STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE RICE ECONOMY OF TARABA STATE: A CRITIQUE OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA'S ANCHOR BORROWERS PROGRAMME (ABP), 2015-2023

John Tenong Francis
Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Humanities,
Federal University Wukari, Nigeria.
francisj@fuwukari.edu.ng, +2348136333818
ORCID ID:0000-0002-3570-9867

Tanko Angyetsokwa Adihikon
Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Humanities,
Federal University Wukari, Nigeria.
tankoadihikon@gmail.com, +2348036372697, +2348024235962
ORCID ID:0009-0004-1033-6488

James S. Onyebuchi
Department of History and Diplomatic Studies, Faculty of Humanities,
Federal University Wukari, Nigeria.
Jamessunday@fuwukari.edu.ng, +2347036268978
ORCID ID: 0000-0002-0389-9774

DOI: https://doi.org/10.64633/wissj.v10i7.20

Keywords

Rice Economy, Nigeria, Qualitative, Anchor Borrowers Programme, State Actors, Non-State Actors

Abstract

Research Problem:
Despite the huge potentials of the Nigerian agriculture, the country can still hardly produce what it can eat. This situation is due to negligence the sector has suffered over the years, occasioned by the oil boom of the early 1970s. Hence, financing the sector had been a major challenge. Some of the quagmire bedeviling the sector includes finance, trade/commerce, mechanization, and best agronomic practices amongst others. One of the recent interventions/programmes aimed at moving the sector out of the woes is the Central Bank of Nigeria's Anchor Borrows Programme (ABP) launched in 2015. But most of the studies does not actually look at these interventions, as it relates to the peasant farmers and other actors.
Method/Theory:
This study therefore, examined the role of ABP with a particular reference to the rice economy of Taraba State. The historical methodology was engaged for in-depth analysis of the subject based on qualitative approach. It is anchored by David Harvey's theory of Accumulation by Dispossession.
Results:
Results emanating from the findings indicate that ABP was highjack by both state and non-state actors who have access to power. The peasants'

farmers who are the main target of the programme ended up being short changed. Thus, this buttresses the argument as presented by the accumulation by dispossession theory which was demonstrated by the state and non-state actors over the peasant farmers.

Conclusion:

Interventions in the agricultural sector particularly the ABP, is being highjacked by the bugioursie in collusion with state actors. Even though, the programme for the first time, brought every stakeholder onboard, yet the peasants' farmers who are the main target were being short change.

Key Contribution to Knowledge:

The study represents an extension of the body of knowledge on interventions in the agricultural sub-sector by interrogating the existing nature and approach of the interventions focusing on the main labour force-peasants.

Recommendation:

The study therefore suggests that the government has to demonstrate "strong will" towards reforms and midwife the process to ensure substantial results otherwise the vicious cycle of poverty, food insecurity will continue unabated.

Introduction

Despite being active in productive activities over the years, the Nigerian farmers are still face with poverty and hunger problems. The peasant farmers constitute major percent of the labour force in the country, Rasaq Oyeleke (2021, 53-65). The irony is that Nigeria possesses extensive arable land totaling 91.1 million hectares, along with 1.3 million hectares of water bodies, 3.14 million hectares of irrigated land, and a coastline exceeding 800 km, all suitable for various facets of the agro-allied sector, including crops, agro-forestry, fisheries, poultry, and livestock. Nigeria accounts for 58.0 percent of the world hunger crisis. Approximately 14 million individuals experience hunger nightly in the country. Currently, over 32 million hectares of arable land are under cultivation, with farm sizes varying from 0.5 to 4 hectares distributed throughout the country. This incident reveals the food security issue confronting the country.

The sector's essential contribution to addressing the intertwined issues of poverty, hunger, and food security is undeniable, as a significant portion of the people relies on agriculture for their livelihood, employing over 70 percent of the populace, Abubakar Khalid (2021,3). But the sector faces numerous obstacles, including inadequate access to inputs, low productivity per hectare, limited financial resources, minimal mechanisation, substandard agricultural practices and extension services, post-harvest losses, and inefficient markets Yusuf P. Yila (2021, 69). Several interventions have been launched in the country by different regimes. Some of these interventions included the Agricultural Credit Scheme, the Commercial Agricultural Credit Scheme, and the Agricultural Credit Support Scheme, among others Sani A Oshishepo (2023, 3-9). But most times the farmers are being short change in terms of input and surplus distribution which often brings about shortfalls in production, and poverty among the peasant farmers.

It is important to note that there is a gab with regard to the nature of these interventions in the agricultural sector. What is clear is that almost every regime in the country comes up with different interventions. What is not clear however, is who are involved, how they are involved, and what impact they have made

particularly on the lives of the peasant farmers who constitute about 90 percent of the labour force, and ultimately food production output. It is in this regards that this study examined the Anchor Borrowers Programme (ABP), launched by the Federal Government through the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2015, which involved State and non-State actors unlike previous interventions. Some of the questions which guided the study included: what is the nature of the intervention, who are the actors, and how has it impacted on the peasant farmers and the entire output in the rice economy of Taraba State. Objectives of the study includes:

i. To examine the nature of the Anchor Borrowers Programme

ii. To Identify the actors, involve in the programme and discuss their roles in the rice economy of Taraba State

iii. And to evaluate the impact of the programme on the peasant farmers and the rice economy in the State

Thus, the study is broken into three key sections so as to achieve the above objectives, namely the nature of the ABP, State and Non-State Actors in the programme, and the Impact of the Programme in Taraba State Nigeria. Hence, it significantly contributed to the subject of intervention so long as food production is concern, especially in connection to the peasant farmers in areas such as poverty, and food security.

2. Literature Review

The condition of Nigeria's rice economy is concerning. It has garnered the attention of many governments in Nigeria with the objective of eradicating hunger, alleviating poverty, and ensuring food security. This has influenced a governmental policy shift to promote investment in large-scale agriculture. However, Johnson, M., H. Takeshima, and K. Gyimah-Brempong (2013), contends that while fulfilling the demand for superior quality premium rice is achievable through large-scale farmers and millers, it does not ensure job creation or equitable wealth distribution among rural farmers, who often allocate a significant portion of their revenue to food expenses. The study serves as a solid foundation regarding the characteristics of large-scale farms, which do not enhance the circumstances of farmers but rather exacerbate their impoverishment – an argument which the current study sustains. This Study however, examines the nature of government intervention with a focus on the peasants' farmers and overall food output.

