FARMER-HERDERS CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA: ITS CHALLENGES AND INTERVENTIONS

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Abstract

Climate change has forced herders to move out of the desert to the forest, searching for a greener posture but not ethnic war. How the address these challenges remains a challenge for this regime and even the next regime. The chapter reveals the role of President Buhari's administration in curbing the farmer-herders conflict. All the attempts at conceptualizing lasting solutions to the crisis faced politicization. This chapter urges states to join the federal government at the center in encouraging all sides to these conflicts to make efforts towards finding a peaceful resolution. As we seek a permanent solution to these unwanted conflicts, efforts must be made to ensure that no innocent person faces any kind of deprivation or loss of rights and freedom under our laws. The fight for peace in the north-central states, the fight against social insecurity and conflicts, must comprise determined action against food security, poverty, inequality, injustice, and against the most extreme and most dependence-inducing form of poverty - being hungry, insecure of today's and tomorrow's food. Access to land is a major cause of conflicts in this region. Central to the discussion in this paper is the need for the State to review the existing laws as they relate to accessibility to land by members of the community. This issue is key to resource sustainability in Nigeria as the majority of its citizens require land for farming and grazing. The government should ensure that there is equity and accessibility to arable and grazing land to avert constant conflict.

1.1 Introduction

Farmer-herders conflict is a national problem as it has assumed a threat to national security and ethnic-religious colorations under President Buhari's administration which is antithetical to national cohesion. The conflict is more prominent in the middle-belt region. The states that constitute the region include- Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, Federal Capital Territory, and as well as southern parts of Kaduna and Taraba States. The conflict is land-resource-based and as such, it is calls for concern as there are other parts of the country that are affected by this resource-based conflict. The tropical and fertile nature of the soil in this region has obviously made the region the net producer of crops such as tubers, cereals, vegetables, fruits, etc. in Nigeria. It is on the premise that Ademola-Adelehin (2017,p.4) aptly contends that:

> In Nigeria, the Middle Belt region is considered the food basket of the country. The fertile soil and temperate climate offer a favorable environment for farmers and herders to thrive. The two communities have been farming and rearing cattle in Nigeria for centuries, benefiting from mutually beneficial relationships. Farmers benefit from cattle manure to fertilize their crops

> and herders benefit from crop refuse to nutritionally feed their herds. This symbiotic practice tied the wellbeing of the herders and allowed for the most disputes between the two groups to be resolved non-violently…

Thus, since 2000, this interdependence has increasingly deteriorated due to changing demography, climate variation, shrinking natural resources, and socio-political manipulation. As a result, violent confrontations have become a major defining feature of interactions, Ismaila and Bibi (cited in Ademola-Adelehin, 2017). It is incontestable that resource ownership and utilization have directly and indirectly defined the dimensions of most conflicts involving in farmers and herders in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. Since 2000, of all resources, however, land has remained an overwhelming source of conflicts among various user groups as well as individuals at varying thresholds. Conflicts between farmers and herders in the use of agricultural land are becoming fiercer and increasingly widespread in Middle Belt region of Nigeria, largely due to 'intensification and extensity' of production activities that are necessitated by increasing human population (Gefu and Kolawole 2005; Fasona and Omojola 2005 cited in Solagberu and Oluwasegun 2010, Tyolumum 2018).

Consequently, the dynamic role of agriculture in the development of the economies of developing nations, including Nigeria, is undeniable. Nigeria, with a population of about 180 million people, occupying a land area of 923,773 square kilometers continues to benefit immensely from agricultural production activities. And with about 82 million hectares of arable land, out of which only 42% is so far cultivated, agriculture (crop and animal production) contributed between 31.2% and 39.2% of total GDP between 1986 and 1995, and over 40% 1999; 2006 and 2017 (National Economic Intelligence Unit 2017). Dwindling economic fortunes, the need to reverse high food importation bills and the ever-increasing demands for food and raw materials continue to exert more pressure on the arable lands which, incidentally, are required by both farmers and cattle herdsmen for their production activities in middle belt region of Nigeria.

