
WUKARI INTERNATIONAL STUDIES JOURNAL

VOLUME 9, ISSUE 1, APRIL 2025



WUKARI INTERNATIONAL STUDIES JOURNAL

VOLUME 9, ISSUE 1, APRIL 2025

Domiciled in the Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Federal University Wukari-Taraba State

ISSN: 2756-4649

Wukari International Studies Journal is an annual publication of Wukari International Studies Group (WISG), domiciled in the Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Federal University Wukari-Taraba State. WISG follows the double blind peer review process. All manuscripts are reviewed by an editor and members of the Editorial Board or qualified outside reviewers. Decisions will be made as quickly as possible, and the WISG strives to return reviewers' comments to author (s) within 4 weeks for final corrections where necessary. Interested scholars are advised to contact the managing editor via wisjournal@gmail.com or/and 07037694253 for submission of papers for subsequent editions.

*Published materials under **Wukari International Studies Group** can be re-used without permission as long as proper citation to the original publication is given; peer-reviewed articles are freely available without subscription or price barriers; and articles are immediately released in open access format with no embargo period.*

Please be aware that certain content, including tables, figures, and text in articles, may come from other sources. In this situation, you should find out whether this content is reusable by contacting the original copyright holder (often the original publisher or writers). Our Journals are licensed as open access with CC BY 4.0 Attribution. This means authors retain full copyright of their publications.

EDITORIAL BOARD

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Professor Shishi Zhema	Department of History & Diplomatic Studies Federal University, Wukari, Taraba State

EDITORS

Prof. J.P. Dada	Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Federal University, Wukari
Prof. Sam O. Aghalino	Department of History, University of Ilorin
Dr. Victor Lukpata	Department of Political Science, Federal University, Wukari
Prof. Lemuel E. Odeh	Department of History, University of Ilorin
Prof. Usman Muhammed	Department of Political Science, Kaduna State University
Dr. Pally Ejime Agidi	Department of Political Science, University of Agbor
Dr. Christopher Ngara	National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies
Dr. Raji, Adesina Abdulfattah	Department of Political Science,Fountain University, Osogbo
Dr. Philip T.Vande	Department of Political Science,Federal University Lokoja

EDITORIAL SECRETARY

Dr. Ochoga Edwin Ochoga	Department of Political Science Federal University Lokoja

EDITORIAL ADVISORY GROUP

Prof. Pita Ogaba Agbese	Department of Political Science,University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, USA
Prof. Adagba Okpaga	Department of Political Science,Benue State University, Makurdi
Prof. Saliba James	Department of History, University Maidugari
Prof. Audu N. Sambo	Department of Political Science ,University of Jos
Prof. Yabuku A. Ochefu	Department of History,Benue State University, Makurdi
Prof. Sunday P. Bako	Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria
Prof. Barnes Anger	Department of Political Science, Benue State University, Makurdi
Prof. Moses E. Ochonu	Department of History, Vanderbilt University, Nashville Tennessee.
Associate Prof. Alio Mahaman	Department of History, Université Abdou Moumouni of Niamey, Republic of Niger

TABLE OF CONTENT

IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN DELTA STATE 1

ARMED BANDITRY IN ADARALAND: A STUDY OF HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND THE PLIGHT OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 9

GIRLS AND SCHOOL-RELATED GENDER BASED VIOLENCE IN AFRICA 17

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN SECURITY: AN EVALUATION OF SHELL'S CSR INITIATIVES IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES OF RIVERS STATE 27

KIDNAPPING AND NIGERIA'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC 38

AN ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES PERFORMANCE IN NIGERIA: AN EXAMINATION OF 2023 GENERAL ELECTIONS 50

CHALLENGES MILITATING AGAINST INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (IFAD) IN IMPLEMENTING RURAL AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN NIGERIA 63

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AND RESILLIENCE OF DISPLACED WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN SHIRORO LGA, NIGER STATE 79

