SECURITY AND COMMAND AUTHORITY: A CASE STUDY OF ENUGU STATE

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Abstract

Research Problem: *Nigerian governors face public demands for security while the Constitution places police command at the federal level. How they exercise influence under this constraint remains insufficiently explained.*
Methods/Theory: *This qualitative study examines Enugu State under Governor Peter Mbah through documentary analysis, limited process tracing and a structured comparison with Lagos, Amotekun and Ebubeagu. It draws on Mann's concept of infrastructural power and published Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) compilations.*
Results: *Enugu has used financing, technology, logistics, auxiliary institutions and coordination to support federal agencies. A state-funded control centre illustrates this arrangement. Reported incidents in selected later quarters were below the first quarter of 2023, but the available series is incomplete and fatalities did not consistently fall.*
Conclusion: *Governors can shape the resources and organisation of security without commanding federal officers. The contribution of these measures to changes in violence remains uncertain, while surveillance creates its own accountability problems.*
Key Contribution to Knowledge: *The article distinguishes command authority from governance capacity and proposes "lent infrastructural power" for infrastructure supplied by a state government but used by federally commanded agencies.*
Recommendation: *Enugu should publish enforceable surveillance rules, clarify authorisation and oversight, disclose security-fund accounts and permit independent evaluation of response and justice outcomes.*

1. Introduction

Research on insecurity in Nigeria has emphasised both the police institution and the federal structure. Hills (2008) argues that police reform can produce institutional changes whose effects remain limited without broader social and political change. Advocates of state police argue that a centrally commanded force cannot respond adequately to local threats (Eboh, 2026). These approaches explain the organisation and

location of police authority, but give less attention to the practical influence of governors who supply resources without acquiring independent operational command.

Citizens expect governors to respond to insecurity and routinely call them the chief security officers of their states. Yet section 214 of the Constitution establishes the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and prohibits a separate police force for the Federation or any part of it. Section 215(2) places command within the federal police hierarchy, while section 215(4) permits a governor to give lawful directions to the state Commissioner of Police on public safety and public order, subject to possible referral to federal authority (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, ss. 214–215). Governors therefore have a limited constitutional role, alongside practical influence through funding, surveillance infrastructure and auxiliary institutions. The question is how these different forms of influence operate and what risks they create.

Existing studies only partly address this. Nigerian research on plural and hybrid security has examined vigilantism and community protection (Pratten, 2008; Smith, 2004). Agboga (2021) shows how Lagos worked around arguments over police decentralisation through practical support for federal policing. His study explains an important case, but does not provide a set of observable measures for comparing the capacity that other governors can build. The debate on state police, renewed in September 2026 by reports of a constitutional amendment proceeding to state assemblies (Eboh, 2026), therefore leaves a prior question unresolved: what can governors already do, and on what evidence should their actions be judged?

The gap is both conceptual and empirical. Command authority is visible in constitutional rules, while a governor's influence through budgets, facilities, equipment, local institutions and coordination is less clearly specified. A security investment can increase the capacity of federal personnel without changing who gives them orders. It can also increase the state's control over information about citizens. The existing debate gives too little attention to this combination of capacity and discretion.

This article examines that problem through Enugu State under Governor Peter Mbah. It distinguishes command authority from governance capacity, identifies five observable ways in which states can support security operations and asks what the available documents establish about their effects. The case is useful because substantial investments are described by the state and because investigative reporting offers a second account of how the surveillance centre operates (Enugu State Government, 2026; Mac-Leva, 2026).

The primary research question is: how can Nigerian state governors exercise meaningful influence over security when constitutional responsibility for police command remains largely federal? A second question concerns the limits of that influence in Enugu. The specific objectives are:

(1) to identify the security levers available to Nigerian state governors within the 1999 Constitution;

(2) to examine how the Enugu State Government combined these levers between 2023 and 2026, and what each lever does;

(3) to assess what conflict-event data show about security in Enugu, and how far improvements can be linked to state action;

(4) to compare the Enugu approach with the Lagos State Security Trust Fund (LSSTF), Amotekun and Ebubeagu.

2. Literature Review

Four bodies of work bear on this question: the constitutional location of police authority, the state police debate, plural security

provision and the governance of security technology. They address different parts of the problem, but seldom examine the point at which state-owned resources are used by federally commanded officers.

