AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE STRATEGY ON THE WAR AGAINST INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA. A STUDY OF IGABI LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA IN KADUNA STATE. 2016– 2023

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ABSTRACT
The growing challenges in Nigeria's National Security hasbecome a major threat to the overall well-being of everyone living in Nigeria, neighbouring countries and her sovereignty in general. This challenge is closely tied to the lapses inherent in national defence policies and inadequate implementation. The expanded and worrisome attacks by armed insurgent groups within Nigeria cannot be unconnected to uncoordinated national intelligence sharing by authorised agencies, lack of sophistication in security infrastructure, shortage in manpower, advanced information and technological backwardness. This research examines the impact of Nigeria's national defence policy on anti-insurgency war in Kaduna State and Igabi Local Government Area (LGA) in particular between 2016 and 2023. The research adopted the quantitative analysis and secondary data capture. The research identified that some of the main reasons for the escalated activities of the armed insurgency group is tied to prolonged economic backwardness of most Nigerians, political instability, ethno religious conflict, impunity, and unemployment. The Clausewitz theory of applied strategy has been adopted for this research. In its findings, the Nigeria national defence policy is a much needed strategy that will further pull the victory in the war on insurgency much closer if adequately implemented. The study recommends the need for professionalization and mobilization of all national security apparatuses as key to her sovereignty.

Introduction

Fundamentally, the responsibility and obligation of any state is to provide security to its citizens. This involves relative absence of security challenges and harmful threats to their lives and properties. The importance and relevance of this to the survival, progress and material development of any state cannot be over emphasised. In a situation where a state possesses the capabilities to defend and promote her national interests, the question of independence, territorial sovereignty and national development are certainly assured. Conversely, a state that lacks the basic capabilities as political, economic, infrastructural, industrial and technological capacities to establish and project strong national defence and security structure would become vulnerable and exposed to various threats and challenges that could undermine her independence and development. (Musa, 2015)

Presently, Nigeria could be ranked among countries with lowest national defence capability in the world. The reasons are simple to establish. The basic ingredients, which make states independent, are absent. States with well-built defence capability have a well-built economic, industrial and technological base. This supports the defence infrastructure like the armed forces and arms industries. Since independence, Nigeria operates a weak and royalty- oriented economy, characterised by the absence of strong and self-supporting industrial and technological capacity. National productive sector, in essence is virtually empty, making her heavily dependent on imports, foreign aid, and goodwill. (Gillian, 2018)

Essentially, national defence policy is an embodiment of a nation's security priorities, including an assessment of her strategic environment, threat analysis and resources allocation for maximum realisation of objectives. Its conception and formulation therefore involves an evaluation of national resources, economic and industrial capacity, strength and weakness of its political and other vital national institutions, scientific and technological attainment and the general level of social justice and equality. Against this background, any serious national defence conception must be hinged on the fact that the indigenous economic structure offers a foundation for the organisational and technological progress of the military as the major instrument of national defence in particular and other vital sectors of national development such as agriculture and social empowerment in general. (Ministry of Internal Security and Home Affairs, Kaduna State, 2020)

This research primarily seeks to analyse and determine the fundamental concern and orientation of the policy vis-à-vis policy objectives, instruments and resources, as well as the environment in which the policy operates. It also analyses the capability of the military in terms of its technological readiness and human resource expertise. (Agbiboa, 2020)

The effect of these serious and gross threat miss analyses which lead to severe consequences for Nigeria's national security hence the emergence of various organised regional armed groups like the Niger delta militant group, Oodua People Congress and presently the Boko Haram insurgents. (ACCORD, 2020) Granted that Nigeria cannot independently sustain her militaristic national defence strategy economically and technologically, the changing pattern and evolution of new trends and challenges in international environment such as terrorism, cybercrime, and global warming and energy insecurity revolutionises the approach to national security in the 21st century beyond conventional security doctrines alone. So long as third-world countries rely on military technology designed and mostly produced in industrial countries, and so long as developing countries adopt military doctrines which have been conceived in the industrialised countries and transferred, imposed via military aid and training, political independence and military self-reliance cannot be achieved in developing countries. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019)

The new national defence strategy is poised at addressing these challenges with great emphasis on political will of leaders, collective peaceful coexistence amongst all diverse groups, protection of lives, properties and investments, active role play in the international community, economic and political stability as well as an improved and technologically advanced security formation that can defend her territory and sovereignty. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020)

Operational Definition of Key Terms

Insurgency: An insurgency is a rebellion against authority when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents. An insurgency can be fought via counter-insurgency warfare, and may also be opposed by measures to protect the population, and by political and economic actions of various kinds aimed at undermining the insurgents' claims against the incumbent regime. However, not all rebellions are insurgencies, as a state of belligerency may exist between one or more sovereign states and rebel forces. (Adam Higazi. (2015)

Strategy: a plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or overall aim or the art of planning and directing overall military operations and movements in a war or battle. (United States Embassy in Nigeria, 2014).

