SEPARATIST MOVEMENT AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA: EVIDENCE FROM BORNO, YOBE AND ADAMAWA STATES (2009 – 2024)

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Abstract

Research Problem: *Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States in the Northeast, Nigeria have been marred by protracted conflicts and separatist aspirations, primarily driven by Boko Haram (BH). This movement has not only posed severe security challenges but has also significantly hindered the region's progress in terms of socio-economic development.*
Method/Theory: *This study was anchored on the Relative Deprivation theory and the Failed State Theory. A survey research design was adopted to stimulate the needed information directly from the target respondents. The population comprises stakeholders in the selected states, including members of the local communities, government and private sector employees, members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), government agency representatives, and members of separatist groups. Based on the Krejcie and Morgan formula, a sample size of 384 stakeholders was used. Data was analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics.*
Results: *The study findings reveal that the insurgency of BH has a significant impact on the agricultural activities ($R = 0.675$; $p < 0.00$). Likewise, the activities of the BH insurgency have a significant effect on Human capital development (HCD) ($R = 0.543$; $p < 0.001$).*
Conclusion: *It was affirmed that addressing the challenges posed by separatist movements requires more than militarised*

interventions. It was observed that beyond the immediate destruction of infrastructure, the protracted conflict has disrupted agricultural output and education.
Key Contributions and Recommendations: *The study contributed to the knowledge and therefore recommends that various security operations should be complemented with agricultural recovery programmes, secure educational facilities to address both the symptoms and root causes of instability in these states.*

1.0 Introduction

Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, is a multi-cultural state combined through colonial amalgamation in 1914. While this political union was intended to promote unity, the historical, cultural, and economic differences among its regions have often bred discontent. Over the decades, unresolved grievances rooted in perceived marginalisation, political exclusion, uneven economic development, ethnic rivalry, and resource control disputes have triggered the rise of separatist movements. From the Biafran secession attempt (1967–1970) to the emergence of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South-East, the Oduduwa Republic agitation in the South-West, and the Arewa independence calls in the North, as well as militant autonomy demands in the Niger Delta (Udeh *et al.*, 2023).

The proclamation of the Biafran State by MASSOB in 2000 was a direct reaction to the Sharia issue in the North during the same year (Ikeh, 2021). Similarly, the Yoruba leaders had a conference on October 8, 2015, in Ibadan, where a communiqué was subsequently released and was seen as a secession threat. This was in response to the abduction and mistreatment of one of their leaders, Chief Olu Falae, by the Fulani herdsmen in the South-west region (This Day, 2016). The northern youths issued a separatist warning in response to the Yoruba Nation campaigns. This led to a violent conflict between the Hausa community and the native Yoruba community in Shasa Market. The conflict began on Thursday, February 11, and escalated on Friday, February 12, resulting in numerous fatalities (Daily Trust, 2023).

Since its emergence, BH's activities have posed a significant security threat using a separatist platform, which has severely hindered socio-economic development in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. The region, characterised by its diverse cultural and economic activities, has witnessed a dramatic shift in its socio-economic landscape due to the BH conflicts. The insurgency has led to widespread displacement, loss of lives, and destruction of property, which have further exacerbated poverty and unemployment rates in the region (Sahara Reporters, 2018). Key sectors such as agriculture and trade, which are the mainstay of the region's economy, have been severely disrupted (UN Department of State, 2021). Educational institutions have been targeted, decreasing educational opportunities and literacy rates (Awotokun & Omotayo, 2018). The healthcare system, already under-resourced, has been overwhelmed due to the crisis, impacting the delivery of essential health services (Nwogu & Ijirshar, 2023). The cumulative effect of these obstacles poses a significant threat to the long-term socio-

economic stability and development of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem

Previous studies have left a vacuum in the study of separatist movements. For example, Nwogu and Ijirshar (2023) reported that the persistent separatist activities have created an environment of insecurity and instability, hindering the normal functioning of communities, resulting from frequent attacks, abductions, and bombings have instilled fear, disrupted daily life, and displaced a significant portion of the population, making it challenging to implement development projects. Udeh *et al.* (2023) added that insecurity caused by separatist movements has disrupted the region's economic activities. Agricultural productivity has declined due to farmers' inability to access their fields, and businesses have suffered because of the volatile security situation. These disruptions have adversely affected livelihoods and overall economic growth (Ansolabehere & Puy, 2022).

