THE ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE IN COUNTER INSURGENCY IN NORTH EASTERN NIGERIA: THE BOKO- HARAMINSURGENCY

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ABSTRACT
This study examines the role of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in counter insurgency in northern eastern Nigeria. The research uses both primary and secondary sources of data from various experts and stakeholders in Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Adamawa, Taraba, Gombe in the North Eastern Nigeria and Nigeria Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies Kuru near Jos Data was generated through questionnaires, interviews and Focus Group Discussions which were later analysed using descriptive method and thematic and content analysis of the secondary data. System theory was adopted and the genesis of insurgency in North Western Nigeria was traced. The study revealed that the counter insurgency against Boko Haram to some extent is succeeding as many of the insurgents have been killed, some repented while others fled and some surrenders their arms and themselves to the Multinational Joint Task Force. Although issues of mutual antagonistic distrust, corruption, inadequate modern equipment, lack of cooperation, poor commitments, weak coordination and poor funding among Multinational Joint Task Force member states undermined inability of Multinational Joint Task Force to end the counter insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria. The study recommends that good moral, values, religious education will serve as panaceas in controlling and bringing to an end religious insurgencies in the north eastern Nigeria and its environs.

Introduction

Boko Haram is a co-product of *salati/wahabison Shu'aibu Saleh*. Abdullahi (2018) opined that *Jamailatu AL-Ahul AL-Sunnah Lil-Alda…. AL-Juhad* known as Boko-Haram in Hausa which means Western Education is forbidden emerged around 2002, even though according to Aisha Wakili as far back as 1989 they existed (Global Terrorist Index, 2022) as a peaceful *Weal Salafist* Islamic movement whose aim was preaching and assisting.

Boko Haram is a home grown insurgence that rose from among the sect of *Izalatul bidi'a wa'ikamatul Sunna* founded in 1992 when Mohammad Yusuf the founding leader of Boko Haram came up with a synthesized and different interpretation entangled with Islam as social fact of deception to stage Jihad which was vehemently rejected by the Izala movement.

Yusufiyya was considered as a throw back and rejection of majority of Muslim in Northern Nigeria".

According to another narration as was upheld by Shu'aibu, Salleh & Shehu (2015) Boko Haram emerged around 2002 as a peaceful *Salafi* movement "Boko Haram was created in 2002 by Muhammad Yusuf (1970- 2009), a radical Islamist cleric, in Maiduguri, Borno State, in North Eastern Nigeria. He set up a religious complex, called *"Markaz"*, an Islamic teaching and learning center that had ulterior political goals to create an Islamic state and impose sharia laws, and it soon became a recruiting ground for the future Jihadist to fight the state (Malam, 2014).

The present day Boko Haram crisis started in 2009, at that time there was a new government legislation of wearing helmet for motorcycles riders. The government of Borno State gave the police order to enforce the use ofhelmet as part of the "Operation Flush", the members of the sect went out on motorcycles for funerals without helmets and the police stopped them. This resulted in a clash between the police and the sect members, which led to the death of four members of the sect and about (18) eighteen members of the sect injured.

The extrajudicial killings of the sects members by the trigger happy elements of the Nigeria police force, angered the sect leader Muhammad Yusuf and led him to wrote a threatening letter to the State Government and the Federal Government too, and urged them to respond within forty days (40) with a view to resolution between the government and the group, and if not then "Jihad" operation will begin in the country of which only Allah can stop it (Onapajo, 2013).

However, after forty days (40), the ultimatum elapsed and the government did not respond to the situation which according to some analysts, the group members started preparing strategies and plans for war. After this incident, the leaders of the sect continued preaching for Jihad and armed confrontation (Onapajo, 2013).