War: a state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country. (Ebegbulem, Ekpe and Adejumo, 2013)

Defence Policy: Military policy (also called defence policy) is public policy dealing with international security and the military. It comprises the measures and initiatives that governments do or do not take in relation to decision-making and strategic goals, such as when and how to commit national armed forces. (Emmanuel and Tari, 2015)

Sovereignty: The authority of a state to govern itself or another state; or supreme and independent power or authority in government as possessed or claimed by a state or community. (Adam Higazi, 2015)

International Community: the countries of the world considered collectively. The international community is a phrase used in international relations to refer to a broad group of peoples and governments of the world. The term is typically used to imply the existence of a common point of view towards such matters as specific issues of human rights. Activists, politicians, and commentators often use the term in calling for action to be taken; e.g., action against what is in their opinion political repression in a target country. (Ebegbulem, Ekpe and Adejumo, 2013)

Literature Review

The research is concerned with the major events, which directly or indirectly shaped the direction of recent national defence policies of the Republic of Georgia and China as well as the main factors that gave insight into policy formulation process and its operationalization in these countries.

The Republic of Georgia: Strategic Defence Review: 2016

The primary mission of the Georgian Armed Forces (GAF) is to protect the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia, to fulfil international commitments and assist civil authorities during natural and man-made disasters. (GFCR- 2016)

The strategic defence Review 2013 - 2016 (GFCR-2016) represents the guideline document for the Ministry of defence (MOD) of Georgia, that identifies main directions for the development of the MOD and Georgian Armed Forces (GAF) through 2016 and aims to enhance GAF capabilities and the north Atlantic treaty organisation (NATO) interoperability. The 2008 Russian War on Georgia significantly changed the security environment requiring a review of national security policy and defence planning. In 2009, the policy was to institutionalize Georgia's security policy and to develop broader, whole-of-government approach. The National Security Review (NSR) process was initiated by the National Security Council. (Hedenskog &Korkmaz, 2016)

The 2008 Russian War on Georgia significantly changed the security environment and necessitated a review of SDR 2007 recommendations. The SDR 2013 - 2016 process used a threat-based methodology and provided the main direction for future Armed Force development and its final structure. This process also took into consideration lessons learned from 2008 Russian military aggression. SDR 2013 - 2016 was elaborated considering recommendations by NATO experts, interagency coordination and active engagement with civil society. According to SDR 2013 - 2016, defence transformation will continue in further development of the necessary defence capabilities to address a changing security environment. (Hedenskog &Korkmaz, 2016)

Georgia faces risks and challenges due to its geopolitical location and changing security environment in the region. To address these risks, in 2009 the National Security Review (NSR) was initiated led by the National Security Council, which includes institutionalized policy coordination among state agencies, increased cooperation between military and civil institutions, and the development of integrated strategies for all agencies involved in the security sector. Defence transformation is based on values, interests and national security policies identified in the NSR and the threats and challenges defined in "Georgia's Threat Assessment Document". (Hedenskog & Korkmaz, 2016)

In this modern era of globalization, Georgia's security environment is impacted by national, regional and international factors. Occupation of Georgian territories by Russia remains a threat to the country's sovereignty and integrity and constitutes a major factor for political, economic and social destabilization. Euro-Atlantic Integration remains a main priority of Georgia's foreign and security policy.

The People's Republic of China: 2012 China National Defence Strategy

China is today the largest military spender after U.S (China's National Defence in the New Era, 2019). Many analysts' suspects China of imperialist designs. This charge of imperialism or what General Guangkai IN 2008 called "China threat", can be explained within economic expansionism and not necessarily, political expansionism. Fears of territorial imperialism, no matter how hard she tries, cannot easily be dispelled especially among her comparatively poor South East Asian neighbours. China defence policy includes deterrence and defence. In order to understand the nature of the Chinese defence policy, it is important to understand two interrelated factors. These are the need to examine the fundamental principles of her defence policy as well as the historic and geo-strategic considerations, which informs Chinese thinking on national security and defence in this century.