The resultant increase in competition for arable land has often times led to serious manifestation of hostilities and social friction among the two user-groups in the middle belt region of Nigeria. The conflicts have not only heightened the level of insecurity, but have also demonstrated high potential to exacerbate the food crisis and national development in Nigeria and other affected countries due to loss of farmer lives, animals, crops and valuable properties (Cotula et al. 2004). For instance, the conflict in Darfur region of Sudan started as a resource based conflict between herdsmen and farmers before transforming into a full-blown war that has claimed over 200,000 lives and rendered over a million people homeless (Tsuwa and Ochoga,2016). Just as in the Sudan, resource-based conflicts arising from farming and cattle-herding distinct ethnic groups is a potential recipe for ethnic war in the middle belt region of Nigeria.

A study of conflicts between herdsmen and farmers in the period between 1991 and 2005, Fasona and Omojola (2005)

found that farmer-herdsmen conflicts accounted for 35% of the major clashes reported by selected Nigerian newspapers. Another study of 27 communities in Central Nigeria by Nyong and Fiki (2005) showed that over 40% of the households surveyed had experienced agricultural land-related conflicts, with respondents recalling conflicts that were as far back as 1965 and as recent as 2005. Historically, relations between herders and sedentary farming communities have been harmonious. They lived in a peaceful, symbiotic relationship: herders' cattle would fertilise the farmers' land in exchange for grazing rights. But tensions have grown over the past decade, with increasingly violent flare-ups spreading throughout central and southern states; incidents have occurred in at least 22 of the country's 36 states.

The insurgence of herdsmen and farmers conflict became more vehement in 2014 particularly in the middle belt region of the country. For instance, the conflict took an initial eruption in Guma, Logo, Gwer west, Agatu etc in Benue State, Obi in Nasarawa State and Barkin Ladi in Plateau State. At this period, the attacks which claimed lives received little or no national security attention to immediately curb the menace. Yet, the effect on human and food security was significant. At present, over 2,000 people were killed and tens of thousands displaced in Benue, Taraba and Kaduna states alone (Daily Sun, May14, 2018). Incidents involving herders accounted for 44 per cent of all fatalities in the country between 2016 and 2018. This land-based-conflict as showed in table 1.1 was a threat to national the president Buahari's administration came on board. Incessant clashes between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in north-central Nigeria have claimed many lives in the past. These confrontations have assumed a regular pattern in terms of frequency in the last ten years. There are many of the conflicts that occurred in remote areas and therefore went unreported.

Table 1. Some Farmers-Pastoralists Conflicts in Northern Nigeria

2014	The Aguta and Guma LGAs mascara where over 1000 persons were reported killed by suspected herders
December 2012	Clashes between Gbagyi farmers and Fulani nomads near Abuja left two people dead, five injured, and over 1,500 people displaced from about 27 settlements that were wrecked.
July 2012	About 200 persons, including a serving federal senator, GyangDantong, were killed in Matse and Kakuru villages during a funeral for some people killed earlier by suspected Fulani herdsmen in Plateau state.
June 2012	At least six people were killed, houses burnt, and several farmlands were destroyed in Ngandum Village, Adamawa State as pastoralists and farmers engaged in a fierce battle. These occurred after Herdsmen led their cattle into rice fields resulting in the death of a farmer.
May 2012	A clash between farmers and herders in Gwer West area in Benue State left five people dead and many others displaced
April 2012	April 2012 One person was killed and several