FEMINISM AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN NORTHEASTERN NIGERIA: A REVIEW 91

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DIFFERENT APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 99

THE ROLE OF LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL AFFINITIES IN THE DYNAMICS OF ECOWAS AND THE AU 106

APPRAISAL OF SOCIAL LISTENING STRATEGIES FOR BRAND IMAGE DEVELOPMENT OF GRAND CEREALS COMPANY PRODUCTS IN PLATEAU STATE 118

THE USE OF PHOTOBOOKS TO DISSEMINATE AND GENERATE MORE AWARENESS ON RABIES AMONG THE GENERAL PUBLIC 131

MANIPULATION OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT IN THE 2023 GENERAL ELECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS ON NIGERIA'S UNITY 134

IMPACT OF THE HADEJA JAMA'ARE RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (HJRBDA) ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND FOOD SECURITY IN JIGAWA STATE 145

EFFECTS OF CRUDE OIL THEFT ON INTERNAL SECURITY OF DELTA STATE 155

THE IMPACT OF OIL RESOURCE MISMANAGEMENT (1958-1992) ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND PATHS FOR THE FUTURE 166

AN EVALUATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN KWARA STATE UNDER A DEMOCRATIC SETTING: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (1999-2015) 179

WOMEN POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN NIGERIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE NIGERIAN WOMEN TRUST FUND (NWTF): FOURTH REPUBLIC IN FOCUS 190

EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE AND ITS EFFECTS ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN JOS PLATEAU STATE 200

TECHNOLOGICAL SELF-EFFICACY AND ONLINE DATABASE ACCESS AS PREDICTORS OF AI USABILITY FOR RESEARCH AMONG SOCIAL SCIENCES LECTURERS IN OYO STATE COLLEGES OF EDUCATION 210

NIGER MILITARY CRISIS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PROLIFERATION OF ARMS: DRAWING LESSONS FROM LIBYA 222

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA'S POLITICAL EVOLUTION, 1966-1979 231

AFFORESTATION AS A MECHANISM FOR MITIGATING VIOLENT CONFLICTS BETWEEN FARMERS AND HERDERS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 243

IMPACT OF THE STATE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE AN EXPOSITORY ANALYSIS OF ROAD, ELECTRICITY AND HEALTH 260

IMPACT OF PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN DELTA STATE

ADAMS ANDREW ATTAH
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES, FEDERAL COLLEGE OF EDUCATION (TECHNICAL) ASABA, adambless2017@gmail.com

KEYWORDS
Impact, Presidential Amnesty, Security Challenges

ABSTRACT
The Federal Government of Nigeria introduced the Amnesty Policy in 2009 to address security challenges in the Niger Delta, particularly in Delta State, where militant activities had resulted in widespread destruction of lives, properties, and critical infrastructure, notably within the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. This study critically examines the impact of the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) on security in Delta State, with a focus on its Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) components. While previous studies have largely assessed the PAP's short-term effectiveness in curbing militancy, this research contributes to the literature by providing a nuanced analysis of the programme's long-term implications for security and economic stability. Using the Frustration-Aggression theory, the study argues that decades of neglect and underdevelopment in Delta State fueled grievances that catalyzed militancy. Unlike previous research, which often measures security improvements through statistical crime reduction, this study incorporates qualitative insights from ex-militants and local stakeholders to assess how sustainable peace is contingent on addressing the underlying socio-economic issues. Data was gathered through a qualitative research approach, utilizing both primary and secondary sources. Findings suggest that while the Amnesty Programme has contributed to improved security and increased crude oil production, its failure to address the structural drivers of conflict—such as poverty, unemployment, and environmental degradation—poses a risk of renewed unrest. This study, therefore, advances the discourse by emphasizing the limitations of security-focused interventions and recommending a more holistic approach that integrates economic and social reforms for lasting peace in Delta State and the broader Niger Delta region.

