AN APPRAISAL OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF NIGERIA'S COUNTER-TERRORISM APPROACH IN THE NORTH EAST - 2009-2021

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Abstract

This paper examined the effectiveness and efficiency of the Nigeria counter-terrorism approach in the North Eastern region of Nigeria from 2009 – 2021. The Nigeria counter-terrorism strategies have not effectively eradicated the Boko Haram sect; they have strategically continued the wanton destruction of lives and properties, resulting in an unprecedented threat to Nigeria's national security. Nigerian counter-terrorism strategies have depended heavily on the kinetic approach. The discussion applied Sir Gerald Templer's Heart and Mind counter-insurgency theory. The paper employed a quantitative approach to data collection and analysis. The paper, therefore, discovered that the Nigeria counter-terrorism strategies in the northeast have been ineffective and inefficient, as evidenced by the responses of 32% of respondents. The paper concludes that reliance on the kinetic approach, disconnection between policy and implementation, poor utilization of modern technology, poor inter-agency collaboration, and lack of morality and motivation are the major factors that have impinged the effectiveness and efficiency of Nigeria counter-terrorism approach in the North-East. The paper recommends winning the heart and minds of the general population and a less kinetic approach in addition to providing modern equipment, inter-agency collaboration, and feedback on policy implementation as the panacea for Boko Haram terrorism.

Keywords: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, National security

Introduction

The North Eastern region of Nigeria has been the epicenter of the terrorist activities of an Islamist sect known as "Jama'atuAhlis Sunnah Lidda'awatihwal-jihad" or Boko Haram. The locals named this group Boko Haram (Education is forbidden) because they believe Western education negatively influences Islam. Boko Haram emerged from the Nigerian Taliban in 2002 in Yobe State and later in Borno State(Serrano &Pieri, 2014). It quickly spread to other Northeastern states and became a covert opposition group against government mismanagement and security force brutality. Since 2010, Boko Haram has committed numerous terrorist attacks aimed at overthrowing the Nigerian government and establishing Islamic law and has achieved a reputation as the deadliest terrorist group, killing 6,644 (GTI, 2014; Asongu et al., 2019).

Nigerian government has launched multiple counter-terrorism offensives against Boko Haram and its splinter group. However, the Nigerian counter-terrorism strategies have been predominantly kinetic; they include the recalibration cum upgrade of the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF) in 2015 (Augustine et al., 2021), Operations Restore Order I, II, and III, BOYONA, Zaman LAFIYA, and Lafiya DOLE (Osakwe &Audu, 2017; Ugwueze& Onuoha, 2020). The Nigerian security forces launched these counter-terrorism offensives intending to defeat Boko Haram and its offshoots, recover the territories under their control, and eradicate terrorism from the North East.

Despite President Mohammadu Buhari's government's claim that Boko Haram has been defeated, the sect and its splinter group have continued to attack Nigeria's North Eastern region (Onapajo, 2016). It is dangerous and evident that Boko Haram has re-strategized and organized bandits who abduct, rape, and murder Nigerians in other states, as corroborated by the assertion of Roberts&Okpanocha (2022, p. 3) that "communities in Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto, andKaduna states have become targets of bandits, kidnappers, andother vices." This study, therefore, evaluated the counter-terrorism strategies of the Federal Government of Nigeria in the North Eastern region from 2009 to 2021. The study identified the factors that have impinged on the effectiveness/efficiency of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategies and recommended more effective and nationalist strategies capable of eradicating terrorism from the North Eastern region and in Nigerian as a whole.

Conceptual Clarification

Terrorism

Academics, analysts, and governments struggle to define terrorism because there is no universal definition. Environmental and social contexts shape how people interpret opinions (Merari, 1993). Terror, terrorize, terrible, terrorism, and deterrent come from the Latin verbs terrere (to tremble) and deterre (to frighten) (Wilkinson, 1986). Terrorism is a psychosomatic state characterized by intense death fear. The September 11 terrorist attacks and U.S. efforts to build a broad anti-terrorism coalition have raised the question of what constitutes terrorism, according to Ganor (2002). Since one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, most researchers believe an objective and internationally accepted definition of terrorism will never be agreed upon. (Marighela, 1999). Without a clear definition of what the act of terrorism symbolizes,

the world is presented with constantly shifting situations and images that make it challenging to define terrorism.

Enders & Sandler (2006, cited in Asongu et al., 2019, p.7) defined terrorism as "the actual and threatened use of force by subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives." This definition is in tandem with the activities of the Boko Haram sect, which is aimed at intimidating the Nigerian authorities into allowing them to establish Sharia laws in the North Eastern.