2.1 Federalism and the constitutional location of police authority

Police and other government security services established by law appear on the Exclusive Legislative List, which places them within the competence of the National Assembly alone (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Section 215 sets out the chain of command, under which the President may give lawful directions to the Inspector-General of Police (IGP). Section 215(4) allows a governor, or a commissioner he authorises, to give the state Commissioner of Police lawful directions on public safety and public order. But the Commissioner may ask, before acting, that the matter be referred to the President or an authorised federal minister. The governor's power of direction is therefore conditional.

Hills (2007) examines relations between presidents and senior police officers in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe. She finds that executive command can coexist with weak public accountability. These are different constitutional settings from Nigeria, where an elected governor is also held politically responsible for local insecurity. Hills's account helps explain the concentration of command, but offers little guidance on the influence of a subnational authority that funds operations without commanding the police.

2.2 The state police debate

The case for state police rests on responsiveness. Supporters argue that decisions made closer to communities could improve responses to local threats (Eboh, 2026). Ostrom and Whitaker (1973) found that residents of small, independently policed communities near Indianapolis rated their police more favourably than residents served by the larger city force. Their study concerns residents' assessments in an American setting; it does not establish that creating state police would reduce violence in Nigeria. Critics, meanwhile, warn that governors could use their own police against political opponents (Warner, 2026).

Both sides concentrate on the transfer of command. Agboga (2021) provides an important exception by examining how Lagos supported policing without waiting for constitutional reform. His findings show a route available under existing arrangements, while recognising Lagos's distinctive economic and political conditions. Two questions follow. Which parts of that experience can be observed in a different state, and does providing equipment also confer control over its use? Enugu's institutional arrangements allow these questions to be examined, although one case cannot settle the national debate.

2.3 Hybrid security provision

A broader literature studies security provided by actors other than the national police. Bayley and Shearing (1996) describe the spread of policing across public, private and community providers. Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) use the idea of security assemblages to show how public and private, local and global actors combine. Bagayoko et al. (2016) apply the idea of hybrid security governance to Africa, where state and non-state institutions interact rather than standing apart.

Nigerian research in this tradition has concentrated on vigilantism. Smith (2004) shows how support for the Bakassi Boys coexisted with abuse. Pratten (2008) places vigilantism within a wider politics of protection, in which a claim to provide security can itself become a source of authority.

These studies explain the dangers of armed groups operating alongside the police. They pay less attention to governors who finance vehicles, communications and information systems used by federal agencies. Such investments leave formal command with the federation, but they may alter the organisation of daily policing.

Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) show the value of examining relationships among actors whose authority and resources come from different places. Bagayoko et al. (2016) similarly question accounts that divide security neatly into state and non-state provision. In Nigeria the division also runs within the state: the federal government commands the NPF, while state governments may supply facilities and operational support. Treating the state as one actor conceals the resulting dependence and makes accountability difficult to locate.

2.4 Technology, surveillance and security governance

Closed-circuit television (CCTV) raises a different problem. Morgan and Dowling (2019) examine the contribution of camera footage to police investigations. Piza et al. (2019), studying crime prevention, find effects that vary by setting and are more consistent where cameras form part of a wider intervention. Evidence about crimes prevented should not be confused with evidence about crimes solved. Neither finding establishes that cameras in Enugu have produced a measurable reduction in violence. What matters for this study is whether cameras and associated equipment change the process by which an incident is detected and passed to officers able to respond.

The same equipment poses a question of power. Lyon (2007) treats surveillance as systematic attention to personal information for purposes that include protection and control. A state may improve the flow of information to police officers while acquiring its own capacity to observe people and vehicles. In a federation, legal command over arrest and operational control of a data system may sit in different institutions. Research on surveillance helps explain that risk, but does not by itself establish who controls Enugu's centre or what safeguards exist there.

The literature explains resistance to institutional police reform (Hills, 2008), overlapping security institutions (Bagayoko et al., 2016) and how one state has worked around decentralisation (Agboga, 2021). It has not supplied a sufficiently precise account of the resources a governor can place at the disposal of federal security agencies, the conditions of their use or the accountability questions that follow.

3. Methodology

The study is a qualitative single-case analysis of Enugu, with a structured, focused comparison of Lagos, Amotekun and Ebubeagu. Gerring (2004) describes a case study as intensive examination of one unit to understand a wider class of cases. Enugu was chosen for three features visible in the material: state investment across the five proposed security levers between 2023 and 2026; a public endorsement of the command centre by federal police leadership; and investigative reporting that questions the legal and operational oversight of the same centre (Enugu State Government, 2026; Mac-Leva, 2026). These features make the case informative. They do not make it representative of all Nigerian states.