China's National defence policy, principles and objectives cannot be over emphasised. The 2012 edition of China's National Defence Policy amply captures and demonstrates the level of awareness in Beijing of the changing trends in international politics, and the need to meet these challenges. China, unlike US has no visible imperialist or expansionist agenda in political terms. For instance, China has no troop contingents of any kind on overseas assignment. She equally operates no military base outside of the country. The same applies to military blocs. China, unlike many other countries, subscribes to no one. Her only concern seems to be on how to contain the Taiwan and Tibet 'bugs' around her. China's National Defence in the New Era, 2019).

To avoid recurrence, China resolved to build a modern and strong military. The China's National Defence Policy echoes this feeling thus: The People's Liberation Army (PLA) in implementing the strategy of building a strong military through science and technology, has accelerated the R & D of defence (sic) weaponry and equipment, trained higher-quality military personnel of new type, established a scientific organisational structure, develop theories of military operations with Chinese characteristics, and strengthen its capability for joint, mobile and multi-purpose operations. (China's National Defence in the new era, 2019).

Chinese strategy of national defence is not military-centred. The strategy is people-centred, which in case of invasion the entire populace would easily be mobilised to resist the invaders.

Assessment of Impact of Nigeria's National Security Strategy on Anti Insurgency in Igabi Local Government Area of Kaduna State Between 2016 and 2023

The Core Objectives of the Nigeria'snational defencestrategy is to provide quick, efficient, decisive response by preventing occurrences and arresting cases within the shortest acceptable time frame. The 21st century creeping menace of insurgence in Nigeria, has put the nation's security apparatus on the spot; opening to public doubt and scrutiny of an intelligence community that has enjoyed shadow coverage and handling since the nations return to democracy. This prevailing era of insecurity to life and property experienced so far cuts across many facets that include political, economic, social and even in the religious arenas. The overwhelming challenge of the internal security in postcolonial Nigeria and averred that; Nigeria's national security is threatened by the problem of Inefficiency, collusion and despondency of its major institutions and structures as instruments of social action and rectification. (Felbab-Brown and Militias, 2020)

Response of Nigeria's Security Agencies in the War on Insurgency

Garba and Dankano, (2017) identified sources of security threats in Nigeria to include: militarism, and military experiences, ethnic/religious pluralism, unemployment, poverty and failure of governance, socio-economic inequalities and demographic factors, small arms and ammunition trafficking, migration and indigene question in Nigeria, her socio-economic status in Africa and the illegal alien issues, globalization, porous security heritage, borders and external influence. It is necessary to distinguish between different causes as each may require different remedy. Like in other countries, the sources of insecurity in Nigeria can be traced to a number of factors. Beyond the external-internal dichotomy, sources of insecurity can equally be classified as either remote or proximate and immediate. In Nigeria, the challenge is not so much about external sources but rather that of internal sources. Terrorism is the most fundamental source of insecurity in Nigeria. (Effiong, U. 2014)

Nonetheless, despite subsequent media coverage indicating that Nigeria may have reached a turning point, insurgency remains a major threat within Nigeria and to West Africa, made clear by recent attacks. We have seen this pattern before. All too often claims of success against terrorists and insurgents are later found to be premature, particularly in assessing the long-term impact of the latest killing of a high value target or the impact of "successful clearing operations." Generally, insurgents do not stand and fight for territory. Rather, will withdraw in the face of a concerted government security campaign and blend into the population to fight another day. Boko Haram's resilience is tied to its ability to "go to ground" and later reappear to coerce, threaten, and terrorize local communities and direct attacks on local police, military units, and government institutions. (Idakwoji, Ojomah, Usman, and Orokpo, 2018)