Given the difficulty of defining terrorism and encouragement from the Counter-Terrorism Committee, States could unilaterally define and assert universal jurisdiction over it (Saul, 2005). The U.S. State Department defines terrorism as the deliberate use of violence against non-combatants, civilian or otherwise (Jackson, 2011). The United States Department of Defence defines terrorism as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful violence to instill fear, with the intent to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of generally political, religious, or ideological objectives" (Sjoberg, 2009, p.71). In 1974, the British government defined terrorism as the use of violence for political purposes and the use of violence to put the public, or any segment of the public, in fear, as a result of attacks on computer installations, electronic data, or public utilities, for instance (Teichman, 1989).

Furthermore, in 1992, the United Nations defined terrorism as a repeated violent action employed by (semi) clandestine individuals, groups, or state actors for criminal or political purposes against soft targets (Bakker, 2014, p.2, Badey, 1998). Despite the use of the term terrorism by the U.N. Council "as an operative legal concept with serious consequences for individuals and entities" (Saul, 2005, p. 142), it failed to give terrorism a universally acceptable definition until the latter part of 2004. Saul asserted that "the UN Council's 2004 definition raises other problems, since it is non-binding (allowing States to preserve unilateral definitions) and potentially conflicts with multilateral treaty negotiations on defining Terrorism (Saul, 2005, p. 142). This article defines terrorism as subnational actors using force and intimidation to achieve political goals, which depicts Boko Haram's tactics.

Counter-Terrorism

Forest (2007), Comolli (2017), Solomon (2017), Adamo (2020), and Njoku (2020) discuss counter-terrorism in their intellectual spaces. Solomon (2017) listed traditional and critical

counter-terrorism perspectives. Terrorist organizations need recruits, supporters, funding, weapons, freedom of movement, communication, hiding places, and vulnerable targets to organize and plan attacks. Terrorism prevention requires a multifaceted strategy.

According to Crelinsten (2013), counter-terrorism is a military term for fighting an insurgency or armed rebellion by forces loyal to the insurgent government. It includes military, political, diplomatic, intelligence, and socio-economic measures a state uses to fight terrorism. In war, foreign occupation, or subversion and armed rebellion, legitimate political authorities use anti-terrorism campaigns (Solomon, 2017).

The most successful anti-terrorism campaigns combine political, security, economic, informational, and civilian efforts to strengthen the government's legitimacy and reduce the insurgents' influence on the civilian population. Counter-terrorism should achieve three main goals: To protect the public from violence, strengthen government institutions' legitimacy and ability to govern responsibly and reduce insurgents' political, economic, and social influence.

Counter-terrorism operations do not involve large-scale combat. However, counter-terrorists and terrorists are officially at war. Scham (2010, p.19) calls this an "enemy-centric" rather than "population-centric" approach, implying that an identifiable enemy is the main target. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the U.S. deployed small military units in Philippine towns and villages to conduct direct actions, train local forces, collect intelligence, and defeat the insurgency. Kilcullen (2007) claims that this strategy only works occasionally against modern insurgencies. Counter-insurgents or counter-terrorists must control the environment rather than defeating one enemy in modern insurgencies. According to Kilcullen (2007), counter-terrorism logically depends on insurgency and changes in response to it. Francart and Patry (2000) called counter-terrorism "counter-warfare" that uses all national power to fight insurgency. Thus, counter-terrorism strategies change as insurgencies do.

National Security

National security is misunderstood and elusive (Wolfers, 1962; Carey, 2000), making it a strange phenomenon, a subjective "feeling," and relational rather than an objective "thing" that can be seen and handled. Economic, diplomatic, power projection and

political survival require national security. After WWII, America pioneered the concept, including non-military or economic security and values issues. National security protects self-preservation, territorial integrity, and economic progress (Abidde, 2014). National security requires economic, energy, and environmental security. Other nation-states, violent non-state actors, narcotic cartels, multinational corporations, and NGOs pose security threats. Authorities include environmental and natural disasters. Diplomacy, economic power, effective armed forces, civil defense and emergency preparedness (including anti-terrorism legislation), critical infrastructure resilience and redundancy, intelligence services to detect and defeat threats, espionage, and class interests ensure national security.

Imobigbe (1981) defined national security as defense and survival. Nweke (1988, pp. 1-2) warns of three dangers of this narrow national security view. First, people confuse "defense" with "security" and overpower the military. The military believes they alone can provide security, stability, and progress. Second, civilian politicians have used national security rhetoric or slogans to rally citizens against perceived internal or external threats to governments in power and strengthen their local influence and political base (Adebayo, 1986). Dyke (1966) defines national security as state sovereignty, territorial inviolability, and individual and collective self-defense against internal and external threats. The state is secure only when citizens feel part of a sovereign political community, have equal political freedom, human rights, and economic opportunities, and can ensure development and foreign policy independence.