The study uses purposively selected documents. Document analysis allows official records and published accounts to be examined as qualitative evidence while recognising their limitations (Bowen, 2009). Sources include legislation, official statements, Enugu State Security Trust Fund (ESSTF) releases, research and journalism, including the International Centre for Investigative

Reporting (ICIR). Conflict-event figures come from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), introduced by Raleigh et al. (2010), through compilations by the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) and the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). Historical context also draws on the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). The institutional recommendation considers the statutory functions of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). Documents were retained for their bearing on legal command, state interventions, institutional operation, reported abuses or recorded events. No exhaustive database search or fixed initial search yield is claimed. The policy discussion incorporates material published up to 15 October 2026; event figures retain the periods and versions of the named compilations.

The analysis proceeds in four steps. First, constitutional provisions were separated from accounts of institutional practice. Secondly, passages describing state action were grouped under five codes: financing, infrastructure and technology, logistics, legislation for auxiliary bodies, and convening or coordination. Thirdly, statements were classified as official assertion, reported documentary detail, journalistic observation, conflict-event count or the authors' inference. Fourthly, events were placed in sequence and assessed against the research objectives. This distinguishes announced expenditure from completed assets and an observed dispatch from average response time. Table 1 identifies the source categories used in the analysis.

The study uses process tracing to examine a proposed sequence of institutional actions (Beach & Pedersen, 2019; Collier, 2011). The available documents establish consistency with parts of the proposed mechanism, but do not provide sufficiently diagnostic evidence to exclude rival explanations. They trace the development of the Fund, the centre, equipment and cooperation with federal agencies. Without operational records and a credible counterfactual, they cannot attribute a change in statewide violence to these interventions. The 2019 Forest Guard initiative, the 2020 Trust Fund law and wider regional changes remain preceding or rival influences.

The focused comparison applies the same questions to the four arrangements: what resource or organisation did the state create; who retained legal command over personnel; what independent evidence is available about operation or abuse; and what rules of accountability apply? These questions help identify differences between supporting federal agencies and establishing a state or regional security outfit. They do not allow a ranking of crime reduction, because the material lacks comparable outcome measures for the cases.

Table 1
Documentary source categories and their analytical uses

Source type	Examples	No.
Legal texts	Constitution; data-protection and IPCR Acts	3
Enugu institutional accounts	State and ESSTF releases; university commissioning speech	5
ICIR analyses	Mac-Leva (2026); Ogunyale (2023)	2
ACCORD compilations	Six quarterly or annual ACLED reports	6
Asylum reports	EASO (2021); EUAA (2025)	2
Comparator and policy accounts	LSSTF; Ogun Amotekun; two State House releases	4
Research literature	Mann; Soifer; Agboga; Hills; Piza; methods studies	20
Other reports and media	News accounts; Amnesty International report	12

Note. Counts represent 54 unique references, each assigned once by its primary analytical role. They include theoretical and methodological works and do not represent 54 independent empirical observations. Several publications draw on the same underlying ACLED data.

The study uses public sources and involved no interviews or contact with human participants. Allegations are attributed to their sources. Its principal limitations are the absence of fieldwork; lack of direct access to original Enugu budgets, the complete Forest Guard law and rules governing coercive powers and complaints; lack of independently measured response times, arrests and prosecutions; and differences between published ACLED compilations. The centre's governing instruments and operational authorisations were also unavailable. These limits constrain causal and legal conclusions, while informing the recommendations for further evidence.

4. Theoretical Approach

4.1 Command authority and infrastructural power

This study adopts and extends Mann's distinction between two kinds of state power. Mann (1984) separates despotic power, the range of actions that state elites can take without negotiation with society, from infrastructural power, the capacity of the state to penetrate society and implement its decisions throughout its territory. Soifer (2008) shows that infrastructural power can be studied as variation across a state's territory, an approach that suits places where state reach is uneven.

This distinction helps explain the Nigerian case. Command of the police remains at federal level, and governors do not possess the ordinary powers of a police commissioner. Yet vehicles, communications, information, local knowledge and coordination affect what officers can do. A state government may supply them. This article uses two terms. Command authority means the legal capacity to direct, deploy and discipline personnel who exercise coercion. Governance capacity means the practical ability to shape their working conditions and the support available for operations.