	others were injured in a Fulani-Hausa Clash in Sokoto.
March 2012	Sixteen people were reported killed in a clash between Tiv farmers and Fulani herdsmen in Kadarko community, Giza Local Council of Nasarawa State. About 5,000 residents fled the community to safer areas in nearby towns.
March 2012	Conflict between Fulani pastoralists and sedentary farmers in Gwer West Local Government Area of Benue State left over 30 people dead.
November 2011	Fulani/ farmers clash in Kirikasamma Local Government area of Borno State left one person was killed and over 17 people from the farmers' side seriously injured. The clash was triggered when farmers in the area took measures to protect the perennial destruction of their yet-to-be-harvested farm produce and incessant attacks on them by the Fulani pastoralists. Conflicts between farmers and Fulani pastoralists in Benue State, left two soldiers, some 50 men, women, and children dead.
March 2010	Fulani herders invaded three villages of Dogo Na Hauwa, Ratsat and Jeji in Jos South Local Government Area of Plateau State killing many people including mostly children and women in a barbaric manner.
December 2009	32 people were killed, scores of houses burned, and several farms destroyed following clashes between pastoralists and farmers in Nassarawa State. About 700 pastoralists were expelled from Borno State and another 2,000 from Plateau State after attacks on local farmers.
February 2005	Dozens of people were killed in Adamawa state when Fulani herdsmen alleged to come from Chad and Niger attacked farming communities in a dispute over grazing land.
February 2004	49 farmers were killed as they flee nomad attacks by Nomads in the farming town of Yelwa, Plateau State.
May 2003	Cattle herders attacked and burned 34 farming villages in Adamawa and Gombe States resulting in 63 dead and over 500 injured The attackers, thought to be nomadic herdsmen from neighbouring Chad, attacked the rural town
February 2003	About 100 people were killed in clashes over the past days between Fulani and the Yungar ethnic groups in Adamawa State.
January 2002	Conflict in the Mambilla plateau in Taraba State between Fulani herders and farming communities which resulted in dozens of deaths forced more than 25,000 Fulani herdsmen to flee across the border to Cameroon. At least 30 people were killed in clashes between farmers and pastoralists over grazing land in BarkinLadi local council area of Plateau State

Compiled by Audu, S.D. (2013) and the current issues were added by author's field work.

As a panacea to the conflicting farmer-herder relations in the middle belt, Benue and Taraba states promulgated the 'Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law' and the same law is been glamour by interest groups to be enacted in Plateau states. The enacted law which ought to be a panacea to resolve the problem has rather become a source of aggravating the conflicts. While the conflict has continued unabated in the middle belt region, these conflicts are, by every measure, complex and multidimensional and appears to have an ethnic colouration, and have appositely made it to have different narratives within Nigeria with little attention on its implications on national security particularly the emphasis on the interventions off the Buhari-led administration. This is the gap in that the chapter intends to fill by formulating appropriate responses that require a clear diagnosis of their root causes, impacts, and implications for internal security, and the interventions of the Buhari-led administration.

1.2 Conceptualizing the Research Problem

The problematic of this chapter is premised on the misconception and discourse by some scholars such as Ochoga (2021) that the silence of president Buhari's over the farmer-herder conflict appears to have fueled the ethnic colouration that the conflict assumed under this administration. This forms the research problem that is the demand of this chapter to interrogate the interventions of the Buhari-led administration in curbing the conflict. This ethnic colouration calls for concern and herders in Nigeria are predominantly the Fulani ethnic community. Fulani is a name of an ethnic group in Nigeria and other West African countries. They are predominantly pastoralists occupationally wise. According to Azarya (1996,p.5), the Fulani pastoralists of West and Central Africa trace much of their current political, religious, and socio-cultural identity from the eighteenth and nineteenth century *jihad* which sedentarized them within conquered communities. The Fulani are said to have originated from Senegambia and then spread across some 20 states in West Africa and the Sahel, up to Western Sudan and the Central African Republic (Blench 1994; Shehu and Hassan 1995; Blench 2010; McGregor 2014 cited in Ibrahim et al., 2015). In Nigeria, they are the mainstay of the meat and milk industry, accounting for about 90% of cattle herd ownership (Abass 2012; Koster and de Wolff 2012). They rear different species of cattle, such as the *Keteku*, *Muturu*, and *Kuri*, but the *Zebu* is identified as the most common (Awogbade 1987; Iro 1994). They also supply skins, bones, and horns as complementary products. The pastoralist system involves young men who tend the herds while the women cook and sell animal products in the market.