Introduction

The discovery of crude oil in Nigeria's Niger Delta in 1958 marked a significant turning point for both the region and the nation. Prior to oil exploration, the Niger Delta was an unspoiled ecosystem that sustained indigenous livelihoods through farming, fishing, and artisanal crafts such as pottery and mat-making (Afinotan, 2019). However, with the first commercial oil discovery at Oloibiri in 1956 by Shell-BP, oil quickly became Nigeria's primary economic resource, contributing over 90 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings (Aaron, 2010; Owugah, 2018). While the Nigerian state celebrated oil as a catalyst for economic growth, the local populations in the Niger Delta perceived it as a source of hardship. The consequences of oil extraction—environmental degradation, resource depletion, and socio-economic marginalization—led to a paradox where oil wealth at the national level coexisted with extreme poverty and disenfranchisement in oil-producing communities (Omotola, 2017; Owugah, 2018).

The causes and consequences of Niger Delta militancy is the persistent neglect of host communities, coupled with environmental pollution, including violent resistance against both the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies (Owugah, 2018; Omotola, 2017). The formation of militant groups, from the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) in 1966 to the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in 2006, is widely attributed to grievances stemming from land dispossession, political exclusion, and economic deprivation (Aaron, 2021; Eseduwo, 2020). Previous research has established that the violence in Delta State and other parts of the Niger Delta significantly disrupted oil production, exacerbating national security challenges (Alagoa, 2016). Additionally, the role of multinational corporations in exacerbating local discontent has been well documented, with scholars like Watts (2019) highlighting the extractive industry's complicity in socio-political instability.

The Nigerian government, under President Umaru Yar'Adua, introduced the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) in 2009, adopting the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) framework (Berdal, 2020). DDR had previously been used successfully in post-conflict settings such as Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to reintegrate former combatants and promote regional stability (Muggah, 2021). The Amnesty Programme in Nigeria aimed to restore security in the Niger Delta by pacifying militant groups, rehabilitating ex-combatants, and reintegrating them into society (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2020; United Nations, 2020). However, while several studies acknowledge the program's short-term successes in reducing violence and increasing crude oil production (Aghedo, 2013; Ukiwo, 2016), gaps remain in assessing its long-term sustainability. Critics argue that the program failed to address the root causes of militancy, including widespread poverty, unemployment, and environmental degradation (Ibaba& Okolo, 2021).

This study extends the existing scholarship by critically analyzing the Amnesty Programme's impact on security in Delta State. While prior research has focused on macro-level assessments of the PAP, this study employs a qualitative approach that integrates perspectives from ex-militants, local community members, and government officials. By applying the Frustration-Aggression theory, the study highlights how socio-economic deprivation remains a persistent driver of insecurity, despite the amnesty initiative. Unlike previous studies that emphasize the DDR framework's technical effectiveness, this paper interrogates the deeper structural challenges that undermine lasting peace in the region. The research argues that the continued failure to address these fundamental issues could lead to a resurgence of militancy, posing renewed threats to both national security and economic stability. By bridging this gap in the literature, this study not only critiques the amnesty model but also contributes to the discourse on sustainable peacebuilding in post-conflict regions.

Statement of the Problem

While the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) has been credited with reducing militant violence and stabilizing crude oil production in the Niger Delta, its long-term effectiveness remains uncertain. The deployment of the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) to restore order and secure economic activities has yielded limited success, as militant groups continue to exploit gaps in governance and security frameworks. One of the primary concerns is the inadequacy of the disarmament and demobilization process, which prioritizes the physical surrender of weapons without addressing the deeper socio-political and economic drivers of militancy. The

absence of a sustainable reintegration strategy leaves ex-combatants vulnerable to rearmament, recruitment by political factions, or re-engagement in violent activities.

Furthermore, multinational oil companies, often accused of exacerbating environmental degradation and human rights abuses, have not fully addressed local grievances related to compensation, resource control, and community development. Despite the introduction of the Amnesty Programme in 2009, many parts of Delta State continue to suffer from persistent insecurity, economic stagnation, and uncompleted development projects. These unresolved issues raise critical concerns about the long-term viability of PAP as a conflict resolution mechanism and its capacity to foster sustainable peace.

