way they think and acts. It is of the view of Ray that poverty influences the way people reason and it has the capacity to hold captive people who possess remarkable abilities. Poverty is a condition in which a person or community is deprived of or lacks the essentials for a minimum standard of living (Ray, 2019). Poverty involves the lack of resources that are essential for dignity and living, it encompasses a social-economic structure that keeps people deprived.

Chelliah and Sudarehan (1999) have noted that the precise definition of poverty has been the subject of significant debate. However, they argue that in common understanding, poverty is defined as a lowness of income that makes it impossible for a family to obtain and enjoy the necessities of living, such as food, clothing, shelter, and water. They informed us that the previous conceptual description of poverty is income poverty, which provides a more comprehensive understanding of the issue. Other forms of deprivation related to healthcare, schooling, sanitation, and accident insurance must also be taken into account. The individuals who are experiencing destitution are the most suitable individuals to enquire about its definition. If you were to enquire about the meaning of poverty to low-income individuals, they would likely respond that it involves the absence of food, water, and a secure residence. It signifies the incapacity to comprehend and a persistent illness. Poverty results in a lack of opportunities for both you and your offspring, a sense of powerlessness in the face of those in positions of authority, and a limited ability to influence one's own life. Narayah, Petesch, and Shan (2011) observed that this could result in a life in which one is perpetually concerned about their safety. Streeten (2008) has a similar view from the prejudiced assessment that poverty must best be defined by the real pauper themselves or by the communities where poor and unlucky people lived . Streeten believed that those that tasted poverty and feel the effect would have the best conceptualization of poverty rather than people who never tasted it.

In another way round, poverty is not a lack of money but a lack of idea. The idea in the sense

that, when a community, nation or individual lacks idea needed to translate the available resources into development, such individual or nation remain in perpetual poverty. Nigeria remains in a vicious circle of poverty because she lacks the idea to utilize or translate her various human and material resources into development that can generate more employment opportunity for their citizenry. In a nutshell, poverty is a multifaceted concept that encompasses all facets of life. It cuts across health, food or material, possession; it could be poverty in mind which affect reasoning or idea. It could be psychological poverty that affects people's behaviour toward developmental policies.

Theoretical Framework

System theory has been adopted in this investigation. The system theory of policy formation is founded on the Eastonian framework for political system analysis. System theory posits that policy is the outcome of the political system's interaction with a variety of environmental factors. According to the theory, political activity is comprised of three primary components: output, the political system, and the environment. The objective conditions and forces that comprise the environment generate demand and supporting inputs.

The study aligns itself to this theory on the ground that N-Power Programme is seen as public policy or output of the political system. N-Power Programme is being designed by the political system in response to the articulation needs, problems generated and aspirations in the environment

Here, the environment is seen as general society of Nigeria, while the citizens are the forces that generated demand and support. Demands are what citizens, groups or individual want from the political system and this can be expressed through clamoring for change that can reduce the incident of poverty and cater for unemployed citizens in the society. While support are the attitude and action of citizens to the political system and allow it to continue working, this is also expressed through decision making of the citizens (individual and groups) in the cause of voting in the election period of 2015 rather than been political apathy. Demands and support are therefore input to the political system.

Political system according to this theory, consist of the institutions, process and personnel of government. This is equivalent to legislative and executive arm of government. The political system is a processor or converter of input into output. This implies that, the legislative and executive arms of government processed the aspiration and the demands of the citizens from the environment and convert it into output or authoritative allocation of values which are public policies. Therefore, N-Power Programme is the outcome of policy making of the government. It is the government decision that is being implemented as anti-poverty to effect changes in the society.

The public policy or government decision will invariably come out as output, which will also influence future inputs into the system through feedback. This imply that if the impact of N – Power Programme in the environment is, positive and able to effect the desire changes as to reduce poverty level and unemployment in the society, people will repose their confidence in the government of All Progressive Congress (APC), and keep on feeding the system with the input that will sustain their government. But if otherwise, people will lose trust and stop their inputs to the system and initiate change against the government of APC.

In any political system, individual and the member of the community have their roles to play to furnish the system with their inputs so as to make it functioning. Likewise, the government has its own role to play in making and concretize a public policy that can transform the country's economy where poverty and unemployment could be blown off. It is after that we can talk about good governance in the society. The theory is relevance to the study in the sense that, it enhances the understanding and stand as an operational tool to further explain the circumstances that surround the government commitment and enthusiasm in formulating and implementing N-Power Programme as poverty reduction programme.

3. Methodology

The methodology employed in this study is based on survey research design which entails the collection of data from both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data were gathered via questionnaires from the respondents. The study was carried out in the Ondo state of Nigeria, The survey location

comprises three LGAs in Ondo State. From the 18 LGAs of Ondo State, 3 LGA were purposively selected, each from the three senatorial districts based on the political and geographical consideration and their active participation in N-Power Programme. The LGAs are; Owo LGA, Akure South LGA and Ilaje LGA respectively**.**

The population of N-Power volunteers in the three LGAs selected formed the population sample. The N-Power Volunteers in Owo LGA was 746, while that of Akure South LGA was 3025 and Ilaje LGA was 1109 respectively. The selection of samples across the population will help us to have balanced information about the impact of the N-Power Programme on poverty reduction in Ondo state and as well reflect the opinion of the population. Therefore, the population of both the three LGAs of N-Power volunteers is 4880. This was the total study population from which samples was selected. Based on the population of the study, Taro Yamane method for samples size calculation was formulated to determine the sample size from a given population of three LGA selected.

n=N/(1+N(e)2)

where:

n = Signifies the Sample Size (unknown)

N=Signifies the Population under Study (4880)

e= Signifies the margin error (0.05)

Substituting the numbers in the formula given, therefore:

: n=4880/(1+4880 (0.05)2

n= 4880/(1+4880 (0.0025

n=4880/(1+12.2)

n=4880/ 13.2

n=369\

Therefore the samples size of 369 respondents was selected for questionnaire administration.

Summary of sample size

LGAs	The population of the study (LGA)	Sample %	Sample size
Akure LGA	3025	3025/4880 x369=228	228
Owo LGA	746	746/4880x369=57	57
Ilaje LGA	1109	1109/1500x369=84	84
Total	4880		369

Source: Author's calculation based on the population of the three LGAs selected for the study

Akure South LGA being the largest N-Power volunteer provides a sample size of 228 respondents, while Owo LGA provides a sample size of 57 respondents and Ilaje LGA provides a sample size of 84 respondents. The study used mean as descriptive statistics and Chi-Square to test the hypothesis.

Sampling Techniques

To achieve the stated samples in pursuit of the objective of the study, a simple random sampling technique was adopted. Simple random sampling was employed in selecting the respondents for the quantitative data via

questionnaire administration. The choice of this sampling technique is necessitated by the nature of the study and since the research is aimed at carrying out an assessment of the N-Power Programme and poverty reduction in Ondo State

4.0. Hypotheses Testing

The hypotheses for this study which are stated in the null form are thereby tested with chi-square.

4.1: Ho_1: N-Power Programme does not have a significant impact on poverty reduction in Ondo State.

Table 4.1 Test Statistics	
	Has the N-Power programme reduced the poverty level in Ondo State?
Chi-Square	32.994[a]
Df	1
Asymp. Sig.	.000

Source: Field Survey, March 2024

The Chi-square result shows that N-power has a statistically significant impact on poverty level in Ondo State. From Table 4.1, p-value (0.000) is less than (0.05) which means H_0 is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted thereby we conclude that the N-power programme has a significant impact on poverty and unemployment reduction in Ondo State.

Decision Rule:

The p- value of 0.000 is less than 0.05 and X^2 tabulated (5.02) is less than X^2 calculated (32.994) in Table 1. Therefore, we reject H_0 and accept the alternative. This implies that the N-power programme has a significant impact on unemployment reduction in Ondo state.

4.2: Hypothesis Two

H_{02}: N-Power programme does not have a significant impact on the people of Ondo State other than volunteer

Table 2: Has N-Power Programme improved socio-economic development of the State via buying and selling of the volunteers.

Table 2 Test Statistics	
	Has N-Power Programme improved the socio-economic development of the State via buying and selling of the volunteers?
Chi-Square	153.778[a]
Df	1
Asymp. Sig.	.000
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 173.5.	

Source: Field Survey, March 2024.

Decision Rule:

Table 4.2 shows the Chi-square result, the p-value of 0.000 is less than 0.05 and X^2 tabulated (5.02) is less than X^2 calculated (153.778). Hence, we reject H_0 and accept the alternative. This implies that the N-Power programme has a significant impact on the people of Ondo State other than volunteers.

4.2: Policy Implications and Discussion of Results

The view of the respondent indicated that N-power Programme had made a credible contribution to the reduction of poverty on the volunteers in the State. From the study reviewed, (Abin 2008) look into the impact of the N-power Programme, implementation and the contribution to the social economic well-being of the beneficiaries at Akwanga metropolis of Nasarawa State, and the study found out that N-power Programme has contributed to the financial, material social wellbeing of the beneficiaries. The result of the finding in this study is an affirmative complement to the submission of (Abin, 2008) that the N-power programme has provided financial empowerment, reduced the social mess of unemployment, reduced over-reliance on parents on daily living and that has improved the livelihood of the volunteers. The direct implication to the volunteers is the reduction of poverty.

One important gap that this study intends to fill is the effect of the N-power Programme on the study area of Ondo State. The study revealed that apart from the volunteers who felt so much impact of the N-power programme, the society at which the programme was implemented also felt the impact as well. The view of respondents indicated that N-power Programme has so much impact on the people of Ondo State that is, the study area other than volunteers who are the target population. The study found out that N-power Programme relieved parents of a financial burden on the volunteers. This implies that even the so call parents who didn't participate directly in the N-power Programme are indirectly benefited from the programme via their enlisted children.

It is also observed by the study that the N-power programme improved the social economic development of the State through buying and selling of the volunteers. The finding indicated that there is more money in circulation through the N-power Programme source due to the volunteers' transaction in the society or state.

In addition to that, the study also revealed that N-power Programme also improved the social responsibility of the volunteers in the state. This implies that with the help of the N-power programme, majorities of the unemployed graduates who felt alienated and see the state' political and social institution as callous and uncaring, and that who have concluded that they are not obliged to the state, have now developed a sense of belonging and have an obligation to work to consolidate the political and social institution and to cooperate with other individual and organization for the benefit of the state at large. N-power Programme has created a consciousness in individual volunteers a duty they have to perform to maintain a balance between the economy and the society.

The study also observed from the opinion of the respondents that N-power Programme enhanced social security in the state. The programme provides to individual household volunteers to ensure access to health care and to guarantee income security to unemployed graduates. N-power Programme as indicated by the study is a federal government programme designed to provide partial income for young graduates that are jobless. Therefore, N-power paid out money through social security programmes, and the majority of the volunteers are now living on social security. The study found out that N-power Programme has fairly reduced the poverty level in the study area of Ondo State; no matter how small it is, majorities of the volunteers tapped into the opportunity and became an entrepreneur. On the overall assessment of the N-power Programme on poverty reduction in Ondo State, the study revealed that the programme has made a fair significant impact on poverty reduction

5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

The study examines the impact of N-Power Programme on the study area of Ondo State and it was established that N-power Programme has impacted and fairly contributed to the poverty reduction in Ondo State and Nigeria at large. The study further concludes that Npower Programme has significant impact on poverty reduction on both volunteers and the general society in Ondo State where it was implemented and that there is no doubt that N-power Programme is an anti-poverty programme that has capacity to reduce the incident of poverty if pragmatically tailored towards skill acquisition

and entrepreneur that can give birth to self-reliance otherwise; the poverty level will remain its status quo in Nigeria.

5.2 Recommendations

It is my sincere belief that for N-power Programme's mandate and its cardinal objective to be realized and achieved, the government and the authorities concerned should continue to pursue the full realization of the mandates and the objective of the programme. Given the findings of this study, the researcher makes the following recommendations as follows;

i. For the N-power programme to be able to realize and achieve its cardinal objective of poverty reduction holistically there will be a need for it to be pragmatically tailored towards skill acquisition and entrepreneur, such skill will provide self-reliance after the expiration of the programme.

ii. A monetary fixed salary policy (MFS) should be introduced into the programme; the monthly stipend designated to individuals volunteers should be divided into two while part should be fixed by the government into individuals volunteers' bank accounts till, after the expiration of the programme and thereafter, the government shall complement the little fixed money for the volunteers so that they can start a small scale business with it.

iii. The stipend of the volunteers should be increased to be commensurate with the current inflation situation in the country, and to be sufficient for the monetary fixed salary policy recommended.

iv. N-power should be reviewed and expanded with legal backing by the legislature to prevent political parties' influence because of change of government. This will lead to the continuation and sustainability of the programme.

References

Akomolafe, A.F, Agunbiade E. O. and Ndayako, S. H. (2018) Analysis of impact of Macroeconomics Policies, Unemployment on Poverty level in Nigeria: 1990-2016 *Bingham Journal of Economics and Allied Studies (BJEAS),* 1(2) 241-253.

Bisong, D. (2019). Impart Assessment of the N-Power Scheme; A case study of Southern Senatorial District of Cross River State. *Journal of Public Administration and Social Welfare Research.*Vol 4. No 1 pp 31-36.

Duncan G. and et.al (2001), Social Consequences of Unemployment; An East-West Comparison. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 11(1) pp 39-54

Howlett, M. and Cashore, B. (2014). Conceptualizing Public Policy.Engeliet. Al (eds), *Comparative Policy Studies*. London Palgrave Macmillan

Ikelegbe, O. A. (1996*). Public Policy Making and Analysis*.Benin City; Uri Publishing Limited.

Landu, E. J; Akomolafe, F. A; Ogundele, K; Adewumi, A.; Gwari, B; Tanko, M. A.; Umar, K. L; Ogunforowa, O. O. and Ibrahim, N. S. (2022). Role of Artisanal Fishery in Poverty Reduction in Kainji Lake Basin. *The International Journal of Agriculture, Management and Technology*, 6(1), 2-7.

Mutiullah A.O. (2010). The Imperative and Chanllenges of Agenda Setting In Nigeria; Road Map to Vision 20:20 20. Abuja, Marvelous Mike Press Ltd.

Mutiullah, A.O. and Olaofe, M. (2010). Pervasive Poverty and Good Governance in Nigeria, Implication for Sustainable Development.*Journal of Political Studies*, Vol 2. No 1, pg 140-141.

Narayan, D.P. (2011*), Voice of the Poor: Crying out for Change*; Oxford University Press.

Okoroafor O. K. D. and Akomolafe. A. F. (2018) Impact of Federal Government Fiscal Actions on Unemployment in Nigeria: 1990-2016 *Benue Journal of Social Sciences,*164-178.

Ray, J. (2019). *Empowering for Kingdom Business Wealth*, (2nd) Edition, Ile- Ife,

NIU Nation Publishers

Sapru, R.K (2004). *Public Policy Formulation, implementation and Evaluation*: New Delhi, Stering Publisher, Private Limited.

Streeten, P. (2008). Does Rural Location Matter? The Significance of a Rural Setting For Small *Business. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship*

Ujo, A. A. (2011*). Public Policy Analysis: A Nigeria Perspective*. Kaduna Nigeria, Joyce Publisher.

Zoaka, Y.A. and Akpen, F. (2012). Local Government Administration and 7 Point Agenda; The Development Responsibilities. *Journal of Legislative Studies and Governance;* Vol.1 No. 3 pp 71-72

SPORTS BETTING AS A MAJOR GAMING IN THE CONTEMPORARY GAMBLING INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA: EXAMPLE OF WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF TARABA STATE

SAMUEL ALEGWU OMANCHI
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, ADMIRALTY UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, IBUSA, DELLTA STATE, Salegwu4all@yahoo.com

EMMANUEL ZINGFA DANNAP
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, KWARARAFA UNIVERSITY, WUKARI, TARABA STATE, sarahzingfa12@gmail.com

KEYWORDS
Sports Betting, Gaming, Contemporary, Gambling Industry, Nigeria, Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State

ABSTRACT
Sports betting have a long and interesting history in Nigeria, dating back to the pre-colonial era. However, it wasn't until the 21st century that sports betting became a popular pastime in the country. This paper seeks to examine sports betting as a major gaming in the contemporary gambling industry in Nigeria with a focus on Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State. It conceptualizes sports betting and appraises the motives for the increased sports betting in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State. It analyzes the level of sports betting and the socio-economic impact of sports betting in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State. The study relied on both primary sources like oral interviews, archival materials and secondary sources like books, theses, articles, newspapers, journals, etc. The study observes that two main reason accounts for the prevalence of sports betting in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State. They are; the widespread availability of smartphones and the internet and two high rates of unemployment and peer pressure. The study demonstrates that despite controversies on the gains and benefits of sports betting in Nigeria, the great improvement in the number of betting companies operating in Nigeria (in our case, Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State) has created more employment. Aside from employing Nigerians in their offices, betting companies create jobs by inviting people to become agents and own physical outlets. The study also found that these outlets have become very prevalent in Nigeria, and have provided a good source of income for their owners. The shop owners also have their own employees, who earn their small share from the sports betting jackpot. The study concludes the controversy of whether sports betting in Nigeria is harmful or harmless to Nigerians remains a matter to be debated.

Introduction

Betting games have a long and interesting history in Nigeria, dating back to the pre-colonial era. However, it wasn't until the 21st century that betting games became a popular pastime in the country (Ibeh, 2023). Numerous factors have contributed to the great expansion of the betting game industry over the years, including the involvement of numerous indigenous firms in Nigeria's betting game market. Numerous innovations have been incorporated into the sector to enhance accessibility and boost customer loyalty. Millions of people now have the ability to wager on games via the internet utilizing smartphones and other easily accessible devices thanks to the advent of online betting (Omanchi and Okpamen, 2018:29; Olaore, Adejare and Udofia, 2021:165). Prior to the year 2000, actual casinos and sporting events served as the main venues for gambling and sports betting in Nigeria. In Nigeria, sports betting has long been a popular pastime, with the majority of wagers being placed on football games. Football pools, which let participants guess game results, were a big deal in the gaming community. Beginning in the 1990s, new laws and regulatory frameworks were established to control the gambling markets, which also brought about changes to the legal landscape. With the passage of the 1990 Criminal Code Act, gaming activities in Nigeria saw a significant change. Due to this decision, a variety of gambling-related activities are now recognized as structured and lawful in the nation (Pulse-Mix, 2021).

While there are many other types of betting games in Nigeria, football wagering is the most popular. In many regions of Nigeria, football wagering is a highly frequent and popular activity. Young people in Nigeria also wager on horse racing, greyhound racing, track racing, American football, basketball, car racing, boxing, hockey, baseball, and martial arts, among other sports. However, betting on football games continues to be the most popular form of gambling in Nigeria, with most participants being young people between the ages of 15 and 40. The anticipated yearly increase in taxes and levies collected by the Nigerian government from the betting sector is predicted to reach US$8.6 million in 2019 from US$5.7 million in 2014, a 14.2% increase in government income from 5.7%. Nigeria is unquestionably the greatest market for betting games in Africa because of its vast population, and it is also a popular location and favoured centre for bet investments. Due to the belief that gaming may help them advance both socially and economically, many Nigerians in both urban and rural regions have become drawn to betting games (Olaore, Adejare, and Udofia, 2021:166).

There will be 182 million mobile customers in 2021, up from the present 153 million, according to data by Business Monitor International (BMI). It is anticipated that the number of gamers would rise in tandem with the number of internet users. Roughly 60 million Nigerians between the ages of 18 and 40 actively gamble on sports, according to recent research. These gamblers wager an average of 3,000 Naira (about $15) each day. As a result, sports betting in Nigeria generates roughly 2 billion naira every day, or around 730-billion-naira year (Lavojo, et al, 2020:212). Current data indicates that an increasing number of individuals are engaged in this activity; some have even abandoned other pursuits that would enable them to have a brighter future since they view this as a source of money. According to recent research, Nigerians wager on sports online for almost 1.8 billion naira per day. Although some people gain from this practice, most people usually end up losing money (Akinlotan, 2022:369). With a population of more than 211 million, Nigeria is now witnessing an increase in online gaming viewers. The nation's internet gambling industry is thought to bring in $400 billion to $500 billion annually. This is expected to increase as a result of the recent growth in online gaming (Pulse-Mix, 2021).

However, out of all the betting activities that Nigerians seemed to like, sports betting seemed to be the most popular across the nation as a whole, and Wukari Local Government Area in particular. Offor, et al, provided evidence to support the aforementioned claims by pointing out that sports betting appears to be the most popular form of internet gambling. It is the process of making wagers and predictions about sporting events. Different cultures wager on sports at different rates, although most wagers are on American football, association football, basketball, baseball, hockey, etc. Sports betting may also include non-sporting events like political elections, reality programs, and horse

racing in addition to non-human competitions like greyhound racing, horse racing, and illicit underground cockfighting. Among other things, it lets you wager on which side will win, by what score, and even whether or not players will receive a booking (Offor, et al, 2021:389). Therefore, the purpose of this article is to investigate sports betting as a significant game in Nigeria's modern gambling business, with a particular emphasis on Taraba State's Wukari Local Government Area.

The Concept of Sports Betting

In its most basic form, sport betting consists of staking money on both the result of a sports event and on side events that take place during the bigger match or fixture (Lungu, 2020:180; Akinlotan, 2022:368; Lavojo, et al., 2020:212). The act of placing money on a game's outcome is known as sport betting. The majority of the time, playing games of chance is predicated on chance (win or lose). These games often provide an instantaneous result, allowing the participants to know if they have won or lost (Olaore, Adejare, and Udofia, 2021:165). Sports betting is commonly understood to be an activity in which participants make predictions and stakes on different games in the hopes of making money from their wagers. Predictions for betting games often included a variety of sports, including boxing, hockey, baseball, horse racing, greyhound racing, American football, track racing, basketball, car racing, and martial arts, among others (Olaore, Adejare and Udofia, 2021:164; Dipo, 2023).