Despite recognising these challenges, there remains a gap in comprehensive empirical research that quantifies and elucidates how separatist movements have affected the socio-economic development of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States specifically. Understanding the extent of these impacts is crucial for formulating effective policies and interventions aimed at rehabilitation and sustainable development. This study seeks to fill this gap by providing a detailed analysis of the various socio-economic dimensions affected by the insurgency, specifically on 2 components: agricultural activities, HCD. As a result, the main aim is to investigate the impact of separatist movements on the socioeconomic development of North-Eastern Nigeria, while the specific research objectives are:

1. To examine the effect of the insurgency of BH on the agricultural activities of Borno, Yola and Adamawa States and
2. To investigate the influence of BH insurgency on HCD in Borno, Yola and Adamawa States.

2.0 Literature Review

Separatist Movement

The concept of a separatist movement has been discussed widely among scholars and professionals in the social and management sciences as a group's efforts to gain political independence for a region within a country or to break away from the existing national government (Thomas & Falola, 2020). This movement usually emerges in a region or community that feels culturally, ethnically, religiously, or economically distinct from the larger nation it currently belongs to (Davis, 2016; Joseph, 2017). The challenges posed by such movements are complex and multifaceted, often requiring a delicate balance of political negotiation, economic development, and respect for cultural and regional identities (Kilybayev & Esteusizov, 2019; Trajano, 2020; Lavina, 2023). From a political science perspective, Goddy *et al.* (2025) defined separatist movements as organised efforts by a distinct group within a state to achieve political autonomy or complete independence, often justified by claims of cultural, ethnic, or historical uniqueness.

Boko-Haram Insurgency

The concept of BH insurgency in the Northeast of Nigeria refers to the violent activities and uprisings led by the extremist group known as BH. The group, whose name roughly translates to "Western education is forbidden" in the Hausa language, has been active predominantly in the northeastern regions of Nigeria, though its influence and

attacks have also extended to neighbouring countries. According to Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013), the insurgency has had a devastating impact on the Northeast region of Nigeria. It has resulted in the displacement of millions of people, creating a massive humanitarian crisis with refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The continuous conflict has disrupted socio-economic activities, particularly agriculture and trade, which are the mainstays of the region's economy (Ojo, 2023). Likewise, education has also been severely impacted, with schools destroyed and children often being the direct targets of violence (Aladekomo, 2021).

Socio-Economic Development in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States

Socio-economic development means improving a society's well-being, quality of life, and prosperity by addressing and enhancing various social and economic factors (Rawlings, 2013). However, the specific strategies and priorities for socio-economic development can vary greatly from one country or region to another, depending on their unique circumstances and challenges (Ugwuala, 2022; Olasupo *et al.,* 2021; Danfulani & Atowoju, 2012).

a. **Agricultural Activities:** Various reports have highlighted that agriculture remains the primary livelihood source for rural populations in Sub-Saharan Africa (FAO, 2021), yet it is increasingly threatened by insecurity, displacement, and climate change. Studies by Iversen *et al.* (2020) demonstrate how insurgency and land conflicts significantly reduce agricultural productivity, limit access to arable land, and disrupt supply chains. For example, in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, the BH insurgency has reportedly led to farm abandonment, food insecurity, and rural poverty (Ajakaiye *et al.*, 2019). Thus, agricultural activities are not merely economic pursuits but are deeply embedded in a region's stability, population displacement patterns, and resilience capacities (Hassan *et al.*, 2020; Awofeso, 2017). Many farmers have been forced to abandon their fields due to the fear of attacks, leading to decreased agricultural production and food insecurity in the region. This disruption of agricultural activities has affected people's livelihoods and strained the country's food supply chain (Obinna & Arikenbi, 2023).