Looking at the policy framework on local rice production in Nigeria, Misari, S.M., A.A. Idowu, and M.M. Ukwungwu (1996), the rice importation prohibition from 1986 to 1995 resulted in an increase in rice output from 0.94 million tons in 1986 to 2.54 million tons in 1994. Despite the prohibition on importation during these eras, there was a rise in illicit importation via the nation's vulnerable borders. As a result, the nation's rice imports expenditures remained constant. The report serves as proof that different government policies on rice have been ineffective, a situation partly attributed to the government's handling of these policies and programs. This has perpetuated the suffering of rural farmers over the years. While the study above looked at bother issues to boost local production, the current study examines the application of these policies on various stages of food production including the farmers.

Nigeria had a longstanding history of rice farming and consumption. However, domestic demand for rice far surpasses the country's present production levels. Various policies to encourage cultivation and consumption of locally produced rice have been largely ineffective. Daramola, B, (2005), asserted that government policies alone cannot ensure the requisite amount and quality of local rice

production; rather, a comprehensive understanding of demand drivers and precise timing of policies are essential. This should also encompass large-scale rice producing farms, which are crucial for informing government policies and must be integrated into the policymaking process. The contradiction in the policy framework has adversely affected domestic rice output and the welfare of rural farmers. The study revealed that a competitive rice sub-sector necessitates a mix of characteristics. The research constitutes a rigorous assessment of the Nigerian government's rice policy. The study indicated that large-scale rice farmers should play a pivotal role in the rice reform strategy. However, over the years, the participation of large-scale farmers in the industry has not resulted in any significant changes. This elucidated the nature and process of implementation. This study analysed rice policy to find issues and propose solutions.

Fabien Tondel, Ibrahima Hathie and Cecilia D'Alessandro (2020), authored a study on the impact of trade policies on the advancement of rice value chains in West Africa, a crucial sector for agricultural and food policies in the region. The research indicated that the governments of West African countries were compelled by the 2008 food price crisis to implement measures designed to swiftly enhance agricultural production, including access to inputs, substantial irrigation investments, and, in some cases, agricultural pricing mechanisms. The research contended that these methods significantly enhanced productivity in Ghana, Senegal, and Nigeria. It emphasised, however, that the growth in production was not universal, since the policies did not yield any substantial improvement, particularly in the development of more integrated value chains. The analysis indicates that the surge in production in Nigeria is primarily attributed to the stringent regulation of rice imports from mid-2019. The control methods encompassed the closure of land borders and elevated import taxes on rice amongst others.

The report specifically addresses West Africa, with particular emphasis on Nigeria, among other countries. It is a credible authority on rice production in West Africa, as it includes the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA). Nevertheless, despite the study indicating that Nigeria's rice output markedly increased since the global food crises of 2008, it did not result in any substantial shift, as the rise aligns with consumption demand, leaving the gap intact. The current study looked at key stakeholders in terms of these policies implementation.

Similar to previous studies, Ya Gao, Tianhui Zhao, Xiuli Xu, and Agbo Patience Ndidiamaka (2023), examined agricultural protectionist policies in Nigeria revealed that the influx of imported rice, which possesses a comparative advantage in quality, disadvantages native rice brands. This compels the Nigerian government to implement various protectionist laws and programs since the 1970s, which have not entirely reversed the trend of imported rice. However, it has caused significant hardship for the rural poor, who cannot afford the soaring prices of rice due to the restriction on imports, while domestic supply has failed to meet local demand. The study concluded that alignment of policies towards protectionism or liberalization does not immediately result in greater rice output, as both approaches have been tested in Nigeria. Of course the current study agrees with the fact that both liberal and protectionist policies are not solely the problem, but deep-rooted issues relating to the stakeholders involve, and the will by government.

It clear as crystal based on the evidences supplied above that most of the policies which either align towards the liberal or protectionist, did not yield any serious result. This is because there is a methodological gab, relating to the stakeholders involve. The policies either

discuss agricultural issues without taking cognisance of major stakeholders. Most times key farmers – the peasant farmers are left out. There has to be a data base of farmer, upon which to fall back to at any time policies are design and implemented. It is on this basis that the study examined the Anchor Borrowers Programme (ABP), which brought on board major stakeholders, but how this is applied became a problem

Nature of the Anchor Borrowers Programme

The Nigeria's agricultural sector has suffered disadvantage in favour of the oil sector Ademola Bakare (2021, 4-6). Though Nigeria is blessed with arable land suitable for the cultivation of all kinds of staple, and equally have the capacity to produce what it can eat; yet, the country spends huge resources on food import thereby draining the country's reserves. However, when revenue from oil began to dwindle, it sends shocking waves to the government. The country was now left with no option but to look inward, and make allowances for other sectors especially the agricultural sector.

It is in recognition of the strategic importance of the agricultural sector to poverty reduction, food supplies, and ensuring food security that the Federal Government of Nigeria through the Central Bank now launched an intervention, to curtail pitfalls in the sector and enhanced development. In line with its major vision of development finance, the CBN identified the potentials of the agricultural sector as a major contributor to the GDP, which underscores the strength of the sector for national growth and development Yila (2021, 67-68). However, the reluctance of financial institutions to lend or loan money to the sector at less than 5.0 percent interest rate, necessitated the CBN to deepen the flow of credit to the agricultural sector (Yila, 2021).

It is important to note that agricultural activities in the country are dominated by peasant small holder farmers who constitute about 90 percent of farm holding in the country Adamgbe, E. T, Belonwu, M. C., Ochu, E. R and I. I Okafor (2020, 57). They are largely characterised by traditional methods of production mainly for subsistence. Hence, the need for an intervention that would provide the farmers with access to inputs, boost productivity and create an enabling environment for modern agricultural practices, and mechanisation. Thus, the Anchor Borrowers Programme (ABP) was launched in 2015 to boost the production and processing of key agricultural commodities, by creating the linkages between anchor companies and smallholder farmers Clement Buari (2023, 62). Rice is among the top agricultural commodities captured by the ABP. Nigeria is one of Africa's largest producers of rice grains but also the continent's largest importer of milled rice (CBN Development Finance, 2024). The production status of rice in Nigeria at the moment stands at 7.0 million metric tons, against a consumption demand of 10.5 million metric tons with a deficit of 2.5 million metric tons. Covering the existing gap in rice production in the country is one of the objectives of the ABP.