The detrimental effects of sports betting on people, families, and communities make it a cause of pain and concern for a number of Nigerians. Even while the majority of individuals manage their sports betting responsibly, many develop addictions (Lavojo, et al, 2020:212; Lungu, 2020:180; Akinlotan, 2022:368; Dipo, 2023). Nigeria's enormous football culture has proven to be a valuable asset for the sports betting sector. Millions of Nigerians watch major leagues like the English Premier League and the Spanish La Liga, and sports gambling gives them the chance to make money doing what they love. In Nigeria, one can currently find betting establishments on most streets; new ones are opening up every day, and there are everyday customers both in-person and online (Omanchi and Okpamen, 2018:29; Lavojo, et al, 2020:212; Lungu, 2020:180; Akinlotan, 2022:368).

Description of the Study Area

Wukari Local Government Area is situated in the southern region of Taraba State and is located between latitudes 7° 52' N and longitude 9° 46' E. It is bordered to the north by Gassol Local Government and to the south by Benue State's Ukum Local Government Area. It borders Taraba State's Ibi Local Government Area to the east. However, Taraba State's Takum and Donga Local Government Areas share its western borders. Additionally, it borders Benue State's Katsina-Ala Local Government Area on Takum Road in Abako, sharing a small piece of that line (Lukpata and Zhema, 2019; Donye, et al, 2021). With a total surface area of 4,308 km², Wukari Local Government Area was established in 1976. As of 2006, the state's population was 241,546 according to the National Population Figure. The area vegetation is of the guinea savannah variety, and the local government suffers a tropical climate. There are wet and dry seasons to identify it. April marks the start of the rainy season, which lasts until October. While November through March is when the dry season occurs and 1.350 mm of rain falls on average. The driest time of year is known as the harmattan, which is defined as a dry, chilly, and dusty wind that lasts from December to February and has an estimated humidity of 13% (Omanchi and Ibrahim, 2017). The region is well-suited for growing roots and grain crops, such as yam, cassava, corn, rice, soy beans, and millets, which are grown for food and income. This practice has significantly altered the rich vegetation of the area's distant past. In addition, the individuals work in white-collar occupations, the arts, and crafts. The local government headquarters' administrative standing has increased employment and drawn more people from neighboring regions for trade, farming, and civil reasons (Donye, et al, 2021; Lukpata and Zhema, 2019; Omanchi and Ibrahim, 2017). The region has an exceptionally rich cultural legacy. The system of customary marriage, folk dances, masquerades, festivals, age divisions, chieftaincy institutions, the arts, and the people's faiths are examples of this.

Factors Influencing Sports Betting in Wukari Local Government Area

Several factors have been deduced by various researchers who have done one form of work or the other regarding betting games or gambling in Nigeria. Some of the researchers did the study at the regional level, while others did the research

with a national outlook. Empirical findings showed about seven major factors responsible for the people's engagement in betting games and why the level of involvement in betting games by Nigerians kept increasing by the day. Some of the factors include strong tradition of sports participation and fandom, innovation and internet betting options, increased indigenous participation, new game offerings, population increase, change in the family system and values and the get-rich-quick syndrome (Lavojo, et al, 2020; Olaore, Adejare and Udofia, 2021; Pulse-Mix, 2021; Lungu, 2020; Omanchi and Okpamen, 2018).

1. Strong Tradition of Sports Participation and Fandom: Particularly football is very popular in Wukari, and many locals and visitors to the area are ardent supporters of both domestic and international teams. An interest in sports betting arises naturally from this love of sports. Accordingly, social media's ascent has contributed to the popularity of sports betting in Wukari. Sports betting businesses utilize social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to advertise their products and draw in new clients. Furthermore, a lot of people share their betting methods and advice with others on social media. Due to this, there is now a thriving sports betting community in Wukari, which has increased the activity's appeal (Omanchi and Okpamen, 2018:29; Lavojo, et al, 2020; Lungu, 2020; Akinlotan, 2022; Boyoja, 2023; Zando, 2023).

2. Innovation and Internet Betting Option: The internet's impact and innovations that provide players with more betting alternatives have been a crucial factor in the growth of betting games in Nigeria (in our instance, Wukari Local Government Area) throughout time. Additionally, more people are participating in betting games and having the flexibility to do so from the comfort of their homes or anywhere else thanks to the internet and information technology (Lavojo, et al., 2020; Pulse-Mix, 2021; Lungu, 2020; Omanchi and Okpamen, 2018; Boyoja, 2023; Zando, 2023). Thanks to innovation and the internet, it is now simple for players to wager on games, monitor their results online, and place bets thanks to the convenience and capability that betting organizations provide (Lavojo, et al, 2020; Pulse-Mix, 2021; Ameh, 2023; Bako, 2023). This implies that the accessibility of sports betting services has facilitated participation. People may now easily make bets on their favourite teams and events in Wukari thanks to the proliferation of sports betting businesses and websites.

3. Increased in Indigenous Companies' Participation: The growing engagement of well-known indigenous Nigerian businesses in the betting industry is another factor contributing to the rise in gaming activity in that country. The rate at which betting games were played in Nigeria was extremely low while they were still played offline and with little involvement from local companies. However, a number of indigenous Nigerian businesses invested in the betting game industry as a result of the country's population boom, young unemployment and underemployment, and betting organizations' identification of commercial prospects in the sector. Their involvement in the industry caused betting shops and centres to spring up all over Nigeria, and this in turn caused Nigerians of all ages, genders, tribes, and nationalities to bet more on sports (Boyoja, 2023; Zando, 2023Lavojo, et al., 2020; Pulse-Mix, 2021; Lungu, 2020; Omanchi and Okpamen, 2018).

4. New Game Offerings: Nigerians' engagement and participation in betting games has also risen as a result of the release of new games and flexible betting possibilities. The betting businesses were able to determine the sorts of games that will appeal to the people of Nigeria and provide them with flexible alternatives that will let them wager stress-free. In an effort to market their brands, some betting organizations also hire well-known football players, models, and artists, as well as sponsor a variety of social events (Yohanna, 2023; Aliyu, 2023; Lavojo, et al., 2020; Omanchi and Okpamen, 2018).

5. Population Increase: Some Nigerians are not working and turn to betting as a form of solace. As a result, the country's population is growing geometrically, and the country's growing unemployment and underemployment rates are contributing factors. As a result, betting has become a national pastime and source of addiction for many Nigerians (Olaore, Adejare and Udofia, 2021; Lavojo, et al, 2020; Bako, 2023; Ameh, 2023).

6. Changing Family System and Values: Numerous things have been altered in Nigeria as a result of the country's ongoing economic challenges since the 1980s. The typical Nigerian single-income, polygamous household as well as the typical stay-at-home housewife or mother

system were altered, and women and children started actively participating in the country's economic life. This led to a new trend in the values and systems of the nation. Following the economic crisis of the 1980s, a lot of women found freedom, which also encouraged a lot of them to start betting. Youth and adolescents were quick to start betting because it gave them an additional way to make quick money if they were lucky enough to win after placing a wager (Lavojo, et al, 2020; Olaore, Adejare and Udofia, 2021; Lungu, 2020; Omanchi and Okpamen, 2018; Omanchi, 2019). From the old agricultural and communal economic pursuit to what is now called an individualistic and competitive economy sought by each individual, a new economic connection was formed that altered the orientation and generated a shift (Lavojo, et al, 2020; Omanchi, 2019; Wuam, 2015).

7. The Get-Rich-Quick Syndrome: The idea of "getting rich quick" has taken hold among many Nigerians, partly due to the disappearance of the traditional value system that placed a premium on labor dignity. Many Nigerians have subsequently abandoned that antiquated value system, which has intensified their desire to get wealthy quickly and their willingness to do whatever it takes to do so. Millions of Nigerians now wager on sports in the hopes of becoming wealthy quickly, forgoing hard labor and decency. Nigeria's economic situation acts as a catalyst. According to the 2022 Global Hunger Index, Nigeria ranked 103rd out of 121 countries. (Yohanna, 2023; Aliyu, 2023; Olaore, Adejare and Udofia, 2021; Lavojo, et al, 2020). In a country where unemployment is high and poverty is widespread, the promise of quick and easy earnings is very appealing. Many young people in Wukari view sports betting as a way to escape poverty and achieve financial success.

The Level of Sports Betting in Wukari Local Government Area

One of the most competitive gambling markets in Africa is Nigeria. In general, Wukari Local Government Area's online and offline gambling practices are similar to those of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. They are both overseen by the National Lottery Regulatory Commission (NLRC), which was founded and made lawful by the National Lottery Act, 2005, and are distinguished by the active involvement of Nigerians (Lavojo, et al, 2020; Olaore, Adejare and Udofia, 2021). According to a 2022 survey, 53% of adult Nigerians who gambled daily made up 36% of those who had gambled in the previous year. This indicates that more than 20 million Nigerians regularly engage in gambling. Social media exposure and technological advancement have helped Nigerians' views on gambling to become more tolerant. Specifically, when it comes to sports betting, it is no longer something people do in private and is now accepted in most societies (Lavojo, et al., 2020; Pulse-Mix, 2021; Lungu, 2020).

The population's size and level of internet usage provide the ideal environment for online gaming businesses to flourish. In Nigeria, there are several legitimate online bookies to choose from, including as Bet9ja, 1960bet, Nairabet, Betfair, 9jaPredict, Betway, and BetNigeria. In contrast to a few decades ago, when they were uncommon, this isn't the case now. A recent report states that there are over 169 cell phone subscribers and over 100 million internet users in Nigeria (Lungu, 2020; Akinlotan, 2022; Lavojo, et al., 2020; Yohanna, 2023; Aliyu, 2023). It is hardly surprising that the percentage of sports bettors in the country has increased along with the number of people using mobile phones and the internet. These days, we can easily and economically place bets from the comfort of our homes or while on the go. Nigeria has very good internet access. Between 2018 and 2022, Nigeria's percentage of internet users climbed somewhat, from about 26% to 38%. Sports betting in Nigeria is definitely expanding because to the country's higher internet penetration and easier access to reasonably priced cellphones (Lavojo, et al., 2020; Pulse-Mix, 2021; Lungu, 2020; Yohanna, 2023; Aliyu, 2023).

With the development of digital technology and the worsening of economic conditions, the gambling industry in Nigeria—in our case, Wukari Local Government Area—has been steadily expanding. An increasing number of people have turned to sports betting as a way to make quick money. People enjoy placing bets on football and eSports, and this tendency is developing steadily. The law makes a distinction between games based on skill, which are allowed, and games based on chance, which are not. Legal forms of gambling include lotteries, land-based casinos, and sports betting; illegal forms include roulette, dice games, and non-skilled card games. Because of this, gambling is becoming more widely accepted (Boyoja, 2023; Zando, 2023; Lungu, 2020; Akinlotan, 2022).

The lotto, slot machines, and online sports betting (such as football league promotions and pools) are the most widely used forms of gambling. The statute makes no specific mention of regulating internet gambling. The legal gambling age in Nigeria is eighteen. The option to wager online has enticed bettors to wager on games they might not have otherwise been willing to on their preferred football league pools and promotions. Recent years have seen a sharp increase in the betting industry as more and more players want to bet on their favourite teams and events via digital platforms (Yohanna, 2023; Aliyu, 2023; Akinlotan, 2022; Lavojo, et al., 2020). Using gender as the foundation for the analysis, the table below provides more details on the extent of sports betting in Wukari Local Government Area.

Level of Sports Betting in Wukari Local Government Area by Gender

S/N	Item	Male	Female
1.	Most visited site or betting platform	In Nigeria, there are several legitimate online bookies to choose from, including as Bet9ja, 1960bet, Nairabet, Betfair, 9jaPredict, Betway, and BetNigeria. Nonetheless, Bet9ja is the most popular online betting platform and the top website in Wukari Local Government Area.	In Nigeria, there are several legitimate online bookies to choose from, including as Bet9ja, 1960bet, Nairabet, Betfair, 9jaPredict, Betway, and BetNigeria. Nonetheless, Bet9ja is the most popular online betting platform and the top website in Wukari Local Government Area.
2.	Level of participation	According to a survey done in 2021 by Bet Ensured, men bet more than women do since they are generally greater risk-takers and passionate about sports.	Despite the fact that men wager more on sports than women, the number of female gamblers has grown over time. In Nigeria, women account for 10.3% of all online gamblers, a number that is continuously increasing.
3.	Reasons for sports betting	Nigeria's economic situation acts as a catalyst. According to the 2022 Global Hunger Index, Nigeria ranked 103rd out of 121 countries.	Nigeria's economic situation acts as a catalyst. According to the 2022 Global Hunger Index, Nigeria ranked 103rd out of 121 countries.
4.	Average amount of sports betting	Sports betting costs about N3,000 per day on average, and 53% of Nigerians gamble at least once a day.	Sports betting costs about N3,000 per day on average, and 53% of Nigerians gamble at least once a day.

5.	Average age of sports betting	The most active age group is between 18 and 45 years old. This proved that people who are in their early 20s and 30s had a higher propensity to gamble online.	The most active age group is between 25 and 40 years old. This proved that people who are in their early 20s and 30s had a higher propensity to gamble online.
6.	Most placed game	Football is the preferred sport of Nigerians, who are passionate sports enthusiasts. Of the 70% of Nigerian males who are passionate about football, most of their gambling is on football matches.	Football is the preferred sport of Nigerians, who are passionate sports enthusiasts. Of the 70% of Nigerian females who are passionate about football, most of their gambling is on football matches.

Source: Author Field Work, 2023

The above table shows how social media exposure and technology advancement have influenced Nigerians' (in our case, Wukari Local Government Area's) perceptions on gambling to become more liberal. For example, sports betting is no longer a taboo activity and is increasingly accepted in society. This is a result of peer pressure, high unemployment rates, and the general accessibility to smartphones and the internet.

Socio-Economic Impact of Sports Betting in Wukari Local Government Area

The socio-economic impact of sports betting in Wukari Local Government Area has been substantial. Firstly, it has boosted the local economy by giving those who are involved in the industry a means of support. This includes both bookmakers and employees. Secondly, sports betting has created jobs, especially for young people who do not have other options for employment. Thirdly, the industry generates revenue for the government through taxes and licensing fees. Lastly, the growth of sports betting has led to community development and engagement by offering opportunities for social interaction and entertainment within the area, thus contributing to the local economy. There are several ways to examine the socioeconomic effects of sports betting in Wukari Local Government Area:

1. Economic Boost: The local economy benefits significantly from sports betting. Because it brings in money for betting organizations, it also opens up job chances for those in the field, including customer service agents, odds compilers, and bookies. This is true since betting organizations create jobs by recruiting people to become agents and operate physical outlets, in addition to hiring Nigerians (in our case, Wukari people) in their offices (Boyoja, 2023; Zando, 2023; Adedokun and Adebayo, 2020; Olanrewaju and Adewumi, 2019; Oyedele and Olagunju, 2019). These establishments have proliferated throughout Nigeria (including the Wukari Local Government Area) and have given its owners a reliable source of revenue. Employees of the store owners also receive a tiny portion of the winnings from sports betting. This enhances the general economic well-being of the neighborhood and lowers unemployment rates (Yohanna, 2023; Aliyu, 2023; Adedokun and Adebayo, 2020; Olanrewaju and Adewumi, 2019; Oyedele and Olagunju, 2019). Put simply, sports betting reduces unemployment and the negative societal repercussions of armed robberies and other crimes by providing jobs to a large number of locals and residents of nearby communities. The local community has benefited greatly from the expansion in work opportunities, which have given people the ability to make a living and raise their socioeconomic standing. Additionally, the presence of jobs has aided in lowering local unemployment rates and fostering economic expansion (Ameh, 2023; Bako, 2023).

2. Revenue Generation for the Government: The Wukari Local Government Area's government receives tax revenue from sports betting, which is utilized to finance a range of public services and development initiatives. The growing acceptance of sports betting has allowed the government to rake in a sizable sum of tax money. The government has been able to invest more money in public services and development projects thanks to the money it has received from sports betting. The local economy has benefited from this revenue infusion, which has opened doors for expansion and improvement (Ameh, 2023; Bako, 2023; Khikando, 2023; Olanrewaju and Adewumi, 2019; Oyedele and Olagunju, 2019). All things considered, Sports betting has been instrumental in augmenting the government's revenue base, which has resulted in socio-economic advancements in Wukari Local Government Area. The tax revenue is employed to finance the development of infrastructure, healthcare, education, and other vital services, thereby elevating the general socio-economic circumstances of the community.

3. Social Infrastructure Development: Due to its ability to foster social contact and enjoyment in the community, sports betting has aided in its growth and engagement. The money made has also been used to fund the development of infrastructure and the provision of basic services like healthcare and education. Wukari Local Government Area uses its increasing sports betting money to build and upgrade its social infrastructure. In order to encourage a culture of sports, physical fitness, and social contact within the community, this includes building and maintaining sports facilities, schools, and recreation centres (Boyoja, 2023; Zando, 2023; Adedokun and Adebayo, 2020).

4. Social Impact: Sports betting affects society in both positive and negative ways. Positively, it encourages a sense of community and camaraderie amongst bettors who converse about sports and compete in amicable ways. It suggests that participating in sports betting fosters interpersonal relationships and a sense of community. Bettors become relationships with other bettors when they get together to watch sports and support their favourite teams (Khikando, 2023; Adedokun and Adebayo, 2020; Olanrewaju and Adewumi, 2019; Oyedele and Olagunju, 2019). By drawing tourists and other visitors who might partake in other economic activities in the area, it can help boost the local economy. But there are unfavourable social repercussions to sports betting as well. Excessive gambling contributes to societal problems like domestic violence, criminality, and mental health issues as well as addiction and financial hardships for local residents and families (Boyoja, 2023; Zando, 2023; Adedokun and Adebayo, 2020; Olanrewaju and Adewumi, 2019; Oyedele and Olagunju, 2019). Simply put, while it has helped the local economy and created jobs, it has also resulted in a number of social problems, including financial ruin and gambling addiction. To reduce the harmful effects of sports betting and encourage responsible gaming, it is critical that the local government put in place efficient rules and support systems.

Conclusion

The study has been able to show that sports betting is a major gaming activity in the Nigerian gambling industry, and Wukari Local Government Area in Taraba State is no exception. It's vital to remember that a variety of factors, such as Wukari's long history of sports fandom and participation, the idea that sports betting can be a profitable endeavor, the availability of sports betting services, and the growth of social media, all contribute to the popularity of sports betting in the city. In Wukari Local Government Area, sports betting has had a mixed effect. While it has helped the local economy and created jobs, it has also resulted in a number of social problems, including financial ruin and gambling addiction. Although the local government has taken some action to address these issues, more needs to be done. More needs to be done to support those who are battling with addiction and to raise public awareness of the risks associated with gambling.

References

Adedokun, O. A., and Adebayo, A. (2020). The Socio-Economic Impact of Sports Betting in Nigeria: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Gambling Studies, 36(1), 117-132.

Ajoke, O. O., Sunday, I. E. & Olakitan, O. O. (2020). Male Undergraduates and Online Gambling in Nigerian Private Universities. Gender & Behaviour, 18(2).

Akinlotan, R. A. (2022). Causes and Effect of Gambling Attitude among Private University

Students: A Study of Crawford University Igbesa Ogun State. Sapientia Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Development Studies (SGOJAHDS), 5(2), 365-383.

Aliyu B. K., (2023). Oral Interview, Trader, 37, Gidin Dorowa, August 2023.

Ameh E, (2023). Oral Interview, Civil Servant/BetNaija Operator, 45, Wukari, August 2023.

Araromi M. A. (2018). Regulation of Gambling in Nigeria: A Need to Review the Status quo. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.

Bako J, (2023). Oral Interview, Civil Servant, 50, Wukari, August 2023.

Boyoja S, (2023). Oral Interview, Civil Servant, 40, Rafin Kada, August 2023.

Donye, A. O., et al. (2012). Assessment of Youth Involvement in Yam Production in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria. Agriculture and Biology Journal of North America.

Ibeh, I. (2023). Sports Betting in Nigeria: A Controversial but Thriving Industry. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://guardian.ng/sport/sports-betting-in-nigeria-a-controversial-but-thriving-industry

Ibiteye, A. O. Gambling in West Africa's Largest City: The Pools-Betting Industry in Ibadan Since 1954 (Dissertation Prospectus). Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu

Khikando C, (2023). Oral Interview, Student, 35, Wukari, August 2023.

Lavojo, J. A., et al. (2020). Predisposing Factors of Sport Gambling among Youths in Taraba State. Sapientia Foundation Journal of Education, Sciences and Gender Studies (SFJESGS), 2(4), 211-221.

Lukpata, V. I., and Zhema, S. (2019). The Impact of Violent Conflicts on Food-Security in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State, Nigeria. International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research (IJPAMR), 5(3), 26 -27.

Lungu, C. T. (2020). Gambling among Nigerian Youths; Implications for Counselling. International Journal of Research and Scientific Innovation (IJRSI), 7(1).

Mustapha, S. A. & Enilolobo, O. S. (2019). Effects of Gambling on the Welfare of Nigerian Youths: A Case Study of Lagos State. Journal of Gambling Issues, (43).

Offor, U. I., et al. (2021). On-Line Gambling among Male Students of Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka: Causes, Consequences and Measures. Unizik Journal of Educational Research and Policy Studies, 7.

Olanrewaju, O. A., & Adewumi, A. O. (2019). The Impact of Sports Betting on the Nigerian Economy: A Review of Literature. International Journal of Contemporary Economics and Business Research, 12(4), 45-54.

Olaore, G. O., Adejare, B. O., & Udofia, E. E. (2021). The Nexus Between the Increasing Involvement of Youth in Betting Games and Unemployment: The Nigerian Perspective. Journal of Humanities and Applied Social Sciences, 3(3), 163-181.

Olowookere, D. (2023). A Comprehensive Guide to Understanding the Rise of Sports Betting in Nigeria. Business Post Nigeria.

Omanchi, S. A. & Okpamen, K. O. (2018). The Changing Patterns of Gambling in Benue State: The Case of Emerging Role of ICT (Information and Communications Technology) in Contemporary Makurdi Metropolis. International Journal of Communications Research, 5 (2). Omanchi, S. A. (2019). Changing Patterns of Market Centres in Idomaland of Central Nigeria, 1900 – 2000. Ph.D. Thesis, Department of History, Benue State University Makurdi.