b. **HCD:** Reports have equally shown that the majority of these BH regions afflicted by conflict and poor governance suffer from arrested HCD progress (Adepoju, 2019; UNDP, 2020). In Nigeria's conflict zones, school closures, teacher shortages, and widespread trauma have weakened the educational system, while health emergencies further deplete the working-age population. According to Olanrewaju *et al.* (2021), conflict-induced disruptions in schooling and training limit the potential for future workforce participation and economic recovery. For example, Obinna and Arikenbi (2023) admitted that BH targeted schools and educational institutions, leading to the abduction of schoolchildren, teachers, and students. This has created a climate of fear and insecurity, discouraging parents from sending their children to school (Obinna & Arikenbi, 2023). As a result, there has been a decline in enrollment and a setback in educational attainment in affected areas. The lack of access to quality education has long-term implications for HCD in Nigeria, as it hinders the acquisition of the skills and knowledge necessary for socio-economic progress (Obinna & Arikenbi, 2023).

Empirical Review and Hypothesis Development

According to George (2021), agricultural productivity in States like Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa declined significantly due to fear, insecurity, and mass displacement. Supporting this, Targba (2022) argued that the insurgency triggered a humanitarian crisis that affected food security at both household and regional levels, with more than 70% of farmers abandoning their farms between 2013 and 2015. In contrast, some studies, such as Nwangwu (2025), offer a broader structural perspective, arguing that while the BH crisis is a major aggravator, it is not the root cause of declining agricultural activities in the sampled states.

H_{01}: The insurgency of BH has no significant impact on the agricultural activities of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States.

Klebanova *et al.* (2024) discuss that the concept of HCD encompasses education, health, skills acquisition, and workforce productivity, which the persistent insecurity in the region has severely undermined. For example, according to Omotoso (2023), the insurgency has led to the destruction of over 1,400 schools, disrupted academic calendars, and forced over 2.8 million people into IDP camps. This disruption has stifled educational attainment and denied millions of children and youths' access to quality education, an essential driver of human capital (Benson, 2022). In contrast to the widely accepted negative impacts, Boiko *et al.* (2025) have pointed to adaptive resilience and the role of non-state actors in mitigating the crisis. For instance, Ifejika and Ojo (2024) argue that faith-based and non-governmental organisations have helped sustain basic educational services and healthcare delivery in IDP camps and remote communities. However, Prieto *et al.* (2020) argue that these efforts are fragmented, underfunded, and lack the systemic backing of government institutions, limiting their long-term developmental impact (Orji *et al.*, 2020; Olanrewaju & Balana, 2021).

H02: The activities of the BH insurgency have no significant effect on HCD in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States.

Theoretical Framework

Relative Deprivation Theory

Runciman (1966) first formulated the relative deprivation hypothesis to elucidate England's attitudes towards socioeconomic disparity over the twentieth century. The central principle of relative deprivation theory posits that individuals who lack essential or highly valued resources in their society, such as social status, wealth, rights, and justice, are more likely to participate in social movements in the belief or anticipation that their grievances or discontent will be addressed. Runciman (1966) identifies two types of deprivation: egoistic deprivation, which pertains to an individual's sense of relative disadvantage, and fraternal deprivation, also known as group deprivation, which relates to the unhappiness experienced by a whole group in comparison to a reference group.

Meanwhile, Anyachukwudinarum et al. (2024) have criticised this theory for its inability to account for the reasons why some individuals who experience marginalisation refrain from participating in social movements. Klebanova et al. (2024) have challenged this idea by arguing that it overlooks the influence of an additional component, namely individual or collective will, in driving social movements. The word 'will' implies that people are driven or compelled to participate in a social movement that they feel may address their dissatisfaction or marginalisation in society and strive towards resolving the discrimination they encounter.

Failed State Theory

Helman and Ratner (1992) developed the failed state theory to defend US behaviour toward non-Western nations after the Cold War. In 1994, the United Nations launched the State Collapse Task Force, which created a worldwide forecasting model to differentiate between nations prone to collapse and those likely to maintain stability. The Task Force delineated the fundamental characteristics of state failure as (1) revolutionary wars, (2) ethnic conflicts, (3) detrimental regime transitions, and (4) genocides (Collier & Hoeffler, 2014; Fearon, 2017). According to their theory, a failed state is defined by the absence of physical sovereignty over its territory or a monopoly on the lawful use of force. Furthermore, it lacks the capability to provide public services, engage with other governments as a complete member of the global community, or efficiently control its people (Reynal-Querol, 2012). The degradation of state functions may arise from internal reasons such as inefficient governance or corruption, as well as external forces like economic sanctions or military action.