The elders, in turn, are in charge of developing and managing resources at the levels of the community and domestic units (Awogbade 1987; Iro 1994). Despite the development and the centralisation of the state dating back to the colonial era, these informal governing mechanisms have been the key to understanding the challenges the pastoralists face with farmers, explaining their social stratification and their seemingly

egalitarian nature (Dyson-Hudson 1990; Bradburd 1996; Okello et al. 2014). From a historical point of view, certain scholars refer to the fact that conflicts resulting from cattle grazing have existed for as long as the practice of agriculture (Blench 2010; Abbass 2012). In the Nigerian context, however, colonization, together with the fall of the Sokoto Caliphate and the introduction of *jangali*(cattle tax), marginalized the Fulani and dispersed them further towards the middle belt and South (Azarya 1996; Okello et al. 2014). According to Ofuoku and Isife (2009,p7), the advancement of farming through irrigation and the increased decimation of pasture across the savannah also extended the scope of conflicts, through transhumance, to the coastal zones which were more ecologically viable (Blench 2010).

This evolution was complemented with the provision of affordable trypanocides, which provided a coping means for the herders in the tsetse-infested humid regions of southern Nigeria (ibid.). Thus, the period from May to September, during the rainy season, has been identified as the intense period of clashes between pastoralists and farmers over arable land, when the Fulani return northwards with their cattle as the vegetation begin to appear. These clashes result from the invasion of the arable land by the cattle during this peak season of crop production (Adisa and Adekunle 2010; Abass 2012) and thereby posing threat to national security and development.

Despite the ethnic coloration to the conflict, this chapter is of the view that the conflict is a land-resource-based-conflict but not an ethnic war as averred by Ochoga (2021) and other scholars. This position taken by this chapter is rooted in the ideological metaphor of The theory of eco-violence.. The farmer-herder violence in the middle-belt and other parts of the country is as a result of a decrease in the quality and quantity of renewable resources, population growth, and resource access act singly or in various combinations to increase the scarcity, for certain population groups, of cropland, water, forests, and fish (Adeoye (2017), certainly not a ethnic war. It is struggle over land-based-resource.

The conflict is about access to grazing posture for cows and other livestocks prone to open grazing. The affected herders migrating and often trigger conflicts when they move to new areas, while decreases in wealth can cause deprivation conflicts (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Implicit in the eco-violence theory is the assumption that competition over scarce ecological resources engenders violent conflict. This trend has been aggravated in contemporary times owing to the impacts of climate change, which has exacerbated ecological scarcity across the world (Blench, 2004; Onuoha, 2007 quoted in Adeoye (2017). In effect, ecological scarcity raises the competitive stakes and the premium that the various societal groups may place on available ecological resources. This condition tends to precipitate violent conflicts. Applied to the present discourse, the theory of eco-violence offers insights into the nature and dynamics of the herdsmen/farmers conflicts in Nigeria with deep analytical understanding of the conflict purely from the land-based-resource connotation.

1.3 The Farmers-Herders Conflicts in Nigeria Before 2015: The Trajectory

Before 2015 scholars have attributed the increasing conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in Nigeria to many key factors. Blench (2003) is of the view that competition for access to this precious resource increases conflict. The schemes allow farmers to take water and more of the river banks for dry season farming. They come into conflict with the other users, especially the cattle herders who have been using same location for many years as grazing and water points. In a field work carried out by Olabode, and Olajide, (2010), they found that where there is competing use of resources, conflict may emerge. They highlighted the following as causes of farmers-pastoralists conflict:

(i) Water scarcity: The only source of water for the cattle during dry season is to lead them to any available water point, which is an often low-land area. Farmers at this time, often engage in nursing their crops at the same water points because of dryness in the upland areas.

(ii). Control over scarce resources: The struggle by different parties to appropriate perceived scarce resources in order to guarantee self or group survival often engenders conflict. Pastoralists for example, do move away from locations that lack sufficient pasture to more favorable locations. The most frequent cause of conflict between farmers and herdsmen in the study area is the destruction of crops by cattle. This is often a result of herdsmen leaving cattle unattended to and thus, making them to wander to cultivated fields.

(iii). Incompatible values: It was observed that the crops grown by the farmers are at the feeding path or stock route of the cattle; this causes interference of cattle on crops, especially those ones at the nutritious value of the cattle. In most cases, this results into crop destruction and thereby engenders conflict.

(iv). Search for Grazing Land: Cattle herders look for where there is sufficient grass or crop residue for their animals to eat. In a situation where leftover crops get eaten it creates conflict with the farmer.