Omanchi, S. A., & Ibrahim, S. U. (2017). The Role of Market Intermediaries in the Economy of Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State, Nigeria. Kwararafa University Journal of Management Sciences (KUJOMS), 3(1), 25 -37.

Oyedele, S. O., & Olagunju, O. A. (2019). The Impact of Sports Betting on the Socio-Economic Development of Nigeria.

International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 9(4), 13-20.

Pulse Mix. (2021). A History of iGaming in Nigeria. Retrieved from https://www.pulse.com.gh/authors/pulse-mix

Wuam, T. (2015). The Centrality of Markets and Economic Growth in Tivland after 1960. Social and Economic History of Northern Nigeria since 1500 AD. Makurdi: Aboki Publishers.

Yohanna Z. V., (2023). Oral Interview, Civil Servant, 55, Rafin Kada, August 2023. .

Zando M, (2023). Oral Interview, Trader, 43, Gidin Dorowa, August 2023.

AN ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT ZONES IN CONTEMPORARY NIGERIA: A TAPESTRY OF TENSIONS

EMMANUEL ZINGFA DANNAP
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, KWARARAFA UNIVERSITY, WUKARI, TARABA STATE, sarahzingfa12@gmail.com

SAMUEL ALEGWU OMANCHI
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, ADMIRALTY UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, IBUSA, DELLTA STATE, salegwu4all@yahoo.com

KEYWORDS
Nigeria, conflict zones, Boko Haram, farmer-herder clashes, resource conflicts, separatism, poverty, inequality, governance, peace building

ABSTRACT
Nigeria, a nation brimming with potential, grapples with a complex tapestry of conflicts woven across its vast territory. This analysis delves into the multifaceted web of contention, dissecting the primary zones of discord that impede the nation's progress. From the insurgency fueled by Boko Haram in the North-East to the farmer-herder clashes in the North-Central, resource conflicts in the Niger Delta, and separatist agitations echoing in the South-East, we examine the actors, causes, and impacts of these conflicts. For the purpose of this paper, a qualitative method of data collection has been adopted; materials were derived from secondary sources of data. Recognizing the interconnectedness of these issues and their root causes in poverty, inequality, and governance shortcomings, we advocate for a multi-pronged approach to peacebuilding, encompassing security measures, dialogue, grievance redress, development initiatives, and social cohesion efforts. By understanding the threads binding these conflicts, we can begin to untangle the tapestry and pave the way for a more peaceful and prosperous Nigeria.

Introduction

All human culture inevitably has conflicts at some point. Since society is made up of individuals with varying interests and ideals, conflicts arise everywhere in the world. The majority of cultures have conflicts when individuals in a sovereign state perceive opposing viewpoints or think their objectives cannot be met at the same time. Discontent, dissent, and controversy are therefore to be expected in situations where there is disparity in access to political power and natural resource control, for example. Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa, is a land overflowing with vibrant culture, diverse communities, and immense potential. Yet, this potential remains tragically unrealized due to a complex tapestry of conflicts that mar the nation's landscape. From the insurgency's grip in the North-East to the resource struggles in the South, these conflicts cast a long shadow, impeding development, disrupting lives, and exacting a heavy toll on the Nigerian people. This analysis aims to untangle the threads of this complex tapestry, examining the primary zones of conflict that grip contemporary Nigeria. We will delve

into the actors, causes, and impacts of these conflicts, recognizing their interconnectedness and root causes in poverty, inequality, and deficiencies in governance. By understanding the nature of these conflicts, we can begin to envision pathways towards a more peaceful and prosperous future for Nigeria.

This analysis acknowledges the vastness and complexity of the issue, focusing on the most prominent conflict zones. It is important to recognize that numerous other localized conflicts and tensions exist, each with their unique dynamics and contexts. This paper examines conflict zones in contemporary Nigeria: a tapestry of tensions. This work is divided into six sections. First, the paper starts with an introduction which is ongoing. Second, it is on conceptual underpinning. Third, it examines the various conflict zones in contemporary Nigeria, focusing on Boko Haram/ISWAP in the North-East, herders-farmers clashes in the North-Central, simmering pro-Biafra sentiments in the South-East, and militancy and resource control in the South-South zones of Nigeria. Fourth is the examination of the cross-cutting themes. Fifth, the paper examines the solutions and the road ahead. Sixth, focus on the way forward, summary, and conclusion.

Conceptualizing Conflict Zones

Conflict zone refers to war or political instability that disrupts essential services such as housing, transportation, communication, sanitation, water, and health care, which requires the response of people outside of the community affected.[31] This connotes that conflict zones are areas where armed conflict is actively occurring or is likely to occur. These zones can be war zones, civil unrest areas, or tense border regions. These areas are often dangerous and volatile, with high risks of violence, injury, and death. Essential services like healthcare, food, and water may be disrupted or unavailable.

Conflict zones are characterized by the presence of armed groups, such as government militaries, rebel groups, or militias. Violence is a high risk, including gunfire and bombings. The political and social situation is often unstable, leading to further violence. Essential services, such as healthcare, food, and water, may be disrupted or unavailable.[32] Conflict zones often lead to humanitarian crises, where people are displaced and lack basic necessities. Rape is more common in conflict zones. This is linked to the greater use of violence during wartime, the absence of a consistent criminal justice infrastructure, the disruption of informal protections from households and the community, the greater gender imbalance in decision-making in militarized zones, and the specific use of rape as a weapon of war.[33]

Conflict Zones in Contemporary Nigeria

Nigeria is a vast country with different peoples and cultures. Regrettably, Nigeria is confronted with numerous intricate and diverse conflict zones that have a substantial influence on its progress and steadiness. Nigeria has seen an increase in violent conflicts, particularly since the conclusion of the Cold War. Numerous violent disputes between individuals, groups, companies, and communities have broken out, causing great stress to the environment and causing suffering to the populace. The paper focuses on Boko Haram/ISWAP in the North-East, herders-farmers clashes in the North-Central, simmering pro-Biafra sentiments in the South-East, and militancy and resource control in the South-South Zones of Nigeria. Each of these four conflicts or geopolitical zones has a unique history and context of conflict:

1. Northeast: The Shadow of Insurgency: North East Nigeria, comprising six states:

[31] Prasad, A. N. & Prasad, P. L. Children in Conflict Zones, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27408226; Women in Conflict Zones: War, Genocide, Occupation, and Militarization, https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com

[32] Bharat H. D. & Balraj K. S. Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones: A Challenge for International Law? In Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 52, no. 7, February 18, 2017, pp. 15-18, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44166760; Conflict zones, https://www.icao.int/Security/SFP/Pages/Conflict-Zones.aspx; Women in Conflict Zones: War, Genocide, …

[33] Bharat H. D. & Balraj K. S. Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones: …; Women in Conflict Zones: War, Genocide, …

Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe, has been severely affected by conflict over the last decade. The conflict is primarily attributable to Boko Haram, a terrorist group responsible for human rights abuses across Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. Since 2009, Boko Haram has radicalized its members and triggered military operations, affecting nearly fifteen million people. Boko Haram and its splinter group, ISWAP, have been causing immense suffering and insecurity in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region for over a decade. The root causes of their conflict include poverty, lack of opportunity, governance deficiencies, religious extremism, resource scarcity, and historical grievances. Both groups have experienced internal divisions, shifting alliances, and evolving strategies.[34]

The conflict transcends borders, impacting neighboring countries like Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, necessitating regional cooperation for solutions. Media manipulation and propaganda are used by both groups to spread fear and recruit members. The humanitarian crisis is exacerbated by the ongoing conflict, causing millions to be displaced, face food insecurity, and suffer from limited access to healthcare. Challenges include countering violent extremism, strengthening governance with transparency, accountability, and inclusion; promoting interfaith dialogue; regional cooperation; and sustained humanitarian aid.[35]

Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are two extremist groups in Nigeria, driven by religious extremism, socioeconomic grievances, and historical tensions. Their actions fuel existing divides and exacerbate existing tensions, as they reject Western education. However, most Muslims condemn their actions, and extremism doesn't represent the religion as a whole. Internal divisions between Boko Haram and ISWAP are complex and constantly evolving, shaped by differing ideologies, strategies, and power struggles. The initial split occurred in 2016 when Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to ISIS, leading to ISWAP. Both groups face internal power struggles and leadership challenges, intensifying conflict in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, causing civilians to suffer from violence, displacement, and limited access to resources.[36] To effectively counter Boko Haram and ISWAP, a multi-pronged approach is needed, including addressing the root causes of conflict, promoting good governance, fostering dialogue and inclusion, and ensuring sustained humanitarian assistance. Regional cooperation and information sharing are also crucial for countering their activities. By addressing these challenges, we can work towards a more sustainable and inclusive future for Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region.

2. North Central: Herders-Farmers Clashes: North Central Nigeria consists of the states of Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, and Plateau, as well as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria, primarily in the North-Central region, have spread across the country, causing widespread loss of lives and property. The conflict is rooted in political, cultural, and ethno-religious beliefs, leading to aggressive encroachment and reprisal aggression between sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists. This has resulted in mutual hostility and reverse-violent attacks, highlighting the need for a more accurate understanding of the conflict.[37] The conflict involves farmers, herders, government authorities, violent groups, and criminal elements. Causes include competition for resources, historical grievances,

[34] Abul A., Emily C., & Heidi K. Poverty And Equity Global Practice: Conflict and Violence in Nigeria Results from the North East, North Central, and South South zones Preliminary Draft Report, 2018, https://documents1.worldbank.org; Kopelen, P. A. Nigeria: A Study into the Causes of Internal Conflict and Instability: A Monograph, 2013, https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org

[35] Abul A., Emily C., & Heidi K. Poverty And Equity Global Practice:…; Kopelen, P. A. Nigeria: A Study into the Causes of Internal Conflict …

[36] Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria Public Sector, in Review of Public Administration and Management Vol. 4, No. 8, December 2015, https://www.arabianjbmr.com; Kopelen, P. A. Nigeria: A Study into the Causes of Internal Conflict …; Olumba, E. E. The Politics of Eco-Violence: Why Is Conflict Escalating in Nigeria's Middle Belt? Terrorism and Political Violence, 36(2), 2022, 180–197. https://doi.org

[37] SPARC Causes of farmer–herder conflicts in Africa, 2023, https://sparc-knowledge.org; Abul A., Emily C., & Heidi K. Poverty and Equity Global Practice: …; Olumba, E. E. The Politics of Eco-Violence: …

poor governance, climate change, economic disparity, and political manipulation. The impact of these conflicts includes loss of life, displacement, food insecurity, economic losses, and psychological trauma. Thousands of civilians have been killed in clashes, with women and children disproportionately affected. Millions have been displaced due to violence, creating a humanitarian crisis. Food insecurity worsens due to disruptions to agricultural activities and markets. Economic losses result from the destruction of crops, livestock, and infrastructure[38].

The current status of the conflict is persistent, with increased military presence and ongoing efforts to engage communities in dialogue and find peaceful solutions. Humanitarian assistance and development initiatives aim to address root causes like poverty and resource scarcity.[39] To address the conflict, a multi-pronged approach is needed, including strengthening governance, promoting dialogue and reconciliation, investing in development, combating climate change, and collaborating between communities, governments, and civil society organizations. A sustainable peace requires collaboration between communities, governments, and civil society organizations. In conclusion, the ongoing conflict in Nigeria requires a multi-pronged approach that includes strengthening governance, promoting dialogue and reconciliation, investing in development, and combating climate change.

3. Niger Delta: Militancy and Resource Control: South-South Nigeria is made up of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers states. Militant groups in the oil-rich Delta region demand greater control over resources and environmental justice, resorting to sabotage and attacks on oil infrastructure. The Niger Delta, rich in oil reserves but deeply marred by poverty and environmental degradation, has been a hotbed of militancy and agitation for decades. The Niger Delta region in southern Nigeria is primarily affected by various groups, including militant groups, oil companies, the Nigerian government, local communities, and civil society organizations. These groups face various challenges such as unequal distribution of oil wealth, environmental degradation, lack of development, historical grievances, weak governance, violence and insecurity, environmental damage, health problems, economic disruption, and social and psychological stress. The current status of the region is marked by reduced militancy, but sporadic attacks and tensions persist.[40] Government initiatives have been implemented with mixed results, but addressing root causes like poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation remains a long-term challenge. Local and international organizations continue to advocate for peaceful solutions, environmental protection, and community development.[41] To achieve sustainable peace and prosperity in the Niger Delta, equitable resource sharing agreements are needed, environmental remediation should be implemented, sustainable development should address poverty, unemployment, and infrastructure gaps, transparent and accountable resource management and conflict resolution mechanisms should be strengthened and continuous dialogue and engagement between stakeholders should be maintained. In conclusion, the Niger Delta region faces numerous challenges, including unequal distribution of oil wealth, environmental degradation, lack of development, historical grievances, weak governance, violence and insecurity, and ongoing challenges. Addressing these issues requires equitable resource sharing, environmental remediation, sustainable development, transparent and accountable governance, and inclusive dialogue between stakeholders.

4. Southeast: Simmering Pro-Biafra Sentiments: Southeast Nigeria comprises five states: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo. Pro-Biafra agitation is driven by historical legacies of the civil war and marginalization, with

[38] Abul A., Emily C., & Heidi K. Poverty And Equity Global Practice:…; Kopelen, P. A. Nigeria: A Study into the Causes of Internal Conflict …; SPARC Causes of farmer–herder …

[39] Abul A., Emily C., & Heidi K. Poverty And Equity Global Practice:…; SPARC Causes of farmer–herder …

[40] Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …; Eghosa E. O. & Rotimi T. S. A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria, CRISE Working Paper No. 6 January 2005, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk

[41] Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …; Kopelen, P. A. Nigeria: A Study into the Causes of Internal Conflict…; Eghosa E. O. & Rotimi T. S. A History of Identities, Violence, and …

roots in economic inequality, perceived injustices, and regional autonomy. The Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) marked the secession attempt of Biafra, leaving deep scars of loss, marginalization, and unresolved grievances. Southeast communities feel underrepresented in politics and economics, fueling resentment towards the federal government. A strong sense of Igbo identity and cultural distinctiveness contribute to separatist aspirations. The war was fought between the Nigerian government and the secessionist state of Biafra, which was declared by the Igbo people of southeastern Nigeria. The war was a brutal affair, and it is estimated that up to 2 million people died, mostly from starvation and disease.[42]

After the war, the Igbo people were marginalized and discriminated against by the Nigerian government. This led to a resurgence of pro-Biafra sentiment in the region. In recent years, there have been a number of protests and demonstrations in support of Biafra. In 2015, the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Nnamdi Kanu, was arrested by the Nigerian government. Kanu is a controversial figure, and his arrest led to protests and violence in southeastern Nigeria. The Nigerian government has taken a hard line against pro-Biafra groups, and it has accused IPOB of being a terrorist organization. However, the group's supporters maintain that it is a peaceful movement that is fighting for the rights of the Igbo people.[43]

The root causes of the conflict include economic disparity, political exclusion, historical injustice, and youth unemployment. The movement's dynamics include non-violent protests and advocacy efforts that are used to raise awareness and demand greater autonomy or independence. Secessionist rhetoric often uses inflammatory language, and government repression can escalate tensions. Media narratives can polarize communities and exacerbate divisions. External influences, particularly among the diaspora, can contribute to the longevity of the movement. Challenges include addressing historical grievances, promoting inclusive governance, tackling economic disparity, fostering dialogue and understanding, and countering radicalization. Acknowledging and finding solutions to past injustices is crucial for healing and reconciliation. Investing in infrastructure, job creation, and development initiatives is key to alleviating economic frustrations. Open and inclusive dialogue between pro-Biafra groups, the government, and civil society is essential for finding peaceful solutions.[44] Sustainable peace and stability in the Southeast require a nuanced understanding of the historical context, addressing legitimate grievances, and fostering inclusive dialogue. Balancing national unity with respect for cultural identity and aspirations is crucial for a peaceful and prosperous future for the region and Nigeria as a whole.

Beyond the Zones: Cross-cutting Themes:

1. Poverty and Inequality: Rampant poverty fuels grievances and vulnerability to exploitation, fostering conditions for conflict across the nation. Poverty in Nigeria is a significant issue, with widespread discontent and limited opportunities fueling extremist narratives. Boko Haram exploits this vulnerability, attracting recruits from marginalized youth. Resource competition, exacerbated by climate change, leads to conflict and grievances, which Boko Haram manipulates to gain support. Inequality is another factor, with perceived unfairness in wealth distribution, political representation, and access to opportunities breeding resentment and

[42] Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments in Mali and Nigeria, Africa Growth Initiative Working Paper 17 July 2014, https://www.researchgate.net; Kopelen, P. A. Nigeria: A Study into the Causes of Internal Conflict …; Eghosa E. O. & Rotimi T. S. A History of Identities, Violence, and …

[43] Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …; Nwabuiro I. The Root Cause of Violence in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis, A Reference Point, OGIRISI: a New Journal of African Studies, Vol. 5, 2008, https://www.ajol.info/index.php; Afegbua I. A., Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria: Causes, Consequences and Prospects in Politics: Contemporary Political Issues and Updates, Wednesday, 3 December 2014, https://chrisdonasco.blogspot.com

[44] Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …; Nwabuiro I. The Root Cause of Violence in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis …; Afegbua I. A., Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria: …

exclusion.[45] Unequal treatment by authorities and elites erodes trust in institutions, creating a fertile ground for extremist ideologies. Social marginalization further deepens poverty. Poverty and inequality are interconnected, as they limit access to education, perpetuate inequalities in job opportunities and income, and further deepen poverty. Complexities exist, as historical grievances, ethnic tensions, and weak governance also play a role. The impact of poverty and inequality varies across different communities and individuals within Nigeria.[46] To address these challenges, a multifaceted approach is needed. Investing in education and skills development can empower individuals, promote inclusive economic growth, and strengthen governance and institutions. A long-term commitment from the Nigerian government, the international community, and civil society organizations is necessary to address the root causes of poverty and inequality alongside other contributing factors, ensuring effective conflict resolution and long-term peace.[47]

2. Weak Governance and Corruption: Ineffective institutions, lack of accountability, and corruption erode trust and hinder sustainable conflict resolution. Weak governance, characterized by a lack of legitimacy and trust, can lead to unrest and resentment among citizens. It can also result in an unequal distribution of resources and opportunities, exacerbating existing social and economic divisions. The lack of accountability and transparency in governance can breed cynicism and disenfranchisement, further eroding trust in institutions and potentially causing violence.[48] Corruption, on the other hand, can lead to the misallocation of resources, exacerbated poverty and inequality, and a power vacuum that armed groups or other actors may exploit. Corrupt officials may also overlook illegal activities, such as arms trafficking and drug smuggling, further destabilizing societies and fueling conflict.[49] The relationship between weak governance, corruption, and conflict is complex and multifaceted, with other factors like poverty, resource scarcity, and historical grievances also playing a role. The impact of these factors can vary depending on the specific context, and a sudden economic downturn in a country with weak governance and high levels of corruption could potentially trigger conflict.

3. Environmental Degradation: Resource scarcity, climate change, and environmental exploitation exacerbate tensions and displacement, contributing to conflict dynamics. Environmental degradation in northern Nigeria has led to land degradation, water scarcity, and oil pollution, causing conflicts and displacement among farmers and herders. This has resulted in reduced agricultural productivity, causing poverty, unemployment, and competition for resources. The loss of fertile land and livelihoods can also force people to migrate, putting pressure on resources and potentially causing conflicts with existing communities.[50] Environmental injustice can exacerbate existing social and economic inequalities, as communities near extractive industries often bear the brunt of pollution and environmental damage while reaping few benefits. This breeds resentment and fuels conflicts. Lack of government intervention can further erode trust and fuel grievances, potentially leading to protests and violence.[51]

[45] Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …; Nwabuiro I. The Root Cause of Violence in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis …

[46] Nwabuiro I. The Root Cause of Violence in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis …; Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …; Afegbua I. A., Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria: …; Olawale, O. A. Conflicts in Nigeria, https://www.researchgate.net

[47] Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …; Nwabuiro I. The Root Cause of Violence in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis …

[48] Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …; Nnamchi, K. C. An Overview of Ethnicity as a Leading Cause of Conflict in Nigeria, IDOSR Journal of Current Issues In Arts and Humanities, 7(1):167-171, 2021, https://www.idosr.org.; Olawale, O. A. Conflicts in Nigeria …

[49] Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …; Nnamchi, K. C. An Overview of Ethnicity as a Leading Cause …; Afegbua, I. A., Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria: …

[50] Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …; Nnamchi, K. C. An Overview of Ethnicity as a Leading Cause …

[51] Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …; Nnamchi, K. C. An Overview of

Examples include the Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria, where environmental degradation in the Lake Chad basin has exacerbated poverty and resource scarcity, creating grievances exploited by extremist groups. Herder-farmer clashes also result from competition for shrinking land and water resources.[52] Environmental degradation does not directly cause conflict, but it acts as a stress multiplier, amplifying existing social, economic, and political tensions. Addressing environmental challenges requires integrated solutions that combine sustainable resource management, equitable access to resources, and addressing underlying grievances.

4. Role of Religion and Ethnicity: While sources of strength, these aspects can also be manipulated to fuel tensions and identity-based conflicts. Conflicts often stem from political, economic, and social inequalities, rather than religious or ethnic differences. Politicians and leaders can manipulate religious or ethnic divisions to gain power, mobilize support, or scapegoat specific groups. Conflict rarely has a single cause, as religion and ethnicity often interact with other factors like resource scarcity, historical grievances, and weak governance.[53] Religion can promote intolerance and promote social divisions, while ethnicity can promote belonging but also foster prejudice and discrimination. Competition for resources can increase conflict when access to limited resources is divided along ethnic lines or when certain groups feel excluded. Historical grievances can create mistrust and resentment, fueling further violence.

Examples of conflicts involving ethnic or religious groups include the Rwandan genocide, religious conflicts in Northern Ireland, and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, religion and ethnicity can also be powerful tools for peace building, as religious leaders can promote reconciliation, and a shared sense of ethnic identity can foster unity.[54] Not all conflicts involving ethnic or religious groups are due to these factors, as material struggles and power dynamics often play a role in the violence.