This study, therefore, interrogates the structural weaknesses of the Amnesty Programme, specifically its implementation in Delta State, and examines its implications for security, governance, and economic stability. It also analyses the disconnect between short-term disarmament strategies and the broader socio-economic realities of the Niger Delta, and contributes to existing scholarship by critically assessing the limitations of DDR in addressing deep-rooted conflicts. The research ultimately argues that unless the underlying grievances of Niger Delta communities—poverty, environmental destruction, and political exclusion—are addressed, the region remains at risk of renewed violence, undermining national security and economic stability.

Clarification of Concepts

Security

When considering the concept of security, it it is essential to ask: what exactly is security? This question is far from trivial, as it assumes that security is a tangible condition that exists independently of the way it is discussed in everyday conversations. Security, therefore, refers to an actual state of existence, which has been understood in various ways throughout history. For instance, in the field of International Relations, the debate between Realism and Idealism has framed security as either a relative condition in the present or an absolute state to be achieved in the future. In both cases, security is presented as something objective that can be defined, measured, and improved.

From this perspective, security is often considered a condition where the likelihood of threats to certain values is low. Baldwin (2021) defines security as “a low probability of damage to acquired values,” while Krause and Nye (2020) describe it as “the absence of acute threats to the minimal acceptable levels of the basic values that a people consider essential to its survival.” These definitions capture the essence of security, emphasizing its role in safeguarding essential values. However, security can be understood in various ways depending on the context. The key question for studying security is: security for whom? It may refer to individuals, states, or even non-human entities such as animal life or environmental protection. In contemporary discourse, security is often treated as a "good" that societies should actively work toward, as it is seen as vital for the survival and well-being of both individuals and states.

Amnesty

Amnesty is often viewed as a political instrument of reconciliation granted by a sovereign authority to individuals who have committed acts against the state, such as treason or rebellion. O'Shea (2021) defines amnesty as a political tool that offers immunity from criminal or civil consequences for politically motivated crimes, including treason and sedition. Similarly, Epiphany (2020) describes amnesty as a government action that grants immunity to individuals or groups involved in criminal activities that threaten the sovereignty of the state. This immunity allows the government to “forgive” past wrongs before legal prosecution can take place.

Mallinder (2020) further elaborates on amnesty, suggesting that it is a form of trade-off that sacrifices some aspects of justice in the interest of fostering transition, peace, reconciliation, and truth. Amnesty is often granted in situations where the state seeks to end violent conflict or promote stability, as seen in the Niger Delta, where peace was a central goal of the amnesty program. The Niger Delta Amnesty Program, launched in 2009, aimed to reduce militancy and ensure the continued exploitation of oil resources, which are vital to Nigeria's economy and the interests of both the federal government and multinational oil corporations. In this context, amnesty becomes a crucial tool for promoting peace and enabling the development of the region, despite concerns over the fairness and completeness of the process.

Research Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research method to explore the impact of the Presidential Amnesty Programme on security in Delta State. The study population includes ex-militants, Amnesty Programme officials, security personnel, and community leaders directly affected by the programme. A sample size of 30 key informants was determined based on data saturation, ensuring that responses provide comprehensive insights into the research problem. The study utilizes a non-probability sampling technique, specifically purposive sampling, to select participants with firsthand experience and deep knowledge of the Amnesty Programme's implementation and effects. This approach ensures the inclusion of individuals who can provide rich, detailed narratives. Data were conducted through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) to capture in-depth perspectives. Thematic analysis was used for data interpretation, identifying patterns and key themes related to security, reintegration challenges, and governance issues in Delta State.

Theoretical Framework

Theoretical Framework: Frustration-Aggression Theory

This study adopts the Frustration-Aggression Theory, originally developed by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939), which posits that frustration often leads to aggression when individuals perceive obstacles to achieving their goals. The theory has since been expanded by scholars such as Berkowitz (1969, 1989), who argued that frustration does not always lead directly to aggression but increases the likelihood of aggressive responses under certain conditions.