The Federal government through the Central Bank of Nigeria, approved the funding of the Anchor Borrowers' Programme (ABP) from the N220 billion Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund (MSMEDF), at a single-digit interest rate of 9 per cent CBN Financial Stability Report (2016, 36). Thus, small-holder farmers engaged in the production of identified agricultural commodities such as Rice, Maize, Wheat, Cotton, Cassava, Potatoes, Yam, Ginger, Soya bean, Sesame seed, Tomato and Livestock, which the country has comparative advantage, were provided with loans CBN UPDATE (2020, 41-42). In 2017, the funding was extended to include Agricultural Commodity

Associations including Rice Farmers Association of Nigeria (RIFAN) amongst others, so as to leverage on the existing organised structures of the agricultural associations for registration of it members. In this regard, each farmer was provided with a grant of ₦N210, 000, to cultivate a hectare of rice CBN Intervention for Agric Sector (2021). The loan process passed through a number of stages involving both state and non-state actors.

Therefore, obtaining the loan involved two major windows: Private Sector-led window, and Public Sector-led Window CBN Anchor Borrowers Programme (2017, 11). In each window, there was a Project Management Team (PMT), established in each state to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the programme. The loan tenor was based on the gestation period of the targeted commodity. For instance, early rice cultivation begins in the end of May, and harvested by November through January of the following year. So, if May is accepted as beginning of the rice farming season and terminates in January, repayment is expected to be done by January. The repayment was done mainly by produce and in some instances by cash. These payments were usually done through the Commodity Association, prime anchors, or through the state anchor – states ministry of agriculture represented the state anchor - so that the leadership of each anchor was responsible for full repayment of facility granted to its members. Thus, eligibility for the loan include: being a member of a farmer group; having a bank account with the PFI; provide a valid Bank Verification Number (BVN); not a defaulting borrower; having a validated farmland; providing 10 per cent minimum equity contribution; and not in multiple associations in one cropping season CBN Anchor Borrowers Programme (2017, 11).

State Actors

Both Federal and State governments had roles in the Anchor Borrowers Programme (ABP). Those involved at the federal level included: Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Research Institutes, Federal Ministry of Water Resources, Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment, and Development Partners among others Muhammad A. Liman (2021,83-84). The Central Bank of Nigeria oversees the Programme, while the Project Management Team (PMT), comprising of key stakeholders setup at the state level took charge of operational management of the ABP. Central Bank of Nigeria Coordinated the entire Programme; provided funds to Participatory Financial Institutions(PFIs) for on-lending to approved projects under the programme; monitored the programme implementation; reviewed the provisions of the guideline from time to time; and carried out other responsibilities as it deems fit Anchor Borrowers Programme (2017, 22).

The state ministry of agriculture represented Taraba State government at the state level. The state government among other things presented an Irrevocable Standing Payment Order (ISPO), covering the entire value of facility including accrued interest; identified and organized smallholder farmers according to commodity; provided contiguous and validated farmland; provided aggregation services; provided off-taker(s) for the produce; and identified Participatory Financial Institutions PFI(s) to partner with CBN ABP (2017). Therefore, major role of the state government included provision of logistic support for the success of the Programme including training of the farmers and extension services; Co-Chaired the Project Management Team (PMT) for state-owned projects; Identified targeted agricultural commodities of comparative advantage; and carried out other responsibilities prescribed by the CBN from

time to time Anchor Borrowers Programme (2017, 22). Thus, the state government under the public led window of the ABP guaranteed the farmers who participated under the Programme and was responsible for loan repayment as well as off-take of produce.

Taraba State Ministry of Agriculture coordinated the state led window of the ABP. So, the ministry identified, organised and guaranteed some rice farmers in the state. At the early stage of the programme, the ministry captured eleven thousand, nine hundred and forty-two 11,942 farmers for both rice and soya beans, out of that number seven thousand nine hundred and sixty-one (7,961) were for rice production Abel Manus (2019). After rigorous screening, only about three hundred (300) farmers were authenticated. The major reason for the reduction in this number was mainly because the people initially thought the fund available for the programme were free money. So, they saw it as a way of getting or cutting from the national cake. But when they realised it was meant to be repaid, they left. This was why out of over seven thousand rice farmers captured, only about three hundred were authenticated. Since the inception of ABP, the state only anchored 2016/2017 wet season, and a total sum of sixty eight million, seven hundred and fourty eight thousand, eight hundred and fourty naira 68,748,840 was released.

Non-State Actors

The Non state actors involved in the APB can be understood based on the following categorisation: Prime and Commodity Association models – also known as anchors (Liman, 83). The Prime anchors or model were the agro-processors/off-takers who were primarily involved in anchoring the farmers or deploying full mechanisation for production (Anchor Borrowers Programme, 11). They served as linkages between the farmers and the market. Once the produce was cultivated by farmers, the prime anchors now off-take the products for processing, packaging, and marketing based on modern practices. In this way, the farmers were relief of the burden of either storage or processing, and linked to the market, which were intended to reduce poverty, hunger, and importation. Therefore, prime anchors are duly registered off-takers, who possessed the capacity to off-take produce from the farmers, identified a Participatory Financial Institution who was willing to partner with it under the Programme, and provided validated farmland. The role of prime anchors included to: identify and organise farmers into groups/co-operatives; train the identified farmers on best agricultural practices, farm management and group dynamics; coordinate and monitor farmers throughout the production season; monitor harvest and facilitate full evacuation of produce; establish produce collection centers; buy-up produce from farmers at agreed price; and pay into farmers' loan accounts for the produce delivered within five days ((ABP, 19-20).

The Prime Anchors involved in Taraba State included Muphido Mills, Alganzaki Mills Ltd., Aluma Lau but now known as Africana, Food First, and Food Security amongst others Madu, M M (2024). The commodity associations' model/anchors are those who represented the various commodities covered under the ABP CBN (2021). Some of these commodities as mentioned earlier included: Cereals (rice, maize, wheat, etc.) Cotton, Roots and tubers (cassava, potatoes, yam, ginger, etc.), Sugarcane, Tree crops (oil palm, cocoa, rubber, etc.), Legumes (soya beans, sesame seeds, cowpea, etc.), Tomato, Livestock (fish, poultry, ruminants, etc.). In the commodity association model, farmers are the primary obligors Madu (2024). Hence, the various commodity associations identified and organised farmers at the state level to participate in the Programme. The essence of including

commodity associations in the programme was for collateral purposes to support the loan for its members. Hence, commodity associations are duly registered by relevant government agencies; have a corporate governance structure in line with the Programmer's objectives at all levels; champion a single commodity; and was to ensure repayment of the facility (ABP, 11-19). Commodity associations like prime anchors, identified and organised farmers into groups; coordinated and monitored farmers throughout production season; monitored harvest and facilitated full evacuation of produce; also establish produce collection centers; facilitated the purchase of produce from farmers at agreed price by the millers and aggregators; pay into farmers' loan account for the produce delivered within 5 days; and ensure full repayment of the loan (ABP, 19).