Solutions and the Road Ahead

1. Promoting Dialogue and Reconciliation: Addressing historical grievances, fostering intercultural understanding, and seeking inclusive solutions are crucial steps towards lasting peace. Dialogue is a powerful tool for breaking down barriers, building trust, identifying shared interests, and humanizing the 'other'. It allows for open communication between conflicting parties, dispelling harmful stereotypes and reducing hostility. It also fosters empathy and reduces dehumanization by allowing individuals to see each other as human beings with complex stories and experiences.[55] Reconciliation mechanisms include truth-telling processes, restoration justice, intergroup contact initiatives, and cultural and educational initiatives. These initiatives promote cross-cultural understanding, challenge historical narratives, and embrace diversity. However, dialogue and reconciliation are complex processes that require time and effort, and there are no guarantees of success.[56]

Security and justice may be necessary for effective dialogue, and accountability for atrocities may be a precondition for genuine reconciliation. Inclusivity is crucial, as it represents all affected groups, including marginalized voices. Grassroots and leadership involvement is essential for fostering broad societal support for reconciliation.[57] Examples of successful dialogue include the

Ethnicity as a Leading Cause …; Olawale, O. A. Conflicts in Nigeria …

[52] Afegbua I. A., Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria: …; Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …

[53] Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …

[54] Nwabuiro I. The Root Cause of Violence in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis …; Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …

[55] Nwabuiro I. The Root Cause of Violence in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis …; Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …

[56] Afegbua I. A., Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria: ....; Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …

[57] Nnamchi K. C. An Overview of Ethnicity as a Leading Cause …; Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …; Nwabuiro I. The Root Cause of Violence in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis …

Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, peace and reconciliation dialogues in Northern Ireland, and community-level dialogue initiatives in conflict zones. These initiatives have played a significant role in addressing the legacy of apartheid, contributed to a decrease in violence, and facilitated local-level reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts.[58]

2. Investing in Human Development: Equitable access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunities fosters social mobility and reduces the appeal of violence. Nigeria's conflicts stem from root causes such as poverty, inequality, lack of education, unemployment, and marginalization. Investing in human development directly addresses these root causes by increasing economic empowerment, promoting social cohesion, offering opportunities and hope, and enhancing good governance.[59] Examples of human development initiatives include education programs, skills training and vocational programs, healthcare initiatives, and social inclusion programs. Education programs improve access and quality of education, especially in conflict-prone areas. Skills training and vocational programs provide individuals with marketable skills for sustainable livelihoods. Healthcare initiatives improve access to basic healthcare services, especially for vulnerable populations and marginalized areas.[60]

Promoting social inclusion involves creating programs that foster dialogue, understanding, and respect between different groups. However, sustainability and addressing corruption are crucial for long-term impact. Programs must reach all segments of society, particularly marginalized groups, to avoid exacerbating existing tensions.[61] In conclusion, investing in human development is a vital long-term strategy for Nigeria's complex conflicts. By empowering individuals, fostering social cohesion, and reducing violence drivers, human development can significantly contribute to lasting peace and stability.

3. Strengthening Institutions: Building trust in government, law enforcement, and the judiciary through effective reforms and fair practices is vital for sustainable peace. Weak institutions fuel conflict by failing to hold perpetrators accountable, fostering inequality, lacking trust, and allowing extremist groups to gain influence. Strong institutions address conflict through the rule of law, accountability, inclusivity, service delivery, and conflict resolution mechanisms.[62] Structuring institutions involves a judicial system, security forces, government agencies, and civil society organizations. An independent judiciary ensures fair trials and proper administration of justice. While government organizations offer necessary services and promote trust, security forces are skilled and competent. Civil society groups support peaceful cooperation and fight for rights.[63]

Important considerations for strengthening institutions include context matters, a holistic approach, and time and commitment. Strengthening institutions must be combined with other peacebuilding efforts, such as addressing economic inequality and promoting social cohesion. Building strong institutions requires time, sustained effort, and political will.[64] In conclusion, strengthening institutions is an essential pillar in creating conditions for lasting peace. By establishing the rule of law, accountability, inclusivity, and effective service delivery, strong institutions offer a framework

[58] Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …

[59] Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …; Nwabuiro I. The Root Cause of Violence in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis …

[60] Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …

[61] Afegbua I. A., Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria: …; El-Bushra, J. et al, From Design to Implementation: Addressing the Causes of Violent Conflict in Nigeria. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 1, 2013, pp. 1-18, DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.5334/sta.cy; Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …; Nwabuiro I. The Root Cause of Violence in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis …

[62] Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …; Nwabuiro I. The Root Cause of Violence in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis …; Afegbua I. A., Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria:…

[63] Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …

[64] Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …; El-Bushra, J. et al, From Design to Implementation: Addressing the Causes of Violent Conflict in Nigeria …

for peaceful conflict resolution and the prevention of future violence.

4. Empowering Local Communities: Supporting community-based conflict resolution initiatives and ensuring local participation in decision-making processes promotes ownership and stability. Local empowerment is a crucial aspect of sustainable peacebuilding in Nigeria. It involves understanding the root causes of conflict, empowering communities to identify and address these causes directly. Empowerment also fosters ownership of solutions, fostering trust and investment in the process. Traditional knowledge from local communities can be leveraged for effective, culturally appropriate solutions. Locally-led initiatives can identify early signs of escalating tensions, allowing for swift intervention and preventing larger-scale violence. Empowered communities are better equipped to manage future challenges and prevent recurring conflicts, creating long-term stability.[65] Forms of empowerment include economic support for local businesses, political inclusion and representation, social cohesion, and capacity building. Successful initiatives include peace committees, early warning systems, and community-led development projects. However, inclusion, sustainability, and external support are essential considerations.[66]

Inclusivity is crucial, as empowerment initiatives must include all stakeholders, particularly marginalized groups, to avoid exacerbating tensions. Support must be sustained to ensure long-term impact, and local initiatives often require support from national and international organizations for resource provision, technical expertise, and advocacy.[67] In conclusion, local empowerment is not a standalone solution to Nigeria's complex conflicts, but it is a crucial component of sustainable peacebuilding. By providing communities with the tools, resources, and agency to address their own challenges, a solid foundation is laid for lasting peace and stability.

Conclusion

The paper provides a framework for addressing the interconnected issues and factors fueling conflicts in Nigeria. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the main conflicts, identifying recurring root causes, and calling for action. It also highlights the need for policy suggestions, reconciliation, and dialogue between conflicting groups. Accountability is also emphasized, as is the need to hold those responsible for violence and human rights violations accountable. It concludes that Nigeria faces a cycle of violence and instability due to competition over scarce resources, unresolved historical grievances, political marginalization, and erosion of trust in state institutions. It calls for a multi-pronged approach, prioritizing resource management, addressing widespread inequality, inclusive governance structures, and meaningful reconciliation processes. Failure to act decisively risks plunging into a cycle of violence, causing devastating consequences for the people and regional stability. It also emphasizes the importance of sensitivity, aligning the conclusion with the primary argument of the analysis, and highlighting the complex challenges involved. It suggests that this can be tailored to suit the specific analysis and the central conflicts covered.

[65] Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …; Nwabuiro I. The Root Cause of Violence in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Crisis …; Afegbua I. A., Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria:…

[66] Mwangi, K. et al, The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments …; Nnamchi K. C. An Overview of Ethnicity as a Leading Cause …; Afegbua I. A., Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria:…

[67] Osabiya, B. J. Conflict Management and Resolution in Nigeria …; El-Bushra, J. et al, From Design to Implementation: Addressing the Causes of Violent Conflict in Nigeria …

THE TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNAL CRISIS IN AKOKO NORTH-EAST, ONDO STATE, NIGERIA

ADEBAJO ADEOLA ADERAYO, PhD
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, TAI SOLARIN UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, IJAGUN,
adebajoaa@tasued.edu.ng/adebajoade@gmai.com

SALAKO, SAMUEL ANUOLUWAPO
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, TAI SOLARIN UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, IJAGUN,
salakosamueltas@gmail.com

BELLO MORUF AYODELE, PhD
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY, ayobello@oauife.edu.ng

ADEKUNLE ESTHER, K.
COVENANT UNIVERSITY, OTA, kennyadekunle66@gmail.com

KEYWORDS
Communal crisis, conflict resolution, conflict mechanism, culture, traditional institutions

ABSTRACT
The study examined the efficacy of using the traditional institutions in managing communal crisis in Akoko North-East, Ondo State, Nigeria. Descriptive research design was adopted, both questionnaire and interview were used to obtain firsthand information. Communitarian theory was employed as a theoretical framework. It was discovered that land, chieftaincy disputes, religion and politicisation are factors causing communal crisis in Akoko North East, Ondo state. The negative effects of the conflict include economic disruption, human displacement and social divisions. Also, it was found that traditional institutions have authority over the affairs of the study area. It also discovered that the existence of two first-class kings, political manipulations, erosion of authority and lack of application of the ancient sacred rite in rural life have been the clog in effective managing of communal crisis in Akoko North-East, Ondo State. It recommended that existence of two first-class kings in same locality should be resolved, political interference should be curbed and traditional institutions should fall back to their ancient sacred rites to ensure their efficacy in managing communal conflicts.

Introduction

Globally, peace and development are interdependent pillars that determine a nation's trajectory of progress. However, nations around the world struggle with a variety of issues that interfere with peaceful living, which has resulted in indiscriminate killings, property destruction, and economic disorder. Azu (2018) identified that one of these issues is the communal crisis. Particularly, communal crisis is not just a phenomenon that affects developing nations; it is a global phenomenon that permeates all societies and frequently has devastating effects on communities, economies, and social cohesion. As a result, several governments have been forced to develop a variety of strategies and measures to halt its precarious effects on the economy (Blanchard, Dudouet & Vion, 2015). Communal disputes have been a persistent problem in Nigeria even before the advent of the Europeans (Umezulike & Ugochukwu, 2021), frequently leading to serious social, economic, and political upheavals. Specifically, in Nigeria, community clashes have been a worrisome and destructive scenario in this Fourth Republic and are occurring across all of the nation's geopolitical zones. Communal conflicts have led to losses of human lives and properties, constant emigrations and displacements, economic downturns, food insecurity among others (Chukwu, Utobo & Ufere, 2022; Lamidi, 2019).

Since independence, successive administrations have been concerned by the complexity of conflicts stemming from political, socio-economic, cultural, and historical reasons, such as the Biafra civil war, Niger Delta militancy, Boko Haram terrorism, farmer-herder conflicts among others (Adebajo & Adebajo, 2023, Eneji & Agri, 2020, Shuaibu, Salleh & Shehu, 2015). Although Nigerian governments have employed a variety of measures and strategies over the years, from diplomacy and negotiation to the deployment of security agents, to reduce and manage the various forms of conflicts, yet, they remain unabated (Udeoba & Eze, 2021). Most of the conflicts occur in rural locations where government visibility is weak and ineffective; where the strength of survival and defence on the part of the localities is at the lowest. Nigeria is known for having a wide variety of ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, which adds to the complexity of intercommunal disputes. Traditional institutions have historically been crucial in preserving social cohesiveness, keeping order, and settling conflicts since they are strongly ingrained in local communities (Ojo, 2016). The institutions like elders, councils and traditional rulers, have access to a plethora of indigenous knowledge and cultural practices can be used to manage violent conflicts. Due to their proximity and familiarity, traditional institutions enjoy legitimacy and trust among community members, which increases their effectiveness as dispute resolution techniques (Osaghae, 2007). Despite the fact that the Nigerian government set up institutional structures to handle conflicts, their effectiveness can be doubted especially in undefended communities (Hassan & Yusuf, 2020). As a result, traditional institutions have developed into separate dispute resolution systems that frequently function independently of governmental institutions (Salawu, 2019).

It is no gainsaying to assert that it is only in the space of peace and harmony, development and pristine habitual relationship can thrive. Thus, it is ideal that a nation as endowed with rich and quality cultural and ancestral background having reputable local individuals symbolizing as mini-gods and emblem of peace like Nigeria to enjoy peaceful cohabitation amongst her inhabitants (Onyima, 2016). Over the years, Nigeria has been confronted with local security issues affecting every facet of social life. As a matter of fact, communities across the six geo-political zones have experienced diverse religious and ethnic conflicts resulting in fatalities, forced evictions and destruction of property (*Premium Times*, 2023). Reflecting on the consequential effects of communal conflict in Nigeria, Falola, Mukaila and Adetipe (2023) opined that there is rising food insecurity, rural-urban migration, human displacement and refugee's crisis occasioned by the communal conflicts with reverbrating effects on national peace and security. In spite of the different measures deployed by successive governments to address communal conflicts over the years, they remain endemic with negative socio-economic consequences (Udeoba & Eze, 2021). This is due to the fact that the governments seems to have little or no access to the indigenous knowledge and cultural practices in addressing the conflict.Literature exist on potential advantages of incorporating traditional institutions into conflict management mechanisms all over the world, including Nigeria(Ikelegbe, 2002; Osaghae, 2007; Obioha,

2018; Salawu, 2019). However, the studies have only been conducted qualitatively and little attention paid to efficacy of using the traditional institutions in conflict management and the challenges confronting them. Hence, the study quantitatively evaluated the traditional institutions in managing communal crises in Akoko North-East, Ondo State, Nigeria.

Research Objectives

The central objective of the study was to examine the traditional institutions in managing communal crisis in Akoko North-East, Ondo State. The specific objectives of the study were to:

1. Describe the traditional institutions used in managing communal crisis in Akoko North-East, Ondo State;
2. Investigate the potentials benefits of using traditional institutions in managing communal crisis in Akoko North-East, Ondo State; and
3. Interrogate the challenges hindering the traditional institutions in managing communal crises in Akoko North-East Ondo State.

Research Questions

1. Which traditional institutions existed in Akoko North-East, Ondo State?
2. What are the potentials of using traditional institutions in managing communal crisis in Akoko North-East, Ondo State?
3. What are the challenges affecting effective use of traditional institutions in managing communal crises in Akoko North-East, Ondo State?

Theoretical Framework

Communitarian Theory

The communitarian theory is used as explanatory framework. The major proponents of the theory include Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), Charles Taylor (1985), Micheal Sandel (1982), Amitai Etzioni (1993). The theory argues that the community is an organised structure with mosaic of values, norms and customs generally accepted by the members to guide and regulate their activities. The theory advocates the principle of community decision-making processes, social solidarity, a sense of shared responsibility and a balance between individual rights and social responsibilities capable of fostering communal peace and harmony in the localities. Communitarianism is rooted in the idea that communities and shared values are foundational to societal well-being, which is pertinent to understanding how traditional institutions contribute to conflict resolution. Communitarianitarian theory has been criticised for disregarding individual rights in favour of group interest. Also, the nature of the conflict, the flexibility of traditional practices and the degree of participation in community decision-making processes can all affect how effective traditional institutions are at managing conflicts.

In Nigeria, traditional institutions are deeply entrenched in the local communities. As social structures of ethnic, religious or regional affiliations, traditional institutions serve as custodians of communal norms and shared principles (Ojo-Ebenezer, 2023). Since pre-colonial era, the Emirs, Obas, Obis, Baales, family heads, the Umuadas, chiefs, the village tribunals, council of leaders, age grades or youth leaders serve as administrative officers, mediators, facilitators, negotiators and peacemakers in the regions of Nigeria (Akpabio, 2022; Nwazie, 1991). They are respected individuals and bodies seen as a special symbol with rich knowledge of culture and values of the society. They often adopt community participation and consensus-building in conflict resolution efforts. Leaders occupying the traditioal institutions possess a wealth of local knowledge and wisdom, facilitate discussions that seek communal solution to conflicts.In managing conflicts, the traditional institutions encourage dialogue including diverse community members, ensuring that multiple perspectives are considered. They are deeply connected to the cultural nuances of their communities, draw on this knowledge to address conflicts in ways that are culturally resonant (Akpabio, 2022; Ojo-Ebenezer, 2023). They navigate disputes while respecting the historical and cultural context within which conflicts arise. By acting as mediators, they ensure that individual grievances are addressed within the framework of communal well-being, thereby contributing to sustainable conflict resolution.

The Concept of Traditional Institution

The traditional institution is not limited to the lexicon of African societies alone, it has also gained cognisance in various societies of the world, and till date, have co-existed with modern governing structures both in developing and developed nations across the globe. In Europe, particularly in England, traditional institutions could be regarded as the monarch (kings and royal chiefs, dukes etc.), also in African societies, particularly in Nigeria, they are regarded as the emirs, obas, council of elders, chiefs and Baale, etc. These institutions widely recognized for their majestic nature and cultural ambiances. Globally, the hallmark of traditional institutions is in governance, cultural preservation and conflict resolution. The review of extant literature reveals that they are repositories of cultural practices, rituals, and symbols that define a community's distinct identity, providing frameworks for leadership, authority, and decision-making within communities. Therefore, in the words of Beall and Ngonyama (2009 as cited in Oladapo, 2022), traditional institutions are the formal and informal rules, norms, and values that humans created and have the authority to impose. They also have the capacity to make choices based on these rules and values.

Traditional institutions are the heritage of customary laws, leadership roles, and communal practices that guide decision-making and conflict resolution within local communities. The fundamental purpose of institutions is to protect the customs and traditions of the populace and to use the laws and conventions of the populace as a tool to resolve disputes that may arise within or between groups of people (Akpabio, 2022). That is, traditional rulers, councils of elders, and other local authorities often wield influence over matters ranging from conflict resolution to resource allocation (Ibeanu, 2008). In agreement, traditional institutions to Obioha (2018) encompass the ancestral practices, leadership structures, and customary laws that regulate social relationships, dispute resolution, and governance within indigenous groups. These institutions contribute to the maintenance of social order, justice, and harmony by upholding established norms and resolving disputes through consensus-based mechanisms (Mboh, 2021). They often serve as bridges between conflicting parties, employing indigenous methods of restorative justice that focus on healing and reintegration (Onuoha, 2017). To Eberbach, et al. (2017) and Ikelegbe (2004), traditional institutions are the organic expressions of community values, norms, and practices that serve as platforms for authority, social integration, and cultural preservation.

In most instances, people are selected for positions in traditional institutions either by election or selection using appropriate traditional means, or through heredity. The institutions are responsible for carrying out legislative, executive, and judicial duties in their local capacities. That is, they create laws, implement, interpret and apply the basic laws, societal norms, and customs to ensure the smooth operation of their communities (Obioha, 2018; Nweke, 2012). By doing this, disputes are often handled and settled in accordance with the local traditions and customs. Thus, to this paper, traditional institutions are cultural organisations that hold significant control over the customs and traditions preserved by the people of Nigeria in managing their daily lives and they operate in various areas across the nation.

The concept of Communal Crisis

Community crisis is a complex situation marked by tensions, disputes, and fights inside or across communities. It frequently results in violence,instability, and disruption of social order. Communal crises are seen to be the outcome of complex social interactions, including issues of control, participation, production and consumption within a society (Alozie, 2019). From the perspective of Omitola, et al. (2023), communal crisis is described as disputes and tensions that develop within or across communities, frequently accompanied by animosity and violence, and which endanger social cohesion and disturb routine. Okoli and Nnabuihe (2019) conceived communal crisis as clashes with low vehemence and local arms between or among several groups of people connected via links to their original land. It is most prevalent in rural communities where caste, religion, ethnicity, and clan are used as narrow distinctions between groups.

Nnoli (2008) conceptualises community crisis as disagreement that arises between different ethnic, religious, or social groups located in the same area and frequently result in violence and instability. This type of crisis can take many different forms, from small-scale conflicts over territory or resources to larger ones that endanger the stability of a whole country or region. Violent outbursts centered on racial,

religious, socioeconomic, or political fault lines are hallmarks of communal crises. Conflicts between groups with similar identities or who live in the same region are also frequent features of communal crisis (Varshney, 2002). Communal crisis can result from socio-economic inequities, competition over resources, political manipulation, identity problem or historical grievances (Okpa, Ajah, Eze & Enweonwu, 2023; Osadola, Olofinsao & Ajisafe, 2021). In addition, interpersonal impulses and underlying social issues can function as catalysts for animosity and violence between different groups. The triggers might be violent acts, uncomfortable circumstances, or perceived injustices (Oravee, 2015).

It is imperative to mention that community identity and social cohesion are significantly impacted by communal disasters. They damage relationships between groups and destroy trust, fostering animosity and dread (Falola, Mukaila & Adetipe, 2023). By implication, conflicts that divide communities frequently strengthen group identities and develop "us vs. them" mentalities that can last long after the crisis has passed. In Nigeria, disputes and confrontations between various communal groupings are marked by underlying tensions and animosity leading to casualties, destruction and heightened tension. Communal crisis challenges governance structures and development efforts within societies because they strain state institutions, hinder service delivery, and undermine efforts to promote stability and progress (Popoola, Olawale & Mufutau, 2020: Kughur, Daudu & Iornenege, 2017). These disruptions caused by communal crisis can have lasting socio-economic consequences, perpetuating cycles of poverty and underdevelopment.

Multifarious causes of Communal Crisis in Nigeria

Communal crisis have been a recurring social phenomenon in Nigeria. Okoli and Ukwandu (2022) asserted that communal conflicts have been recurring despite the level of social, political and economic development in Nigeria. Communal conflicts became worrisome after the end of the Nigerian Civil War as several communities have persistently been at loggerheads either over lands, market sites, local government administrative offices, police stations, or inclusion in a state or local government area. Also, communal clashes have been recorded in many rural areas inspired by sheer hatred for others cultural practices.