Unlike previous studies that have applied the Frustration-Aggression Theory to general conflict and violent uprisings in Nigeria (e.g., militancy in the Niger Delta or Boko Haram insurgency), this studyextends the theory's application by specifically analysing the Amnesty Programme as a state response to aggression born out of frustration in Delta State. It critiques the theory's assumption that aggression ceases once frustrations are addressed, demonstrating how unresolved socio-economic grievances continue to fuel insecurity despite the disarmament process.

Militancy in the Niger Delta

The term *militancy* has been defined in various ways. According to Quamruzzaman (2021), it refers to the acts of individuals, groups, or organizations that engage in violence, typically driven by a cause—whether political, religious, ideological, economic, or social. In contemporary discourse, the term "militant" is often used interchangeably with "terrorist." Ashimolowo and Odiachi (2012) suggest that the motive behind militancy is often the desire for justice or the demand for rights. When negotiation fails, militancy becomes a means of using force to challenge the authorities in power. More recently, militancy is understood to involve individuals who may be either forced or voluntarily recruited into a militia or militant organization.

Chindah and Braide (2021) define militancy as a combative state or disposition to fight for a cause or belief. It is often a violent response by an individual or group in reaction to claims of political oppression, underdevelopment, or social injustice. For those involved in militant activities in the Niger Delta, the cause is often rooted in demands for political autonomy, economic equity, and social rights.

A critical aspect of the Niger Delta conflict is the perceived political oppression faced by the ethnic minorities in the region. This sentiment of political marginalization has been voiced by many within the region. Kowa (2021) highlights that the roots of militancy in the Niger Delta predate the discovery of oil. He explains that the early resistance, including the AdakaBoro revolt, was a reaction to political exclusion, as the minority groups in the region were dominated by the majority ethnic group in the Eastern region, particularly the Igbos. Kowa argues that these struggles for political autonomy and justice in the Niger Delta began long before oil became a central factor in the region's development.

Militancy in Delta State is not a recent phenomenon; however, it has been suppressed intermittently through various government policies and military interventions. The establishment of institutions like the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, the Amnesty Program, and the operations of the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) has all been part of efforts to manage and curtail militant activities in the region. Despite these measures, militancy remains a significant challenge in the state, driven by deep-rooted

grievances over political and economic marginalization.

The Amnesty Programme and DDR in Delta State

The economic potential of the Niger Delta is starkly contrasted with the underdevelopment experienced by its people. Despite the immense oil wealth generated by the region, over 90% of Nigeria's revenue comes from this region. The Delta State and surrounding areas remain characterized by poverty, environmental degradation, and poor infrastructure (Eke, 2021). The state, rich in resources, suffers from a long-standing crisis of neglect, worsened by the failure of the government and multinational corporations to invest in the welfare of the people who bear the brunt of resource exploitation (Obi, 2019).

Delta State, part of the larger Niger Delta, faces these challenges more acutely. Communities reliant on fishing and farming for their livelihoods have seen their environment devastated by oil spills, gas flaring, and the constant expansion of oil infrastructure. While successive governments have attempted to address this, including through the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, the impact has been minimal. Local youth, disenfranchised and marginalized, have been at the forefront of militant movements, pushing for political autonomy and environmental justice (Akinola, 2020).

The emergence of militancy in the Niger Delta, particularly in Delta State, has been fueled by the perceived political oppression and economic exclusion of ethnic minorities. Groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) have engaged in violent actions including pipeline vandalization, hostage-taking, and sabotage of oil facilities as a form of resistance. These militant actions, while disruptive, are rooted in deeper issues of systemic injustice, neglect, and the struggle for resource control (Aghalino, 2021).