The Rice Farmers Association of Nigeria (RIFAN) Taraba State branch anchored farmers across different farming seasons in the State under ABP (Khalid Anas, 2024). Beginning with the 2018 farming season, RIFAN registered/anchored over nine thousand (9000) farmers, but only about three thousand six hundred and thirty nine that participated. In the 2019 dry season, twelve thousand (12000) farmers were captured, but only about five thousand nine hundred and ninety eight (5998) that finally got involved, while eleven thousand were captured for the wet season. During 2020, over sixty seven thousand (67,000) farmers were captured at the dry season, and thirty seven thousand (37000) returned, over one hundred thousand (100,000) farmers were registered for the wet season, but it was over fourty eight thousand that took part. At the 2021 dry and wet seasons, over nine thousand farmers were captured (K Anas,2024). Other rice farmers associations in Taraba State also participated. Each of these associations was made up of fifteen members (15) Baba Jen Adebayo (2024). Some of them included: Pastors Wife, Nassara Multi Purpose, Nassara Women Multi-Purpose Naduke, Tsohon Ciki, 10 Village United, Zanuwa Multi-purpose, Alhassan Multi-purpose, Barde Youth, Dambo Multi-purpose, Green Land I &II, Karofi, Lamurde, Shukura, Advance Farners, Door to door, Mbur, and Ka bar ganin ka tara

Each farmer was to be provided with inputs and implements under the programme. In every hectare of land, each farmer was entitled to the following: 1 water pump, six bags of fertilizer, 2 litre of liquid fertilizer, 3 litre of herbicide, 25kg of seed, 1 knapsack sprayer, and two hundred and ten thousand naira (210) loan (K Anas, 2024). However, in some instances is either the items were not provided, or they came late, thereby setting back the hands of clock. Between 2018 and 2020 cropping seasons about ₦5.9 Billion was already disbursed to 27,187 RIFAN members in Taraba State both dry and rain fed farming seasons through Unity Bank Plc (A Khalid, 2023).

Other than prime and commodity associations, there were also Participatory Financial Institutions (PFIs) (M Liman, 84). The PFIs included Deposit Money Banks, Development Finance Institutions, and Microfinance Banks. The place of the PFIs in the ABP is central on both the anchors and farmers. This was made possible by the validation of the list of farmers submitted for participation in the ABP, and conducting relevant Credit Risk Management System (CRMS), and Know Your Customer (KYC) checks on the farmers and anchors. Other importance of the PFIs was the registration of loan beneficiaries on the National Collateral Registry (NCR); opening of individual loan accounts for validated farmers for the loan facility; apply for the release of funds after fulfilling conditions precedent to drawdown; credit farmer's account with the approved amount within 10 working days of receipt and unutilised funds returned to the CBN

immediately; ensure due diligence on loan administration, monitoring and recovery; liaise with services providers to confirm actual inputs received by the farmers to determine their loan obligation; and repatriate principal and interest to the CBN at the end of the loan tenor among others (ABP, 20-21).

Some of the PFIs in Taraba State included: Unity Bank, Key Stone Bank, Bank of Agriculture, United Bank for Africa, and Nigerian Risk's Based System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) PLC among others. These financial institutions opened bank account for farmers connected with the various anchors involving both off-takers and commodity associations. It was part of the requirements that each farmer has a bank account number for easy coordination and accountability. The launching of the Bank Verification Number (BVN) by the CBN, in collaboration with the Bankers committee on 14th February, 2014 as a unique identifier, and strengthening of the know-your-customer requirements across the banking industry, became premeditated CBN BPS/DSD/GEN/CIR/01/001 (2016). Thus, when CBN in Nov. 2015 flagged off the Anchor Borrowers Programme, aimed at giving loans to farmers at a single digit interest rate, it made the BVN registration of farmers as one of the requirements. Hence, the various commercial banks as mentioned earlier, registered farmers who were linked with the various anchors. For example, Unity Bank registered and opened account numbers for farmers under RIFAN (Rice Farmers Association of Nigeria), Key Stone Bank accounted for farmers under Alganzaki Mills Ltd, and Bank of Agriculture hold account for farmers connected with Muphido Mills and the Taraba State Ministry of Agriculture that led the public window of the ABP (BPS/DSD/GEN/CIR/01/001, 2016) Materials and Methods

The Study was carried out in Taraba State North East Nigeria. It interrogated the CBN intervention specifically the Anchor Borrowers Programme (ABP), beginning from 2015 when the programme was launched, to 2023 when it was already eight years in existence, which also allows for examination of changes overtime. This is why the historical methodology which allows for critical and systematic examination of the study in time perspective or changes over time based on fact and evidences available was used - it is embedded in the qualitative approach. Both primary and secondary sources of data were use. The primary sources included oral interviews with farmers which helped the researcher getting in touch with the main actors in the field, and having firsthand information that were not recorded or yet to be recorded. Other primary sources utilized were official publications such as reports, reviews, and bulletins, particularly those related to the Anchor Borrowers Programme (ABP), implemented by the Federal Government through the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). These records provided substantial information on the programme's establishment, objectives, and structure, encompassing both state and non-state actors, while relevant data were analysed to assess its impact.

Key stakeholders consulted included financial institutions within the state, the State Ministries of Agriculture and Land and Survey, the Taraba State branch of the Rice Farmers Association of Nigeria (RIFAN), and various prime anchors who acted as off-takers or processors and formed critical components of the ABP. Specific insights regarding the rice economy and ABP interventions in Taraba State significantly enriched this study. Additionally, minutes and reports from relevant government agencies were reviewed. The Secondary sources comprised both published and unpublished materials, including manuscripts, journal articles, and dissertation, which together provided a

comprehensive overview of existing state of knowledge on the subject. Both the primary and secondary sources were used complementarily to strengthen the study and potential bias were minimised in the process. The literature review was organised around themes which revealed a methodological gab. It was analysed based on major component of the study such as the nature of the intervention, the state and non-state actors involved, and it impact on the rice economy of the state. Relevant data repository visited include: www.cbn.gov.ng, Thrive Agric Jul 17, (2020) https://naerls.gov.ng,https://www.nigerianstat.ng, www.reliefweb.resources-ifpid, search key words included Nigeria, Anchor Borrowers Programme, Rice Production, Rice import, and agricultural intervention amongst others.