Existing literature have identified the drivers of communal conflicts in Nigeria in varying degrees of significance (Okoli & Ukwandu, 2022; Okoli & Ogayi, 2018; Okoli & Lenshie, 2018; Oravee 2015; Alimba, 2014). The studies of Okoli and Ukwandu, (2022) and Alimba (2014) identified with issues relating to cultural, economic, political, and socio-ecological factors as causes of conflicts. Ethno-identity disputes has been linked to communal conflict to aggressive resource competition. This suggests that fights between communities over power, ownership, or access to political or economic resources serve as the basis for community conflict. Oravee (2015) expounded further that land related issues especially farmland disputes as substantial and crucial driver of communal conflicts in Nigeria. Clashes over lands are seen not only in light of veritable economic resources but also could be driven by genuine or misguided political or cultural issues (Ayokhai, 2013; Okoli & Atelhe, 2014). For intance, the Aguleri-Umuleri-Umuoba Anam crisis in Anambra State was driven by issues of land ownership. Scholars such as Adeyote and Omilusi (2015) Uzuegbunam and Nwobia (2014), Okoli and Uhembe (2014) also identified identity-based, livelihood-related, and partisan political factors as drivers of communal conflicts in Nigeria. They believed that communal conflicts may result from a combination of cultural differences, access to resources or possibilities for employment, and problems with political representation. These elements have frequently reinforced one another in the majority of community conflict cases in Nigeria, leading to disastrous consequences. Citing the Sagamu conflict in the late 1990s between the Yoruba and the settler-Hausa groups and Ife-Modakeke crisis as instances, they held that prejudices and ethno-cultural disparities have contributed terribly to communal conflict in Nigeria, exacerbating ethno-cultural stereotypes (Asiyanbola 2007). Contemporary trails of communal conflicts in Nigeria are influenced by elite manipulation and politicisation; the political class alongside their religious counterparts have taken advantage of religion and ethnicity as tools for bargaining and mobilisation for patronages in the sharing of national resources (Adeyote & Omilusi, 2015; Okoli & Uhembe (2014).

Hassan and Yusuf (2020) contended that the political elites' desperation and opportunistic

desire for political dominance has frequently fueled communal conflicts. In order to garner support during elections, Nigerian political actors have a history of exacerbating ethnic and religious tensions, which has resulted in violent outbursts. This was true in the instance of Nasarawa State's Ombatse conflict, Wukari crises in Taraba State which explains why communal conflict in modern-day Nigeria seems unsolvable as government appears to be unable to handle the issues of communal and ethnic conflicts because they are only being managed rather than resolved (Alozieuwa, 2016; Nwagwu 2016; Nwanebo, Odigbo, & Ochanna, 2014). The study of Okoli and Nnabuihe (2019) explored the sources, fault-lines, and associated catalysts of occurrence of communal conflict in Nigeria as its drivers. Sources are the underlying causes of communal conflict which could be chieftaincy related issues, boundary, and land conflicts. Fault-lines appear to be the opportunistic socio-cultural and political factors such as cultural prejudices, identity politics, religion and ethnicity and associated catalysts include various socio-ecological, demographic, socio-economic and governance challenges. For instance, the effects of urbanisation and population growth, climate change and governance-related problems such as socioeconomic crises exacerbate communal conflicts (Schuab, 2014; Asiyanbola, 2007; Blench & Dendo, 2005). Ogundiya (2017) claimed that communal conflicts in Nigeria have frequently been constructed along the dividing lines of native (indigene)-settler, Christian-Muslim, farmer-herder, and inter-clannish closures, in keeping with the current socio-cultural and political fault-lines. Given all of these, it is clear that communal crises are complicated phenomena that are influenced by a range of historical, political, economic and social aspects. The root causes of these crises are interconnected on a global scale, reflecting the complex character of human society.

Negative effects of Communal Conflicts in Nigeria

Communal conflicts have left indelible marks on societies worldwide, causing profound social, economic, and psychological consequences. Communal conflicts have long been a significant challenge in Nigeria, exacerbating social tensions, undermining peace and stability, and hindering socio-economic development. The far-reaching consequences and implications of communal conflict for the country's structure include the following. One of the effects of communal conflict is economic disruption and development setbacks**.** Due to infrastructure damage, business closures, and disruptions to agricultural activity, communal crises frequently cause considerable economic disruptions (Okoli & Nsemba, 2018). Recurrent conflicts between farmers and herders in Nigeria's Plateau State have resulted in the abandoning of productive fields, which has a detrimental effect on agricultural production and food security (Nwagwu, 2016). Also, in the works of Akindele and Olanrewaju (2019), it was discovered that communal conflicts disrupt agricultural production, trade, and commerce, leading to loss of livelihoods, food insecurity, and economic stagnation. Insecurity resulting from communal conflicts deters domestic and foreign investment, constraining economic growth and development (Olaniyan, 2014). Vital infrastructure such as roads, schools, health facilities, and markets are often destroyed during conflicts, impeding access to essential services and hindering development (Ibrahim & Adebisi, 2018).

Communal crisis also causes displacement and forced migration**.** Mass displacement is frequently brought on by racial or ethnic conflicts since populations are compelled to evacuate their homes to avoid the violence (United Nations High Commission on Refugees,UNHCR, 2020). For example, the current conflict between farmers and herders in Nigeria's Benue State has resulted in thousands of people being displaced, escalating humanitarian issues (Brimah, 2018). Individuals and communities affected by communal conflicts suffer from psychological trauma, including anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Adeyemi & Ogunyemi, 2016). Also, communal crises also lead to social divisions and trust erosion. Conflicts within communities exacerbate already-existing social divisions and undermine trust between various racial or religious groups (Varshney, 2002). Deep-seated divides between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs still exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the 1992–1995 conflict (Dzankic & Hulusic, 2015). Inter-group connections and societal cohesiveness in Nigeria have been hampered by community disputes (Onuoha, 2017). Prolonged conflicts erode social cohesion and trust within communities, undermining traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution and fostering a culture of violence (Onuoha, 2012).

Human rights violations and trauma are also one of the effects of communal crisis**.** Communal clashes frequently result in serious human rights violations, such as torture, deaths, sexual assault, and displacement and strain the capacity of security forces, exacerbating inter-communal tensions and contributing to human rights abuses and extrajudicial killings (Amnesty International, 2020). Numerous crimes against civilians were committed during the Sudanese conflict in Darfur, leaving long-lasting trauma and emotional scars (Mayer et al., 2017). Similar to cases of violence during communal conflicts, survivors in Nigeria have experienced trauma and emotional distress (Adebayo & Olaleye, 2014). Furthermore, institutional weakness and governance challenges are aftermath of communal crisis**.** Ineffective service delivery and development can be hampered by communal crisis, which can weaken state institutions and erode governance systems (Stewart & Fitzgerald, 2018). The government of Iraq has struggled to maintain law and order and deliver basic services as a result of years of fighting (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami, 2019). Long-running conflicts in Nigeria have made it difficult for the government to handle and respond to new problems (Hassan & Yusuf, 2020). By and large, communal conflicts have broad-reaching, multifaceted repercussions on civilizations that affect them on the psychological, social, and economic levels. Due to these conflicts, communities around the world have had to deal with weakened governance institutions, human rights breaches, trust erosion, and economic setbacks. Communal disputes have real-world effects in Nigeria, scarring people and communities, impeding efforts to grow, and jeopardizing the country's unity.

The Imperative of Traditional Institutions in Solving Communal Crises in Nigeria

Nigeria has experienced numerous communal crises due to its complex socio-political landscape. These crises often arise from ethnic, religious, and economic differences. The Nigerian government and various stakeholders employ a range of mechanisms to address and resolve the conflicts. This involves mediation and dialogue, security interventions, legal framework or adjudication, arbitration, peacebuilding committee and grassroots initiatives. The mechanisms are explained as follows in line with the locations where they have been utilized in Nigeria's geopolitical zones justifying the imperative of traditional institutions (religious leaders, traditional rulers and youth organisations).

Mediation and dialogue are critical traditional conflict management mechanisms used in bringing conflicting parties together to discuss their differences and find common ground (Uhunmwuangho & Epelle, 2011). The government, religious leaders, and traditional rulers often play key roles in facilitating discussions. For instance, in resolving the Jos crisis in Plateau state, the ethno-religious conflicts between the predominantly Christian Berom and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani communities. Over the years, the Nigerian government-initiated dialogue sessions involving community leaders, religious heads and youth representatives, aimed at fostering understanding and promoting peaceful coexistence between the groups (Garkuwa, 2023).

The deployment of security forces, the military and police, is a common mechanism to quell violent outbreaks and restore order. This approach is often criticised for being reactive rather than preventive. Specifically in the Niger Delta plagued by incessant violence due to the exploitation of oil resources and environmental degradation. Over the years, the Nigerian government has deployed military forces to the area to combat militant groups and protect oil installations. The kinetic approach imposed negative peace characterised by human rights violations (Nwogwugwu, Alao & Egwuonwu, 2012).

Nigeria has established legal and institutional frameworks to address communal conflicts. The constitution guarantees the rights of all citizens, and various laws have been enacted to protect minority rights and promote justice. Institutions such as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the judiciary play critical roles in investigating abuses and ensuring accountability in Nigeria. For instance, Benue and Taraba states have witnessed violent clashes between farmers and herders over land use. The government's response includes enforcing existing land use laws, deploying security forces, and supporting peace-building initiatives through legal channels (Lucas. et al., 2024). However, the Nigerian Human Rights Commission has been involved in investigating human rights violations and recommending measures to prevent future conflicts. Although, the recommended measures are partly implemented or not all.

Peacebuilding committees are established at various levels (local, state, and federal) to prevent and manage conflicts. The committees comprise representatives from different ethnic and religious groups, government officials, and security agencies. Their mandate includes conflict prevention, mediation, and monitoring of peace agreements. For instance, Kaduna state has experienced significant ethno-religious violence, particularly between the Christian-dominated Southern Kaduna and the Muslim-dominated Northern Kaduna. The Kaduna Peace Committee, consisting of religious leaders, traditional rulers and civil society organizations, played significant roles in mediating disputes and fostering dialogue between the communities (Best, 2007). As can be gleaned from the aforegoing, the strategies in one way or the other made use of the native authorities, village heads or elders and youths in resolving conflicts. This underscores the efficacy of adopting traditional institutions, that is, grassroots initiatives in solving issues peculiar to the society. Traditional institutions possess adequate knowledge of indigenous dynamics to mobilise communities for peace-building activities (Ojo-Ebenezer, 2023).

Research Methods

The study adopted descriptive survey research design in order to get firsthand information from the target area. The Local Government comprised of 16 towns namely Ikare Akoko (headquarters), Okela, Okegbe Okorun, Eshe, Odo, Ilepa, Okoja, Iku, Odeyare, Odoruwa, Okeruwa, Iyame, Igbede, Oyinmo, Ishakunmi and Ekan. Ikare Akoko was chosen as the target area for the study due to prevailing communal crisis in the area. The study covered the Akoko North-East Local Government Area of Ondo State. According to United Nations World Population Prospects (2023), the estimated population of Ikare Akoko is 199,019. The population is made up of people of various ages (youth, and adult), sex (male and female), occupation, ethnic, and educational backgrounds. The primary data were collected using questionnaire and interview methods. 384 copies of questionnaire were administered randomly and five participants who gave consent were purposively selected and interviewed. Purposive sampling technique was used to select individuals who had in-depth knowledge of the traditional institutions in the area of the study. The secondary sources used included academic journals, reports, books, magazines and online articles. The sample size for the quantitative data was determined using Miller and Dillman (2011) formula. The formula was adopted because it shows sample size is inversely proportional to the square of margin error and accurate for calculating sample size based on specific population as it is in this location. Sample size obtained was 383.88. Approximately, the sample size was 384. The quantitative data was analysed using simple percentage while the qualitative data was coded, transcribed and thematically analysed.

Data Presentation and Analysis

Table 1. The traditional institutions used in managing communal crisis in Akoko North East Local Government Area, Ondo state

S/N	Research Items	SA	A	D	SD
1.	Traditional rulers such as kings exist in Akoko North-East L.G.A, Ondo State just as in other areas of Nigeria.	299 85.6%	50 14.4%	0 0%	0 %
2.	Council of chiefs and elders are well-recognised in localities in Akoko North-East L.G.A in Ondo State.	310 88.8%	39 11.2%	0 0%	0 0%

3.	Family heads are traditional institutions in Akoko North-East L.G.A., Ondo State.	320 91.7%	29 8.3%	0 0%	0 0%
4.	Age-grade system exists in Akoko North-East L.G.A in Ondo State.	115 32.9%	161 46.1%	25 7.2%	48 13.8%
5.	Traditional religious heads are prominent institutions in Akoko North-East L.G.A, Ondo State.	280 80.2%	40 11.5%	18 5.2%	11 3.1%

Source: Field survey, 2023

In table 1, all(100%) the respondents believed that traditional rulers such as king(s) who govern in the society exist in the location of the study. 100% thought that there are well-recognised council of chiefs and elders in area. All the respondents thought that family heads are parts of traditional institutions in Akoko North East. Meanwhile, All 79% thought that age grade exists in Akoko North East and 21% had a contrary idea. 91.7% agreed, while 8.3% disagreed that traditional religious heads are a prominent institution in Akoko North-East L.G.A, Ondo State. In communities in Nigeria, through traditional institutions having different individuals like kings, chiefs, elders, family heads, age grade and traditional heads are found in Akoko North East.

From the interviews, it was revealed that in Ikare-Akoko that there exists two First-class or Grade A monarch, namely the Olukare of Ikare kingdom, HIM. Oba Akadri Saliu Momoh IV and Owa Ale of Ikare, Oba Adeleke Adegbite-Adedoyin II. Also, they attested to the fact that there is long list of council of chiefs at both sides of the two monarchs who advise and assist the kings. At the town level, there exists council of elders(*Erigbo)* who settles minor disputes in the locality, while at every quarter of the town, there are age grades called *regberegbe* . in addition, there youths who are organised and coordinated by youth leaders(*Olori Odo),* who sees to the affairs of the youths. The traditional religious heads (Onimale) also exist and perform traditional religious rites in the communities.

Table 2. Potentials of adopting traditional institutions in managing communal crisis in Akoko North-East Local Government Area

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD
1	Through mediation, peacemaking and customary rules, traditional institutions have the necessary tools to resolve disputes and maintain harmony in Akoko North-East L.G.A in Ondo State.	214 61.3%	72 20.6%	40 11.5%	23 6.6%
2	The council of chiefs and elders can foster social cohesion by creating forum to address recurring conflicts due to	222 63.6%	80 22.9%	29 8.3%	18 5.2%

	their proximity with the locales in Akoko North-East L.G.A., Ondo State.				
3	The kings, council of chiefs and elders, through the knowledge of the customs and familiarity with the community can bridge divides and facilitate dialogue to identify andaddress the remote causes of conflicts in Akoko North-East L.G.A in Ondo State.	276 79.1%	62 17.7%	10 2.9%	1 0.3
4.	The king and his councils through their position of cultural authority and divine figure resolve issues that can erupt into state-crisis in Akoko North-East L.G.A in Ondo State.	198 56.7%	56 16.1%	50 14.3	45 12.9
5	Through the belief and sacredness of the traditional religion, the religious heads can also contribute to dispute resolution in Akoko North-East L.G.A in Ondo State.	202 57.9%	88 25.2%	32 9.2%	27 7.7%

Source: Field survey: 2023

In table 2, 82% believed that traditional institutions through mediation, peacemaking and customary rules resolve disputes and maintain harmony in Akoko North East L.G.A in Ondo while 18% objected. 87% thought that council of elders and chiefs can foster social cohesion by creating forum to address recurring conflicts due to their proximity with the locales while 13% thought otherwise. 97% felt k council of chiefs and elders can bridge divides and facilitate dialogue to resolve conflicts in Akoko North-East L.G.A in Ondo State. 79% felt that traditional institutions can through their position of cultural authority and divine figure facilitate dialogue to resolve that can erupt into state-crisis. 83% perceived that the religious heads based on sacredness of religious rites contribute to dispute resolution in Akoko North-East L.G.A in Ondo State while 17% did not perceive so.

The interviewees revealed that communal disputes of great dimension are mostly resolved by the king and council of chiefs of Akoko prior to the kingship rivalry in the area. However, it was found out that minor disputes on land ownership, rents, marriages, etc. among inhabitants are solved by Council of Elders (Erigbo). While the religious heads solve issues relating to spirituality. In short, the interviewees ascertained that organised traditional institutions have and will always be a strong tool to manage communal crisis in the area of study. Gleaning from the data presented, the traditionnal institutions play critical roles in managing crisis that can result to violence engulfing the state. They have been engaging in managing issues on land ownership, rents, religion, marriage, etc,.

Table 3. Challenges hindering effective management of communal crises by the traditional institutions in Akoko North-East Local Government Area

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD
1.	Political manipulation by elites seeking to exploit communal divisions for their own gain is a challenge facing traditional institutions in Akoko North-East L.G.A., Ondo State is	283 81.1%	30 8.6%	21 6.0%	15 4.3%
2.	Historical crisis of succession among the traditional institution poses a challenge to curbing communal crisis in the area in Akoko North-East L.G.A., Ondo State	303 86.8%	30 8.6%	12 3.4%	4 1.2%
3.	Erosion of authority of traditional institutions due to changing societal values affects them in managing communal crisis in Akoko North-East L.G.A., Ondo State.	227 65.0%	71 20.3%	32 9.3%	19 5.4%
4.	Absence of a comprehensive legal backing for traditional governance and conflict resolution limits the capacity of traditional institutions to address complex communal crises effectively in Akoko North-East L.G.A., Ondo State.	68 19.5	52 14.8%	25 7.2%	204 58.5%
5.	Lack of application of the ancient sacred rites by traditional institutions due to negative effects of money and modernity affects management of conflict in Akoko North-East L.G.A., Ondo State face challenges in reducing conflict due to	262 75.1%	68 19.5%	12 3.4%	7 2.0%

Source: Researcher's Field Work, 2023

In table 3, it was revealed that 90% believed that political manipulation by elites seeking to exploit communal divisions for their own gains is a problem facing traditional institutions in the location of the study while 10% believed otherwise. it can be deduced that traditional institutions face challenges in carrying out their role of managing communal conflicts in Akoko North-East L.G.A., Ondo State. 95% perceived that historical successional crisis among the traditional institutions in Akoko North-East L.G.A., Ondo State poses a problem to curbing communal crisis in the area while 5% thought contrarily. 85 % agreed and 15% disagreed that erosion of traditional institutions' authority and legitimacy due to changing social values constitutes a barrier to traditional institutions in managing communal crisis in the study area. Meanwhile, 34% agreed and 66% disagreed that the absence of a comprehensive legal backing for traditional governance limits the capacity of traditional institutions to address complex communal crises effectively in the area. Lastly, 95% believed lack of application of the ancient sacred rites in their activities owing to the negative impact of money and modernity affects traditional institutions in reducing conflict.

In affirmation with the above, the participants advanced that the current communal crisis in Akoko North-East L.G.A., Ondo State is as a result of interference and manipulation by political elites in the traditional organisation of the town. It was identified that the deceased former governor of Ondo State, Oluwarotimi Akeredolu, in kickback against the Olukare of Ikare's lack of support to his political campaign, rewarded the Owa Ale of Ikare by upgrading him to a first-class king, leading a faction degenerating into different crisis the town faces. Also, Akoko has had a long history of crisis within its communities, due to successional or right to kingship crisis since the colonial period which has not been resolved till date. It was remarked that long ago in history, at the demise of Olukare, Owa Ale being the right-hand man to the king was given the charge to make decisions in assistance to the regent (a female heir). Subsequently, the then Owa Ale declared himself king, and thus, the position of kingship title amongst his descendants continues till date. However, the crisis was aggravated due to the upgrade of the seat of Owa Ale as first-class king.

Gleaning from the interviews, the traditional institutions did not fully lose their authority as perceived. However, due to modernity and change in social values, traditional institutions' authority is eroded. They also remarked that, due to the unabated and irreconcilable factions in the town, the civilized inhabitants give little or no reverence to the activities of the monarch, however, the sacred rites known as "*Oro*" and sacrifices are followed and the timings and prohibitions given by the monarchs. Also, the Erigbo's and council of chiefs' decisions to resolve disputes are followed by the parties to the conflict as they still reverence them. More so, the participants ascertained that traditional institutions in Akoko have no challenge of legal backing, that it is the institutions' inclusion in politics that led to their vulnerability and reasons for more conflicts in the region. They also validated that the non-application of the ancient sacred rite in carrying out various activities due to the influence of money from political elites and modernity pose a challenge to traditional institutions in curbing conflict, as people see those who should be sacred as corrupt \.

Discussion of Findings

On the first objective, the findings of the paper disclosed that there are traditional institutions in Ikare-Akoko as there are in other geo-political zones of Nigeria. As found out, there are two First Class monarchs, the Olukare of Ikare and Owa Ale of Ikare, having each a long list of chiefs regarded as council of chiefs. There also exists council of elders known as "*Erigbo*" who settles minor disputes, with age-grades and traditional religious heads inclusive in the institution. This confirms Okeowo (2023) assertion that just like every other local government area in Ondo State, Ikare-Akoko has two contending and rivalry kings that have continued to clash over supremacy in the community, and the kings have a long historical antecedents that predates colonial periods and have a strong influence on the lives of the people of the community. Also, the finding is in consonance with the view of Mustapha and Hadiza (2019), who observed that traditional institutions exist in all ethnic groups in Nigeria, despite variations in their capabilities and modes of operation. These institutions have contributed to Nigeria's history and were crucial to the administrative process prior to, during, and after colonial governments.

On the second objective, the findings also showed that traditional institutions have great potentials in managing communal conflicts in Ikare Akoko. The traditional institutions,

especially the council of chiefs and elders play great role in settling disputes that may degenerate into violent conflict. Adebile (2023) contended that the elders (Agba) are the key actors in managing and resolving conflict in Ikare-Akoko and other communities in Ondo state. He furthered that the communities in Ondo State have a renowned quasi three tier government like configuration with the king as the supreme authority in the community supported by his chiefs who deliberate on issues surrounding the posterity of the community. The Agbas are summoned by the king and his chiefs to help out with certain matters since they are believed to be wiser, possess immense knowledge about the community and more experienced by virtue of age (Adebile, 2023). This is in tandem with the opinion of Ojo-Ebenezer (2023), who asserted that traditional institutions, especially the council of elders are held in high regard by the general public due to their duties as elders representing a range of families and wards, and they are highly appreciated in town meetings, when issues affecting the entire town are debated. They served as a court of appeals for anyone who had received an unfavorable judgment from the head of their household.