In response, the Nigerian government introduced the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) in 2009, with the aim of addressing the underlying causes of militancy through a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) framework. The initiative, set in motion by then-President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, sought to provide militants with an alternative to violence by offering amnesty, vocational training, and financial support. In the first phase, around 26,358 militants accepted the amnesty offer, significantly reducing violent activities in the region (Kuku, 2020). However, the implementation of the programme in Delta State and the broader Niger Delta has been criticized for its limited impact on long-term peace and development.

The DDR process in Delta State included the disarmament of militants, rehabilitation programs, and reintegration into society through vocational training and education. Although thousands of ex-combatants were trained in various fields such as welding, maritime services, and oil and gas technology, many expressed dissatisfaction with the quality and duration of the training (Oluwaniyi, 2020). Some former militants even reported instances of mismanagement and the failure of training centers to provide adequate resources, leading to frustration and a renewed sense of betrayal (Oluwaseun, 2020).

Despite the relative cessation of hostilities following the amnesty, challenges remain. The long-term reintegration of ex-militants into society has been sluggish, and the broader issue of systemic underdevelopment persists. While the amnesty programme succeeded in temporarily pacifying militant groups and securing oil production, it has failed to address the root causes of militancy in Delta State with obvious economic inequality, environmental degradation, and political exclusion. Furthermore, the continued military presence in the region has contributed to the fragility of the peace (Ahon, 2020). The Nigerian government, while focusing on oil production and maintaining security, has not sufficiently invested in sustainable development programs that could prevent future violence (Eke, 2021).

A critical perspective on the Amnesty Programme, especially from groups like MEND, is that the initiative served more as a means of quelling unrest and facilitating uninterrupted oil exploitation than as a genuine effort to address the social and economic injustices faced by the people of Delta State (Bayagbon, 2020). As argued by Nwajiakwu-Dahou (2021), the government’s approach to the region has been reactive rather than proactive, with peace efforts such as the amnesty largely seen as temporary measures that fail to address long-term development needs.

In light of these shortcomings, the current debate surrounding the amnesty and DDR process in Delta State revolves around whether the peace it has brought can be sustained. Scholars like Otite and Umukoro (2021) suggest that for any meaningful peace to take root, there must be a comprehensive and inclusive development plan for the region—one that not only addresses infrastructural deficits but also ensures political empowerment and environmental justice for the people of Delta State. On the whole, while the Presidential Amnesty Programme succeeded in temporarily reducing militant activities, it has not provided a lasting solution to the Niger Delta conflict. The region, including Delta State, still faces significant challenges related to the development of human capital, environmental recovery, and the equitable distribution of oil wealth. Until these issues are meaningfully addressed, militancy in Delta State and the broader Niger Delta remains a complex and ongoing challenge.

Conclusion

This study has examined the impact of the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) on security and stability in Delta State, situating its analysis within the Frustration-Aggression Theory. The findings align with previous studies that link militancy in the Niger Delta to historical marginalization, environmental degradation, and economic exclusion. However, unlike prior research that views the PAP primarily as a successful security intervention, this study critiques the programme's long-term effectiveness by highlighting the persistence of unresolved socio-economic grievances.

Conceptually, the study reinforces the Frustration-Aggression framework by demonstrating that while state interventions such as the PAP's Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) strategy can reduce immediate threats, they do not eliminate the underlying frustrations that drive militant activities. Theoretically, the study extends previous applications of the Frustration-Aggression Theory by illustrating how economic and environmental frustrations, if left unaddressed, create conditions for cyclical violence.

The study's findings show that short-term pacification strategies are insufficient for sustainable peace. Unlike prior studies that focus on the PAP's role in restoring oil production, this study reveals that the lack of structural reforms in governance, economic inclusion, and environmental justice continues to threaten stability in Delta State. Therefore, long-term peace requires a paradigm shift from security-driven responses to comprehensive socio-economic transformation, ensuring that ex-militants and their communities' benefit from the region's oil wealth in a meaningful and sustainable manner.