(v). Proximity to Stock Routes: Farmers who have their farms very close to the road or animal path are liable to have their crops destroyed whenever there is a loose control on the cattle. This shows that such closeness often leads to real threat on farming system.

In explaining the causes of conflicts, Kimani, (2013) saw as key factors population pressure and competition over resources especially during droughts, vicious cycles of settling of scores in attacks and counter-attacks and poor dialogue between the different over range resources, mainly water and pastures. According to him, the pastoralists see the survival and well-being of their livestock as paramount because they represent more than just economic assets but are also social, cultural and spiritual assets that define social identity. A herder was quoted by Abbass as saying: “Our herd is our life because to every nomad life is worthless without his cattle. What do you expect from us when our source of existence is threatened? The encroachment of

grazing fields and routes by farmers is a call to war (Abbass, 2012)

The major victim of herder-farmer conflict is human security. Human security presupposes the protection of human population from all forms of socio-existential threats and vulnerabilities (Okoli, 2014; Okoli and Ayokhai, 2016 cited inOkoli, 2016). Herder-farmer conflict has led to dire socio-economic and humanitarian consequences, including loss of livelihoods, population displacement, loss of life and property, and decline in rural productivity and agricultural output. Loss of livelihoods in turn exposes the affected population to material hardships, exemplified in hunger, disease and malnutrition. Population displacement involves of abrupt dislodgment of rural population from their natural abode – the place of optimal productivity. There has been mass sack of households by marauding herdsmen-militants in places such as Guma, logo, Gwer west, Agatu etc in Benue State, Obi in Nasarawa State and Barkin Ladi in Plateau State. The displaced populations are exposed to stiffer socio-economic ordeals in the course of their refugee-like sojourn.

Much destruction of lives and property has been lost as direct and indirect consequences of herdsmen militancy in different parts of the country. There have been serial killings in the hinterlands of Plateau, Nasarawa and Benue state as result of the herder‟s onslaughts. The BarkinLadi incident in Plateau state (2012) led to the killing of about 500 villagers in an over-night brutal escapade perpetrated by the herdsmen-militants (Okoli and Orinya, 2013). Scores of villagers in Agatu area of Benue State in 2014 and recent cold blood attacks in 2017 on Guma , logo and the most recent killing of two catholic priest and 17 others in Mbalom, Gwer west. In the aftermath of the tragedy, breadwinners of many families are killed, exposing the affected households to acute material hardships. In terms of property wastages, herdsmen – farmer's conflict has been associated with the worst degrees of material vandalism. It has been associated with arson, leading to burning of family houses, assets and farmlands. Oftentimes, it has led to desolation of rural villages in places like Nasarawa and Benue States.

The impact of herdsmen militancy on rural productivity and agricultural output has been particularly devastating. With the mass displacement of farmers from areas affected by herders‟ attacks, there is a significant decline in agricultural production and output in those areas. This has been amply demonstrated by the relative shortage of farm produce in the rural and urban markets of Central Nigeria. The trend is also palpably evident in the soaring prices of farm produce in the area. A market survey in Makurdi and Lafia suggests a rapid rise in the prices of staple produce. This has been an observable trend given the deterioration of farmer-herder crisis in the States since 2018.

Beyond the issue of human security, herdsmen militancy has been a veritable threat to cordial intergroup relations in Nigeria. It has resulted not only in mutual distrust between the farmers and herders, but also between the ethnic Fulani and the rest of the native/settled communities. This scenario has complicated the indigenes-settlers schism in that context. It has also brought about rapid polarization between Christians and

Muslims who, coincidentally, are symmetrically categorized in the locality as either herders or farmers. Thus, as the inter-group tension and hostility blossom, the traditional symbiosis that had hitherto characterized the affected group becomes increasing interred in the cemetery of mutual animosity and vendetta. The logical implication of the foregoing is that herdsmen militancy poses a threat to human security, agricultural productivity/output as well as inter-group co-existence long the president Buhari took over the sheep of the country in 2015. The collateral complications of the above impacts create a volatile societal scenario that is inimical to national security, development and national cohesion before 2015.