Impact of Anchor Borrowers Programme on the Rice Economy of Taraba State

This is examined by the number of farmers captured or anchored, amount disbursed, amount repaid and total productivity. Our specific focus is rice commodity as included in the ABP, with competitive advantage. Thus, as part of the implementation process, CBN had disbursed the sum of N12.09 billion to 49,658 farmers in sixteen states including Taraba CBN Financial Stability Report (December 2016, 36). Other states involved included: Adamawa, Anambra, Benue, Cross River, Enugu, Edo, Kwara, Kaduna, Kogi, Oyo, Kano, Kebbi, Nasarawa, Sokoto, Niger, and Zamfara States. This disbursement was from July to December, 2016.

In the 2017 review period, ₦36.37 billion was disbursed to 155,732 farmers, compared with ₦12.57 billion to 27 farmers in the first half of 2017 CBN Economic Report For The First Half (2018, 43-44). The programme which was meant to cover the thirty six states of the federation including the FCT, disbursement was however made through thirteen (13) states government anchors and one hundred and twenty-seven (127) private-led anchors. This raises an eye brow when the country have thirty six states but only thirteen states government anchors were involved in the implementation. Under the public sector led window, all the state government through its ministry of agriculture was supposed to serve as off-takers. What this probably means is that some states are left out in the periods under review. The commodities financed included: rice, maize, wheat, soya beans, cotton, cassava, groundnut, fish and poultry. It was said to have added 2.0 million metric tons to domestic rice supply. Out of the ₦36.37 billion that was disbursed, only N1.57 billion was repaid. This shows the level of fraud in the programme involving various stakeholders. Though at the moment the EFCC is going after defrauders/defaulters but little success has been recorded because government officials are also involved.


The sum of ₦82.59 billion was disbursed to 490,481 farmers in the second half of 2018, while in the first half of 2019; ₦26.67 billion was disbursed to 237,967 smallholder farmers CBN Financial Stability Report June (2019, 40). The figures compared showed a significant decrease representing 67.7 per cent in the amount and 51.5 per cent in the number of farmers. Again 19 Participating Financial Institutions (PFIs) were involved, together with 255 private led anchors, and 14 state government anchors. It is understood when only 19 PFIs were involved because some of the PFIs have branches in all states of the federation. The same also applied to the private led anchors since we only have 36 states, and there were already 255 private led anchors – it was comparatively justified CBN Financial Stability Report June (2019, 40). But in this review period we only have 14 state government anchors out of the 36 states. The agricultural activities financed included cassava, cotton, maize, rice, soya bean, tomato, wheat, poultry, cattle rearing and fish farming. The amount repaid during the review period

was ₦2.89 billion, reflecting a decrease of 14.8 per cent, from ₦3.39 billion recorded in the second half of 2018 CBN Financial Stability Report June (2019, 41).

During 2020 wet season, the CBN-RIFAN partnership, has financed 221,450 rice farmers for the cultivation of 221,450 hectares in 32 States and ₦179.35 billion was disbursed to 1,008,457 farmers in total CBN (2021). In the 2021 season, the sum of ₦215.01 billion was disbursed in the second half of 2021 to 384,617 smallholder farmers for the production of major agricultural commodities. A total of ₦15.47 billion was repaid in the 2020 season, and ₦53.09 billion was repaid in the 2021 season, representing an increase of 243.18 per cent CBN Financial Stability Report June (2021, 42-43). The sum of ₦4.17 billion was released for an integrated rice milling project in the first half of 2021. At the end of December 2021, 4,489,786 farmers were anchored, who cultivated 5,300,411 hectares across 21 commodities through 23 Participating Financial Institutions in the 36 States of the Federation and FCT Godwin I Emefiele (2022). However, records of productions in those periods were not documented – this makes the whole process suspicious.

About ₦103.72 billion was disbursed to 245,361 smallholder farmers in the second half of 2022, while in the first half of 2023, the sum of ₦37.90 billion was disbursed to 123,856 smallholder farmers across the country to cultivate rice, maize, and wheat CBN Financial Stability Report – June (2023,41). This reflected a decrease of 63.46 per cent in the amount disbursed. However, repayments increased by 20.16 per cent to ₦82.15 billion. Furthermore, a total of 175,282 hectares of land were cultivated in the first half of 2023, compared with 529,478 hectares in the second half of 2022, indicating a decrease of 66.89 per cent. At the end of February 2023, CBN's ABP was suggested to have supported about 4.57 million smallholder farmers, who cultivated over 6.02 million hectares of 21 commodities across the country Pearl Ogbonna (2023,2). The Bank so far had released the total sum of ₦1.079 trillion, as of February 28, 2023, and ₦0.960 trillion was due for repayment. Out of that amount, 52.39% of the loans have been repaid. It was further suggested that the ABP had increased National output of focal commodities, with maize and rice peaking at 12.2 and 9.0 million metric tons in 2021 and 2022 respectively. See Plate 1, below for the entire disbursement, farmers involved, and hectares covered by each season since 2015-2021.

Plate 1, Pie chat displaying seasonal disbursements, number of farmers and number of Hectares financed under ABP, 2015 - 2021,



Source: Yusuf P. Yila "Rationale, Experience and Challenges" Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review Volume 59/4 December (2021).75

The Pie chat above indicates seasonal disbursements based on number of farmers and hectares of land involved. This represent the total summation in Nigeria at large from the time the programme was launched in Novenber, 2015. However, the highest coverage of land in 2021, was 1.629.850 hectares in a country with over 91. Million hectares of land. Also, the total coverage of farmers in Nigeria under the programme as displayed was 1, 261.007 which was the highest, given a population of over 70 percent farmers. This only suggest the inadequacies of the programme in terms of coverage of key areas such as farmers, farm land, and funding. Also, evidences from Taraba state only show numbers of farmers covered, but details such as hectares of land covered and amount involved either do not exist or they are being covered for some reasons that looks suspicious.