3.0 Research Methodology

The study used a survey research approach to get the necessary information from the intended participants directly. The selection of a survey research design is based on its efficacy and practicality in answering the study's research inquiries. A quantitative research approach was adopted for this study because the research problem cannot be fully studied, the research questions cannot be appropriately answered, and the research objectives cannot be achieved without collecting and analysing data for the study. The population for this study comprises all stakeholders in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, including members of the local communities, indigenous groups, government and private sector employees, members of NGOs, government agency representatives, and separatists. The sampling size for this research was determined using the Online Raosoft Sample Size Calculator to arrive at 384 from the three states' population of 13,686,715 based on NBS, 2022.

The stratified random sampling technique was also employed to categorise the population into homogenous subgroups. An independent simple random technique will then be drawn from each group. This was necessary to guarantee sufficiency and equitable representation of the sample. The probability sampling method is warranted due to the expense and time required to encompass all clusters. Hence, choosing a simple random sampling technique becomes a good option because of the difficulty of obtaining a sample frame for administering the study's instrument to select each respondent from the quota allotted to the state.

The various socioeconomic development dimensions were measured using items adapted from studies of Abada and Ngwu (2019). Some items relating to agricultural activities and ecological impact were adapted from the questionnaire used by Rasaki (2022); while the pattern of internal displacement was adapted from the works of Johnson and Rodriguez (2019). Items adapted from Aktürk (2021) measured employment opportunities. The study also adopted items from previous studies (Olasupo *et al.*, 2021) that successfully used survey questionnaires to measure the local communities' indigenes development. The study adopts Karasek's Job Content Questionnaire (JCQ) version 1.8 (revised 2007), which was measured using a 5-point Likert Scale from strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), neutral (3), agree (4), strongly agree (5). The structured questionnaire was utilised primarily to improve answer uniformity, considering that variances in replies are likely to be significant when addressing

complex topics such as separatist movements and socio-economic growth.

Reliability and Validity

The reliability test was conducted using item-total correlation and Cronbach's Alpha for the individual scales. Items were determined to be internally consistent and reliable if they reported a minimum item-total correlation coefficient of 0.40. Carter and Lee (2018) asserted that reliability coefficients ranging from -0.26 to +0.26 are usually significant at the 0.01 level if the sample size is 100 or above, and that such scales provided consistent and reliable scores. Cronbach's Alpha for the scales is above 0.70, recommended in the literature (Wilson, 2014; Taylor *et al.*, 2007). Thus, the internal consistency of the measures will not be doubted as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: KMO and Bartlett's Test

Construct	No. of Items	KMO	Bartlett's Test	Sig.
Insurgency of BH	10	0.754	1897.003	0.000
Agricultural activities	10	0.765	4534.527	0.000
HCD	12	0.772	1273.954	0.000

The data was collected using a primary method of a self-administered questionnaire. To administer the instrument, an official letter was obtained from the Institute of Governance and Development Studies to seek approval for this research. This was achieved by recruiting and training three Field Assistants (FAs) to administer the questionnaire. The FA was recruited and trained from the sampled states (Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa) to administer the questionnaire and other associated social issues. The criteria for the selection were that FAs reside in sampled states for convenience and easy access to the respondents.

Data were analysed using both descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. The descriptive statistics were used to: present the main characteristics of the data collected, describe the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, analyse the questionnaires, and answer the research questions. Furthermore, inferential statistics were employed using bivariate correlation and multiple regression analysis to analyse the relationships between the independent variable, separatist movement, and the dependent variable, socioeconomic development. It was used to test the effect of the hypothesis and allow for the generalisation of the findings to a larger population.

4.0 Results and Discussion

This section presents the socio-demographic features of respondents about the many social and demographic elements that delineate the stakeholders involved in a study. Table 2 presents the attributes for testing the significance of comprehending and evaluating the sample population's makeup to aid in making significant findings.