National security requires military acquisition, deployment, and use, according to Held & McGrew (1998). Romm (1993) claims no threat to standards, values, and ideals or fear of attack. National security defends values from humans and non-humans and pursues international interests. National security protects values and interests from all threats (Okwori, 1995). Resource-based protection. National security is sovereignty, territory, and independence. Protecting citizens is national security. Umar (2000, p.42) states that ancient empires defended their sovereignty, national security, and territorial integrity. These interests threaten sovereignty. Modern states protect citizens. According to Mbachu (1998, cited in Lukpata&Shishi, 2019), a state's first duty is to protect citizens' lives and property. States must protect their interests. The national

security issue cannot be taken for granted by any state" (Mbachu, 1998).

According to Umar (2004), national security is the defense of national self-determination to choose an independent socio-economic system. National security includes protecting and improving citizens. Thus, national security analysis plans to develop and assess national security policies. "Security is beyond militarism," Tedheke (1998) said. Security trumps the military—security safeguards socio-economic well-being and external threats.

Review of Relevant Literature

Terrorism, like all evil, has outpaced efforts to combat it, even in academia. From Galula (1964) and Thompson (1966) to Smith (2001), Nagl (2002), and Kilcullen (2006), two critical perspectives emerged. First, insurgencies and terrorism are different forms of conflict that cannot be defeated by direct military confrontation. Thus, conventional methods need help to counter irregular threats. Second, most studies agree that coercive insurgency tactics, primarily when used exclusively and indiscriminately, are more likely to backfire (Omeni, 2015; Halsne, 2018). Insurgents' ability to win over locals makes it difficult for counter-terrorism forces to use coercion against them.

Umar (2013) examines Nigeria's Northeast counter-terrorism operation and its overuse of coercion. In 2011, Boko Haram's insurgency caught the Nigerian government off guard, according to Umar (2013). Ekot (2023) noted that Nigeria's ethnicity affects governance. Ekot's observation suggests that Nigeria's multi-ethnic and multi-religious makeup may have hindered counter-terrorism efforts. The government used military force to suppress the uprising because it lacked counter-terrorism expertise and strategies. The government's military operation is believed to weaken human security, strengthening Boko Haram and possibly local support. Umar (2013) reported the Nigerian military extrajudicial killings, torture, and other human rights violations against Boko Haram leaders, members, and suspected sympathizers, as well as a disregard for international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict. Umar claimed that these radicalized Boko Haram and swayed disgruntled citizens.

Odobo and Andekin (2019) found that the Nigerian response to the Boko Haram insurgency only recently adopted classical counter-terrorism tactics. They saw a multi-stakeholder strategy that

focused on the North East population as the key to defeating Boko Haram. The victims' support fund, military human rights desk, and North East Development Commission were attempts to promote a population-centered anti-Boko Haram campaign. However, their research did not explain how this countered Boko Haram.

Extant literature has examined the Nigerian military's Northeast counter-terrorism efforts. Omeni's (2015) thesis explains why the institution, lauded for its success in the Nigerian civil war and international peacekeeping, has aggressively fought Boko Haram since 2011. Omeni (2015) argued that the Nigerian military's inability to adapt to current realities is due to its identity crisis, which stems from its colonial formation. The British-modeled post-colonial Nigerian military has failed to rethink its internal security role. Omeni accused the post-colonial Nigerian military of indiscipline, coup culture, political interference, and lack of professionalism. These actions undermine the institution and civil-military relations. Thus, Omeni found the Nigerian military unprofessional and unable to win over the population in irregular warfare like the Boko Haram uprising. A post-civil war culture of successful regional peace support operations makes it less adaptable. This perception prevented the military from diversifying counter-terrorism functions. The military realized in 1978 that it needed a counter-terrorism strategy, but it never expected to play a major role in internal security (Omeni, 2015).

Sutch and Lark (2014) supported Omeni's claim that the military doctrine never developed a unified counter-terrorism theory and practice because it saw Nigeria's main security threat as external. They also argued that Nigerian military doctrine drew heavily from classical Western interpretations of the military's role as the state's primary defender against external aggression/threat and its primary force instrument. It may be accurate, but it has led to an overemphasis on conventional warfare strategies and a military doctrine that is hard to change during a counter-terrorism campaign. According to Sutch and Lark (2014), Boko Haram's military doctrine is flexible and adaptable to the local operational environment, while the military finds it challenging to defeat the insurgent group. Thus, Sutch and Lark, and Omeni suggest that the Nigerian military has made a minor contribution to counter-terrorism. The military was unprepared for unconventional warfare. Omeni, Sutch, and Lark correctly observed that the military still struggles to develop a Nigerian military counter-terrorism doctrine; they should have discussed the entire internal security architecture.

Their study lacks military and non-military components of counter-terrorism. Thus, while their contributions shed light on Nigeria's counter-terrorism culture, they cannot assess the Boko Haram insurgency.