There was a clash and skirmishes between the Boko Haram sects' members and security forces in Borno and Bauchi states on July 27 of 2009. The situation calmed down. However, the Nigerian army on 28 July 2009 reportedly launched an offensive attack on the sect leader, Muhammad Yusuf's compound and a nearby mosque used by the members in Borno State capital of Maiduguri. This violence between the Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces claimed the lives of more than 1000 people in Maiduguri. However, according to sources as contained in Global Terrorist Index (2022) over 100 bodies were reported to be found beside police headquarters in Maiduguri. Many civilians were forced to flee from their homes. This violence led to the killing of the sect leader Muhammad Yusuf in police custody, which brought the end of the five days crisis (International Crisis Group, 2014).

Immediately after the 5 days uprising, with death of sect leader Muhammad Yusuf, the activities of the Boko Haram went underground, but they regroup and re-emerged in 2010. Under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, who happens to be deadly than Muhammad Yusuf attacked on armed personnel, civilians and government properties that escalated in terms of frequency and terrorist attacks.

Metelits (2022) opined that the group Boko Haram carried out its first attacks when it orchestrated a large prison breaks in September 2010 in Bauchi which led to the escape of more than 700 inmates including its members.

According to Obayuwana (2014) the group, (Boko Haram) on 16th June, 2011 attacked police headquarters in what was believed to be the first suicide bombing in the history of Nigeria. So also the group attacked the United Nation Building in Nigeria capital Abuja by a lone suicide bomber in August of 2011. An act that was claimed by the group spokesperson known as Abu Qaqa. There was increased in intensity and frequency of the Boko Haram attacks between 2011 and late 2014. The violent attacks were mainly targeted at the security agencies, government properties, markets, mosques, churches, schools, football field and political gatherings. Another dimension that was introduced between those periods was the assassination of politicians, religious scholars and abduction of school children. In between July 24 and July 28 2009, Celestial church, Deeper Life, Eklysiyar Yannwa Nigeria, five public primary schools and the headquarters of the Universal Basic Education Board in Maiduguri were destroyed. Human Rights Watch report (2012), argued that "in January 2012, Boko Haram sect coordinated and carried out series of attack which resulted in the death of more than 180 people including large number of security personnel and civilians which is believed to be among the highest death in a single day since the group began its violent campaign in July 2009".

The year 2013 witnessed the increased in the intensity of the attack. Dan'lyan (2015) argued that what "led the Federal Government of Nigeria to declare State of Emergency in the states of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno which were then the most devastated by the insurgency. It was in the year 2014, precisely April that the new tactics of kidnapping was widely adopted by the insurgents as a weapon.

On the account of International Crisis Group (2014) "On April 14th 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped nearly 300 school girls from Government Girls Secondary School Chibok, as a result Boko Haram was blacklisted by a United Nations Security Council on 22nd May 2014". Some of the girls escaped, while others rescued, some died and many remained captives to date from 20th September, 2016. It was only recently when the insurgents released a new video of the girls on 14th August 2016 showing the girls appealing to the government to release Boko Haram inmates in exchange for their freedom, and the insurgent asserted in the affirmative girls appeal (Human Right Watch, 2018). It was reported that during his speech on 1st September, 2016 at the United Nations General Assembly as reported by premium times an online newsmagazine, former Nigeria President Muhammad Buhari "has called for the United Nations and other international bodies to help mediate between his government and the insurgents, especially as with the regards to the Chibok girls exchange Abdullahi (2018). 22' September, 2016 the other prominent unresolved Boko Haram School killings and abduction is that of the Federal Government College Buniyadi. On the early hours of 25th February] 20-14, more than fifty-nine school boys were killed and others abducted by the Boko Haram insurgents. However, the case of Chibok girls over shadow that of Buniyadi, more than 59 students killed, many injured, others abducted while the schools was destroyed. Also in May of 2014, the town was attacked again, so also on July 10th 2015 which led the civilians to flee the town not until April 17th 2016 when the first batch of those who flee the town started returning back (ECOWAS Counter Terrorism, 2018).

The Boko Haram insurgent in Nigeria is one of the deadliest extremist armed groups in the world. According to Global Terrorist Index (GTF) (2015), the group was responsible for the deaths of over 6,644 people in Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon in 2014 alone. Its brutal insurgency has affected every stratum of life in Nigeria's North East and the neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad in areas of destruction of lives and property, closure of schools, description of economic and social activities, leading to front line of the conflict (Human Right, 2018).