4.2 Lent infrastructural power

Mann's (1984) account concerns the state's capacity to carry decisions into society. Soifer

(2008) shows how that reach may vary across territory. The Enugu case adds a question about the level of government that builds the infrastructure and the institution that puts it to use. A subnational government can own or finance cameras, a control room and patrol vehicles while federal agencies continue to command the officers responding to an alert. The study calls this arrangement lent infrastructural power. The term refers to functional support given by one level of government to another. It does not imply a legal loan, a transfer of statutory powers or proof that the state can direct each operation.

Hooghe and Marks (2003) show why government authority should not be assumed to reside at a single level. This study contributes to Mann's theory by extending infrastructural power to an intergovernmental relationship in a federation: a subnational government can build infrastructure used by federal coercive agencies without acquiring independent command over their officers. The concept also identifies how surveillance infrastructure can acquire despotic potential through discretionary access to information without an increase in police command. This is a theoretical risk requiring investigation, rather than a finding that Enugu's centre has been used for political repression.

The arrangement also shows why greater capacity does not necessarily mean better government. Mann distinguishes infrastructural from despotic power. A government may increase the reach of institutions and at the same time gain opportunities for discretionary monitoring. Enugu's surveillance centre raises this possibility because the equipment is described as state-funded while federal personnel take part in tracking and arrests (Mac-Leva, 2026). Lyon (2007) helps explain why information held for public safety requires rules about access and use.

4.3 Observable levers and expectations

Five levers make the argument observable. Financing appears in budget proposals, payments and fund records, which must be distinguished from one another. Infrastructure and technology consist of facilities and equipment used for detection, verification, dispatch and evidential work. Logistics covers vehicles, equipment and joint operational arrangements. Legislation concerns the powers and limits of auxiliary structures such as forest guards. Convening power counts where the state helps settle a dispute or enables coordination with a recorded result. Each lever addresses the first two research objectives; the security-event evidence and comparison address the remaining objectives.

Three expectations follow. A governor can supply operational capacity without receiving police command. The capacity can matter to security operations only if authorised agencies use it and if the equipment works. Finally, the distribution of infrastructure and command creates a separate question about who authorises access, monitors use and accepts responsibility for mistakes.

5. Results and Presentation of Data

The case evidence is presented in the order required to answer the research objectives. The setting and five levers address objectives one and two. The conflict-event figures address objective three. The comparative assessment is taken up in Section 6 for objective four.

5.1 Enugu State and the security baseline

Enugu has 17 local government areas (LGAs) and a projected 2022 population of about 4.69 million (EUAA, 2025). The European Asylum Support Office (EASO, 2021) reports 18 ACLED security incidents and five deaths in 2020. From 2021 the wider South-East experienced separatist violence,

attacks on police stations, enforcement of sit-at-home orders, kidnapping and conflicts involving farming and pastoral communities. An ICIR analysis drawing on ACLED recorded 57 conflict-related deaths in Enugu in 2021 and 156 in 2022 (Ogunyale, 2023). In February 2022 gunmen killed three policemen at a checkpoint in Enugu South LGA (Igwe, 2022).

Some of the measures examined here predate the Mbah administration. In August 2019, Governor Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi's government announced plans to recruit and equip 1,700 forest guards (Oluchi, 2019; Vanguard, 2019). The Enugu State Security Trust Fund Law dates to 2020, according to the later investigative account (Mac-Leva, 2026). Governor Mbah assumed office on 29 May 2023, after the high reported death toll of 2022. ACCORD's first-quarter 2023 report recorded 32 events and 27 fatalities under the previous administration (ACCORD, 2023a). A senior security adviser cited in the EUAA report also described the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) as less combative than in earlier years (EUAA, 2025). These antecedents are necessary when judging what changed after May 2023.

5.2 Financing

The Mbah administration inaugurated the ESSTF Board of Trustees on 13 February 2024 (ESSTF, 2024). The Fund rests on a law enacted in 2020 and reported as amended in 2023; it seeks contributions from government, local councils, companies, religious bodies and individuals (Mac-Leva, 2026). At the inauguration, Mbah projected state security spending of ₦20 billion for 2024 and appealed for private-sector support (ESSTF, 2024). A February 2025 release subsequently reported fundraising of ₦3 billion (ESSTF, 2025). These announcements do not independently establish the sums eventually received or spent.