Table 2: Participants' Socio-demographic

Construct	Dimensions	N	%
Gender	Female	158	41,1%
	Male	226	58,9%
Age	<30 years	95	24,7%
	30 - 39 years	102	26,6%
	40 - 49 years	79	20,6%
	>50 years	108	28,1%
Marital Status	Single	98	25,5%
	Married	252	65,6%
	Separated/Divorced/Widowed	34	8,9%
Education	Secondary School Education	35	9,1%
	OND/NCE or equivalent	75	19,5%
	HND/Bachelor	144	37,5%
	Postgraduate	70	18,2%
	Islamic Certificate	24	6,3%
	Others, Primary School, No School etc	36	9,4%
Nature of Stakeholders	Member of the community in the NER	81	21,1%
	Government/Private Employees	118	30,7%
	Member of NGOs	36	9,4%
	Government Agency Rep	29	7,6%
	Member of Separatists/Repentant	36	9,4%
	Others	84	21,9%
How long have you been living or working in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, Nigeria	<5 years	91	23,7%
	5 - 9 years	57	14,8%
	10 - 14 years	47	12,2%
	>15 years	89	23,2%
	Not applicable	100	26,0%
	Total	**384**	**100**

Source: SPSS v30 Output, 2025

Gender: Female (41.1%), Male (58.9%). Most respondents are male. **Age:** <30 years (24.7%), 30–39 years (26.6%), 40–49 years (20.6%), >50 years (28.1%). The population is spread across age groups, with young adults and older individuals well represented. This implies that younger respondents (under 40 years, 51.3%) are at the most economically productive stage of life. **Marital Status:** Single (25.5%), Married (65.6%), Separated/Divorced/Widowed (8.9%). The majority are married, showing a family-based social structure. **Education:** Secondary (9.1%), OND/NCE (19.5%), HND/Bachelor (37.5%), Postgraduate (18.2%), Islamic Certificate (6.3%), Others/No School (9.4%). Most participants have a tertiary education, but a non-negligible portion (15.7%) have little to no

formal education. **Nature of Stakeholders:** Community members (21.1%), Govt/Private employees (30.7%), NGOs (9.4%), Govt reps (7.6%), Separatists/Repentant (9.4%), others (21.9%). This represents the broad representation of stakeholder categories. However, the implication of this diversity reflects the multifaceted effects of separatism. **Duration of Stay/Work in state:** <5 years (23.7%), 5–9 years (14.8%), 10–14 years (12.2%), >15 years (23.2%), Not applicable (26.0%). Respondents have varying degrees of exposure to separatist activities. The implication is that long-term residents (>15 years) bring perspectives on how prolonged separatist conflict has eroded infrastructure, disrupted agriculture/commerce, and reduced social cohesion.

Test of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1

H_{01}: The insurgency of BH has no significant impact on the agricultural activities of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States.

Table 3: The contribution of the insurgency of BH to the agricultural activities

Model	R	R^2	Adjusted R^2	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,675[a]	,455	,454	,916	
2	,725[b]	,525	,522	,856	2,159

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
2	Regression	308,773	2	154,386	210,476	<,001[c]
	Residual	279,467	381	,734		
	Total	588,240	383			

a. Dependent Variable: Access to agricultural extension services and support has been limited in the state due to the insurgency.
b. Predictors: (Constant), BH attacks have disrupted the transportation of agricultural products to markets in the state
Source: SPSS v30 Output, 2025

Table 3 presents the contributions of the insurgency of BH and its significant impact on the agricultural activities of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. The R = 0.675 shows a strong positive relationship between BH insurgency and access to agricultural extension services/support. The R^2 = 0.455 (45.5%) shows that about 45.5% of the variance in access to agricultural services is explained by BH's disruption of agricultural product transportation, while the adjusted R^2 = 0.454 indicates the model is stable with very little difference from R^2.

The ANOVA shows that the overall regression model is highly significant, F(2, 381) = 210.476, p < 0.001. This indicates that BH's attacks (disrupting transportation and destroying farm assets) are not random influences but have a measurable effect on agricultural activities. The Durbin-Watson Statistic Value = 2.159 falls within the acceptable range (1.5 – 2.5), suggesting that the residuals are independent and no autocorrelation problem exists in the regression. The strong predictor of reduced access to agricultural extension services and support shows that the BH insurgency significantly affects agricultural activities in the selected states.