Andekin (2019) examined the Nigerian government's Boko Haram conflict management strategy. Andekin argued that the Nigerian government adopted response mechanisms that addressed both the military and non-military phases of counter-terrorism. However, there was little evidence, particularly in the early stages of the conflict, that the government had a developed, coherent counter-terrorism strategy before deploying military forces to contain the insurgency. Strategically, Nigeria never considered the Northeastern internal security operation counter-terrorism. Andekin (2019, p. 62) noted:

Boko Haram started as a nascent group before becoming what it is today. The group was initially seen as a criminal organization, a malfeasance, and an Islamic sect with no genuine religious inclination whose deviant behavior required law enforcement action.

The government should have spent more time with a counter-terrorism plan and political will to defeat the insurgency (Danjibo et al., 2020). Andekin suggests this partially explains why the military initially conducted the counter-terrorism operation as conventional warfare. The military's transition from traditional warfare to counter-terrorism was difficult for an institution so ingrained in it.

Counter-terrorism operations go beyond traditional warfare, and This enhances Gordon (2011)'s assessment of US anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. Gordon asserted that counter-terrorism involves more than military operations. Population-centric counter-terrorism supposedly includes construction, reconstruction, maintenance, local conflict resolution, health and education initiatives, security supervision, community mentoring and training, and garbage collection. To win over locals. Gordon did not specify whether the military should perform this "population-centric" function or be done within a multidimensional counter-terrorism framework where other stakeholders provide non-coercive expertise.

Howard (2019) showed that counter-terrorism development aid can stabilize if properly designed and implemented. However, research in Northeast Nigeria has shown that government officials,

traditional rulers, intervention bodies, and political cronies have diverted aid, hurting Boko Haram's anti-terrorism efforts. Brechenmacher (2019) noted the diversion of reconstruction funds into private pockets while ignoring local needs. Citizens' confidence in the government's counter-terrorism efforts has plummeted. Alqali (2018) argued that such skewed aid practices had endeared some people to Boko Haram, whom they now believed to be less corrupt and better able to guarantee their basic needs, security, and justice.

Njoku (2018; 2020) examined NGOs' counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategies. Njoku (2018), like Baker (2007) and Halsne (2018), supports a multi-agency counter-terrorism approach but believes NGOs should be allowed to provide development and humanitarian services and advocate for human rights. Kenya, Mali, and Nigeria restrict NGOs' counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency work. NGOs' political advocacy, human rights activism, and transparency and accountability efforts have hampered these nations' counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts (Njoku, 2020). Njoku (2018) claims that the government has excluded CSOs from counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency policymaking, hindering their efforts in Nigeria.

The National Security Strategy (NSS, 2014 cited in Bala &Ouédraogo, 2018), National Counter-terrorism Strategy (NACTEST, 2016), and other national security instruments emphasize interagency collaboration between defense and security agencies, other government agencies, the media, CSOs, and other relevant entities to fight internal security threats like Boko Haram. Like the military, CSOs promote internal security. Njoku (2020) suggested that all relevant agencies, including NGOs, could perform their essential roles within a coherent and well-coordinated internal security strategy to improve North East government counter-terrorism operations.Majekodunmi (2015) noted the Nigerian government's longstanding failure to provide purposeful good governance. When the government fails to provide basic social infrastructures to boost economic growth, roads, electricity, and other critical infrastructures deteriorate, causing widespread poverty. North Eastern Nigerian states have weak leadership. According to Alabi (2019), Owasanoye, the chairman of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), has attributed the increase in "violent crimes and biting poverty in northern Nigeria to years of poor leadership in the region." Solving the North’s problems will solve 50% of Nigeria's problems. The region's irresponsible leadership created the Boko Haram national

monster. According to Granguillhome et al. (2021), the World Bank's poverty report on Nigeria's North East and Lake Chad basin was high. The World Bank reports high poverty, low human capital, and limited access to essential services in the region. Thirty years of declining economic activity and household incomes. The lake's southwest bordering the Nigerian North East has a 70% poverty rate, nearly double the national average. Adamawa and Yobe have 74% and 70% poverty rates, respectively, compared to 38% nationally. Boko Haram is blamed for North-East backwardness, with 2.7 million displaced and 12.8 million needing humanitarian aid. 10.6 million people in Nigeria's North East's three worst-hit states, Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, need humanitarian aid (Granguillhome et al., 2021).

Boko Haram sect analysis examined why some kill and others fund, shelter, or support terrorists. Kinship, ideology, weapon availability, and criminal networks influence terrorism. Profiling terrorists becomes nearly impossible. The Nigerian government must understand terrorism: "Should they make the false assumption that some sort of profiling can identify terrorists, their effort to defeat Boko Haram will be counter-productive, and possibly exacerbate the current security challenge" (Forest, 2012, p. 80).