The menace of Boko- Haram resurfaced later and became regional as a result of the sects killings and assassination of Law Enforcement and Security Agencies, innocent civilians, and foreign nationals around northern eastern Nigeria and Sahel Region notably Chad, Cameroon and Niger on daily basis. The menace or dastard acts of Boko-Haram insurgents necessitated a regional response to end the menace (Yakubu, Gwaya & Ham, 2021). In 2011 the Federal Government of Nigerian, Chad, Niger and Cameroon formed the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and in April 2012 it was deployed and mandated to counter insurgency in the North Eastern Nigeria and Sahel region and to use maximum force against the Boko Haram group (Onuoha, 2013). During President Goodlluck Ebel Jonathan's administration defence budget was increased consecutively from 100billion Naira (625 million dollars) in 2010 to 927 billion Naira (6 billion dollars) in 2011 and also 1 trillion Naira (6.25 billion dollars) in 2012, 2013 and 2014. The defece budget gulped 3.38 trillion Naira in four calendar years to counter or fight insurgency (Leadership Newspaper, 10 March 2024) cited in (Ja'e, Buba, Yahaya, Yusuf & Abubakar, 2024).It is against this background that this study examines the roles of MNJTF in counter insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria and Sahel region: the Boko Haram insurgency.

Conceptual clarifications

Boko-Haram

United States Institute of Peace (2012) defines Boko Haram as an Islamic sect who believes politics in Northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. It wants to wage a war against them, and federal republic of Nigeria generally to create a pure Islamic State ruled by Sharia Law. The name Boko Haram has tis origin in media and public, community coinage. "Boko" in Hausa stands for Western Education and "Haram" is Hausa word taken form Arabic it means something not acceptable in Islam; something forbidden or prohibited. Boko Haram therefore may be interpreted as meaning that the Western education is prohibited in Islam (Addo, 2016).

The group's original name is *"Jamatul Alhul Sunnal Lidala Wati Wal Jihad*, in Arabic translated in English to mean People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's teaching and Jihad. The definition by USA Institute of Peace (2012) is relevant to our current study as it captures the terrorist activities of these groups and it origins as it relates to our current study under investigation.

Insurgency

This is an organized movement aimed at the overthrowing of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The key distinction between an insurgency and other movements is the decision to use violence to achieve political goals.

Adejo (2018) opined that insurgency is problematic. He added that insurgency is perhaps best understood by first considering what is insurgency? Insurgency is not conventional war or terrorism for example but it shares with them the use of force to achieve political end. It is quite true that Adejo (2018) conceptualized insurgency to mean the use of force, but he failed to elaborate what type of force he means, this makes this concept inappropriate for the concept of insurgency as used in this study. For instance, insurgency as used in this study means the use of terror by illegal or terrorist to kill and to destroy lives and property.

Dze-Ngwa (2018) opined that insurgency as the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region or a country. Dze-Ngwa argued that, insurgency normally begins before it is recognized by the governing authorities, allowing the insurgent leaders to organize and operate in a clandestine manner until it choose to commit violence and subversion. This definition captures our concept of insurgency as it dealt with the use of subversion and violence as the modus oprandi of insurgents such as Boko Haram in North Eastern Nigeria as the current study under investigation.

United States Institute of Peace (2012) argued that insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. In other words, an insurgency is an organized protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government. Here, the US Institute of Peace (2012) is relevant to our study because it captures the concept of insurgency as an armed group that uses subversion and violence armed conflict to overthrow the constituted government as we are witnessing the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria and the Sahel Region.

Ayuba & Okafor (2018), looked at insurgency in three different ways of much importance to us is the first definitions offered which is in total agreement with that of US government that "insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, modify or challenge the political control of a region". Insurgency can also be seen as any guerrilla terrorist, militant, revolutionary or any other form of irregular warfare that does not follow the rules, laws and conventions of war and is usually carried out against a state. Equally, this concept is relevant to our study as it dealt with the activities of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria especially in North Eastern Nigeria where these insurgent groups have been carrying out irregular wars against the constituted authorities.