According to the ICIR's reading of Enugu's 2024 budget, security-technology line items amounted to ₦4.657 billion. They included ₦940 million for surveillance and monitoring, ₦430 million for fingerprint databases and ballistics and DNA laboratories, and ₦40 million for 20 drones (Mac-Leva, 2026). The ICIR also reported a ₦10 billion provision in the 2025 budget for cameras, drones and facial recognition. The original budget documents were not available to this study, and an appropriation does not show that the full sum was released, committed to procurement or spent.

5.3 Infrastructure and technology

The centre of the model is a Command and Control Centre in Government House. The Enugu State Government reports that President Bola Tinubu inaugurated it on 4 January 2025 (Enugu State Government, 2026). The ICIR's investigative account describes more than a thousand cameras linked to the centre by fibre-optic cable, with capacity to follow vehicles and record faces. It also reports drones used to observe places beyond the fixed camera network (Mac-Leva, 2026).

In the ICIR account, a reporter watched an operator examine an alert while another directed a patrol by radio (Mac-Leva, 2026). This establishes a detection-to-dispatch link during the visit, without measuring its reliability across the state. The Centre for DNA Forensics and Criminal Investigations at Godfrey Okoye University was inaugurated on 24 June 2026 through a partnership involving the university and Enugu State Government (Anieke, 2026). The commissioning record establishes its intended forensic role, but does not document routine criminal casework or successful prosecutions.

The EUAA report identifies Isi-Uzo, Enugu North, Nsukka, Uzo-Uwani and Udi among the LGAs with high recorded incident numbers between January 2024 and August

2025 (EUAA, 2025). Several contain extensive rural areas beyond the urban camera network. This distribution helps explain the emphasis on drones and local patrol structures. It does not establish that violence moved out of Enugu city because cameras were installed. That would require comparable location data before and after installation.

5.4 Logistical support to federal agencies

The government describes the Distress Response Squad (DRS) as a police response arrangement supplied with more than 150 vehicles fitted with cameras and connected to the centre. A government account published on 3 July 2026 reports responses within two to four minutes during a test attended by the IGP on the visit associated with the forensic-centre inauguration (Enugu State Government, 2026). This was a reported demonstration, not an independently measured average. The IGP's endorsement establishes public support from police leadership without providing an estimate of routine effectiveness.

The Secretary to the State Government told the ICIR that the centre links the police, Air Force and Army through a common hub. The state Commissioner of Police said that police and Department of State Services (DSS) personnel carry out tracking, while the police do not control the centre itself (Mac-Leva, 2026). The distinction is central. Officers can remain in federal chains of command while using facilities supplied by Enugu State. The published account leaves unanswered who has final authority to access the records, retain them or approve tracking.

5.5 Legislation and auxiliary structures

The Forest Guard programme began under the previous government in 2019, when recruitment and vetting arrangements were reported (Nkem, 2019; Oluchi, 2019). In June 2025, the Mbah administration announced the appointment of a retired army colonel as chairman of the Forest Guard Board, subject to legislative confirmation, and a retired senior police officer as Commander (Enugu State Government, 2025). These appointments show changes in leadership. Whether they improved training, discipline or operational performance cannot be assessed from the appointments alone.

A contemporaneous report records the signing of the Enugu State Forest Guard Act, 2020 after its passage by the House of Assembly (Alike, 2020). This establishes a reported legislative antecedent to the Mbah administration. The complete enabling law and rules governing arrest, detention, firearms and public complaints were not obtained for this study. Specific coercive powers cannot therefore be assigned to the Guard on the basis of the signing report. Their scope requires examination of the statutory text and applicable constitutional limits.

5.6 Convening and coordination

Official accounts of meetings with traditional rulers often record attendance without showing what changed. A more concrete example appears in the EUAA report. In 2025, while a dispute involving communities in Udi and Enugu South was associated with a death, the Enugu State Boundary Committee reportedly resolved a long-standing dispute involving communities in Nkanu East and Nkanu West (EUAA, 2025). The committee's intervention provides an instance of administrative coordination relevant to conflict management. The source does not show whether the settlement endured or whether it reduced subsequent violence.