Boko Haram's founder Yusuf preached, "Our land was an Islamic state before the colonial masters transformed it into a kafir land. The current system is contrary to true Islamic beliefs" (Salkida, 2009). Boko Haram's ideology describes how white European colonial powers drew lines on a map in a somewhat arbitrary and capricious plan to carve up the African continent and empowered local tribes, many of which had embraced Christianity, to rule as proxy landlords until WWII and a wave of independence movements ended colonial rule. However, what followed was worse: rampant corruption among a political and wealthy elite heavily invested in the status quo. A huge gap between Nigeria's youth's aspirations and the system's opportunities for a better life, a lack of critical infrastructure and essential support services, a history of military dictatorship and political oppression, a swelling population amid economic despair, and a system that fosters political extremism. Northern Nigerian Muslim parents worry about their children's spiritual and moral future and the Sultan of Sokoto's declining influence (Stern, 2021).

Methodology:

This study worked with the projected population of the National Population Commission of Nigeria (NPC) 2021. NPC

placed Adamawa at 4,778,877, Borno at 5,995, 271, and Yobe at 5,995,271.

Table 1.1 National Population Commission 2021 population projection

S/No.	`States	Population of female	Population of Male	Total Population
1	Adamawa	2,384,483	2,394,394	4,778,877
2	Borno	2,968,117	3,027,154	5,995,271
3	Yobe	1,751,931	1,813,327	3,565,258
Total				14,339,406

Source: Modified from the NPC 2021 population projection

Sample and Sampling Technique

To effectively determine the sampling representative of the entire population of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states, which is 14,339,406, the sample size was calculated using Taro Yamane's formula:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where: N= sample size required

N = number of people in the population

e = allowable error (%) or degree of error

The result gave the sample size as:

$$n = 399.98$$

n = 400

The sample size obtained from the above analysisis 400. Therefore, 400 structured questionnaires were distributed in a Stratified Random Sampling procedure.

STATISTICAL TECHNIQUEFOR DATA ANALYSIS

Data for the study were coded and analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and Stata 15. The software was employed for the data analysis and test of hypotheses as presented below:

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

Four hundred copies of the questionnaire were administered to the sampled respondents accordingly. Table 1.2 below abridges

the return rate of the total number of questionnaires administered to the research participants during the study.

As tabulated above, Table 1.2 shows that 400 questionnaires were distributed to the research participants in the study area (Northeastern Nigeria). Of these, 332 questionnaires, representing 83%, were correctly filled and returned. Therefore, the data for this study were analyzed and interpreted based on 83% of the questionnaires that were correctly filled and returned.

Table 1.2 Synopsis of administered questionnaires

	Total	**Frequency of Returned**	**Percentage**	**Not Returned**	**Percentage**
Questionnaires	400	332	83%	68	17%
Total	**400**	**332**	**83%**	**68**	**17%**

Source: Questionnaire administered, 2021/2022

This section is devoted to the analysis of the social and demographic characteristics of the respondents, as demonstrated in Table 1.2

Table 1.3 Social and demographic characteristics of the respondents

Gender	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
Male	254	76.6
Female	78	23.4

Total	**332**	**100**
Age	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
20-25	52	15.4
25-30	54	16.0
30-35	53	16.8
35-40	53	16.8
40-45	50	15.0
45-50	60	17.0
50 and above	10	3.0
Total	**332**	**100**
Educational Qualification	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
FSLC	50	15.0
SSCE	68	18.0
ND/NCE	107	35.0
Degree/ HND	56	17.0
Masters and above	51	16. 0
Total	**332**	**100**
Religion	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
Christianity	125	38.0
Islam	138	41.6
African tradition religion	69	20.4
Total	**332**	**100**
Occupation	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
Civil/public servant	53	16.8
Business	120	36.2
Farming	87	26.3
Others	72	20.7
Total	**332**	**100**
State	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
Adamawa	110	33.2
Borno	115	34.7
Yobe	107	32.1
Total	**332**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2021/2022

Going by the distribution of the respondents based on gender, 76.6% are male, while 23.4% are female. The reason for the higher percentage of male over female respondents is not farfetched from the nature of the Northern society, which does not allow women to move freely and interact with people of the opposite sex. The society practices a purdah system, which emphasizes women's

seclusion from public places to prevent sexual temptation that may gravitate into immoral affairs.

More than 15.4% of the respondents are between 20 to 25 years, 16% are between 25 to 30 years, and 16.8% are between 30 to 35 years. Those who are 35 to 40 years are 16.8%. Fifteen percent of the respondents are between the ages of 40 to 45, 17% are between the ages of 45 to 50% while just 3% of the research participants are 50 years and above.

On educational qualification, 15% of the respondents possess First School Living Certificate (FSCL), 18% are Senior School Certificate Examination holders, 35% have NCE and ND, 17% possess HND and Degree certificate, while 16% of them have a masters degree and above. This shows that the respondents are knowledgeable and enlightened enough to give objective and dispassionate accounts of insecurity and terrorism currently bedeviling the nation's Northeastern region. Thirty-eight percent (38%) of the research participants are Christians, 41.6 % are Muslims, and 20.4% practice African Traditional Religion. On the occupational distribution of the respondents, 16% are civil/public servants, 36.2% are businessmen and women, 26.3% are farmers, while 20% are into other sources of livelihood. This shows that the respondents are gainfully engaged in enterprising economic activities.