Multinational Joint Task Force

Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is the combination of security forces of individual nation-states for the specific purpose of enforcing control and orderliness in a conflict prone area(s) to restore peace and normalcy. Specifically, the MNJTF in the Lake Chad is a formation that comprises units of the Chadian, Cameroonian, Nigerien and Nigerian armed forces with a Nigerian Brigadier General (Assanvo, Abatan, & Sawadogo.,2016). It was first organized as a solely Nigerian force in 1994, during the administration of Sani Abacha, to checkmate banditry activities and to facilitate free movement along its northern border (Musa, 2015). In 1998 it was expanded to include units from neighboring Chad and Niger with the purpose of dealing with common cross-border security issues in the region. As Boko Haram insurgency intensified from 2010, the task of the MNJTF was expanded in April 2012 to encompass counter-terrorism operations. The force was made up of about 8,750 military personnel with the mandate to combat and bring to an end the Boko Haram and other violent extremism in the sub-region (Dze-Ngwa, 2018). From the foregoing, it is clear that the idea of Multinational Joint Task Force is toward the course of restoring peace and social order in North Eastern Nigeria and Sahel Region.

Theoretical Issues

Four major theories have dominated theoretical debates on insurgency and counter insurgency. The frustration aggression theory which focuses on condition which exists when a goal response suffers interference while aggression is an act whose goal response is injury to an organism.

The psychological theory which focus on personality, psycho-pathology and psycho-social traits as factors responsible for insurgency and terrorism. Structural theory of conflict which focuses on structural defects internally or externally generated as the main approach which viewed public policy and state relations as a system with components of which conflicts or peace of one state in a region will affect the whole states or systemCollins (2007). The system theory which views public policy and state relations as a system with components, of which conflict or peace of one state in a region will affect the whole states or region. These theoretical underpinnings seek to unravel the various issues of insurgency and counter insurgency that have strongly destroyed the socio-cultural, psychological, economic and institutional foundations. Although as laudable as these theoretical positions are only one of them have delved into the main classes of explanation of insurgency and counter insurgency. This, this study intends to fill this knowledge gap by using system theory approach in order to understand the history, nature of insurgency and counter insurgency in North eastern Nigeria that spread across Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Mali and lastly delve into applications of system theories to the understanding of Boko- Haram insurgency and Multinational Task Force counter insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria.

System Theory

This paper utilized one theoretical approach such as the system theory in the analysis of conflict and Multinational Joint Task Force in the fight against Boko- Haram. System theory is the interdisciplinary study of systems in general, with the goal of elucidating principle that can be applied to all types of systems at all levels in all fields of research. The term originates from Bertalaffy's General System Theory (GST), used in other fields, such as action theory of Talcott Parsons, the social systems theory of Nikijas Lukman and System theory of David Easton cited in Bamigbose (2013).

The system theory explains the interconnections of nexus between security and development and defines the regular interaction or interrelation between groups of activities in the society, as any occurrence in a sector of the society positively or negatively affects other sectors or the society. The sense of insecurity or conflict occurs when there is wanton destruction of lives and property, incessant armed robbery incidents, increase in kidnapping resulting in ransom or death, or both, armed insurgency such as the Boko- Haram menace e.t.c. Similarly, David Easton system theory views system in terms of public policy and state relations as a system with components. He further argues that policy making as a system has component that is related to each other. He sees states relation as interconnected, interdependent and integrated. He further argued that success or failure, peace, conflict in one state or region will affect the other state or region as they interact with one another in the international system or environment Easton (1965) cited in Bamigbose (2013).