On the third objective, it was revealed that traditional institutions face some challenges in carrying out their role of managing communal conflicts in Ikare-Akoko such as political manipulation, historical successional crisis, erosion of traditional institutions' authority and lack of application of the ancient sacred rite of selection in many activities. The finding confirms Okeowo (2023) position that traditional institutions in Ikare-Akoko have the potential to settle the current conflicts in the community, however, the battle between the two monarchs fueled by political manipulations have allowed the crisis to linger for long. In many local governments in Ondo State such as Ifedore, Akure South and Okitipupa, there are several monarchs that rule together peacefully without violent clashes over supremacy. Also, the battle for supremacy by the monarchs in Ikare-Akoko is simply due to the thriving economic posterity of the area which is known for export of cocoa and palm oil from colonial period till date. This crisis between the kings have led to serious conflicts between the king's factions, eroded and ridiculed the traditional authority. In addition, the finding confirms the assertin of Hassan and Yusuf (2020), Onuoha (2017) that political manipulation and elite interests, erosion of authority and legitimacy, lack of institutional framework and support, resource constraints and modernization, are challenges facing traditional institutions in carrying out their role of conflict resolution in Nigeria.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Communal conflicts are inexorable in many societies and it is a recurring issue in Nigeria of which traditional institutions still remain viable means of management. The traditional institutions in Ikare-Akoko have existed for decades and possess the potentials to manage communal conflicts. However, the traditional institutions have continued to be ineffective due to the challenge of supremacy battle between the two monarchs, politicization and manipulation resulting into violent clashes. The study concluded that if supremacy battle is not timely addressed, communities in Ikare Akoko North East, will become hubs for unabated violence. Therefore, the paper recommends that:

i. The existence of two first-class kings in same localities should be resolved using the true ancestral kingship procedure in the area. The existence of two equal monarchs with historical rivalry will not in one way or the other promote social cohesion among their followers.

ii. Political interference in the affairs of the traditional rulers should be curbed to avoid manipulation and erosion of authority. The elevation of one king as a first-class king which created rivalry between the two monarchs was due to political involvement.

iii. Traditional institutions should fall back to their ancient sacred rites in every activity of the area.

iv. Unnecessary crave for money and materialism should discouraged by the traditional rulers. This is because they are the custodian of cultures and traditions and cannot afford to lose their legitimacy and authority due to crave for money, materialism and political positions.

References

Abbas A. (2018). *Peace and conflict resolution in Nigeria: An imperative tool for countering violent extremism*. A Paper Presented at the Conference of Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) North East Zone. Federal University Kashere.

Adebajo, A. A., & Adebajo, A. O. (2023). Community leaders and management of pastoralist-farmer conflicts in Benue and Nasarawa States, Nigeria. *Journal of Community Development Research (Humanities and Social Sciences)*, *16*(1), 13-26.

Adenike, E. T. (2021). Poverty, unemployment and insecurity challenges in Nigeria. *Tanzanian Economic Review*, *11*(1), 115-136.

Adzenga, J. I., Umar, I. S., Olaleye, R. S., Ajayi, O. J., & Onyenkazi, H. A. (2019). Farmers' perceived effects of communal conflicts on the delivery of agricultural extension services in North-Central, Nigeria. *Journal of Agricultural Extension*, *23*(4), 39-47.

Afigbo, A. E. (1987). The Igbo and their neigbours: Inter-group relations in South-eastern Nigeria to 1953 (pp. 34-98). Ibadan: University Press.

Akinsowon, F. I. (2021). Root causes of security challenges in Nigeria and solutions. *International Journal of Innovative Social Sciences & Humanities Research*, *9*(4), 174-180.

Akpabio, H. E. (2022). Traditional rulers and alternative dispute resolution: A case study of Etinan Local Government Area, Akwa-Ibom state, Nigeria. *Caleb International Journal of Development Studies*, *5*(1), 215-231.

Alozie, C. C. (2019). Communal conflicts and challenges of national integration in Nigeria in the 21st century. *International Journal of Social & Management Sciences*, *2*(1), 39–50

Amadiume, I. (2001). African women: Voicing feminisms and democratice futures. *Macalester International*, *10*(1), 1-9.

Amnesty International, (2020, Aug. 20). Nigeria: Government failings leave rural communities at the mercy of gunmen. *Amnesty International*. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/08/nigeria-government-failings-leave-rural-communities-at-the-mercy-of-gunmen/

Ani, K. J. (2017). Ezza-Ezillo conflict and national implications in Nigeria: The need for multi-dimensional peace-building. *AFFRIKA Journal of Politics, Economics and Society*, *7*(2), 143-159.

Azu, V. N. (2018). The challenges of traditional institutions in communal conflict management in Nigeria, The case of Niger Delta region. *The Journal of Social Sciences Research*, *6*(4), 89-94.

Best, S. G. (2007). *Conflict and peace building in Plateau State, Nigeria*. Spectrum books limited.

Blanchard, P., Dudouet, F. X., & Vion, A. (2015). Le cœur des affaires de la zone euro. Une analyse structurale et séquentielle des élites économiques transnationales. *Cultures & conflits*, (98), 71-99.

Canci, H., & Odukoya, O. A. (2016). Ethnic and religious crises in Nigeria: A specific analysis upon identities (1999–2013). *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, *16*(1), 87–110.

Chukwu, M. F., Utobo, K., & Ufere, N. N. (2022). Effects of Fulani and Herdsman Farmers clashes on Agricultural development in Nigeria. *Economic and Business Review*, *3*(3).

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict societies. *European economic review*, *48*(5), 1125-1145.

Eberbach, K., Kubera, A., Okoth, N. L., & Watanabe, A. (2017). Contemporary traditional leaders a study on land and governance in South Africa. In *African Meeting Process for Debate and Proposals on Governance in Africa: The Southern African Perspectives* (p. 185).

Ejiofor, P. F. (2023). The fear of ethnic domination: explaining the persistence of natural resource conflicts in Nigeria. *Ethnopolitics*, *22*(1), 1-21.

Eneji, A. G., & Agri, E. M. (2020). Insecurity, conflict and socioeconomic development in Nigeria. *Social Science Journal*, *8*, 1-19.

Eze, O. E; Nwonyi, S. & Oselebe, C. C. (2024). Communal crisis and psychological trauma of victims of Ezza/Ezillo communal war in Ebonyi State, Nigeria. *African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies AJPAS*, *17*(1), 128-151.

Ezeani, E., Akov, E. T., & Okoye, K. E. (2024). Unethical practices and the role of traditional ruler-ship institutions in modern conflict resolution in Tiv-land, Nigeria. *African Security Review*, *33*(1), 33-48.

Falola, A., Mukaila, R., & Adetipe, A. E. (2023). Food insecurity and dietary diversity of the vulnerable group in Nigeria: drivers and coping strategies. *Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Üniversitesi Tarım ve Doğa Dergisi*, *26*(2), 355-364.

Garkuwa, N. A. (2023). Ethno religious conflicts and dialogue processes in Jos metropolis, Plateau State Nigeria. *Al-Hikmah Journal of Arts & Social Sciences Education*, *5*(2), 1-5.

Gumede, M., & Irabor, H. C. (2024). The conflict over natural resources in the Niger Delta region, Nigeria: Who is to blame?. *African Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies (formerly Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation)*, *13*(1), 177-189.

Hassan, A., & Yusuf, I. A. (2020). Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in contemporary Nigeria: A study of traditional rulers' roles and challenges in conflict management in Kano emirate. *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *20*(1), 119-143.

Ibeanu, O. (2008). Traditional institutions and conflict transformation in Africa: The Igbo of Nigeria and the Tiv and Berom of Plateau State, Nigeria. *ACCORD*,1-15.

Ikelegbe, A. (2004). The economy of conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, *13*(2), 168-189.

Kpae, G. (2021). Impact of oil exploration on the Niger Delta: the drivers and dynamics of conflict over environmental degradation. *J Adv Soc Sci Humanities*, *7*(1), 1382-1394.

Kughur, G., Daudu, S., & Iornenege, M. (2017). Effects of communal crises on selected crops production among farmers in Langtang North Local Government Area of Plateau State, Nigeria. *International Journal of Agricultural Science, Research and Technology in Extension and Education Systems (IJASRT in EESs)*, *6*(2), 95-100.

Lamidi, K. O. (2019). Communal conflict, communal peacemaking and governmental intervention in Nigeria: Lessons from the Ife-Modakeke crisis. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, *19*(2), 11-32.

Lucas, J. M., Gambo, S., Targema, T. S., & Shem, W. (2024) Traditional dispute resolution strategies (TDRS) of selected ethnic groups in Taraba State and their implications to the farmers-herders crises: An exploratory study. *World Scientific News*, 189, 273-287.

Mazrui, A. (2003). Conflict in Africa: An overview. *Armed Conflict in Africa*, 21-42.

Mboh, L. (2021). An investigation into the role of traditional leaders in conflict resolution: The case of communities in the Mahikeng Local Municipality, North West Province, South Africa. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, *21*(2), 33-57.

Nomor, D. T., & Ominyi, S. O. (2021). Impact of herdsmen-farmers' conflict on small off-farm businesses in Benue State. *Journal of Economics and Allied Research*, *6*(3), 51-61.

Ngwoke, P. N., & Ituma, E. A. (2020). Ethno-religious conflict and sustainable development in Nigeria. *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies*, *76*(4), 1-8.

Nwagwu, E. J. (2016). Indigenes and settlers conflict in Nigeria: A negation to national integration and nation building. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 7(4), 218-227.

Nwazie, E. (1991). *Modes of indigenous disputing and legal interactions among the Ibos of Eastern Nigeria*. A Doctoral Dissertation Research at Arizona State University. Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism. (1991). Presented at the *Proceedings of the*

VIth international symposium, Ottawa, Canada, August 14-18, 1990. The Commission.

Nweke, K. (2012). The role of traditional institutions of governance in managing social conflicts in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta communities: Imperatives of peace-building process in the post-amnesty era. *British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences*, *5*(2), 202-219.

Nwogwugwu, N., & Alao Olatunji Emmanuel and Egwuonwu, C. (2012). Militancy and Insecurity in the Niger Delta: impact on the inflow of foreign direct investment to Nigeria. *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (Kuwait Chapter)*, *2*(1), 23-37.

Obioha, E. E. (2018). Traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution in Africa: The Igbo of Nigeria perspective. *Journal of Black Studies*, *49*(4), 365-389.

Ogbette, A. S. (2021). Population pressure, urbanisation, and nomadic pastoral violence in West Africa. In *Transborder Pastoral Nomadism and Human Security in Africa* (pp. 41-50). Routledge India.

Ojo-Ebenezer, O. (2023). The role of traditional institutions in conflict resolution among Okija people. *International Journal of Development and Management Review*, *18*(1), 18-31.

Okeke, O. (1995). Urban politics in Aba: rivalry between indigenes and non-indigenes since 1953. *Journal of urban history*, *21*(5), 622-652.

Okoli, A. C., & Atelhe, G. A. (2014). Nomads against natives: A political ecology of state, Nigeria. *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, *4*(2), 76-88.

Okoli, A. C., & Lenshie, N. E. (2022). Beyond military might: Boko Haram and the asymmetries of counter-insurgency in Nigeria. *Security Journal*, *35*(3), 676-693.

Okoli, A. C., Lenshie, N. E., & Suleiman, M. A. (2023) Climate change and rural violence in Northern Nigeria: A discursive reflection. In *Banditry and Security Crisis in Nigeria* (pp. 36-55). Routledge.

Okoli, A. C., & Nnabuihe, O. (2019). Communal conflicts in Central Nigeria: A political economy perspective. In O. Oshita et al. (eds.), *Internal security management in Nigeria* (pp.123–138). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8215-4_7

Okoli, A. C., & Ogayi, C. O. (2018). Herdsmen militancy and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria: A theoretical briefing. *African Security Review*, *27*(2), 129-143.

Okoli, A. C., & Ukwandu, D. (2021). Communal Conflicts in Nasarawa State, North Central Nigeria: A Socio-Contextual Rethink. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, *21*(2), 81-100.

Okpa, J. T., Ajah, B. O., Eze, O. J., & Enweonwu, O. A. (2023). Communal conflict and violence: Causes and impact. In *Handbook of Anger, Aggression, and Violence* (pp. 1-17).

Oladipo, I. E. (2022). Traditional institutions and conflict resolution in contemporary Africa. *African Journal of Stability & Development*, *14*(1&2), 224-244.

Olaniyan, A., & Okeke-Uzodike, U. (2015). Desperate guests, unwilling hosts: Climate change-induced migration and farmer-herder conflicts in Southwestern Nigeria. *Conflict Studies Quarterly*, (10), 23-40.

Omitola, B., Ayeni, A. A. A., Olatoye, M. O., Omitola, A., Akinrinde, O. O., & Alo, F. S. (2023). Communal conflict and post-conflict developmental challenges in Nigeria. *Journal for ReAttach Therapy and Developmental Diversities*, *6*(9s), 1254-1264.

Onuoha, F. (2017). Traditional institutions and communal conflicts in Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum*, *52*(2), 89-107.

Osadola, O. S., Olofinsao, O. M., & Ajisafe, I. O. (2021). Fact or mythology-Yoruba and Benin Historical Correlation. *Fact or Mythology-Yoruba and Benin Historical Correlation*, *87*(1), 12-12.

Osaghae, E. E. (2000). Applying traditional methods to modern conflict: Possibilities and limits. *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict Medicine, Boulder: Lynne Rienner*.

Oyediran, O. (1985). Ethnic conflicts and political development in Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *23*(2), 229-249.

Onyima, B. N. (2016). Nigerian cultural heritage: Preservation, challenges and prospects. *OGIRISI: a new Journal of African Studies*, *12*, 273-292.

Shuaibu, S. S., Salleh, M. A., & Shehu, A. Y. (2015). The impact of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigerian national security. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, *5*(6), 254-266.

Udeoba, C. E., & Eze, C. U. (2021). Government strategies in tackling insecurity in Nigeria and the way forward. *Nigerian Journal of Social Development*, *10*(1), 93-97.

Udoh, I. (2020). Oil production, environmental pressures and other sources of violent conflict in Nigeria. *Review of African Political Economy*, *47*(164), 199-219.

Uhunmwuangho, S. O., & Epelle, A. (2011). Challenges and solutions to ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria: case study of the Jos crises. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, *13*(5), 109-124.

Ukwuani, G. C. (2019). *Neutralizing Boko Haram Resurgency: Power of Targeted Holistic Education Policies* (Doctoral dissertation, Walden University).

Umezulike, N., & Mbara, K. U. (2021). Assessment of roles of traditional rulers in community conflict management in Imo state. *Journal of Continuing and Development Education*, 1(1), 152-161

UNHCR (2024). UNHCR commits to sustainable solutions to Nigeria's forgotten displacement crisis. *United Nations Refugees Agency. https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-commits-sustainable-solutions-nigeria-s-forgotten-displacement-crisis*

THE PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL MIGRATION OF THE IGBO TO EQUATORIAL GUINEA

P. F. OWOJUYIGBE
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND DIPLOMATIC STUDIES, ADEYEMI FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, ONDO, ONDO STATE, NIGERIA, owojuyigbeop@aceondo.edu.ng

KEYWORDS
Igbo migration, Equatorial Guinea, Pre-colonial and colonial history, Intra-African mobility, Cultural exchange

ABSTRACT
Migration in History started from the earliest times, from the age of wanderers to the present. The Igbo of South-eastern Nigeria inclusive were involved in the migration web. This paper further establishes the existing discourse on the History of Equatorial Guinea focusing on the Igbo migrants who assisted in the pre-colonial feats of Equatorial Guinea through archival facts and the existing literature.

Introduction

The Igbo formed the bulk of Nigerian labourers who migrated to Fernando Po. However, some scholars claimed and referred to all the labourers from Nigeria as 'Nigerian labourers' without clear distinctions. This study focuses mainly on the Igbo of Nigerian descent that formed the bulk of the Nigerian population that migrated to Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Southern Cameroon, and other parts of Africa in circulatory out-migration.[i] For instance, there was a clear demand for Igbo labourers in British Southern Cameroon and Fernando Po, Equatorial Guinea because the Nigerian south-easterners were tested agriculturalists, hardworking, agile, and overwhelmingly Christians. Here, the Hausa and Fulani from Northern Nigeria were not desired as they were predominantly pastoralists and Muslims. The racialisation against Islam as earlier discussed and the proximity of the geographical location of the Hausa and Fulani in the Northern part of Nigeria necessitated the low population of the Hausa and Fulani in Equatorial Guinea. Even though some literature termed the migrant labourers as 'Nigerians' however, most of the migrants were Igbo.[ii]

> *Equatorial Guinea is a police state and citizens and foreigners alike have been reported subject to indiscriminate attacks by authorities.*[iii] *The President, Francisco Macias Nguema,*[iv] *is a member of the Fang tribe, which did not get along with Nigeria's Ibos, who traditionally make up the bulk of the contract labourers.*[v]

'Ibo' and 'Igbo' are generally used interchangeably in most Euro-centric literature. The words denoted the people, language, and cultural identities of the Igbo, the original pronunciation is indigenous to the word 'Igbo' since the European colonial administrators and writers could not pronounce the '*gb*' sound and such diction is not in the English pronunciation accents.[vi] The New York Times report further clarifies that the majority of Nigerians who migrated to Equatorial Guinea during and after the colonial rule as contract labourers were the Igbo. Some names below proved that the Nigerian migrants were Igbo migrants but not the entire Nigerian major ethnic groups of the Hausa, Yoruba, and others as some authors claimed. The archival records reveal the migration, life and death of the Igbo populace while in Equatorial Guinea[vii] The Igbo contact in Equatorial Guinea could be traced back to the late 1920s as contract labourers when the Spanish colonial administrators could not get enough labourers for the colonial cocoa, coffee, and timber plantations from China, Cameroons, and Liberia. Obadare noted that about eight industrial pacts transpired between the Spanish

colonial administrators and the Igbo contract labourers between 1942 and 1974.[viii]

Moreover, migration history emanates from the oral traditions of origin of the Igbo. For instance, the Eri oral tradition emphasised that the Igbo migrated from the middle belt of Nigeria; Eri was an acclaimed Igala man who gave birth to the sons that established the core of Igboland. The Igala kingdom of the confluence of Nigeria features in the migration oral traditions of Igbo origin. Consequently, the Igbo from earliest times till now have been migrants as evident in their oral traditions of origin, developments, and statistics of global dispersal overages.[ix] Apart from the Igbo migrants, other migrant labourers testified as evidenced in the quotes below.

> *I was stolen with six other boys three years and two months ago by a black man called Lennard. He is dead now, but his wife, Mrs. Madine is alive. I was told I would work for an Englishman and get 4£ a month. A Spanish steamer 'Pachico' took us from Freetown. When we went on board, we were locked down below for two hours till she left. The ship called at Monrovia and picked up plenty more boys. I do not know how many the boys were, and we went straight from there to Fernando Po. At Fernando Po, I got to a house and was asked to sign a contract that would last for three years. I said I did not want to. I was told that if I did not sign, I should be imprisoned, so I reluctantly signed.* [x]

The pre-colonial and colonial migration of the Igbo people to Equatorial Guinea represents a critical yet underexplored chapter in African migration history. This research delves into the historical, cultural, and economic dynamics that propelled the Igbo to migrate to Equatorial Guinea, tracing patterns of movement and adaptation from the pre-colonial period through the colonial era. It examines how socio-economic factors such as trade, labour demands, and colonial policies facilitated this migration, alongside the cultural exchanges that ensued between the Igbo and indigenous communities. Unlike previous studies that predominantly focus on intra-Nigerian Igbo migration or forced transatlantic displacement, this research situates Igbo mobility within the broader framework of intra-African migration, offering a nuanced perspective on their agency and resilience in navigating new socio-political landscapes.

A significant contribution to the literature is its emphasis on the interplay between indigenous African systems and colonial interventions in shaping migration patterns. The study critically evaluates how Igbo entrepreneurial activities and labour migration intersected with the plantation economy and colonial administrative structures of Equatorial Guinea. By employing a comparative analysis of pre-colonial voluntary migrations and colonial-era labour movements, it highlights continuities and disruptions in Igbo migration practices. This research distinguishes itself by utilising archival materials from Nigerian and global digital archives, filling gaps in existing scholarship that relies heavily on colonial records. It also brings attention to the long-term implications of this migration on identity, community formation, and cross-cultural interactions within Equatorial Guinea.

In framing the Igbo migration narrative within the context of intra-African dynamics, the study contributes to the broader discourse on African migration and challenges Eurocentric narratives that have historically overshadowed indigenous African mobility. This approach provides a fresh lens for understanding the complexities of African migration histories and their enduring impacts.

Conceptual Framework

This study is grounded in migration theory, postcolonial studies, and cultural exchange frameworks, emphasising the multifaceted nature of the Igbo migration to Equatorial Guinea. Migration theory provides a lens to examine the push and pull factors that motivated the Igbo to relocate, such as economic opportunities, trade networks, and colonial labour demands. Postcolonial theory contextualises migration within the broader dynamics of colonial exploitation and resistance, shedding light on how colonial systems shaped mobility patterns while simultaneously being navigated and contested by the migrants. Additionally, the study employs the cultural exchange framework to explore the interactions between the Igbo and the indigenous communities of Equatorial Guinea, analysing how these interactions influenced identity formation, cultural adaptation, and socio-economic integration. This framework also

incorporates a historical perspective, connecting the pre-colonial voluntary migrations of the Igbo to the forced and incentivised movements of the colonial era. By intertwining these theoretical and historical approaches, the framework allows an exploration of migration as a dynamic process influenced by intersecting local, regional, and colonial forces.