The ABP was meant to achieve a number of objectives contained in the 2015 guidelines reviewed in 2017. One of such objectives was to link farmers with off-takers, and the market. In other words, farmers were expected to be linked with processors including the private and public processors. Under the private window there were prime anchors who were the various private off-takers or processors; and there were also commodities associations of various agricultural products including rice, who equally served as off-takers. This arrangement was to help farmers with post-harvest management such as storage, processing, and marketing which constituted a problem. Indeed, the ABP was able to link farmers with a number of processors across the

country. In 2017 for example, one hundred and twenty-seven (127) processors were already linked to the farmers under the private-led windows CBN Economic Report for The First Half (2018, 43-44), and in 2018 it was reported that 255 private led processors were linked with farmers CBN Financial Stability Report (2021, 42-43), however only 13 state government anchors were involved 2017, and 14 in 2018 respectively. It was meant to have involved all the thirty six (36) states ministries of agriculture including the FCT. The fact that only sixteen (16) ministries of agriculture were involved, out of thirty six (36) states suggested that it was not all states of the federation that were actually involved in the programme.

In Taraba State, a number of off-takers were involved namely: Alganzaki, Muphido, Africana, Food First, and RIFAN among others. These off-takers anchored farmers in the state across different farming season under the ABP. In most cases the linkage between farmers and the prime anchors as mentioned above, were usually smooth because the farmers were under them directly. So, the process beginning from harvesting, off-taking/processing and marketing went with little hitches. However, this was not the case with the public led window anchored by the State Ministry of Agriculture, and a few of the prime anchors. This is because some of the farmers as registered or captured were not actual farmers, but were only registered to be part of the fund made available for the programme which they saw as national cake. This behavior led to the major obstacle faced with repayment as would be seen later Anonymous (2024).

Increase financing to the agricultural sector and financial inclusion of farmers were part of the target by the ABP. Lack of sufficient funding has crippled the agricultural sector over the years. To compound this problem, commercial banks hardly give out loans to farmers, but even when they do, they do so at double digit interest rates making it difficult for the farmers. But the ABP introduced loans to farmers at a single digit interest rate of 9 percent CBN Financial Stability Report (2016, 36). One of the requirements to access this loan was the Bank Verification Number (BVN), which could only be obtained after opening a bank account. Thus, a number of farmers opened a bank account and were issued with the BVN introduced in 2014, through the various participatory financial institutions (PFIs). This way, the agricultural sector received huge funding, and the pool of financial inclusion was expanded. In February 2023, CBN claimed to have disbursed about ₦1.079 trillion, and ₦0.960 trillion was due for repayment (Ogbonna,2). Those figures are suspects, and the reason for the suspicion is because the same CBN made it clear that the ABP was to be financed from the 220 billion naira made available for the MSMEDF. In any case, problem was encountered with the repayment largely due to insincerity on the part of both the state and non- state actors involved in the programme. In some instances, most of the farmers captured in the programme by the various actors are fraud. A good number of the peasants captured were not actually involved in farming, but were brought in by the actors to benefit from the proceed thereof, and so repayment was eluded.

In Taraba State a good number of peasants' farmers were suggested to have been captured, under the various private and public sector windows. But these farmers in many instances happened to either be family members or close allies of heads of the various farmers associations, who were now captured either by RIFAN or some of the prime anchors. Some of the prime anchors were not even in existence before the introduction of ABP, but were established at the peak of the programme only to reap from the resources thereof. Such anchors were largely fraudulent, and now gone to extinction because the aim was not to participate in agricultural production, but to

have a share in what they regard as public fund. Consequently, there were massive failures in repayment because the resources were never deployed for the purpose which it was meant for, but were mismanaged or squandered. Examples of cases of failure in repayment were the one involving MUPHIDO Mills, and the Bank of Agriculture (BOA), Taraba State Branch. The arrangement involving MUPHIDO Mills, BOA as the PFI, and farmers were lacking clarity, which resulted in the failure in repayment (Madu, 2024). Another instance is the one involving the State Ministry of Agriculture where sixty eight million, seven hundred and fourty eight thousand, eight hundred and fourty naira (68.748.840) was released to about three hundred (300) farmers, only 7 seven million naira was repaid by 15 farmers out of 300 as at 31st May, 2020 Manus (2023). This kind of irregularities widely characterised the various farmers associations under RIFAN in the state. Politicians high jacked the process, and registered people who were actually not involve in farming. Findings from the fields show that plans were on ground to go after defaulters by relevant security agencies.

Reducing import was also a cardinal objective of the ABP. The governor of the CBN suggested that the ABP was able to boost production and reduced import CBN ABP (2018,17). But evidences on ground did not support such claim. From the quantity of rice production in terms of metric tons in Nigeria, nothing significantly changed. In 2017, the rice consumption requirement in Nigeria stood at 7.9 million metric tons, but production ranges between 3.5-4 million metric tons Kamai, Omoigui, Kamara, and Ekelemem (1). The current rice consumption requirement is 10.5 million metric tons, but production falls at 7 million metric tons CBN DFI (2018). Covering the existing gap in rice production in the country is one of the objectives of the ABP. Drawing from these figures as at 2017 the shortfall in production stood at 3 million metric tons. The same in 2023, the shortfall still ranges between the same figures. Though production actually increase from 3.5-4 million Metric tons, to about 7 million Metric tons, but despites this increase, there is still a gap of about 3 million Metric tons in consumption requirements given the figures above. What this means is that nothing significant had changed because consumption requirement rises at almost the same percent with production thereby maintaining the same margin in consumption demand. Conversely, importation during the study period decreased; the decreased was not because local production could satisfy local demand, but was due to ban on importation to boost local production during the same period Ademola Bakare (2021, 6). See Plate II below, showing the trend of Nigeria's rice importation to meet its domestic demand.

Plate. II. Pie chart showing rice import trends by Nigeria and Benin, 2013-2022



Another claim is the rice pyramid displayed at the 5th Anniversary of the ABP in Kebbi State in 2021 (CBN DFI, 2018). The CBN Governor claimed that the pyramid displayed was evidence that the ABP was already a success, suggesting that the rice pyramid was a sign that more success was going to be recorded. However, even though success was recorded, it was insignificant considering the food demand particularly the requirement in rice consumption which is yet to be met. Plate III below, shows the rice pyramid displayed at the fifth anniversary of the ABP in 2021.Plate III, Rice Pyramid Displayed at the Fifth Anniversary of the Anchor Borrowers Programme in 2021



Sources: Ademola Bakare "The Growing Rice Pyramids" CBN UPDATE Vol. 3 No. 5 May Benjaminsen, (2021). 4-6

The rice production requirement for each state is 1 million metric tons under the ABP (A Khalid, 9). Therefore; Taraba rice production capacity was expected to increase to 1 million metric tons in the course of the programme. However, production over the periods in question keep fluctuating between 300–400 metric tons, indicating a shortfall of about 600-700 hundred metric tons. Putting these figures together, and setting the records straight, means that Taraba State, and the country at large is yet to meet its food requirements, and therefore food importation is still key in meeting food demands in Nigeria against the claim made by the CBN governor that food importation has been significantly reduced (Khalid, 90).