Table 4: Coefficients contribution of the insurgency of BH to the agricultural activities

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	,985	,154		6,410	<,001	,683	1,287
	AA01	,695	,039	,675	17,863	<,001	,619	,772
2	(Constant)	,466	,160		2,919	,004	,152	,779
	AA02	,438	,050	,425	8,766	<,001	,340	,537
	AA03	,403	,054	,363	7,481	<,001	,297	,509

a. Dependent Variable: Access to agricultural extension services and support has been limited in the state due to the insurgency.

Source: SPSS v30 Output, 2025

Table 4 further shows the contribution of the insurgency of BH to the agricultural activities. The first model on AA01 (The BH insurgency has led to a decrease in the availability of agricultural resources) ($B = 0.695$, $\beta = 0.675$, $t = 17.863$, $p < 0.001$). This shows the positive relationship, indicating that the insurgency strongly affects agricultural activities (through reduced access to agricultural extension services), and the confidence interval (0.619 – 0.772) does not cross zero, strengthening the evidence.

Both models' intercepts are significant ($p < 0.01$), but the more important interpretation lies in the constructs' contributions. However, all constructs (01, 02, and 03) show strong, statistically significant effects ($p < 0.001$) on the dependent variable. The results clearly demonstrate that the insurgency of BH significantly negatively impacts agricultural activities in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States; hence, the null hypothesis was rejected.

Hypothesis 2

H_{02}: The activities of the BH insurgency have no significant effect on HCD in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States.

Table 5: The contribution of the activities of the BH insurgency to HCD

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	,543[a]	,295	,293	1,024	
2	,559[b]	,313	,309	1,012	1,957

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	167,365	1	167,365	159,618	<,001[b]
	Residual	400,541	382	1,049		
	Total	567,906	383			
2	Regression	177,480	2	88,740	86,598	<,001[c]
	Residual	390,426	381	1,025		
	Total	567,906	383			

a. Dependent Variable: Local communities and NGOs have played a significant role in mitigating the impact of the BH insurgency on HCD.
b. Predictors: (Constant), The BH insurgency has disrupted access to education in the state

Source: SPSS v30 Output, 2025

Table 5 presents the activities of the BH insurgency and its significant effect on HCD in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. The R = 0.543 shows a moderate positive correlation between the disruption of education by the BH insurgency and HCD. Also, the R^2 = 0.295 (29.5%), which means about 29.5% of the variation in HCD is explained by the disruption of education. The Adjusted R^2 = 0.293 is the explanatory power is still stable at 29.3% and Durbin-Watson is not reported in Model 1, so autocorrelation was not tested here.

The ANOVA (Model Significance) F = 159.618, Sig. < 0.001 is statistically significant, which means that the disruption of access to education alone has a significant effect on HCD. For the second model, F = 86.598, Sig. < 0.001 is statistically significant. The implication is that education disruption and limited economic opportunities due to BH are statistically significant predictors of human capital outcomes. Meanwhile, the contributions of the predictors with respect to education disruption (Model 1) explain nearly 30% of the variance in HCD. This suggests education disruption is the primary driver, while loss of economic opportunities makes an additional but smaller contribution.

Table 6: Coefficients contribution of the activities of the BH insurgency to HCD

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	1,556	,164		9,504	<,001	1,234	1,878
	HCD01	,539	,043	,543	12,634	<,001	,455	,623
2	(Constant)	1,253	,188		6,657	<,001	,883	1,624
	HCD02	,163	,052	,159	3,142	,002	,061	,264

a. Dependent Variable: Local communities and NGOs have played a significant role in mitigating the impact of the BH insurgency on HCD.