The Igbo People in Equatorial Guinea

The recruitment and labour migration to Fernando Po entailed the last remnant of Spanish colonialism in Equatorial Guinea, which faced significant challenges and prohibitions imposed by other European empires. Despite its small size, comparable to Belgium, the Island was embroiled in a complex and illicit labour recruitment system characterised by explicit prohibition, and international intervention. The European colonial powers explicitly prohibited recruitment and labour migration to Fernando Po. This collective stance aimed to curtail the exploitative labour practices predominant on the island. In 1930, the International Labour Organization (ILO) intervened to halt the labour supply from the Republic of Liberia. This intervention brought significant attention to the harsh labour conditions on Fernando Po, leading to a widespread boycott and the island earning the grim monicker, 'the Island of no return.'[xi]

However, stealthy recruitment efforts entailed labour shortages with concealed labour suppliers. The planters of Fernando Po, responsible for producing about two percent of the world's cacao, faced a severe labour shortage due to boycotts and international scrutiny. This shortage forced them to seek alternatives, often illegal means to recruit labour. To address the labour deficit, planters turned to clandestine labour suppliers. These suppliers operated covertly to bypass international prohibitions and boycotts. Two distinct and successive clandestine labour recruitment operations were initiated in Rio Muni and Nigeria, located to the east and north of the Bight of Biafra. The first phase of stealthy recruitment targeted Rio Muni, the mainland part of Spanish Guinea. This region provided a pool of labourers who could be secretly transported to Fernando Po. The recruiters used deceptive tactics and coercion to secure workers. As the situation in Rio Muni became increasingly difficult, the planters extended their stealthy operations to Nigeria. This phase involved more sophisticated and widespread recruitment efforts, drawing primarily from the densely populated regions of Owerri and Calabar, where economic desperation made individuals more susceptible to entrapment. The scale of stealthy recruitment from Rio Muni and Nigeria was unparalleled in its region and period. The operations were extensive, involving a network of underground recruiters and connivance from local intermediaries who facilitated the transportation and concealment of labourers. Given the small size of Fernando Po, the proportion of stealthy labour recruitment was significant. The illegal recruitment efforts managed to sustain the cacao production on the island despite international prohibitions and boycotts. The labour recruitment and migration to Fernando Po during this period highlight the extreme measures taken by planters to overcome labour shortages. Despite explicit prohibitions and international interventions, the planters relied on stealthy operations in Rio Muni and Nigeria to maintain their workforce. The scale and audacity of these recruitment efforts were unprecedented, reflecting the desperation and determination to sustain the island's economic output amidst widespread condemnation and boycotts. [xii]

In 1926 with labour shortages in Fernando Po, Spanish colonial authorities turned to their continental exclave, Rio Muni. This decision marked a new phase in labour recruitment, transforming the border zones with Gabon and Cameroon into critical labour reserves for Spanish recruiters. Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch describes the phenomenon of aggressive labour recruitment as "the plague of recruiters." This term refers to the widespread and often coercive labour recruitment practices rampant in the hinterlands of resource-extraction regions across central and southern Africa decades earlier. The recruitment efforts initially started with a trickle of small traders and recruiters using counterfeit papers to smuggle workers from Nigeria's eastern provinces, specifically from Calabar and Victoria to Santa Isabel, on ferry boats. Over time, this trickle transformed into a large-scale smuggled network that utilised canoes. This network illegally transported tens of thousands of Ibibio and Igbo workers to Fernando Po, highlighting the scale and organisation of the operation. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War left Fernando Po, then under fascist control, financially and diplomatically isolated until the end of World War II. This isolation exacerbated the reliance on illegal labour recruitment to sustain its economy. The economic and diplomatic isolation

entrenched the illegal canoe trade along the Bight of Biafra. Around 1940, following the Great Depression, Calabar's merchants, seeking profitable ventures, significantly increased their involvement in illegal recruitment. By 1940, the proportion of illegally recruited workers constituted about 10% of Nigeria's wage-employed population. This statistic underscores the vast scale of the smuggling operations and the economic pressures driving labour migration. The aftermath of the Great Depression in Nigeria and the profitable ventures by Calabar's merchants played crucial roles in driving the illegal recruitment network. Even after World War II, the flow of migrant labour to Spanish Guinea remained significant. The continued disenfranchisement and discrimination faced by these workers contradicted contemporary narratives of the late colonial period as a time of nationalist protest and class-based entitlements. Some migrant labourers challenged Frederick Cooper's and Carolyn Brown's assertions that the late colonial period was characterised by wage labourers turning to nationalist protests and claiming entitlements through class-based means.[xiii] Instead, the experience of migrant labourers in Spanish Guinea reveals a more complex and continued struggle for basic rights and survival. The recruitment constellation that took hold of Nigeria's eastern provinces highlights the transformation from small-scale recruitment to a large-scale smuggling network that transported tens of thousands of Ibibio and Igbo workers to Fernando Po. The Spanish Civil War and World War II further entrenched illegal recruitment, with significant economic and social impacts. Despite narratives of nationalist protest in the late colonial period, the experiences of migrant labourers in Spanish Guinea underscore continued disenfranchisement and exploitation, challenging simplistic historical interpretations.[xiv]

The empirical tracing of recruitment networks sheds light on various socio-economic and non-human factors that shaped labour migration, particularly focusing on the institution of bride-wealth in Fang societies of Rio Muni and the trading and merchant structures of the Igbo and Efik in southeastern Nigeria. This analysis also emphasises the often-underestimated role of kinship and ethnicity in these processes. In Fang societies, bride-wealth was a critical socio-economic institution. Young men migrated to earn necessary resources for the bride-wealth, influencing labour migration patterns significantly. The Igbo and Efik communities had sophisticated trading and merchant networks. These structures facilitated labour recruitment, with merchants acting as intermediaries, linking recruiters with potential migrants. Similarly, Ravi Ahuja's research on South Asian maritime labourers highlights how colonial 'networks of subordination' were accompanied by the 'networks of the subordinated.' These networks were not merely remnants of pre-capitalist societies nor solely infrastructures of resistance but were dynamic and multifaceted. Ahuja underscores the significant, though often underestimated, roles of kinship and ethnicity in structuring labour migration. These social bonds were crucial in organising and sustaining recruitment networks. The empirical tracing also includes the role of non-human actors such as currencies, travel documents, labour laws, and contraband goods in shaping labour migration. Financial transactions, including payments to recruiters and bribes to officials, were facilitated by currencies. These exchanges were pivotal in maintaining recruitment networks. The authentic and counterfeit travel documents enabled labourers to navigate bureaucratic and legal obstacles, that facilitated their movement across borders. Colonial labour laws, often manipulated by recruiters and employers, became tools of control and exploitation within recruitment networks. The smuggling of contraband goods, such as alcohol, was intertwined with recruitment activities. These goods were used as incentives or bribes, aiding in the illegal recruitment processes. Ahuja's analysis employs Bruno Latour's sociology of associations, which focuses on the interconnectedness of human and non-human actors within networks. Unlike traditional social history, which emphasises human agency and social structures, Latour's framework considers the influence and agency of non-human actors in shaping social dynamics. Applying Latour's sociology of associations to recruitment networks provides a comprehensive understanding of how various elements, human (recruiters, migrants, officials) and non-human (currencies, documents, laws, contraband) interacted to facilitate labour migration. The empirical tracing of recruitment networks to Fernando Po underscores the intricate roles of kinship, ethnicity, and non-human actors in labour migration. Integrating Ravi Ahuja's insights on networks of subordination with Bruno Latour's sociology of associations offers a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics at play. These approaches reveal the

complicated and often exploitative nature of colonial labour systems and emphasise the need for a holistic perspective in examining historical labour migration.[xv]

From the Calabar coastline, the silhouette of the volcanic peak of Fernando Po is visible on the horizon. The recruitment networks navigating the stretch to the island included a diverse group of Nigerian recruiters, including former labourers, traders, and professional gangs run by canoe-owning coastal merchants. As the former often engaged in small-scale recruitment, the latter, the commercial elite of Calabar Province, established a stealthy sea lane across the bay, using both steamers and canoes. The recruiters varied in background and approach. Former labourers and traders engaged in sporadic, small-scale recruitment, while organised gangs of canoe-owning merchants dominated the more systematic and large-scale operations. The commercial elite of Calabar Province played a crucial role in facilitating this stealthy route. The coastal merchants used their resources and connections, to enable a steady flow of labourers across the bay. During the Spanish Civil War, the number of labourers who arrived on colonial ferry boats significantly decreased. However, this decline was countered by a substantial increase in the use of large sea-going canoes for transporting labourers. Following the Spanish Civil War, the traffic of labourers on sea-going canoes rose exponentially. This shift underscored the adaptability and resilience of the recruitment networks amidst political turmoil. The post-Spanish-Civil War period saw a clear distinction between different social structures within which Nigerian recruiters operated. Igbo traders and former labourers primarily relied on kinship-based networks. These networks were rooted in familial and community ties, with facilitated trust and cooperation in recruitment efforts. In Calabar, the Efik wards operated on a patronage-based system. These networks were characterised by hierarchical relationships and patron-client dynamics, which structured recruitment processes. The Efik society also featured the Ekpe secret society, which operated a long caste-class line. This society played a significant role in organising and controlling labour recruitment through its influence and authority. The recruitment networks from Calabar to Fernando Po evolved in response to changing political and social conditions. The commercial elite of Calabar Province played a pivotal role in maintaining these networks and adapted their methods to ensure a continuous supply of labourers. The distinction between the kinship-based networks of the Igbo and the patronage-based Efik wards, along with the caste-class dynamics of the Ekpe society, highlights the complex social structures that underpin labour recruitment. This intricate web of relationships and systems underscores the multifaceted nature of colonial labour migration and the adaptability of the networks that sustained it.[xvi]

The two groups of Nigerian recruiters, labourers and traders, who were professionalised gangs of canoe-owning coastal merchants were driven by the material consequences of British colonial rule and the economic challenges of the palm oil depression. The development of transport infrastructure and the decline in palm product prices reshaped their economic opportunities, making labour recruitment for Fernando Po's planters highly attractive. The development of transport infrastructure under British colonial rule significantly affected canoe-owning middlemen. The new infrastructure reduced the reliance on traditional canoe-based transport, diminishing the economic power of these middlemen. The palm oil depression led to a remorseless decline in prices of palm products offered to farmers by European import-export factories. This economic downturn created financial pressure on farmers and traders who depended on palm oil as a primary source of income. Recruiters were promised payments between 500 and 800 pesetas (or £10 to £16) per labourer delivered to the Curaduria in Santa Isabel. These payments represented a substantial income, far exceeding what could be earned through traditional trading or farming. Even the lower figure of 500 pesetas was equivalent to approximately five months of work as an individual trader or a year’s work on a plantation. This comparison highlights the significant financial incentive for recruiters to engage in labour recruitment. By 1935, there were 5,000 Nigerians on Fernando Po, with half of them labourers. This indicates an already substantial recruitment effort driven by the aforementioned economic incentives. By 1940, the number of Nigerians under contract on the island had doubled to 10,000. This dramatic increase underscores the effectiveness and profitability of the recruitment networks established by Nigerian recruiters. The economic challenges posed by the solidification of British colonial rule and the palm oil depression created a context in which labour recruitment for Fernando Po's planters became a highly lucrative opportunity for Nigerian recruiters. The guaranteed payments for delivering *braceros*

(labourers) offered a significant financial incentive, far exceeding traditional income sources. This economic motivation, coupled with the changing transport infrastructure and declining palm product prices, drove both former labourers and canoe-owning merchants who actively participated in the recruitment networks, leading to a substantial increase in the number of Nigerian labourers on the island.[xvii]

In understanding the motivations behind Nigerian recruiters' enthusiasm for labour recruitment to Fernando Po, it is essential to consider the prolonged economic depression in Eastern Nigeria and the drastic decline in the value of palm oil. In 1933, Martin deduced that palm oil was worth only 17% of its barter terms of trade levels of 1912. This substantial drop in value indicates a severe and prolonged economic downturn, with Eastern Nigeria experiencing a long depression from 1914 to 1945. The significant reduction in palm oil's barter terms of trade value reflects a broader economic struggle in Eastern Nigeria. The plummeting prices for palm products meant farmers and traders could no longer rely on palm oil as a stable and profitable income source. Ship. The depression, lasting over three decades, created widespread economic hardship. Many individuals and families faced declining incomes and increasing financial pressures, pushing them to seek alternative means of livelihood. The promise of payments between 500 and 800 pesetas (or £10 to £16) per labourer delivered to Fernando Po offered a lucrative alternative. Compared to the declining income from palm oil, these payments were a substantial financial incentive. The payments for recruiting labourers were equivalent to several months of work as an individual trader or even a year's work on a plantation, this contrast in earnings made labour recruitment an attractive and profitable venture. Given the economic depression and declining palm oil prices, both former labourers and professional recruiters from the commercial elite of Calabar Province were highly motivated to engage in labour recruitment. The financial rewards provided a significant boost to their incomes. The number of Nigerian labourers on Fernando Po grew substantially, from 5,000 in 1935 to 10,000 by 1940. This increase reflects the successful efforts of the recruiters and the strong economic push factors driving labour migration. The prolonged economic depression in Eastern Nigeria and the drastic decline in the palm oil value created a context of financial desperation and hardship. With their guaranteed payments and higher earnings, this economic backdrop made the recruitment opportunities for Fernando Po an attractive and necessary alternative for many. Both former labourers and professional recruiters capitalised on these opportunities, leading to a significant increase in the number of Nigerian labourers on the island. This period highlights how economic conditions can drive labour migration and reshape local economies and livelihoods.[xviii]

The exceptional payment rates offered to recruiters for delivering labourers to Fernando Po, which were double those of recruiting agencies in other African colonies, played a crucial role in driving the recruitment efforts. These high financial incentives provided substantial economic motivation for Nigerian recruiters, resulting in increased recruitment activity and a significant influx of labourers to the island. This comparative advantage underscores the economic factors that shaped labour migration patterns and, highlights the importance of financial incentives in recruitment processes during this period.

The recruitment payments for labourers to Fernando Po were exceptionally high compared to other large-scale recruitment treaties such as that between the Union of South Africa and the Portuguese Empire. The payments for Fernando Po, ranging from £10 to £16 per head, were double the £5 per head rate in the South African agreement. This significant financial advantage provided powerful economic incentives for Nigerian recruiters, driving increased recruitment activity and contributing to the influx of labourers to the island. The comparative analysis highlights the role of financial incentives in shaping labour migration patterns and underscores the economic factors that influenced recruitment efforts during this period.

The migration of almost all recruits from the Owerri Igbo or Southern Ibibio regions of the palm oil belt provinces in south-eastern Nigeria to Fernando Po can be understood within the context of land scarcity, high population density, and economic pressures. The regions of Owerri and Calabar were among the most densely populated areas in Africa. In the 1930s, Calabar Province had a population of over 1 million, while Owerri had approximately 2 million people. This high population density led to significant land scarcity, making it challenging for families to sustain themselves through agriculture alone. The economic conditions in these regions were difficult, with low levels of

subsistence agriculture. The primary cash crops, palm oil, and cassava, were grown alongside food crops on family farms. Despite these efforts, the limited arable land and the pressure of a large population meant that many families struggled to meet their basic needs.[xix]

Palm oil and cassava were the main cash crops in these regions. The cultivation of these crops provided some economic relief but was insufficient to alleviate the widespread poverty and land pressure. The need to generate additional income was a significant driver for migration, as individuals sought better economic opportunities elsewhere. Colonial taxation policies further strained the local economies. In the colonial cartographic categories, some districts of eastern Nigeria had over 100 taxable sales per square mile, compared to approximately one per square mile in Rio Muni. The high tax burden and the limited economic opportunities at home made migration an attractive alternative.

Given the socio-economic pressures, many young men from the Owerri Igbo and Southern Ibibio regions were recruited to work on the plantations in Fernando Po. These recruits were drawn by the promise of better wages and living conditions, though the reality was one of harsh labour and exploitation. Recruiters employed various deceptive tactics to entice these young men, including false promises about the nature of the work and living conditions. Upon arrival, many found themselves trapped in a cycle of debt bondage and subjected to penal sanctions if they failed to fulfil their contracts.

The stark contrast in population density between south-eastern Nigeria and Rio Muni highlights the relative economic pressures the migrants faced. In Rio Muni, with only one taxable male per square mile, there was less competition for land and resources, which likely contributed to the demand for external labour from densely populated regions like Owerri and Calabar. Although the economic opportunities in Fernando Po were harsh and exploitative, these were perceived as better than the limited prospects in the overcrowded and economically strained regions of south-eastern Nigeria. This perception drove the migration despite the associated risks and hardships.[xx]

The migration of Owerri Igbo and Southern Ibibio individuals to Fernando Po during the colonial period was driven by acute land scarcity, high population density, and economic pressures in their home regions. Despite the harsh realities of labour conditions, the promise of better economic opportunities motivated this movement. Martin deduces that during this era, Eastern Nigeria was in a long depression between 1914 and 1945. Colonial taxation and recruitment practices exacerbated these pressures, making migration a seemingly necessary option for many young men from this densely populated area provided critical insight into the socio-economic dynamics and the exploitative nature of colonial labour systems.[xxi]

In Nigeria, recruitment paths for labour migration were intricately shaped through kinship ties and the development of ethnically redefined immigrant associations, which were becoming more prevalent in urban areas. These home town associations played a crucial role in supporting new arrivals by providing employment opportunities and other community needs. The recruits were Owerri Igbo or Southern Ibibio from the palm oil belt provinces, where land scarcity and high population density made subsistence difficult. In the 1930s, Calabar Province had a little over one million people, while Owerri had around two million. This high population density led to acute land scarcity and low subsistence levels, driving people to seek alternative livelihoods. Palm oil and cassava, initially grown as cash crops, became primary food crops on family farms. This shift indicates the economic pressure on these communities to sustain themselves amidst declining agricultural profitability.

The motivations for migration from Eastern Nigeria can be understood through two narratives: a liberal and ethnographic perspective and a Marxist and Materialist storyline. The liberal and ethnographic narrative genre emphasises the adventurous spirit of youth seeking to enhance their social status and eventually reintegrate into their home communities with improved prospects. The notion of Wanderlust and the pursuit of prestige played a role in motivating migration. The Marxist and Materialist storyline perspective highlights the economic struggles faced by poverty-stricken individuals responsible for paying taxes and bride-wealth. The political stabilisation and subsequent pauperisation in the interwar period increased mobility, particularly among younger sons who faced diminishing land shares and rising bride prices.[xxii]

The internal Igbo diaspora and recruitment patterns were in two ways, the internal Igbo Diaspora and the recruitment by Kinship. The internal migration within colonial Nigeria was significant, with millions of Igbo people moving to tenant farms, mines, trades, administrative, and urban jobs. Fernando Po became an additional destination for the diaspora. The recruitment by Kinship involved the Igbo recruiters, who typically operated in smaller groups compared to the more professionalised Calabar recruiters. Many Igbo recruits travelled with a relative, which indicated strong kinship ties in the recruitment process. These relatives were often from the same village group, though broader kinship terms could apply to those perceived as foreigners within Nigeria. These two sets of migrants usually travelled by walking. Later, the recruiters' advanced fees enabled buses, trains, and canoes to reach Oron, the departure point for ocean-going canoes to Fernando Po. Each canoe, seating up to forty people including ten paddlers, facilitated the clandestine transportation of labourers across the bay. [xxiii]The population of Igbo migrants and other Nigerians were close to five thousand according to 1936, census data for Fernando Po's residence. African population showed the following distribution: Bubi or Fernandino, 9,348; Rio Muni, 6,800; Nigeria, 4,819; French Cameroon, 4,200; São Tomé, 209; Liberia, 175; Sierra Leone, 155; and Annobon and Corisco, 146. During this period, Fernando Po was a significant destination for labour migration. However, there was a notable distinction in the type of labour provided by different groups of African migrants. Most non-Spanish African migrants who arrived on the island were skilled labourers and traders, compared to the unskilled plantation workers, or the braceros. This distinction often led to tensions and hostility among the different groups, as the skilled labourers and traders occupied a different socioeconomic status than the braceros, who were primarily involved in the unskilled work on the plantations. This divide exacerbated the existing social hierarchies and contributed to the complex dynamics of labour relations on the Island.[xxiv] Unlike the braceros who were primarily engaged in hard manual labour on plantations, these skilled labourers and traders brought different, skills and participated in various trades and services. Their economic activities were diverse, often involving trade and specialised skills that did not directly contribute to the labour-intensive plantation economy that was dominant on the island. The plantation economy, which was central to the economic structure of Fernando Po, required a substantial workforce of unskilled labourers to maintain productivity. The skilled labourers and traders were perceived as inapplicable to this economic system. The non-participation of these migrants in the plantation economy was seen as a lack of integration into the primary economic activities that the colonial authorities and plantation owners deemed necessary for the island's economic growth. The skilled labourers and traders faced hostility from the colonial administration and the local population involved in the plantation economy. Their different economic roles and perceived detachment from the hard labour required on plantations contributed to social tensions. The presence of skilled labourers and traders might have been viewed as a threat to the existing economic order, as they competed for resources and opportunities without contributing to the plantation workforce. The influx of skilled labourers and traders among non-Spanish African migrants to Fernando Po during this period led to significant social and economic tensions. Their skills and economic activities did not align with the needs of the plantation economy, resulting in perceptions of uselessness and hostility from those invested in maintaining the plantation-driven economic structure. These dynamics highlight the interplay between labour migration, economic integration, and social acceptance in colonial settings.[xxv]

The British firm Ambas Bay and the main German planter on the island, W.A. Moritz, were significant actors in labour recruitment. Ambas Bay used its launch to bring workers from rubber plantations in Calabar, funded by the Cámara (local colonial administration). Moritz received workers from a family friend's plantation near Mount Cameroon. J.W. Dougan, an influential planter on Fernando Po, was supplied with large numbers of workers from the Eyamba ward in Calabar. This indicates a well-established network between the recruiters in Calabar and the planters on Fernando Po. The recruiters were predominantly Efik, a group whose name means oppressor in the Ibibio language. This etymology reflects the historical dominance of the Efik over their Ibibio counterparts. These recruiters brought Ibibio and Igbo labourers and canvassed from riverside markets in their hinterland. Initially, recruiters also brought over the surplus of slave descendants from their towns, indicating a continued legacy of exploitation and subjugation within these communities. The primary recruitment centres were in Calabar and Umuahia near Bende. These towns were

connected by a well-worn trading route along Enyong Creek, a major tributary of the Cross River. This route facilitated the movement of goods and people, including the recruitment of labourers. The areas around Itu, Bende, and Afikbo had large slave markets. In the late eighteenth century, this route became a major artery for the Atlantic slave trade pouring out of Old Calabar. Even after the British government restrained its slave traders, the legacy of these markets influenced the labour recruitment practices in the region. A Freeboy Calabar testimony provides firsthand evidence of the recruitment practices. According to this testimony, the recruiters were deeply entrenched in the social and economic fabric of the region, leveraging their networks to supply labourers to planters on Fernando Po. The detailed accounts from various sources, including the Curaduria and police files, corroborate these testimonies. They offer a comprehensive picture of the recruitment networks and the socio-economic dynamics. The recruitment of labourers for Fernando Po's plantations involved a complex network of actors, including British and German planters, professional Efik recruiters, and the descendants of slaves. The well-established trading routes and historical legacy of slavery in the region facilitated this process. The testimonies and archival evidence have highlighted the deep-rooted connections between the recruiters in Calabar and the planters on Fernando Po, revealing the exploitative practices that persisted in the labour recruitment systems of the colonial era. For instance,

> *Archival sources reveal the intricate connections between recruiters in Calabar and planters on Fernando Po during the colonial era, shedding light on exploitative labour practices. Testimonies from former labourers and recruitment documents highlight how recruiters manipulated contracts, often misleading workers about wages and conditions. For example, correspondence between colonial officials in Nigeria and Spanish administrators in Fernando Po reveals complicity in illegal recruitment networks, despite nominal oversight. Court records from Calabar expose cases where labourers, primarily Ibibio and Igbo, contested abusive conditions, yet these claims were often dismissed due to systemic biases favouring recruiters and planters. Additionally, ship manifests and labour contracts show discrepancies in promised versus actual wages, underscoring the exploitative nature of the recruitment system. These archival materials illustrate the enduring power dynamics and the economic imperatives driving colonial exploitation.*[xxvi]

Furthermore, the German planters in Cameroon expressed significant concerns over the efforts of planters from Fernando Po to lure away their workers. This competition for labour was part of the dynamics of labour migration in the region, where Fernando Po, with its thriving plantations, became an attractive destination for workers seeking better opportunities. The Eyamba family, one of Calabar's most commercially and politically powerful lineages, played a notable role in this context. Members of the Eyamba family had settled on Fernando Po in the late nineteenth century, further entrenching their influence in the region. The rise of the Eyamba family on Fernando Po, particularly their involvement in the free market economy, came at the expense of the traditional landed interests of Duke Town, Calabar. This shift reflected broader economic transformations, where entrepreneurial families like the Eyambas capitalised on the opportunities provided by the colonial economy, often challenging the established powers back in their homeland. The Eyambas' success on Fernando Po exemplified the growing importance of commercial acumen and adaptability in the colonial context, overshadowing the more static, land-based power structures that previously dominated regions like Calabar.[xxvii]

Conclusion and Recommendation

The Igbo migrated in mass to Equatorial Guinea during the pre-colonial era and supported the prosperity of the agriculture-based economy of the colonial government. The Igbo migration was legal and illegal due to the massive and urgent need for more labourers on the colonial plantations. Archival documents reveal that both the Igbo and Equato-Guinean colonial governments benefitted from the migration with further hardships common with colonialism.