5.7 Oversight of the surveillance centre

The state's Attorney-General told the ICIR that a surveillance law was being drafted and that the centre operated with reference to the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023 (Mac-Leva,

2026). Section 37 of the Constitution protects privacy, subject to the lawful restrictions permitted by section 45. The Act does not provide a blanket exemption for security processing: section 3(2) exempts qualifying processing from specified Part V obligations while retaining sections 24, 25, 32 and 40, subject to constitutional rights and limitations (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, ss. 37, 45; Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023, s. 3). These provisions do not themselves establish who may authorise an individual tracking operation. The published record leaves access, retention, disclosure and institutional responsibilities unresolved. The ICIR reported no independent oversight arrangement or accessible complaints procedure at the time of its investigation (Mac-Leva, 2026). The missing governing instruments prevent a conclusive assessment of particular operations.

5.8 Recorded security events and attribution

Table 2 reproduces the available Enugu figures from the cited compilations. ACCORD rows include all ACLED event types, including protests and strategic developments; they are not counts of violent crime alone. The annual 2023 row overlaps the selected 2023 quarters.

Table 2

Recorded ACLED events and fatalities in Enugu State

Period	Event categories	Events	Fatalities	Cited compilation
Jan–Mar 2023	All ACLED types	32	27	ACCORD (2023a)
Apr–Jun 2023	All ACLED types	23	10	ACCORD (2023b)
Oct–Dec 2023	All ACLED types	20	9	ACCORD (2024a)
Full year 2023	All ACLED types	115	82	ACCORD (2024b)
Jan–Mar 2025	All ACLED types	21	13	ACCORD (2025a)
Apr–Jun 2025	All ACLED types	27	33	ACCORD (2025b)

Note. The annual row overlaps the quarterly rows and must not be summed with them. Each value belongs to the named publication, whose extraction date and event coverage govern its interpretation. Fatality estimates are subject to reporting limitations.

6. Discussion of Findings

6.1 What the Enugu case establishes

The first proposition receives substantial support. A governor can finance surveillance, vehicles, facilities and coordination without gaining command over police or military personnel. The Enugu case shows the arrangement in a concrete form: the state supplies the control room and associated resources, while officers from federally commanded agencies use them (Enugu State Government, 2026; Mac-Leva, 2026). This is an institutional change worth explaining in its own right. Whether it has lowered statewide violence is a different question, and the published evidence does not answer it with comparable operational and outcome measures.

6.2 Comparison with Lagos, Amotekun and Ebubeagu

The Lagos State Security Trust Fund (LSSTF) is the closest comparator (LSSTF, n.d.). Adekoya (2020) reports that its 2019 audited statement recorded ₦4.2 billion in income, including ₦1.43 billion from private cash donations. Enugu's Trust Fund follows the same broad practice of supporting federal agencies. The materials do not provide comparable audited receipts, expenditures and outcomes for Enugu, so they cannot establish either fiscal efficiency or the successful replication of the Lagos model.

Amotekun shows a different use of state authority. South-West governors launched the regional security arrangement in January 2020. The Attorney-General of the Federation challenged its legality before the Federal Government and governors agreed on a legal route involving state legislation and alignment with community policing (Erezi, 2020; State House, 2020; TheCable, 2020). Ogun subsequently established an Amotekun Corps under state law (Ogun State Security Network Agency and Amotekun Corps, n.d.). Its significance here is the decision to organise separate personnel and specify their powers under state law. That changes the questions of supervision and discipline compared with providing equipment to an existing federal agency.

Ebubeagu demonstrates why those questions cannot be treated as formalities. South-East governors announced the outfit in 2021. Amnesty International subsequently made allegations of unlawful killings involving personnel associated with Ebubeagu in the region (Amnesty International, 2025). Uthman (2022) reports disputed accounts of killings in Imo, including a later claim of responsibility by the DSS. The conflicting accounts should remain distinct. They establish the need to investigate allegations and lines of command, not that every allegation has been judicially proved.

The same comparative questions bring out the difference. Lagos and Enugu primarily illustrate the provision of money, equipment and facilities to agencies under federal command.

6.3 Theoretical implications and limits

Mann's account of infrastructural power helps explain the Enugu investments because they alter the state's practical ability to collect information and support the implementation of decisions (Mann, 1984). The Enugu arrangement also qualifies a simple picture of state reach. The federal agency possesses command, but its practical reach may be improved by facilities provided by the state. Lent infrastructural power names this division of contribution. Soifer (2008) draws attention to territorial variation in reach; the Enugu evidence directs attention to a further distinction between the authority that provides an asset and the authority that employs it.