Recommendations

1. The skill acquisition components of the Amnesty Programme offer potential benefits for both local communities and oil companies if properly implemented. Oil multinationals operating in Delta State should prioritize the employment of trained ex-militants by reserving job quotas for local inhabitants. This would foster a sense of inclusion and partnership, reducing hostility toward the companies.

2. The government should reopen the Amnesty Programme to accommodate militant groups in Delta State that were initially excluded or failed to accept the offer due to mistrust. Many aggrieved youths who missed the initial window have continued to demand inclusion, and integrating them into the programme would help consolidate peace.

3. Deploying military forces, armored vehicles, and police helicopters in Delta State has often escalated tensions rather than resolving conflicts. Instead of militarization, the government should prioritize dialogue, community engagement, and sustainable development as tools for long-term peacebuilding.

4. The success of the Amnesty Programme requires coordinated efforts between the federal government, Delta State government, local authorities, oil companies, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, and other intervention agencies. These stakeholders must actively contribute to the programme, particularly in skill acquisition, employment creation, and economic empowerment initiatives.

5. The government should implement a comprehensive development plan for Delta State, particularly in the oil-producing communities of Warri Southwest and Burutu. Just as Abuja was rapidly developed through targeted government investment, a similar model should be applied to the Niger Delta to ensure the provision of modern infrastructure, clean water, quality healthcare, and improved educational facilities.

By implementing these recommendations, Delta State can move beyond a temporary ceasefire to achieve long-term peace, stability, and economic prosperity. Addressing the root causes of militancy means eradicating marginalization, environmental degradation, and lack of opportunities, these remains the only sustainable path toward a peaceful and prosperous Delta State.

References

Aaron, K. (2021). *The politics of oil and conflict in the Niger Delta: A historical and contemporary analysis*. *African Conflict Review, 15*(2), 125-150. https://doi.org/10.22242/africanconflict.2021.15.2.125

Afinotan, L. A. (2019). *Oil, environmental degradation, and human rights in the Niger Delta: A revisit*. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 21*(4), 50-65. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244019888387

Aghalino, S. O. (2021). **Militancy and political oppression in the Niger Delta: Revisiting the causes of violence in Delta State**. *Journal of African Political Economy, 45*(3), 35-52. https://doi.org/10.1080/ape.2021.1208486

Ahon, O. (2020). **The impact of the amnesty programme on militancy in the Niger Delta**. *African Conflict Journal, 12*(1), 66-85. https://doi.org/10.1017/acj.2020.1182

Akinola, A. A. (2020). **Economic exclusion and the rise of militancy in Delta State, Nigeria**. *International Journal of Social Development, 16*(4), 152-170. https://doi.org/10.1080/ijsd.2020.2038274

Akinwale, A. T. (2010). **Reintegration of ex-militants in the Niger Delta: Challenges and prospects**. *African Journal of Political Science, 24*(3), 95-112. https://doi.org/10.4324/ajps.2010.022

Alagoa, E. J. (2016). *The Niger Delta and its ongoing struggles for justice and environmental protection*. In O. Nwoke& L. U. Okafor (Eds.), *The politics of resource control and conflict management in Nigeria* (pp. 98-112). Lagos: University of Lagos Press.

Ashimolowo, A., &Odiachi, E. (2012). *Militancy and violence in the Niger Delta: A theoretical exploration of the causes and solutions*. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 30*(2), 79-94. https://doi.org/10.1017/jcr.2012.19

Baldwin, D. A. (2021). *Security and the concept of human vulnerability: A critical rethinking*. *International Security, 45*(2), 35-62. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00410

Bayagbon, C. (2020). **The failure of the amnesty programme and the resilience of militancy in the Niger Delta**. *Journal of African Conflict Studies, 17*(2), 112-131. https://doi.org/10.1080/jacs.2020.0605247

Berdal, M. (2020). *Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration: Global lessons and the Niger Delta experience*. *International Peacekeeping, 27*(5), 690-710. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2020.1749689

Berkowitz, L. (1969). The frustration-aggression hypothesis revisited. Psychological Bulletin, 106(1), 59-73.