Based on the findings, it is recommended that further research and policy efforts recognise the historical significance of intra-African migration

in shaping cultural and economic landscapes. For policymakers and historians, understanding the legacy of Igbo migration to Equatorial Guinea offers valuable insights into contemporary issues of migration, integration, and identity within the region. This research underscores the need for preserving oral histories and cultural artefacts to document the experiences of migrant communities, ensuring their contributions are acknowledged and integrated into broader narratives of African history. Additionally, fostering collaborative initiatives between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea could enhance cultural exchange and economic partnerships rooted in this shared history. By highlighting the resilience and adaptability of the Igbo migrants, the findings advocate for more inclusive approaches to migration studies that prioritise indigenous agency and intra-African mobility over external, Eurocentric paradigms.

[i] Blackwell, "Igbo Migration", 79-83; https://eastwestreporters.com/2020/09/04/did-you-know-there-is-an-igbo-tribe-in-equatorial-guinea-and-they-are-the-third-largest; Sundiata, *From Slaving to Neo-Slavery*, 182; https://nationaldailyng.com/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-igbo-tribe-of-equatorial-guinea; and https://www.legit.ng/1368913-igbo-people-3rd-largest-tribe-equatorial-guinea-33500.html

[ii] Blackwell, "Igbo Migration", ii, 53, 127 and Sundiata, *From Slaving to Neo-Slavery*, 182; 403-7/1/2208, Calprof, Nigerian National Income Inquiry, 1950-1954; 4089-7/1/1945, Calprof, Labour Department: Annual Report, 1949-1953; 3412-7/1/1352, Calprof, Labour Department Establishment of 1945-1953; 3682-7/1/1640, Calprof, Labour Ordinance, 1946-1951; 3682/1-7/1/1641, Calprof, Labour Department., Return of Labour Statistics, 1949-1952; 3682/IV, Vol.III--7/1/1642, Calprof, Labour Department, Return of Labour Statistics. 1952-1956; 4081/3-7/1/1930, Calprof, Labour Situation in Nigeria, 1949-1950; OW4593.9/1/974, Rivprof, Labour Inspectorate: Annual Report, 1940-1952; OB438 Vol.I-4/1/199, Obudist, Labour Correspondence on General Matters, 1939-1954; C328-2/1/53, Rivprof, Recruitment of Nigerian Labour to Fernando Po, 1939-1951; C.737-2/1/102, Rivprof, Ports of Nigeria: Report by A.N. Strong, 1949-1951; 4597-7/1/2358, Calprof, Medical Department: Annual Report, 1950-1954; OG.1792-2/1/1798, Ogprof, Medical Department: Annual Report, 1939-1956; 1472-1/4/309, Ikotdist, Nutrition in the Colonial Empire Report, 1939-1956; 525 Anglo-Spanish Employment Agency, Recruitment of Labourer, 1950-1951; ARODIV, 19/1/44, OW.3961, Umprof. 5/1/41, Recruitment of Nigerian Labour to Spanish Territories: Return of the Nigerian Labour to Spanish Territories, A Provincial Administration, 1948-1949; pp.1,3,4,7,8,9,11,13,15,17,18,19,21,23,25,27,29; Quarterly Returns of Labourers to Spanish Territories of Gulf of Guinea with forms A and B, 1951-1955, pp. 35-44, 46-86.

[iii] This factor makes data collection in Equatorial Guinea infeasible. For instance, Sundiata was arrested, and detained, and his research was destroyed when he travelled to Equatorial Guinea for research fieldwork in the 1970s. See Sundiata, *From Slaving to Neo-Slavery*, xi.

[iv] The first indigenous president of Equatorial Guinea who ruled from 1968-1979. He was deposed and banished via a coup led by his nephew, Lieutenant Colonel Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo.

[v] The evidence of age-long police cruelty and brutal living of the Igbo in Equatorial Guinea, see N/A, "Nigeria, Citing Cruelty, Recalls 45,000 from Equatorial Guinea," *The New York Times,* January 27, 1976, 3.

[vi] NAI/CSO/A1/U1, Uchendu, *The Igbo of South East Nigeria*, 1965; NAI/CSO/A1/B2, Basden, *Among the Ibos of Nigeria*, 1966; NAI/CSO/A1/B3, Basden, *Niger Ibos,* 1966; NAI/CSO/A1/H8, Henderson, *the King in Every Man: Evolutionary Trends in Onitsha Ibo Society and Culture*, 1972; NAI/CSO/A1/N7, Nwaguru, *Aba and British Rule: The Evolution and Administrative Developments of the Old Aba Division of Igbo land*, 1973.

[vii] *The New York Times*, 1976, 3; See the confirmation through the following names discovered in the archival materials: OP.496, 12/1/310, Ondist, Agreement between Aros and Ibos in Ujalli Court Area. Awka Division, Re-Land Rents for Lands Occupied by Aros, 1933-1949; CA/ Na/S.6115/52, Damion Nwonaku, Deceased, Letter on 24/08/1955, J.O. Thomas signed, Calabar, 648; CA/ Na/S.6115/52, Damion Nwonaku, Deceased Treaty Labourer, Calabar, Letter on 13/12/1955, J. Ola Thomas signed, L.O. His wages paid, 691; CA/ Na/S.3060/54, Thompson Nwachukwu, Deceased, Treaty Labourer, Letter on 15/09/1955, J.O. Thomas signed, Calabar, 660, 667-668, 670-671, 681, 683, 684, 704, 706, 709; 7/S.3/66, Nwanyiamadi Njoku, Deceased, Letter on 30/09/1955, signed by the British Vice Consul and L.O. 690, 646, 679, 696; CA/ Na/S.6030/52, Uchendu Achilike, Deceased from Calabar, Letter on 11/10/1955, J. Ola Thomas signed, 686-687; CA/ Na/S.6030/52, Uchendu Achilike, Deceased Treaty Labourer, Calabar, Letter on 21/10/1955, J. Ola Thomas signed, 691, 695, 708, 712-713, 721; CA/ Na/S.6030/52, Uchendu Achilike, Deceased Treaty Labourer, Letter on 14/12/1955, Entitlement Paid, 771; CA/ Na/9, Amadi Anozie, Deceased from Calabar, Letter on 25/10/1955, J. O. Thomas signed, 692; Non-payment of Balance, a letter written by Obiagwu Achilike on 21/11/55 to the D.O. Owerri Division, 719; CA/ Na/S.5778/52, Longinus Anumudu, Deceased, Letter on 28/11/1955 to D.O. Owerri Division; CA/ Na/S.6819/55, Anyamele Ajokubi, Deceased, Calabar, Letter on 19/12/1955, J. Ola Thomas signed, 770; CA/ Na/S.6319/52, Ubachuru Okere, Deceased, Letter on 21/01/1956 from Agbala Native Court, Owerri,786; CA/ Na/7/53, Kalu Okoronkwo, Money paid on behalf of the Deceased, Letter on 22/03/1956, L.O. signed, 854; CA/ Na/S.8442/55, Dennis Odunzie, Deceased, Calabar, Letter from Obudu Native Court Area, Owerri Division Reported by the Labour Officer, Calabar on 07/05/1956, 896; CA/ Na/S.8602/52, Josiah Mehara, Money Remittance, Letter on 07/04/1955, L.O. signed, 603; CA/ Na/S.8602/52, Josiah Katakoma Mehara Ohaka, Oforola, Remittance, Letter on 15/04/1955, D.O. Owerri Division signed 603; Remittance: Ayanwu Anosiye through the D.O. Owerri, Letter on 07/04/1955, D.O. Owerri Division signed by F.P. Treaty Labourer, 607-610; CA/ Na/S.8586/52, Deceased Raymond Nwagu, Letter on 25/04/1955, Urata Native Court, Owerri Division signed by L.O. 611, 614-616, 622, 624, 626, 633, 680, 689; L.11/157, Remittance: Dominic Oke, Letter on 20/05/1955, Signed by the British Vice Consul and L.O. 617, 627; Deceased No.5358/52, Jerome Agbala Nkwoji, Letter on 06/06/1955, Signed by the Senior D.O. Owerri Division, 626, 628, 637-640, 650-651, 656-658; 12074/50 (03491/52), Remittance Check for Donatius Eke, Letter on 18/06/1955, Calabar, Signed by the British Vice Consul and L.O. Santa Isabel, 642, 630, 643-646, 664; Deceased No. S.6115/52, Damion Nwonaku, Letter on 30/08/1955, Obudu Agwa, Signed by the D.O. Owerri Division, 626, 649, 654-655, 662-663; CA/ Na/S.2230/53, Aloysius Okere, Calabar, Remittance Letter on 10/09/1955, J. Ola Thomas signed for the Acting L.O. 666-667, 673-674; CA/S.5253/52, Remittance: Dickson Onu, Calabar, Letter on 16/11/1955, Owerri Division signed by J.O. Thomas, 724; S. 6319/52, a Deceased Treaty Labourer Ubaohuru Okere, Letter on 31/01/1956 of Agbala Native Court (N.C), Owerri Division, J. Ola Thomas signed for the L.O. remittance too.

[viii] Ebenezer Obadare, "Constructing Pax Nigeriana? The Media and Conflict in Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea Relations," *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 10, no. 1 (2001): 80–89,

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.114.104&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

[ix] Isichei, "*The Ibo People*", 29-30; NAI/CSO/B/M17, Mair, *An African People in the Twentieth Century*, 1965; NAI/CSO/A1/U1, Uchendu, *The Igbo of South East Nigeria*, 1965; NAI/CSO/A1/B2, Basden, *Among the Ibos of Nigeria*, 1966; NAI/CSO/A1/B3, Basden, *Niger Ibos,* 1966; NAI/CSO/A1/H8, Henderson, *the King in Every Man: Evolutionary Trends in Onitsha Ibo Society and Culture*, 1972; NAI/CSO/A1/E6, Ekechi, *Missionary Enterprise and Rivalry in Igbo land,* 1966; NAI/CSO/A1/N7, Nwaguru, *Aba and British Rule: The Evolution and Administrative Developments of the Old Aba Division of Igbo land*, 1973.

[x] A report from F. E. K. Strong, Lieutenant, and Commander, Senior Naval Officer, West Coast of Africa on a commentary statement by Sarpo, a Mendi boy, a native of Sierra Leone who lived in Krootown road, a British ambassador to Spain to Ministro de Estado, 14 January 1913, AGA Caja 81/06945 E-20.

[xi] Enrique Martino, "Clandestine Recruitment Networks in the Bight of Biafra: Fernando Po's Answer to the Labour Question, 1926–1945," *International Review of Social History* 57, S20 (2012): 40 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859012000417.

[xii] Martino, "Clandestine Recruitment", 2012: 40

[xiii] Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labour Question in French and British Africa,* (Cambridge, 1996); Carolyn A. Brown, *"We Were All Slaves": African Miners, Culture, and Resistance at the Enugu Government Colliery*, (London: Oxford, 2003)

[xiv] Martino, "Clandestine Recruitment", 2012:40; Cooper, "Decolonization and African Society",1996:80; Brown, "We Were All Slaves": 2003:45; Ravi Ahuja, "Networks of Subordination-Networks of the Subordinated: The Ordered Spaces of South Asian Maritime Labour in an Age of Imperialism (c.1890–1947)", in Ashwini Tambe and Harald Fischer-Tine (eds), *The Limits of British Colonial Control in South Asia: Spaces of Disorder in the Indian Ocean Region* (London, Oxford, 2009), 13–48, 33.

[xv] Martino, "Clandestine Recruitment", 2012:42; Ahuja, "Networks of Subordination", 2009, 33; Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory,* (London: Oxford, 2005), 59.

[xvi] Martino, "Clandestine Recruitment", 2012:54

[xvii] Martino, "Clandestine Recruitment", 2012:54; See Appendix I-V

[xviii] Martino, Clandestine Recruitment", 2012:55

[xix] Martino, "Clandestine Recruitment", 2012:56.

[xx] Martino, "Clandestine Recruitment", 2012:57, 26.

[xxi] Susan Martin, *Palm Oil and Protest: An Economic History of the Ngwa Region, South-Eastern Nigeria, 1800–1980*, (London: Cambridge, 1988): 88, 119.

[xxii] Martino, "Clandestine Recruitment", 2012:57.

[xxiii] Martino, "Clandestine Recruitment", 2012:58; Martin, 1988: 88.

[xxiv] See GG to DGMC, 12 June 1933, AGA, C-81/06467 E-19; ''Hospitalidad Excesiva'', El Defensor de Guinea, 2 November 1933 cited in Martino, 2012:54-55;

[xxv] Warren T. Morrill, "Immigrants and Associations: The Ibo in Twentieth Century Calabar," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5 (1963): 424–448; Richard Henderson, "Generalized Cultures and Evolutionary Adaptability: A Comparison of Urban Efik and Ibo in Nigeria," *Ethnology* 5 (1966): 365–391; Howard Wolpe, *Urban Politics in Nigeria: A Study of Port Harcourt* (Berkeley: CA, 1974), 56–81; 60; Brown, "We Were All Slaves", 2003, 182–187; Martin, *Palm Oil and* Protest" (1988): 90-95; Segun Osoba, "The Phenomenon of Labour Migration in the Era of British Colonial Rule: A Neglected Aspect of Nigeria's Social History", *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 4 (1969): 524; Amin,

"Modern Migration in West Africa" 1974, 93-118; Chima Korieh, *The Land Has Changed: History, Society and Gender in Colonial Eastern Nigeria* (Calgary: AB, 2010): 268–282.

[xxvi] GG, 31 October 1931, AGA, C-81/08146, E-1; Curaduria, 3 November 1932, C-81/08125, E-4; Ca´mara to GG, 16 December 1930, 81/08095, E-18; West African Plantation Company Victoria to Kemner, 20 May 1926, Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde [BArch], R 1001/3504.; Curaduria, 6 June 1932, C-81/08126, E-21; Ivor Miller, *Voice of the Leopard: African Secret Societies and Cuba* (Jackson, MS, 2009): 128; Patrick Manning, "Slave Trade, 'Legitimate' Trade, and Imperialism Revisited: The Control of Wealth in the Bights of Benin and Biafra", in Paul E. Lovejoy (ed.), *Africans in Bondage: Studies in Slavery and the Slave Trade,* (Madison, WI, 1986): 203–233; Martino, "Clandestine Recruitment", 2012:60

[xxvii] GG, 31 October 1931, AGA, C-81/08146, E-1; Curaduria, 3 November 1932, C-81/08125, E-4; Ca´mara to GG, 16 December 1930, 81/08095, E-18; West African Plantation Company Victoria to Kemner, 20 May 1926, Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde [BArch], R 1001/3504.; Curaduria, 6 June 1932, C-81/08126, E-21; Ivor Miller, *Voice of the Leopard: African Secret Societies and Cuba* (Jackson, MS, 2009): 128; Patrick Manning, "Slave Trade, 'Legitimate' Trade, and Imperialism Revisited: The Control of Wealth in the Bights of Benin and Biafra", in Paul E. Lovejoy (ed.), *Africans in Bondage: Studies in Slavery and the Slave Trade,* (Madison, WI, 1986): 203–233; Martino, "Clandestine Recruitment", 2012:60.

References

Adamako-Sarfoh, J. "The Effects of the Expulsion of Migrant Workers on Ghana's Economy, with Reference to the Cocoa Industry." In *Modern Migrations in Western Africa*, edited by Samir Amin, London: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Ahuja, Ravi. "Networks of Subordination–Networks of the Subordinated: The Ordered Spaces of South Asian Maritime Labour in an Age of Imperialism (c.1890–1947)." In *The Limits of British Colonial Control in South Asia: Spaces of Disorder in the Indian Ocean Region*, edited by Ashwini Tambe and Harald Fischer-Tine. 13-48, 33. London, 2009.

Brown, Carolyn A. *We Were All Slaves: African Miners, Culture, and Resistance at the*

Enugu Government Colliery. London: Oxford University Press, 2003. 182-187.

Blackwell, James K. "Igbo Migration, Entrepreneurship, and the Creation of the 'Igbo Scare' in British Southern Cameroon, 1900-1975." A dissertation submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of History-Doctor of Philosophy 2020: 1-32, 74-119, 116-216, view (msu.edu)

Cooper, Frederick. *Decolonization and African Society: The Labour Question in French and British Africa*. London: Cambridge, 1996.

Henderson, Richard. "Generalised Cultures and Evolutionary Adaptability: A Comparison of Urban Efik and Ibo in Nigeria." *Ethnology* 5, (1966): 365–391.

Isichei, Elizabeth. *The Ibo People and the Europeans: The Genesis of a Relationship to 1906*. London: Faber and Faber, 1973.

Korieh, Chima. *The Land Has Changed: History, Society, and Gender in Colonial Eastern Nigeria.* Calgary: AB, 2010. 268–282.

Latour, Bruno. *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory.*London: Oxford, 2005. 59.

Manning, Patrick. "Slave Trade, 'Legitimate' Trade, and Imperialism Revisited: The Control of Wealth in the Bights of Benin and Biafra." In *Africans in Bondage: Studies in Slavery and the Slave Trade,* edited by Paul E. Lovejoy, 203-233. Madison: WI, 1986.

Martin, Susan. *Palm Oil and Protest: An Economic History of the Ngwa Region, South-Eastern Nigeria*. 1800–1980. London: Cambridge, 1988. 88, 119.

Martino, Enrique. "Clandestine Recruitment Networks in the Bight of Biafra: Fernando Po's Answer to the Labour Question, 1926–1945." *International Review of Social History* 57, no. S20 (2012): 39–72.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859012000417.

Miller, Ivor. *Voice of the Leopard: African Secret Societies and Cuba,* Jackson: MS, 2009:128

Morrill, Warren T. "Immigrants and Associations: The Ibo in Twentieth Century Calabar."

Comparative Studies in Society and History 5 (1963): 424–448.

Obadare, Ebenezer. "Constructing Pax Nigeriana? The Media and Conflict in Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea Relations." *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 10, no. 1 (2001): 80–89. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.114.104&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Osoba, Segun O. "The Phenomenon of Labour Migration in the Era of British Rule: A Neglected Aspect of Nigeria's Social History." *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 4, no. 4 (1969): 515–538.

Sundiata, Ibrahim K. *From Slaving to Neo-Slavery: The Bight of Biafra and Fernando Po in the Era of Abolition, 1827-1930*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996.

Wolpe, Howard. *Urban Politics in Nigeria: A Study of Port Harcourt.* Berkeley: CA, 1974, 56–81; 60.

NAI/CSO/A1/B2. Basden, George T. *Among the Ibos of Nigeria*. London: Frank Cass. 1966.

NAI/CSO/A1/B3. Basden, George T. *Niger Ibos.* London: Frank Cass. 1966.

NAI/CSO/A1/E6. Ekechi, F.K. *Missionary Enterprise and Rivalry in Igbo land 1857-1914*. London: Frank Cass, 1966.

NAI/CSO/A1/H8. Henderson, Richard N. *The King in Every Man: Evolutionary Trends in Onitsha Ibo Society and Culture*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972.

NAI/CSO/A1/N7. Nwaguru, Johnson E. N. *Aba and British Rule: The Evolution and Administrative Developments of the Old Aba Division of Igbo land 1896-1960*. NP: Asaba, 1973.

NAI/CSO/B/M17. Mair, L.P. *An African People in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.

NAI/CSO/A1/U1. Uchendu, Victor C. *The Igbo of South East Nigeria*. London: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1965.