The system theory is important and relevant to this study due to the fact that states are interconnected or interdependent with each other in the environment or international system. For instance, because of the linkages of states or the world economy as global village the problem or conflict in one state will affect other states or its environs. For instance, the war in Sudan has affected Chad its neighbouring state as influx of refugees into Chad. The insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria for instance is a problem that has regional and sub-regional consequences in states such as Chad, Niger, Benin Republic and Cameroon. The interdependence or states integration to solve its problems in areas of security brought states like Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin Republic to form Multinational Joint Task Force to counter insurgency of Boko Haram in the North Eastern Nigeria andSahel region.

Methodology

Research Design

This study assessed the role of multinational joint task force in counter insurgency in the North Western Nigeria. The study adopts a survey research design that employed both primary and secondary sources of data collection.

Population and Sample Size

The study population was 504,600, Taro Yemane statistics was used to draw four hundred (400) respondents as sample size. Questionnaire, interview and Focus Group Discussions instruments were used for data collection and descriptive statistics was employed for data analysis.

Sample size

A simple size is the numerical value of that portion. In other words it is the number of units that make up the sample. The sample size of this population of the study will be determined through Taro Yamne Formula.

Thus $n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2}$

Where:

n = Sample size

N = Population

e = Level of Precision in % = sampling error of 0.05

1 = Constant

Therefore $n = \frac{504{,}600}{1+504600 \times (0.05)^2}$

$= \frac{504{,}600}{505{,}600 \times 0.025}$

$= \frac{504{,}600}{1262.5} = 399.683$

$= 400$

Study Area

The study area comprises the North Eastern Nigeria that is made up of Gombe, Bauchi, Borno, Adamawa, Taraba and Yobe State, and the Sahel. The Sahel is an Arabic Word translated in English to mean "the shore". The area covers about 6,000 kilometers from East to West Africa. The Sahel region according to United Nations strategy covers ten (10) countries such as Burkina Faso, Nigerian, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Guinea, Benin, Gambia and Senegal. However, the study covers Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republic that multinational joint task force.

Method of Data Analysis

The study adopted descriptive survey research to analyse and interpret the data collected from the field with tables, percentages and content and thematic analysis was used to analyse the secondary data collected through books, journals, magazines, newspapers, seminar papers, internet sources, e-learning among others.

Data Presentation and Analysis

Table 1: Sex Distribution of Respondents

Sex of Respondents	Frequency	Percentage %
Male	288	72
Female	112	28
Total	400	100

Source: *Field Survey 2024.*

Table 1above shows that 288(72%) of the respondents are made up of male, while 112(28%) are female. The implication of this is that male respondents constitute most of the sampled population and were available for the investigation under study.

Table 2: Age of Respondents

Age (Years)	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
15-20	12	3.0
21-30	142	36
31-40	110	27.6
41-50	106	26
	28	7.0

51 and above	**400**	**100**
Total		

Source: *Field Survey 2024.*

Table 2 provides information on the distribution of respondents across different age groups. The data is summarized as follows viz-a-viz: From 15-20 years.12 responses represents 3.0% of the total response, 21-30 years: 142 responses, making up 36% of the total, 31-40 years 110 responses, representing 27.6% of the total, 41-50 years: 106 responses, constituting 26% of the total, 51 and above: 28 responses representing 7.0% of the total.

Table 3 Profession of Respondents

Profession	**Frequency**	**Percentage %**
Farmer	150	37.5%
Military	78	19.6%
Para military	48	12.1%
Intelligence Agencies	100	25.1%
Farmer's Associations	22	5.5%
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey 2024.

Table 3 provides information on the distribution of respondents across different professions or works of life. The data is summarized as follows: Farmers: 150 response, representing 37.7% of the total respondents. Military: 78 responses, making up 19.6% of the total. Paramilitary: 48 responses, 12.1% of the total Intelligence Agencies: 100 responses constituting 25.1% of the total.

Question 4 Boko –Haram Insurgents Means
Table 4

Statement	**Frequency**	**Percentage%**
Terrorist Group	150	37.5
Jihadist	98	24.5
Irreligious, heartless &senseless organization	92	23.1
Islamic Extremist	58	14.5
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey 2024.