1.4 Curbing the Farmer-Herders Conflict by the Buhari Administration

Since the conflict is a threat to national security, the"RUGA Settlement and National Livestock Transformation Plan (NLTP) are policy initiatives conceived by the President Buhari led-administration to address the conflict caused by open grazing.



Figure 1: A typical look of open grazing of castles

(j) Ruga Settlement Initiative

In an attempt to address the incessant farmer- herders conflict arising due to climate change . the President Buhari led-administration initiated the 'Ruga Settlement policy'. Ruga Settlement that seeks to settle migrant pastoral families simply means rural settlement in which animal farmers, not just cattle herders, will be settled in an organized place with provision of necessary and adequate basic amenities such as schools, hospitals, road networks, vet clinics, markets and manufacturing entities that will process and add value to meats and animal products. A careful look at that initiative appears that the overall benefit to the nation includes a drastic reduction in conflicts between herders and farmers. This is because incessant violence

between herders and farming communities has claimed thousands of lives across Nigeria.

The "Ruga Settlement" seeks to settle migrant pastoral families simply means rural settlement in which animal farmers, not just cattle herders, will be settled in an organized place with provision of necessary and adequate basic amenities such as schools, hospitals, road networks, vet clinics, markets and manufacturing entities that will process and add value to meats and animal products. Other gains are job creation, access to credit facilities, security for pastoral families and curtailment of cattle rustling. Stripped of the politics and howling that has attended the recent comments, there is no government plan to seize state land, colonize territory or impose Ruga on any part of the federation. Government has made it clear time and again that the programme is voluntary.

This chapter reveals that so far, twelve states have applied to the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, making lands available for the take-off of the scheme in their states. This number is sufficient for the pilot scheme. Unfortunately, some state governments that have not signified interest in the scheme and, therefore, are not on the invitation list have been misleading people that the federal government is embarking on a scheme to take away their lands. Mostly, these are state leaders that have no explanation to offer their people for continued non-payment of workers' salaries. It is true that government at the centre has gazetted lands in all states of the federation but because the idea is not to force this programme on anyone, the government has limited the take-off to the dozen states with valid requests. The "Ruga Settlement initiative was intended to address perennial land resource-based conflict but implementation was criticized mostly by most states of the federal as an attempt to achieve territorial expansion by the Fulani ethnic group. It is implementation problem is that it was only 12 states that voluntary signed up for the settlements.

(ii) Livestock Transformation Plan

The National Livestock Transformation Plan is a policy conceived by the Buahri led administration to prevent farmer-herders conflict, and add value chain to the livestock's production in Nigeria. There are six key pillars on which the plan is built. Namely- economic investment, conflict resolution, law and order, humanitarian relief, information, education and strategic investment communication, and crosscutting issues.

Table2: Livestock Transformation Plan Key Pillars

Economic Investment	Law and Order	information, education and strategic investment communication
Conflict Resolution	Humanitarian Relief	crosscutting issues

Source: Author's construction (2022).

Based on the aim of the plan, the Economic Investment Pillar will support and strengthen the development of market-driven ranches in seven pilot states for improved livestock productivity through breed improvement and pasture production, in addition to efficient land and water productivity. The ranch is also designed as an integrated business which makes provision for (a) the development of commercial crop production to support livestock through the supply of quality fodder and other feed materials, (b) the formation of producers into clusters to create viable ranch herd sizes, and (c) creation of cooperatives to facilitate improved access to inputs, infrastructure, finance, markets, and support services. In studying the objectives of the plan, the Conflict Resolution Pillar will support rebuilding social capital at the community level to promote mutual trust, confidence building and consolidating the peace process. Based on the plan, this focuses on capacity building of community leaders in peace building, conflict resolutions and management, supporting the process of disarmament and rehabilitation of militias, disbanding and rehabilitating vigilante groups, supporting the institutionalization and functionality of dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms, and promoting social cohesion.