While Nigerian security force offensives have taken a significant toll on insurgent leadership and, at times, on its fighting strength, the Nigerian forces have also suffered heavy losses in insurgents' attacks. In the face of international criticism and a recent ambush that left several soldiers dead, reports circulated in mid-May 2018 of a mutiny by troops in the army'sseventh division, which is deployed in the northeast to counter Boko Haram. The commander of the division (whom troops reportedly shot at) was subsequently replaced. In 2019 the Nigerian defenceministry announced that two divisions of the military had been stationed in the border region near Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, where they will coordinate with their regional counterparts to track the girls. Apparent shortfalls in regional intelligence-sharing and interoperability, which stem from a lack of capacity, political tensions, and historic factors, are a key challenge. Many experts suggest that, even with good intelligence on the location of the girls, rescue operations would be extremely dangerous, and argue that a negotiated release of the hostages would be preferable. While the Nigerian government has reportedly accepted foreign offers of assistance in response to the kidnappings, it remains unclear how quickly and to what extent Nigerian officials are cooperating with foreign advisors and experts. (Jamestown Foundation, 2020)

Some analysts have faulted government's over-reliance on hard power and the security forces alleged heavy-handedness which in their view tends to alienate the public from the fight against Boko Haram. The Nigerian government's declaration of a state of emergency in areas highly affected by the sect's activities gave the police and security forces enormous powers to search without warrants, arrest, detain, and impose restrictions on movements through the enforcement of curfews. Interagency rivalry and lack of coordination is a common feature of the Nigerian security architecture. Interagency rivalry is often caused by competition for resources, need for visibility, and quest for a favorable public rating of the agency's effectiveness. The unwieldy number of agencies that make up the NFPT made coordination of its activities difficult despite the centralization of oversight functions on the NSA. Such a framework must address areas of interface such as policy coordination, intelligence sharing, integration of resources, and joint planning and conduct of operations. This common framework should also designate an appropriate hierarchical structure that would foster decisive actions at critical times. (Omokhoa I. E., Okuchukwu, 2018)

Theoretical Framework

The study adopted theory of applied strategy. Thecore objective of the theory is that the concept of conventional defence strategy is obtained from the viewpoint that acquisition

and building of strong and sophisticated armed forces is a necessary element and guarantor for national security.

Clausewitz: Theory of Applied Strategy

It is a very difficult task to construct a scientific theory for the art of war, and so many attempts have failed that most people say that it is impossible, since it deals with matters that no permanent law can provide for. (Clausewitz, 1976) However, Clausewitz recognized only two levels of war: strategic (the use of battles to achieve the military and political objective of the war) and tactical (the art of winning battles). This is the theoretical framework that will best suit this study because of the details and strong view of the scholar.

Clausewitz was quick to point out that neither form of war existed independently. A well-conducted defence, he wrote, usually consisted of many offensive blows (e.g., counterattacks and spoiling attacks): "One cannot think of the defence without that necessary component of the concept, the counterattack. ... Even in a defensive position awaiting the enemy assault, our bullets take the offensive." (Clausewitz, 1976) Likewise, attackers must occasionally employ defensive measures to gain time or to re-locate forces, particularly if the resources to press forward continuously and evenly across an entire front are not available. Thus, "the act of attack, particularly in strategy, is a constant alternation and combination of attack and defence.

Relevance of thetheory to the study

The adoption of this theory as basis for the examination of the impact of the new national defence strategy truly enhances our understanding of the Nigeria's war on insurgency. The Clausewitz's approach differed from others in that, his attempted to account for all the impediments to action, all the unknown genius, chance, friction, uncertainty and all the variations in scenario that result from the particularity of individual circumstances and prevent war from becoming a science. Given the tendencies of the day, Clausewitz's response to the crisis in theory was itself rather astonishing as he redefined the term 'theory.' The national defence strategy therefore should also consider much use of non-kinetic approach at some points. Involving communities in conflict management and actualization of sustained peace and tranquillity should be adopted. Eventually, guns don't win battles. Humans do.

Criticism Labelled against Theory of Applied Strategy

Conventional doctrine fails to understand that, the issue of defence transcends military force and encompasses the general well-being and progress of all members of the society. The state can only remain safe and secured when its citizenry has a sense of belonging to a common political authority, enjoy equal economic, political and human freedoms. According to this view, the utility of military power is declining and this means that states ought to concern themselves with issues of economic development that would benefit their people. A state will be said to be experiencing a sense of false security if it still wallows in food shortages, population explosion, low level of productivity and per capita income, a higher rate of illiteracy, unemployment and much more. Security follows from economic development and other essential welfareprogrammes designed to guarantee the wellbeing of a people rather than over-indulgence in military power which only gives spurious sense of security.