Increase in income of the peasants' farmers and poverty reduction were major component of the objective. Peasant farmers face a lot of difficulty resulting in the wide spread poverty and hunger among them. So, the ABP was said to have been designed to address issues of poverty among them by increasing their income through enhanced capacity, and linkage to the market. However, these peasants' farmers were largely being short changed in the process. It was made possible in two ways: capturing of farmers, and the marketing of the products thereof. The process of capturing farmers in the ABP was flooded

with irregularities such that the main farmers were left out, and were replaced with friends and family members of politicians who siphoned funds for needs other than agricultural production (Anonymous, 2024). This was reflected in the list of farmers association that was linked with some of the off-takers. So, resources that were meant to reach out to actual peasants' farmers, ended up in the hands of imposters.

Secondly, the marketing arrangement involved also disappropriate farmers from the surplus generated. Part of the repayment arrangement of the ABP, was for the peasant farmers to pay using the produce harvested at the end of each cropping season which was determine by the circle of the commodity involved. Farmers were expected to bring bags of rice that is in commensurate with the loan obtained. So, the prices were determined based on the market value at the beginning of harvest (M M Mustapha, 2024). The market value at the beginning of harvest is usually low because at that time, a lot of products were already in the market, thereby bringing down the prices of goods. The off-takers, who at the beginning of harvest purchase them, and make repayment to the bank in fulfillment of the repayment process, benefits more than the peasants' farmers. The off-takers purchased rice-paddy, processed them, and make available to the market at a time when the price of the products had already risen, because the season had gone far away from harvest, bringing about scarcity, and rising in the prices of food commodities. These two processes; the faulty capturing of peasants' farmers, and commodity marketing ensured the continued impoverishment of the peasants' farmers.

The Nigerian agricultural sector has been largely described as peasant based, and so remained at the subsistence level. This condition is largely being associated with insufficient mechanisation, and shortfalls in the use of modern agricultural practices. The uses of modern implements and improved seeds have been a major challenge. As noted earlier, the level of mechanisation is still low (PricewaterhouseCoopers Limited,5). Nigeria's rice yield is one of the lowest globally at 2 tonne per hectare, relative to 4–7 tons per hectare in Asia. Take for example the tractors involved in Nigeria which is at 0.3 hp/ha, relative to 2.6hp/ha in India and 8 hp/ha in China. The number of the tractors involved is estimated at 22,000 thousand in Nigeria, relative to 1 million and 2.5 million in China and India respectively. The farmers were said to be provided with the following items in each hectare of land: 1 water pump, six bags of fertiliser, 2 litre of liquid fertiliser, 3 litre of herbicide, 25kg of seed, 1 knapsack sprayer, and two hundred and ten thousand naira (210) loan (K Anas, 2024). No mentions of tractors were made. Extension services that were supposed to have provided guide to these farmers was lacking, not because there were no staff at the State Ministry of Agriculture to carry out this assignment, but because they were either cut out, or not mobilised with funds to facilitate the process. Therefore, the target to assist peasant farmers transform from subsistence to commercial production became a mirage.

Generally, while the Federal Government of Nigeria through the CBN appears to have design the ABP to include both state and non-state actors – an aspect which singled it out from previous interventions - it implementation appears to be a charade. This was evident from the activities of both the state and non-state actors as discuss earlier. Thus, the implementation approach is faulty. Farmers were been short changed, and the funding misdirected thereby dispossessing the peasants' farmers and accumulation of the profit by bourgeoisies who hijacked the process as being anchored by Harvy's theory of accumulation by dispossession. Therefore, the state and the federal government at large

have to establish a data base of peasants' farmers who are the bedrock of Nigerian agriculture so that further interventions can be channeled appropriately. At the moment no such data exist. Conclusion

By and large, the intervention which was exceptionally design with major stakeholders onboard ended up disappointing due largely to the lack of "Strong Will" on the side of the government and surplus accumulation on the part of the various non state actors. The intervention launched on November, 2015 as Anchor Borrowers Programme, targeted at increase food production to reduce import, increase input supply to boost production volumes, mechanisation and increase financing to farmers thereby reducing hunger and poverty among the peasant farmers. State and non-state actors, who served as anchors, by capturing peasant farmers involved in rice production, ended up capturing friends, family, and close associates of politicians, and of some heads of the various farmers association under the programme. This resulted in the massive failure of repayments, because majority of the fund did not get to the right hands that would have used it for the purpose to which it was made for. Therefore, achieving major objectives of the programme such as increasing funding, reducing importation and solving hunger and poverty levels among the peasant farmers remains a mirage. The large-scale farmers or agricultural entrepreneurs appeared to have teamed up in the expropriation of the farmers. Profit extraction often drives these large-scale agricultural investors; and this can only be change by a "strong will" on the part of government who should midwife the process.

The empowerment of what B N. Ayittey describes as Atinga is very important. Atinga is the African peasants who are the main forces of the African agriculture. But in the quest to modernise the agrarian economy, leaders in the country embrace western capitalist model, which informed the choice of large-scale farm investors that created more problems than solutions. However, modernisation is not westernisation. The peasantry that is the major strength of African agriculture has to be strengthened to meet modern challenges. The major challenges of the peasants are access to inputs and best agronomic practices. So, production by rice farmers in the state suffers from lack of basic knowledge on best agronomic practices such as rice spacing, application of herbicides, soil types and seed varieties. These practices largely determine harvest. This gap can be covered by the provision of sufficient extension agents by the state government who can educate these farmers in terms of best agronomic practices, instead of wasting resources on tractors, which are often times allocated to politicians.

However, this is not to down play the importance of tractors and other infrastructures such as warehouses and road, which the government need to, take seriously. Weaknesses of the peasants in terms of access to basic infrastructure such as warehouses and road are being exploited by large-scale farmers through their agents known as middlemen. This chain can be broken, when the state government embark on road construction, and together with investors, construct warehouses that would provide for the need of these farmers at the time of harvest, so that they don't become vulnerable.