The Law and Order Pillar supports the strengthening of legal frameworks for improving livestock production, peace and harmony. It will support community-based protection system, support the strengthening of justice system (formal and informal), livestock movement control and governance among others. The Humanitarian Relief Pillar focuses on rebuilding and reconstructing of common facilities and worship place, markets and individual homes that have been destroyed. A closer that the policy suggests it will also support the rehabilitation, reconstruction, resettlement and compensation of the displaced persons affected by the farmer-herder conflict in the seven targeted pilot states. In addition, it will provide input and land for crop farmers for those that had been displaced. Benue and Nassarawa are in advanced stages in this. The Information, Education and Strategic Communication Pillar provides information, education and strategic communication on the development of grazing reserves in the frontline states, and migate the consequences of Herders and Farmers conflicts such as un-wanton loss of lives, destruc7on of proper7es including schools and facilities. The Crosscutting Issues Pillar identifies various crosscutting issues necessary to realise the objectives of this programme. These include Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) and research contribute to building the evidence base in programme implementation; as well as Gender Mainstreaming.

Be that as it may, this policy identifies the strategic policy and programme areas that need to be addressed for the recommendations of the FMARD national livestock conference and the NEC Committiee to be actualized. Plan focuses on pilot intervention in the frontline states such as Adamawa, Benue, Ebonyi , Edo, Kaduna, Nassarawa, Oyo, Plateau, Taraba, Zamfara as Pilot phase one. But the implementation of this plan was not nationally successful because it was politicized by most state governors, mostly the states in the north-central and the southern part of the country. Therefore, the beautiful idea of the

National Livestocks Transformation Plan intended to address the farmer-herders conflict was frustrated for political and sectional interest without considering the national security interest.

1.5 Conclusion

Climate change has forced herders to move out of the desert to the forest in search for greener posture but not ethnic war. How the address this challenges remains a challenge for this regime and even the next regime. The chapter reveals the role of the President Buhari led-administration to curb the farmer-herders conflict. All the attempts at conceptualizing lasting solution to the crisis faced politicization. This chapter urges states to join the federal government at the centre in encouraging all sides to these conflicts to make efforts towards finding a peaceful resolution. As we seek a permanent solution to these unwanted conflicts, efforts must be made to ensure that no innocent person faces any kind of deprivation or loss of right and freedom under our laws.

The fight for peace in the north-central states, the fight against social insecurity and conflicts, must comprise determined action against food security, poverty, inequality, injustice, and against the most extreme and most dependence-inducing form of poverty - being hungry, insecure of today's and tomorrow's food. Access to land is a major cause of conflicts in this region. Central to the discussion in this paper is the need for the State to review the existing laws as it relate to accessibility to land by members of community. This issue is key to resource sustainability in Nigeria as majority of its citizens require land for farming and grazing. Government should ensure that there is equity and accessibility to arable and grazing land to avert constant conflict.

There are genuine concerns by discerning Nigerians on the need to review the existing constitution in the country. Issues such as indigeneship and settlers rights in communities are review of the land use acts which have been abused largely by the upper class should be in the front burner in the constitution review process. The chapter concludes that it is in the interest of the State to end the rhetoric on the demarcation of grazing land and take concrete steps to address the genuine needs of herdsmen for availability of grazing land, resolve the re-occurring conflicts in the agricultural sector which currently provides employment to over 80 % of the country's population.

Peace is a cherished good of humanity. But it is a good that many people have not enjoyed for decades. Millions of people have been deprived of peace for much of their foreshortened life, while an even greater number - possibly all humankind - can feel the threat of being severed from peace and stability - if not for themselves, for their children. Good in itself, peace - true, lasting peace - is also a symptom of well-being, a symptom of people living in harmony with themselves and others. Otherwise peace can be no more than elusive, an appearance maintained through repressed violence, undermined by the sense of frustration and

impotence, and which will eventually be threatened by revolt.

A learning agenda that integrates food security more clearly into an analysis of conflict would contribute important insight for future work. A deeper understanding of linkage between conflict and food security would help to build a better foundation for interventions aimed at both conflict prevention and recovery.

Policies need to be put in place to promote growth and distribute its benefits broadly across society. Agricultural development, as part of economic and social changes that give the poor greater power over the productive resources and the social factors that shape their livelihoods, is indispensable to the enhanced food security of the rural population and to a more peaceful and stable environment. Equitable growth and pro-poor policies are critical not only to prevent the outbreak of conflicts but also in immediate post-conflict situations.

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