Berkowitz, L. (1989). Frustration-aggression hypothesis: Examination and reformulation. Psychological Bulletin, 106(1), 59-73.

Chindah, A. P., & Braide, S. A. (2021). *The Niger Delta crisis: Developmental challenges and the rise of militancy*. *Environmental Policy and Development Journal, 25*(4), 212-231. https://doi.org/10.1177/2050191721102956

Dollard, J., Doob, L., Miller, N., Mowrer, O., & Sears, R. (1939). Frustration and Aggression. Yale University Press.

Eke, N. (2021). **Environmental degradation and economic inequalities in the Niger Delta: An analysis of the long-term effects of oil exploration on Delta State**. *Journal of Environmental Economics, 14*(2), 58-78. https://doi.org/10.1080/jee.2021.1025697

Epiphany, P. (2020). *Amnesty, reconciliation, and state legitimacy in post-conflict societies*. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64*(3), 512-535. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720907841

Eseduwo, L. (2020). *Militant activities and regional security in the Niger Delta: A comprehensive review*. *African Journal of Political Science, 15*(3), 72-98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.afpol.2020.04.005

Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2020). *The effectiveness of DDR programs in post-conflict societies: Evidence from the Niger Delta*. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64*(3), 500-523. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720915769

Kowa, I. (2021). *The historical roots of militancy in the Niger Delta: Political oppression and the search for autonomy*. *African Journal of Political Science, 14*(1), 75-91. https://doi.org/10.1007/ajps.2016.10

Krause, C., & Nye, J. S. (2020). *The shifting nature of security: Rethinking security policy in a post-pandemic world*. *International Affairs, 96*(5), 1119-1137. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa138

Kuku, T. (2020). **Presidential Amnesty Programme: Challenges and outcomes**. *Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, 28*(4), 233-245. https://doi.org/10.1080/jpcs.2020.1117524

Mallinder, L. (2020). *Amnesty, transitional justice, and peace: New perspectives on post-conflict justice*. *International Journal of Transitional Justice, 14*(3), 506-528. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijz014

Muggah, R. (2021). *Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in post-conflict settings: The role of the international community*. *Peace and Conflict Studies, 28*(1), 43-59. https://doi.org/10.1002/peace.1052

Nwajiakwu-Dahou, S. (2021). **DDR in the Niger Delta: Progress and setbacks of the amnesty programme**. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 38*(1), 33-46. https://doi.org/10.1002/crq.1080

Obi, C. (2019). **Oil, militancy, and development in the Niger Delta: Lessons from Delta State**. *Global Development Review, 5*(3), 102-121. https://doi.org/10.1155/gdr.2019.301127

Omotola, J. A. (2017). *Environmental degradation and militancy in the Niger Delta: Addressing the root causes*. *Environmental Policy and Law, 47*(2), 109-122. https://doi.org/10.3233/EP-170123

O'Shea, J. (2021). *Amnesty as a tool of reconciliation: Lessons from recent experiences*. *Peacebuilding, 9*(1), 91-106. https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2021.1871483

Otite, O., &Umukoro, O. (2021). **The politics of peace and development in the Niger Delta: A critical assessment of the Presidential Amnesty Programme**. *African Development Review, 33*(2), 198-213. https://doi.org/10.1111/adr.12342

Owugah, A. (2018). *Oil and the politics of resource control in Nigeria: The Niger Delta experience*. *International Journal of Nigerian Studies, 9*(1), 85-102. https://doi.org/10.1080/14736817.2018.1445142

Quamruzzaman, M. (2021). *Militancy in contemporary Africa: Understanding the causes and impacts*. *Journal of African Conflict Studies, 19*(3), 41-56. https://doi.org/10.1080/20421308.2010.10552033

United Nations. (2020). *Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration: An updated framework for the 21st century*. UN Peacebuilding Support Office. https://www.un.org/peacebuilding