Table 4, shows that, 37.5% respondents said that Boko-Haram is a terrorist group, whereas 24.5% responded that they are Jihadist. Also 92 respondents which constitute 23.1% agreed that Boko-Haram is an irreligious, heartless and senseless organization, whereas 58 respondents, which constitute 14.5%, are of the opinion that Boko-Haram is Islamic extremist.

Question 5 Boko- Haram insurgency threatens the security of North Eastern Nigeria, Nigeria, Sahel Region and West Africa in general.
Table 5

Response	**Frequency**	**Percentage %**
Yes	352	88
No	28	7.0
No Idea	20	5.0
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey 2024.

Table 5 represents responses to a question asking the respondents whetherBoko- Haram insurgency threatens the security of North Eastern Nigeria, Nigeria, Sahel Region and West Africa in general. Respondents were given three options "Yes," "No," or "No Idea." The responses on the data are summarized as follows; Yes; 352 responses, accounting for 88.0% of the total. No: 28 responses, making up 7.0% of the total. No idea: 20 responses, constituting 5.0% of the

total. The total number is 400, and the percentages indicate the proportion of responses to each category relative to the total. The majority of respondents (88%) indicated that Boko- Haram insurgency threatens the security of North Eastern Nigeria, Nigeria, Sahel Region and West Africa in general. We therefore assert that Boko- Haram insurgency threatens the security of North Eastern Nigeria, Nigeria, Sahel Region and West Africa in general.

Question 5 Boko-Haram insurgency has negative impact on peace and socio-economic development in North Eastern Nigeria and the Sahel Region.

Table 5

Response	Frequency	Percentage(%)
Yes	340	85
No	30	8.0
No Idea	28	7.0
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey 2024

Table 5 presents information on Boko-Haram insurgency has negative impact on peace and socio-economic development in North Eastern Nigeria and the Sahel Region.

The data is summarized as follows based on the options given to the respondents such as "Yes," "No," or "No Idea." The responses on the data are summarized as follows; Yes; 340 responses, accounting for 85.0% of the total. No: 30 responses, making up 8.0% of the total. No idea: 28 responses, constituting 7.0% of the total. The total number is 400, and the majority of respondents (85%) indicated that Boko-Haram insurgency has negative impact on peace and socio-economic development in North Eastern Nigeria and the Sahel Region. We therefore affirm that Boko-Haram insurgency has negative impact on peace and socio-economic development in North Eastern Nigeria and the Sahel Region.

Question 6 The response to the counter insurgency by the MNJTF has been successful in areas of recapturing the territories captured by the Boko-Haram, releasing those held under the hostage of Boko-Haram and returning those internally displaced persons to their ancestral homes.

Table 6

Responses	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	350	88
No	28	7.0
No Idea	22	5.0
Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey 2024.

Table 6 presents responses to the question whether the counter insurgency by the MNJTF has been successful in areas of recapturing the territories captured by the Boko-Haram, releasing those held under the hostage of Boko-Haram and returning those internally displaced persons to their ancestral homes. The respondents were given three options such as "Yes," "No," or "No Idea." The data is summarized as follows: Yes 350 responses, accounting for 88% of the total. No: 28 responses making up 7% of the total. No Idea: 22 responses, constituting 5% of the total. The total number of respondents is 400, and the percentages indicate the proportion of responses in each category relative to the total. Most respondents (88%) indicated that the counter insurgency by the MNJTF has been successful in areas of recapturing the territory captured by the Boko-Haram, releasing those held under the hostage of Boko-Haram and returning those internally displaced persons to their ancestral homes reflecting a significant portion of the total respondents of the surveyed population. A smaller percentage of (7%) indicated No. whereas (5%) indicated No Idea. We therefore assert that MNJTF has responded successfully to the counter insurgency in the North Eastern Nigeria.

Question 7: The challenges of MNJTF in counter insurgency in the North Eastern Nigeria and the Sahel Region are in areas of corruption, lack of funding, inadequate logistics and modern counter insurgency equipment, no synergy or good civil- military

relations in the Sahel Region or North Eastern Nigeria.