The most troubled States in the Northeast are well represented in this study as indicated in the Table: 33.2% are from Adamawa State, 34.7% are from Borno State, and 32.1% of the respondents are from Yobe State. This shows that the respondents are representative enough to warrant generalization.

Presentation of Results and Evaluation of Hypotheses

Summary of the Coding of Respondents

a. 1 "Strongly disagree" 2 "Disagree" 3 "Neutral" 4 "Agree" 5 "Strongly agree"

b. Religion: 1 "Christianity" 2 "Islam" 3 "African tradition"

c. State: 1 "Adamawa", 2 "Borno", 3 "Yobe"

d. Academic Qualification: 1 "FSLC", 2 "SSCE", 3 "OND", 4 "DEGREE", 5 "MASTERS and above",

e. Occupation 1 "civil service", 2 "business", 3 "farming", 4 "others".

f. Gender 1 "Male”, 2 "Female".

g. Age 1 "Youth (20-50)", 2 "Elder (51 and Above)"

The respondents' rating of Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts (NCTE)

$NCTE = b_0 + b_1 GENDER + b_2AGE + b_3ACAQ + b_4OCP + b_5REL + b_6STATE$

Where:

NCTE = Nigeria Counter-Terrorism Efforts

GENDER = Gender

AGE = Age

ACAQ = Academic Qualification

OCP = Occupation

REL = Religion

STATE = State

Table 1.3 The respondents' rating of Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts (NCTE)

Rating of Nigeria's counter-terrorism	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
Effective and efficient	51	15.3
Very effective and efficient	43	12.8
Ineffective and inefficient	187	56.3
Fairly effective and efficient	32	10.0
Undecided	19	5,6
Total	**332**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2021/2022

Summary of Descriptive Statistics of NCTE Model

Summary of Descriptive Statistics of the Variables NCTE GENDER, AGE, ACAQ, OCP, REL AND STATE

Table 1.4

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
NCTE	332	0.5181	0.5004	0	1
GENDER	332	1.5	0.5008	1	2
AGE	332	45.1506	15.3086	20	70
ACAQ	332	3.0421	1.3768	1	5
OCP	332	2.5542	1.0827	1	4
REL	332	2.0331	0.8127	1	3
STATE	332	2.0572	0.8039	1	3

Source: Author Generated from Stata 15

Table 1.5: Ordered Logistic Regression Result for NCTE Model

Variables	Odds Ratio	z-statistics	Probability
GENDER	1.3857	1.47	0.014
AGE	1.0034	0.47	0.037
ACAQ	1.0311	0.38	0.007
OCP	1.0148	0.14	0.008
REL	0.9217	-0.59	0.003
STATE	0.9707	-0.21	0.030
Pseudo R^2 = 0.0069 | Prob(chi2) = 0.7889| log likelihood= -228.32			


Source: Computation by Researcher Using Stata 15

Over 15% of the respondents rate Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts to be effective and efficient, 12.8% rate it to be very effective and

efficient, 56.3% rate it to be ineffective and inefficient, 10% rate it as being fairly effective and efficient while 5.6% are undecided in their rating. Judging from the rating of 56.3% of the respondents (the highest rating), it is safe to maintain that Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts are not effective and efficient. The ineffectiveness of Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts is further affirmed by the ordered Logistic regression results that indicated positive and significant odds ratio for all the categories of respondents is an indication that the majority of the respondents agreed that Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts (NCTE) in the North East region is inadequate by 1.3857, 1.0034, 1.0311, 1.0148, 0.9217 and 0.9707 units for the respondents under gender, age, acaq, occupation, religion, and state respectively. The pseudo R2 indicated that the model is a good fit.

It is so because the terrorism and insecurity in Nigeria are worsening and deteriorating despite substantial financial investments that are voted into the security situation in Nigeria. The roads are still unsafe, people can hardly go to their farms to engage in agricultural activities, countless innocent citizens are in the hands of terrorists in captivity, and many Nigerians are in Internally Displaced People's Camps (IDPCs) across northern Nigeria. The indices of wreckages that are going on in Nigeria because of the activities of Boko Haram or ISWAP terrorists are overwhelming. No day ends without pockets of incidence of terrorism in Nigeria. This development is a testament to state actors' ineffective, inefficient, and egregious performance in the fight against terrorism.