Agboga (2021) demonstrates that Lagos acted on policing without constitutional decentralisation. The Enugu evidence is consistent with this argument and supplies observable categories for examining a second state. It does not show that the two arrangements produce identical results. Hills (2008) describes the resistance that frustrates institutional police reform. Investment in facilities may avoid some of those obstacles, but reliance on federal cooperation remains. Piza et al. (2019) explain why cameras are most meaningful as part of a wider intervention. Their evidence should not be carried over as a numerical estimate of crime prevented in Enugu.

The third proposition concerns control of information. An arrangement that respects the federal police chain of command can still concentrate surveillance data in a state-

controlled facility. Mac-Leva's (2026) account raises questions about access, authorisation and redress. Lyon (2007) gives a reason to examine these powers, since surveillance can serve different ends. Here the contribution to Mann's theory is a warning about how infrastructural capacity may enable discretionary action below the national level. The available evidence identifies an oversight gap; it does not demonstrate that the centre has in fact been used against political opponents.

The state police debate consequently involves more than a choice between central and state command. Reuters reported the transmission of a constitutional alteration bill to state assemblies in September 2026 (Eboh, 2026). An official statement on 15 October described the state approval process as ongoing and the National Policing Bill as still being prepared for transmission (Onanuga, 2026). These procedural developments do not establish that state police services had acquired operational authority. Whatever the eventual constitutional arrangement, surveillance access, public expenditure and complaints require enforceable rules.

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

7.1 Conclusion

The question guiding this article was how governors influence security when command of the NPF remains federal. Enugu shows five ways in which a state can act: financing, infrastructure and technology, logistics, auxiliary institutions and coordination. The investments are especially visible in a state-funded control centre and equipment used by federal officers. The material establishes an increase in the institutional means available for security work, although the extent of any improvement in crime prevention or prosecution cannot yet be measured from the available evidence.

The article contributes an account of governance capacity distinct from command authority. It also proposes lent infrastructural power as a description of facilities and resources supplied at state level and put to use within federal chains of command. The idea helps locate practical influence in a federation and makes its limits easier to see.

7.2 Recommendations

1. The Enugu State Ministry of Justice should publish a draft law for the Command and Control Centre and connected camera network within six months and submit it to the House of Assembly. It should define lawful purposes, authorisation, retention periods, access controls, audit trails and a complaints procedure. The proposed timetable concerns drafting and submission; enactment remains a legislative decision.

2. The State House of Assembly should establish an independent oversight board through that law, drawing on retired judicial officers, the legislature, civil society and the media. The board should examine access logs, investigate complaints and publish an annual report, with lawful protection for ongoing investigations. Its membership, appointment process and powers should be specified in the legislation.

3. Within twelve months, the state government, Enugu Police Command and DSS should agree and publish a protocol identifying who approves tracking requests, controls the centre, stores and retrieves records, authorises disclosure and accepts responsibility for subsequent arrests. The protocol should preserve each agency's legal command responsibilities.

4. The ESSTF Board of Trustees and relevant state financial authorities should publish audited accounts showing pledges, actual receipts, budget releases, contracts and expenditure as separate categories.

Procurement for surveillance equipment should be disclosed in a form consistent with applicable law and legitimate security requirements.

5. The Enugu State Government and House of Assembly should make the Forest Guard's enabling law and operational rules publicly accessible. These should state the guards' legal powers, recruitment and training requirements, limits on firearms or detention, the procedure for transferring suspects to the police and the mechanism for complaints.

6. The state should commission an independent university or research organisation to evaluate the arrangements annually using dispatch times, equipment availability, arrests, prosecution outcomes, complaints and comparable event data. The evaluator should be independent of programme delivery, use consistent periods and definitions, and account for changes in federal or regional operations.

7. The Enugu State Government should agree a memorandum of understanding with the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) for conflict research, prevention and management training, and reciprocal sharing of early warning information. This would draw on the Institute's statutory research, mediation, policy-advice and training functions (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution [Establishment] Act, 2007, s. 8). The agreement should name responsible officers, protect informants and personal data, and set a timetable for research reports and training. This collaboration should complement the independent annual evaluation.

7.3 Future research

A subsequent study could compare several states using the five levers. Access to command-centre logs and prosecutorial records would allow the operational chain to be tested more closely. Research should also examine legal safeguards for the growing use of surveillance technology, especially when the government that funds the system is not the institution that formally commands the officers using it.

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