Table 7

Variable	No of respondents	% of respondents
Yes	342	85.5
No	28	7.0
No Idea	30	7.5
Total	400	100

Source:Field Survey 2024

Table 7 presents responses to the question about whether the challenges of MNJTF in counter insurgency in the North Eastern Nigeria and the Sahel Region are in areas of corruption, lack of funding, inadequate logistics and modern counter insurgency equipment, no synergy or good civil- military relations in the Sahel Region or North Eastern Nigeria. Respondents were given three options "Yes," "No," or "No Idea." The data is summarized as follows: Yes: 342 responses, accounting for (85.5%)of the total. No: 28 responses, constituting 7.0% of the total. No: Idea 30 responses, making up 7.5% of the total. The total number of respondents is 400, and the percentages indicate the proportion of respondents, 85.5% that the challenges of MNJTF in counter insurgency in the North Eastern Nigeria and the Sahel Region are in areas of corruption, lack of funding, inadequate logistics and modern counter insurgency equipment, no synergy or good civil- military relations in the Sahel Region or North Eastern Nigeria. 7% said No. While7.5% indicated No Idea. We therefore assert that the challenges the challenges of MNJTF in counter insurgency in the North Eastern Nigeria and the Sahel Region are in areas of corruption, lack of funding, inadequate logistics and modern counter insurgency equipment, no synergy or good civil-military relations in the Sahel Region or North Eastern Nigeria.

Discussion

The study revealed that most of the respondents indicated that there have been successes and challenges of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the counter insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria. Most respondents asserted that MNJTF has success fully recovered territories previously under the control of Boko Haram in the North East and some parts of the Sahel religion such as Gwuza, Damboa, Baga, Damasak, Ngala and Mober to Diffa in Nigeria Republic where Boko Haram have imposed strict Sharia Law on that conquered and occupied territories. The study equally revealed that most people held as hostages by the Boko Haram sects/insurgents has been released and most of them has returned to their ancestral homes.

The majority of the respondents in the study indicated that corruption, distrust, lack of modern military equipment, logistics and poor funding from the countries that formed MNJTF are militating the effective operations of the MNJTF in counter insurgency in North Eastern Nigeria.

Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

The Multinational Joint Task Force in counter insurgency in the North Eastern Nigeria involves successes and challenges. Many towns and villages such as Chibok, Gwoza, Baga, Munguno, Guzamala, Gamborou, Ngala, Bama and Mober to Diffa in Niger Republic among other places in the Sahel region that were once under the control of Boko-Haram insurgents were collected back by the MNJTF and people in that areas that were once in internal displaced people's camps have relocated to their ancestral homes. Equally, most of those men, women, girls and children held under the hostages of Boko-Haram have been released as a result of efforts of the MNJTF in their fight against insurgency. Although successes such as recovery of some territories captured by Boko-Haram setting free the hostages of Boko Haram captives, by the MNJTF, there remain some elements of Boko Haram that are still carrying out their theories acts such as kidnapping, bombing that happened in the month of July 2024 at weeding in Gooza were about fifty people were peared dead. Again towns of Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria. This paper commends that for the MNJTF fight against counter insurgency to be wiped out completely in the Sahel region and especially in

the North Eastern Nigeria, government should have a good sinegy in civil-military relations in counter insurgency by building good confidence emasures between the military and civilians in the affected areas of insurgency by giving vital information to the military by the civilians in sensitive areas. Governments of the MNJTF state should use the Mallams or Islamic clerics to preach good moral values to the followers of these sects to lay down their arms and embrace peace.

Furthermore, corrupt MNJTF officers that are corrupt in terms of giving information, supply of arms to the Boko-Haram should be fished out and punish coupled with the civilian that do the same by giving critical information to Boko-Haram sect about the operations of MNJTF andshould be punished to serve as a deterrent to other intending officers of MNTF and civilians.

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