The rating of counter-terrorism activities in Nigeria is illustrated in Fig. 1.1 thus:



Theoretical Framework

This paper adopted Gerald Templer's counter-insurgency theory (1948-1960 in Malaya). Templer supports "Winning Hearts and Minds" (HAM) counter-insurgency. HAM theory explains what needs to be done in critical areas of counter-insurgency operation and can help countries facing insurgency to evaluate their counter-terrorism strategies. Sir Gerald Templer, a British Army officer, coined the term "hearts and minds" (HAM) theory after the 1950s British counter-terrorism campaign in Malaya (Long, 2006). Templer attributed the Malayan counter-insurgency victory to the hearts and minds strategy. He believed the "hearts and minds" counter-terrorism strategy recognized that coercive force alone could not win a counter-terrorism operation without a political and economic development plan that addresses the unrest's root causes. "The shooting side of this business is only 25% of the trouble, and the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us," said Templer (cited in Cloake, 1985, p. 262). The uprising's solution is in the people's hearts and minds, not more troops in the jungle.

Dixon (2009) claims that Templer, a combatant and military strategist, advocated non-military counter-terrorism as more effective than military methods. Templer's support for a hearts-and-minds counter-terrorism strategy stems from Mao Zedong's 1949 guerrilla warfare in China, according to Dixon (2009). Mao said the guerrilla must move among the people like a fish swims in the sea (Dixon, 2009, p. 362). Thompson (1966) argued that counter-terrorism strategies should focus on political subversion, not guerrillas or terrorists. Thus, winning the hearts and minds of the host government is more important than killing insurgents for counter-terrorists. Thus, hearts and minds symbolize legitimacy and popular support in counter-terrorism campaigns.

During the Vietnam War, the US commissioned a group of military strategists to improve its counter-insurgency campaign. Counter-insurgency relies on winning the local population's "hearts and minds" to legitimize the host nation's authorities and "drain the sea in which the terrorists swim" (Egnell, 2010, p. 282). Hearts and minds analysts prioritize populace protection from insurgents. In the current strategic context, this theory assumes that terrorism with popular support has excellent mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy, making it difficult for counter-insurgents to target.

Thus, the counter-terrorism campaign's goals can be achieved with local support. The hearts and minds theory also advises insurgent nations to address "bad governance and lack of administration." Thus, reforms, law enforcement, and addressing distributional,

ethnoreligious, communal, and corruption issues are needed to improve governance and deliver governance and developmental dividends to the local population. The HAM theory's final issue is being excluded from poor living conditions or rising expectations. HAM theory says economic aid and good governance will win over the population.

The theory requires coordinating military, political, and economic strategies. The government must develop affected areas while fighting insurgents to gain legitimacy and support. Schafer (1988) suggests coordinating military, political, and administrative leaders for balanced action on all fronts and levels. Hearts and Minds value development over security. The HAM theory applies to this study because the Nigerian government's North Eastern counter-terrorism operations will succeed if the military kinetic strategy is combined with non-kinetic strategies to win public support. Boko Haram's history and ideology are rooted in socio-economic, political, and religious contestation dynamics that military engagement may not solve.

Scholars have criticized HAM theory. Pauker (cited in Long, 2006) modestly argues that people's living standards can help counter-terrorism efforts. He argues that military action against insurgents should take precedence over development. He believes in "reawakening the people's confidence and hopes through convincing evidence that the government does care about their welfare" (Pauker, cited in Long, 2006, p. 23). Schafer (1988) further criticizes Hearts and Minds. He said the hearts and minds prescriptions are three "oughts": governments should protect the population from terrorists, provide competent, legal, responsive administration, and meet rising expectations with higher living standards. Schafer considers these unrealistic. Nigeria needs to be more robust to manage all three aspects of this strategy simultaneously. Schafer also criticized the theory's miscalculations of underdeveloped governments, populations, insurgency sources, and outsiders' intervention ability. Schafer submitted that the intra-governmental limits on reform by foreign organizations and troops, government-population relations, and insurgent-population relations often limit leverage.

Discussion of Findings on Nigeria's counter-terrorism Efforts

According to the study, Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts against the terrorist organization Boko Haram are ineffective and inefficient. 53% of participants in the study confirmed and rated this as accurate. This finding validates the work of Olumu et al. (2020),

who noted that the nation's counter-terrorism strategies have been characterized by ad hoc approaches that can only resolve issues or the aftermaths that terrorist acts generate at any given time. This approach is not misplaced in counter-terrorism, but it cannot ensure the long-term defeat of terrorism. As anticipated, the process repeatedly proved counterproductive. It prompted the federal government to create a National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (hereafter NACTEEST) in 2014, which was reviewed and implemented in 2016 (Eme, 2018). Although NACTEST can be viewed as Nigeria's soft approach because it accommodates both military and non-military strategies, there is no evidence that it has significantly reduced terrorist activities in Nigeria. A year after reviewing the policy document, Amnesty International (2017) reported that Boko Haram perpetrated approximately 65 attacks, resulting in 411 civilian deaths and at least 73 abductions. Numerous Nigerians continue to be alarmed by the continued strength of the Boko Haram sect and the security threat posed by the newly emerged Fulani Herdsmen.