Source: SPSS v30 Output, 2025

Table 6 presents the contribution of the activities of the BH insurgency to HCD in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States, Nigeria. The table presents two constructs (HCD01: The BH insurgency has disrupted access to education in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States and HCD02: The quality of education in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States has been negatively affected by the BH insurgency), each with regression coefficients predicting the dependent variable: HCD01: B: 0.539; t-value: 12.634; p < 0.001, meaning for every unit increase in Construct 01, the dependent variable increases by 0.539 units. HCD01 (likely representing a major dimension of BH insurgency impact) positively and significantly contributes to HCD outcomes via community/NGO mitigation. Construct 02: B: 0.163; t-value: 3.142; p = 0.002, which is a smaller contribution compared to Construct 01. Construct 02 has a smaller but still significant effect on HCD. The evidence does not support this claim. Both constructs are statistically significant (p < 0.05), meaning BH insurgency activities significantly affect HCD. Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, the

activities of the BH insurgency significantly affect HCD in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States at a 5% significance level.

Discussion of Findings

The findings of this study reveal that the BH insurgency has had a significant adverse effect on agricultural activities in the selected states. This outcome aligns with earlier research consistently showing that violent conflicts disrupt farming systems by displacing farmers, destroying farmlands, and reducing access to agricultural inputs and markets. For instance, Rasaki (2022) observed that the insurgency in North-East Nigeria led to widespread abandonment of farmlands as rural communities fled attacks, resulting in severe declines in crop yields and food supply (Singh, 2022). Similarly, Edwards *et al.* (2016) reported that insurgency-related insecurity discouraged cultivation and livestock rearing, thereby weakening the region's agricultural base.

Earlier works by Benjamin (2021) emphasised displacement and reduced labour availability as central consequences of insurgency, but the present result highlights how sustained insecurity has deepened food insecurity and rural poverty across these states. The prolonged attacks have limited access to farmland, markets, and agricultural credit facilities, making recovery difficult even in relatively safer zones (Uvere, 2025). This is consistent with more recent analyses by FAO (2018), which note that the BH crisis has created long-term structural barriers to agricultural productivity.

The findings of this study indicate that the BH insurgency has significantly affected HCD in the selected states. This outcome aligns with previous studies that have consistently demonstrated the devastating impact of insurgency on education, health, and overall human development in conflict-affected regions. For instance, Afifudin (2025) found that persistent attacks on schools and abductions of students not only disrupted the education system but also created a climate of fear that discouraged school attendance. Similarly, Bratko *et al.* (2021) observed that the destruction of infrastructure, displacement of communities, and targeted violence against teachers and students severely weakened human capital accumulation in the North-East.

Furthermore, the present results extend the work of scholars such as Olawumi (2023), who argued that the BH insurgency has created a generational setback in HCD due to large-scale displacement, loss of livelihoods, and restricted access to essential social services. In parallel, Harefa and Harsono (2025) reported that millions of children in the North-East were deprived of formal education and healthcare because of insurgency-related insecurity, corroborating the significant effect highlighted in this study. While some interventions by governments and NGOs have sought to mitigate these challenges, the sustained intensity of the insurgency has meant that recovery has been slow and uneven (Paalo *et al.*, 2024).

5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

It was discovered that the persistence of separatist agitations, coupled with armed insurgency, has had profound impacts on economic productivity within the region. Indeed, beyond the immediate destruction of infrastructure, the protracted conflict has disrupted agricultural output, trade networks, education, and healthcare delivery, creating a cycle of poverty and instability. These socio-economic distortions have further deepened grievances, indirectly sustaining the very separatist sentiments the state seeks to quell. It was evident that agricultural productivity has suffered substantial declines due to the destruction of farmlands, restricted access to arable land, and the displacement of farming communities. This is also premised on HCD,

which has been severely undermined through the destruction of schools, loss of skilled professionals, and interruptions in education and vocational training. Likewise, the internal displacement and forced migration have destabilised community structures, strained host communities, and exacerbated competition over scarce resources.

Based on the study's findings and the conclusions drawn from them, the following recommendations are made:

a. The various security operations should be complemented with agricultural recovery programmes and job creation initiatives with respect to agri-business to address both the symptoms and root causes of instability in these states. This will help secure farming zones, subsidised inputs, and irrigation support while facilitating displaced farmers' access to markets.

b. There should be more efforts by various governments to rebuild and secure educational facilities, implement mobile schooling in IDP camps, and incentivise the return of trained professionals. Aside from that, there is a need to invest in vocational training linked to local market demands to reduce youth unemployment and radicalisation risks.

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