REFERENCES

I Primary Sources

Interview

S/N	Name	Age	Gender	Ocupation	Location	Date
1	Baba Jen Adebayo	61Years	M	SEC. ALganzaki Mills	Jalingo	8/05/2024
2	Khalid Anas, RIFAN	37Years	M	RIFAN official	Jalingo	06/05/2024
3	Mohammed Madu Mustapha,	55Years	M	CEO Muphido Mills	Jalingo	02/05/2024
4	Anonymous	61 Years	M	Farmer	Jalingo	02/05/2024
5	Khalid Abubakar	53 Years	M	BOA	Jalingo	02/05/2024

Official Publications

Adamgbe, E. T. Belonwu, M. C. Ochu, E. R. and Okafor I. I (2020) "Analysis of the Impact of Central Bank of Nigeria's Agricultural Intervention Funds on the Economy"Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review 58 n1 March: 57 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Agriculture for impact, Small and Growing (2014): Entrepreneurship in African Agriculture, A Montpellier Panel Report, June: 1-28 www.ag4impact.org

Akande, S.O and Akpokodje, G. (2003) "Rice Prices and Market Integration in Selected Areas in Nigeria" USAID, 1-20

Anchor Borrowers Programme (ABP) (2017), Development Finance Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, 13 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Bakare, Ademola (2021) "The Growing Rice Pyramids" CBN UPDATE, 3 n 5 May: 4-6 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Buari, Clement (2023) "Strategic Management in the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN): The Journey So Far." BULLION 47 n 4 October - Dec. 62 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

CBN Economic Report for the First Half Of (2018), 43-44 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

CBN Financial Stability Report – DECEMBER (2016), 36 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

CBN Financial Stability Report – December (2021), 42-43 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

CBN FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT – DECEMBER 2016, 36 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

CBN Financial Stability Report – JUNE (2019), 40 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

CBN Financial Stability Report – June (2023), 41www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Central Bank of Nigeria (2020) "A Broad Spectrum of Financial Instruments to Boost Agriculture, Manufacturing, Health, Oil and Gas"CBN UPDATE, 2 n 6 JUNE: 41-42 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Central Bank of Nigeria Development Finance > Agriculture > Anchor Borrowers' Programme www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Central Bank of Nigeria Development Finance > Agriculture > Anchor Borrowers' Programme www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Central Bank of Nigeria Development Finance > Agriculture > Commodity Development Initiative (CDI) > CDI: Rice www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Central Bank of Nigeria Featured Articles > ABP: Emefiele pledges more CBN intervention for Agric sector www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Central Bank of Nigeria Featured Articles > Emefiele Tasks Nigerians on Food Security www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Emefiele, Godwin I. (2022) "Unveiling of FCT Mega Rice Pyramids under the RIFAN-CBN Anchor Borrowers' Programme"Opening Remarks 18TH January, www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Keegan Kautzky (2020) "Agriculture and Entrepreneurship: Creating a way forward" YALINETWORK 1-4

Khalid, Abubakar (2021) "Evaluating the Effects of the Anchor Borrowers Programme (RIFAN MODEL) on the Development of Taraba State" (A Seminar Presented to the Depatment of Business Administration, Taraba State University, Jalingo,): 3

Liman, Muhammad A., (2021) "A Review of Federal Government Support Policies and Programmes for Food Security: A Farmers Perspective"Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review, 59 n 4 December; 83-84 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Manus, Abel (2019) "Report on the ABP Facility granted to Taraba State" MANR/AGRIC/AIDS/2078/163

Michael etal, (2013) " Assessing the Potential and Policy Alternatives and Growth in Nigeria" International Food Policy Research Institute,: 1-65 www.reliefweb.resources-ifpid 01301 accessed 13/06/2016

National Agricultural Extension and Research Liason Services et al., (2013) "Agricultural performance survey of 2013 wet season in Taraba state" Zaria: NAERLS Press, 1- 21.

National Bereau of Statistics, "National Survey on Exportable Agricultural Commodities in Nigeria" 2017-2019

National Bureau of Statistic, filling data gaps on agricultural statistics 1994/95 – 2005/6, Federal Republic of Nigeria, November, (2007).

National Bureau of Statistics, Rice Data Systems in Nigeria: Building a Rice Data System for Sub-Saharan Africa (2009). 1-72.

Ogbonna, Pearl (2023) "52.39% Anchor Borrowers' Programme Loans Repaid" CBN UPDATEVol. 5 No. 3 March. 2 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Olawale, Ismail (2015) "Communication and Communication along the Agricultural Value chains in Nigeria: A framework for Agricultural Information Production" NAERLS Quarterly, 4, Issue 2 2-14.

Oshishepo, Sani A (2023)" Impact of Central Bank of Nigeria Interventions to Agriculture: Evidence from Anchore Borrowers Programme" BULLION, 42 n.2; 3-9 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Oyeleke, Rasaq (2021) "An Overview of Federal Government Policies and Programmes for Food Security in Nigeria" (Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review 59 n 4 December; 53-65 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Ref: BPS/DSD/GEN/CIR/01/001 "Bank Registration Number under the CBN Anchor Borrowers Programme (ABP)" July 20, (2016) www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Smalley, Rebecca (2013) "Plantations, Contract Farming and Commercial Farming Areas Africa: A comparative Review" Future Agricultures, 4

Statistics: Rice Production in Nigeria. Thrive AgricJul 17, (2020)

Taraba Agricultural Development Programme, "Background Information on Rice Potentials in Taraba State", TADP Report, (2015): 2

Taraba State Agricultural Development Project, (2024) "Rice Production in Taraba State, 2022-2023"

Third National Fadama Development Project (2015)

Wright, Rahama (2020) "Finding Opportunities along the Agricultural Value Chain" YALINETWORK.: 1-4

Yila, Yusuf P. (2021) "Rationale, Experience and Challenges" (Central Bank of Nigeria Economic and Financial Review Volume 59/4 December: 69 www.cbn.gov.ng accessed 14th July, 2024

Articles

Johnson, M., H. Takeshima, and K. Gyimah-Brempong (2013) "Assessing the Potential and Policy Alternatives for Achieving Rice Competitiveness and Growth in Nigeria." IFPRI Discussion Paper 01301. Washington DC: The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

Daramola, B (2005) "Government Policies and Competitiveness of Nigerian Rice Economy." Paper presented at the Workshop on Rice Policy and Food Security in Sub Saharan Africa, organized by WARDA, in Cotonou.

Fabien Tondel, Ibrahima Hathie and Cecilia D'Alessandro (2020) "Outcomes of dialogue on rice sector development and trade policies in West Africa" Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale. (IPAR); 1-7

Ya Gao, Tianhui Zhao Xiuli Xu and Agbo Patience Ndidiamaka (2023) "Can Agricultural Protectionist Policies Help Achieve Food Security in Nigeria" Frontiers in Sustainable Food System, 31 March, 1-7