Despite the government's counter-terrorism efforts, Nigeria's terrorism threat remains. These strategies, especially the kinetic approach, have not reduced Boko Haram's terrorist attacks. Even after the Buhari administration declared the technical defeat of the Boko Haram sect in December 2015, pragmatic evidence suggests the Islamic sect is resilient against all odds and will likely remain a threat for the foreseeable future. The emergence of several other terrorist sects is also predictable. In Nigeria, Boko Haram killed over 297 people in coordinated attacks in the first half of 2018. These include the abduction of three UN aid workers from an IDP camp in Bornu state, the adoption of 110 Dapchi schoolgirls in March 2018, the sects' daring attacks on military formations, including super-camps, the recent murder of two of the abducted aid workers, and the imminent threat to kill the unreleased Dapchi schoolgirl Leah Sharibu. Despite NACTEST, Nigeria's counter-terrorism policies have failed to stop political terrorist attacks.Contemporary international politics considers security to include socio-economic emancipation, social justice, political inclusiveness, and widespread well-being, so a military solution to Nigeria's terrorism death spiral would fail. The study suggests that military and population-centered counter-terrorism strategies are needed for Nigeria to win a nationalistic and lasting victory over terrorism.

Adedire, Ake, and Olowololujo (2016) noted that Nigeria's government had developed many strategies to combat Boko Haram since terrorism and insurgency began. First is sending over 8,000 troops to northern Nigeria to fight insurgents without a Military Code of Justice. On April 21, 2013, Nigerian soldiers invaded and killed Baga people in Borno state. Nigerian soldiers killed over 200 Boko Haram suspects in a single operation after an attack (Akande, 2013). The federal government has sent a trained anti-terrorism combat squad to terrorist zones to combat Boko Haram (Okukpe, 2015). Second, the acquisition and development of more advanced, adequate, and appropriate military assets, the recent approval of the African Union, and the violations of an extensive international coalition to collaborate with our military. Third, international bodies allow Chad, Niger, and Cameroon to deploy soldiers in Nigeria legally.

The Nigerian military also hunts terrorists outside its borders. Fourth is declaring an emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, the worst-hit northern states. The lack of a Military Code of Justice to identify targets and protect civilians in Northern Nigeria has increased casualties. Fifthly, the government encourages public and media participation in terrorist intelligence gathering.

Conclusion

The primary focus of this study is Boko Haram's Strategies and the Nigerian Counter Terrorism Approach: An Evaluation of Counter-Terrorism Strategies in the Northeast from 2009 to 2021. Due to Boko Haram's terrorist activities, Nigeria's security situation is unsettling and turbulent. Nigeria, a former African superpower, has collapsed due to decade-long terrorism by The Boko Haram sect. In its quest to defeat Boko Haram, Nigeria has developed counter-terrorism strategies. The study examined Operation Safe Corridor (OSC), prisoner exchanges, kinetic and soft approaches, recalibration of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), and the National Counter-terrorism strategy (NACTEST 2014 and NACTEST 2016). This study shows that Nigerian counter-terrorism strategies cannot defeat Boko Haram terrorism for various reasons. Despite being intended to guide Nigeria's fight against terrorism, the National Counter-terrorism Strategy appears to differ from counter-terrorism operations. Several obstacles have hampered the MNJTF's efficacy and effectiveness. Logistics, funding, and member-state commitment have hindered it. Thus, terrorism's longevity. This study's Nigerian Boko Haram terrorism recommendations are based

on government counter-terrorism strategies' inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

Recommendations

Following the findings of this research, the following recommendations are put forward:

(i) The Nigerian security forces should be given enough, sophisticated, technologically advanced, and superior weapons to defeat the Boko Haram terrorist group, whose armories are more lethal and far-reaching than those of the military and fighting men.

(ii) The government should hire respected clerics and other security experts to deradicalize radicalized youth using regulated teachings from the glorious holy Quran and hadiths. This will help them see beyond the perverted Quran they were given.

(iii) The government should ensure that a significant percentage of idle youth engage in enterprising activities like education, skill acquisition, jobs, and attention-involving activities. Thus, misguided individuals cannot use them for terrorism. Most Boko Haram fighters were selected, radicalized, and conscripted.

(iv) The government should focus more on quick impact projects (QIP) in the Northeastern region to win the hearts and minds of the general population and restore the trust and confidence between the Nigerian security forces and the populace.

(v) The farmlands and fishing areas should immediately demine to enable people to return to their livelihoods. Furthermore, adequate security should be put in place in the farm areas to assure the returnees of their safety.

(vi) Federal government and civil society organizations should start infrastructural repairs. Schools, hospitals, and police stations should be given top priority.

(vii) Efforts should be made for post-traumatic stress disorder counselling of ex-combatants and victims of Boko Haram terrorism while also encouraging forgiveness from the affected and the infected.

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