Research Methodology

The study employed qualitative means to elicit data through interviews and focus groups discussions. Data collected was analysed through qualitative data miner software.

Area of Study

The study area is Igabi Local Government Area in Kaduna State.It is one of the most populated LGA in Kaduna State and most affected by insurgents' attacks within the period under review.

Population of the study

Igabi Local Government Area has a population of 636,400 Population (2022 projection) and an area size projection of 3,222 km² Area 197.5/km².

Sample Size and Sampling Technique

The sample size for this research is based on arriving at data saturation through the interview conducted. The sample is the representative of the whole population in the area under study. The respondents for FGD and KII were arrived at using purposive sampling based on snowball sampling technique.

Source of Data Collection

Data will be sourced primarily from interviews with internally displaced persons, front line health workers, government officials, security agents and traditional rulers within Igabi LGA. The research will also make use of secondary source of data to help solve the research problem been considered. This would be done through accessing government records, official publications of organisations, text books, articles and journals related to the subject matter.

Method of Data Collection

This research work will use the qualitative method of data collection using survey research design. The respondents were from within Igabi LGA. A session of focus group discussion with eight (8) groups of respondents were conducted which comprised 4 groups for men and 4 for women. KII with 6 traditional authorities and 26 security personnel was conducted which explained the reality of less insurgency attacks in the area. Additional data was gathered form review of magazines, newspapers, internet sources, government publications, unpublished materials, edited opinions, which are all secondary data.

Method Data Analysis

The data was analysed using thematic content analysis of qualitative data miner (QDM) software. The analysed data formed the basis for generating findings of the study.

Research findings

This research shows that Nigeria's defence strategy has left much to be desired hence did not adequately address or significantly improve chances of gaining undeniable victory in the war on insurgency.

1. One of the research findings shows that a major setback in the war on insurgency lies with the inadequate implementation of the provisions of the policy.

2. The finding of the research also indicates the justification for the establishment of the new national defence policy as an additional effort towards cubing the violent activities of the insurgency groups.

3. It also identified the need for a joint international collaboration especially with neighboring countries to ensure adequate border patrol and constant surveillance

4. The finding also indicates the urgent need for the review of the current national defence policy to meet up with operational diversity of insurgent groups.

5. One of the major challenges of the national defense strategy is poor inter agency collaboration. A reviewed security strategy must ensure unlimited and uncensored intelligence sharing to increase tendencies of victory against terrorism.

Summary

The title of the research is 'an examination of the impact of Nigeria's national defence strategy on the war against insurgency in Nigeria. A study of Igabi local government area in Kaduna state between 2016 and 2023. The study adopted Clausewitz theory of applied strategy as its theoretical framework. The study anchored on survey research in which mixed method of qualitative and quantitative methods were used. The study utilized both primary and secondary sources of data. The study reviewed some related literature on insurgency and military operations. The study discovered some gaps from literature reviewed which ought to

be filled. Such gaps include the clamour for a reviewed security policy to further check insurgency in Igabi LGA.

Conclusion

Winning the war on insurgency requires a combination of political settlement, civil society participation and military solution. After several false starts, genuine talks should begin without further delay. The federal government should proceed in ensuring unlimited synergy between all security agencies to boost chances of defeating insurgency and insurgents in Igabi LGA and Nigeria ta large. Dialogue with radical Islamists, however, may fail, and other aggrieved groups currently ignored by the authorities could become real threats. The most urgent national question is the constitutional and practical devolution of power, responsibilities and resources from the centre to the states and local councils. Many feel the central government is too powerful and are unhappy with how it allocates resources. A functional, restructured and capacitated Nigeria should be able to tackle the root causes of conflict and violence and end it.

Recommendations

It is recommended that the federal government of Nigeria should among others;

1. Ensure adequate implementation of Nigeria's national security policy.

2. Hasten the review of the current national defence policy haven identified major lapses in its provisions and inability to provide adequate guide to defeat insurgency.

3. Improve intelligence gathering and surveillance so that law enforcement agents could become proactive and reasonably predict potential crime with near accuracy rather than being reactive.

4. Increase its gear towards achieving efficient logistics and transportation network, secure communications, and integrated joint and partner intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

5. Collaborate with civil society to advance the importance of security in Nigeria. With active involvement of civil society in security management, it is most likely that we could have less violence, human right abuses and social injustice.

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